Full Judgment Text
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Reserved on: 6 November, 2019
th
Pronounced on: 27 November, 2019
+ CRL.M.C. 4551/2018 and Crl.M.A.31631/2018, 35622-
35623/2018, 5574/2019
SALMAN KHURSHID ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Aadil Singh Boparai, Ms.
Sakshi Kotiyal, Mr. Shivanshu Singh
& Mr. Prithvi Narula, Mr. Pramod
Kumar Dubey and Mr. Kushank
Sindhu, Advocates along with
petitioner in person.
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Meenakshi Chauhan, APP for
State with SI Rakesh Kumar, PS Amar
Colony
Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Vasudha Bajaj &
Mr. A.Gupta, Advocates for R-5.
+ CRL.M.C. 5069/2018 and Crl.M.A.33507/2018
S.R VAISH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Madhav Khurana, Advocate with
Mr. Nitin Saluja, Mr. Mudit Gupta,
Mr. Varun Singh, Mr. Aman Panwar,
Mr. Akshay, & Mr. Harsh G.
Advocates
versus
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 1 of 31
STATE & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Meenakshi Chauhan, APP for
State with SI Rakesh Kumar, PS Amar
Colony
Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Vasudha Bajaj, Mr.
Rupendra Pratap Singh, & Mr.
A.Gupta, Advocates for R-3 & R-4.
+ CRL.M.C. 175/2019 and Crl.M.A.5611/2019
STATE ..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Meenakshi Chauhan, APP for
State with SI Rakesh Kumar, PS Amar
Colony
versus
DR. SHARDA NAYAK ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Siddharth Luthra, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Mumtaz Bhalla,
Mr. Aadil Singh Boparai, Ms. Ritika
Ahuja & Ms. Vaishali, Advocates for
R-1.
Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Vasudha Bajaj,
Mr. Rupendra Pratap Singh &
Mr. A.Gupta, Advocates for R-2.
+ CRL.REV.P. 950/2018 and Crl.M.A.5601/2019
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY & ORS..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Vasudha Bajaj & Mr.
Rupendra Pratap Singh & Mr.
A.Gupta, Advocates
versus
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 2 of 31
STATE & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Meenakshi Chauhan, APP for
State with SI Rakesh Kumar, PS Amar
Colony
Mr. Siddharth Luthra, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Mumtaz Bhalla,
Mr. Aadil Bopanai, Ms. Ritika Ahuja
& Ms. Vaishali, Advocates for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
JUDGMENT
1. These petitions arise out of various orders relating to a criminal
case pending on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, South-East
District at Saket Courts Complex, New Delhi and have given rise to
certain common questions of fact and law and, therefore, on the
request of all parties, have been heard together and are being decided
through this common judgment. It may be mentioned here that the
criminal case relates to first information report (FIR) no.421/2015 of
police station Amar Colony, which was registered on 31.03.2015, on
the complaint of Rear Admiral M.M. Chopra, described as Vice-
Chairman of Delhi Public School Society (“DPS Society”) respecting
an incident that had statedly occurred from about 9.30 a.m. onwards
on 30.03.2015 in the office of DPS Society located at F Block, East of
Kailash, New Delhi-110 065.
2. On the allegations made in the complaint dated 30.03.2015
which formed the basis of the above-said FIR, the police initially took
it to be a case involving offence punishable under Section 448 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), reference at that
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 3 of 31
time having been made to the involvement of Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak
(respondent in Crl. MC 175/2019 and Crl. Rev. 950/2018), she
concededly being a life member of the said society. The initial
investigation into the said FIR resulted in a report dated 18.02.2016
(charge-sheet) under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 being submitted in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate on
01.03.2016 on the basis of which cognizance was taken for offence
under Section 448 IPC whereby the afore-said respondent (Sharda
Nayak) was summoned as an accused.
3. By order dated 01.03.2017, the request of investigating agency
for “ further investigation ” was allowed by the Metropolitan
Magistrate and this eventually led to a supplementary report
(supplementary charge-sheet) dated 15.12.2017 being submitted
whereby request was made for prosecution of certain others to be
initiated, they including petitioner Mr. Salman Khurshid (Crl. MC
4551/2018) and petitioner S.R. Vaish – also described as Satyajit
Vaish – (Crl. M.C. 5069/2018), the investigating agency requesting
for cognizance to be taken and trial to be held for offences under
Sections 419, 451, 474, 120B IPC.
4. Cognizance on the supplementary charge-sheet was taken by
the Metropolitan Magistrate, by order dated 08.01.2018, in terms of
which the two above-mentioned petitioners, and one Narender Kumar,
were summoned. But, the said order was set aside by this court by
order dated 09.05.2018 in Crl. MC 1589/2018 for the reason the main
charge-sheet had not been considered. The Metropolitan Magistrate
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 4 of 31
thereafter passed a fresh order, this time upon perusal of the main
charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet and by proceedings
recorded on 04.08.2018 took cognizance and issued process against
the said three persons summoning them as accused.
5. Meanwhile, the case against the person described as prime
accused (Dr. Sharda Nayak) had come up before the Metropolitan
Magistrate for consideration of charge. By order dated 09.06.2017,
charge was found made out for putting her on trial for offences
punishable under Sections 416, 451, 467, 471, 474 IPC. The order led
to formal charges being framed on 22.07.2017. The said orders
framing charge, and the charges framed in its wake, were assailed
before the court of Sessions, its revisional jurisdiction having been
invoked by petition (Crl. Rev. 493/2017) preferred by respondent Dr.
Sharda Nayak. The revision petition was allowed, by judgment dated
15.09.2018 of the Additional Sessions Judge, setting aside the order of
the Metropolitan Magistrate, the respondent Sharda Nayak having
consequently been discharged.
6. While the State and the complainant (and Society) have
challenged the revisional court’s order of discharge of respondent
Sharda Nayak by Crl. MC 175/2019 and Crl. Rev. 950/2018, the other
two accused viz. Mr. Salman Khurshid (petitioner in Crl. MC
Nos.4551/2018) and Mr. S.R. Vaish (petitioner in Crl. MC 5069/2018)
by their respective petitions have brought challenge to the summoning
order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate in their respect.
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 5 of 31
7. From the material submitted with the two charge-sheets which
have been presented pursuant to investigation into the subject FIR it
appears that there is substantive evidence available confirming the fact
that Mr. V.K. Shunglu (second petitioner in Crl.Rev.P.950/2018) was
the elected Chairman of DPS Society holding the said office during
the relevant period, Rear Admiral M.M. Chopra (third petitioner in
Crl.Rev.P. 950/2018 – also the first informant) being the Vice
Chairman. While the former (the then Chairman of DPS Society) was
away on some foreign visit, the latter (the Vice Chairman) was in
India and in absence of the former would assumably be looking after
the duties of the office held by him.
8. Though in the FIR, registered on the complaint of the Vice
Chairman of DPS society, allegations have been made about trespass
into the premises of its office at about 09:30 a.m. on 30.03.2015, the
investigation has brought out evidence showing the entry of the
aforementioned persons sent up for trial with a large group of others
around 08:30 a.m. and in this regard reference may be made to the
statements (under section 161 Cr.P.C.) of security guards named Tutu
Kumar, Tarni Prasad Singh, Sham Bihari, Abhey Singh, confirmation
of their word coming forth in similar statements (under section 161
Cr.P.C.) of certain others including Zeenat Khader (Joint Secretary),
Komal Yadav (driver), Madan Singh (driver) and Ashwani Kumar
(driver).
9. The prosecution relies upon, inter alia, the eye-witness account
of a large number of employees of DPS society including Mr. P.K.
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 6 of 31
Mahajan (Deputy Director), Jaender Singh Virdi (Additional
Secretary), Anupama Kumari (Programme Executive), Smt. Sunita
Mehandiratta (Executive Assistant), Sanjeev Ranjan Prasad
(Accountant), Ratheesan (Accountant), Mohd. Naushad (Accountant),
Mr. I.J. Noata (Consultant), Veer Singh Naryal (UDC), Manju Rawat
(UDC), Gireesh Chander (LDC), Dharam Singh (peon), and Sanju
Kumar ( safai karamchari ), each of whom by their respective
statements (under section 161 Cr.P.C.) seek to confirm that Dr. Sharda
Nayak, accompanied by Mr. Salman Khurshid, Mr. S.K. Vaish and
Mr. Narender Kumar (the three persons additionally sought to be
prosecuted), forming part of a large group, had entered into the office
of DPS Society and gone into the office room of the Chairman where
Dr. Sharda Nayak had proceeded to occupy the official chair of the
Chairman, declaring to the entire staff that she had taken over as the
Chairperson of DPS Society. These witnesses also seek to state that
the said four persons had called the entire staff to the conference room
where they were addressed by Dr. Sharda Nayak and Mr. Salman
Khurshid, each of whom had told those assembled that the existing
working Committee of the Society had been dissolved and Dr. Sharda
Nayak had been elected as the new Chairperson.
10. It may be mentioned here itself that, during the investigation
into the FIR, the police had called upon Dr. Sharda Nayak, by notices
under section 91 Cr.P.C. to furnish documentary proof, inter alia,
about such changes in the Society wherein she may have been elected
as the Chairperson, she having responded by a reply merely stating
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 7 of 31
that the required documents were in public domain and could be
inspected in the office of Registrar of Societies.
11. It was conceded at the hearing that there had been no such
elections (as was claimed) held preceding the above mentioned
incident of 30.03.2015 wherein Mr. V.K. Shunglu, the existing
Chairman of the DPS Society may have been replaced by Dr. Sharda
Nayak. In this context, in fact, the learned senior counsel appearing
on her behalf (also appearing for Mr. Salman Khurshid) submitted that
Dr. Sharda Nayak had been under some “illusion” about her claim to
be the Chairperson of DPS Society. From this, it can be safely
deduced that on the date of the incident i.e., 30.03.2015 Mr. V.K.
Shunglu continued to be the Chairman of the DPS Society and the
claim allegedly made at the time of the visit and stay of aforesaid
persons in the office of the Chairman of the said society, during his
absence, about Dr. Sharda Nayak having been elected as the new
Chairperson was not only false but baseless to their knowledge.
12. Be that as it may, it must also be noted here that the
investigation has brought out that during the relevant period, the DPS
Society comprised of nineteen life members. The said nineteen life
members included not only the then Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the society, but also three out of four persons against whom
allegations have been made, viz. Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak, Mr. Salman
Khurshid and Mr. Narender Kumar. It may also be noted here that it
was conceded at the hearing that the grand-father of the fourth accused
(S.R.Vaish) had been earlier a life member of the said society.
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 8 of 31
13. From the FIR, registered on the basis of complaint dated
31.03.2015 of the Vice Chairman of DPS Society, it is clear that he
(the first informant) was himself not present at the scene at the
relevant point of time. It appears that the information which he
conveyed to the police was based on the facts which he may have
gathered from the employees of the society who would have been
present, some of whom have been mentioned above. He reported
“illegal trespass” into the office of the society by “some personnel”,
the locks of the office of the Chairman having been broken, the
intruders appearing to be “very dangerous and harmful”, Dr. (Mrs.)
Sharda Nayak having “forcibly occupied” the office of the chairman
and having issued orders to the staff and certain others quarters, and
on such facts solicited intervention of the police for restraint against
continuation of such activities. As observed earlier, the police took it
to be a case of criminal trespass and registered the FIR for
investigation only into the offence under section 448 read with section
34 IPC. It is inherent in this that it was incumbent on the investigating
police to gather evidence by examining all relevant witnesses,
particularly such employees as were present on the premises and may
have seen or heard or otherwise witnessed the events in full or in part.
14. The main charge-sheet which was submitted on 01.03.2016
concluded with a request for prosecution to be initiated for the
aforesaid offence (under section 448 IPC) against Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda
Nayak. As has been brought out at the hearing by petitioner Mr.
Salman Khurshid himself, the first charge-sheet was based primarily
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 9 of 31
on the statements of Ms. Sunita Mehandiratta (Executive Assistant),
Ms. Anupama Kumari (Programme Executive), Mr. Veer Singh
Naryal (UDC), Mr. Gireesh Chander (LDC), Ms. Manju Rawat
(UDC), Mr. Dharam Singh (peon), Mr. Shyam Lal (peon), Mr. Malbe
Abbas (peon), and Mr. Sanju Kumar ( Safai Karamchari ). The said
charge-sheet ( i.e. , the main one) referred to reports of two other
incidents subsequent to the one of 30.03.2015, the first occurring on
13.04.2015 and the second on 15.05.2015, the latter (the incident of
15.05.2015) forming subject matter of a separate FIR No.605/2015
involving offences under sections 365/323/342/452/34 IPC of Police
Station Amar Colony. It was conceded at the hearing that Dr. (Mrs.)
Sharda Nayak is also an accused in the criminal case arising out of
said other FIR (No.605/2015) which is now pending consideration of
the charge (post the summoning order) in the same court of
Metropolitan Magistrate.
15. The main charge-sheet referred to the probe into the role of
certain others, viz. , Mr.Manish Gupta, Mr. Kanwar Pal Malik and Mr.
Rajiv Maheshwari, they having accompanied Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak
to the office of DPS society on 30.03.2015, the investigating agency
finding no sufficient material to attribute culpability on their part. It
also stated that Mr. Salman Khurshid and Mr. Narender Kumar (who
have been summoned on the basis of supplementary charge-sheet)
being life members of the DPS society had “legal right” to come to its
office, no eye witness having made any “specific allegations against
them” except as to their presence.
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 10 of 31
16. It appears that the complainant (and DPS society) were not
satisfied with the result of investigation culminating in the charge-
sheet as aforementioned, presented on 01.03.2016, for trial only of Dr.
(Mrs.) Sharda Nayak to be held, that too on the charge limited to the
one for offence under section 448 IPC. A protest petition was filed, to
the maintainability of which objections were raised. But, while the
said matter was pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, the
Station House Officer (SHO) of Police Station Amar Colony, by his
request in writing dated 18.02.2017, sought permission of the
Metropolitan Magistrate for “further investigation” to be carried out.
Taking note of this request, the Metropolitan Magistrate, by her order
dated 01.03.2017, gave go-ahead to the investigating police, while
declining to act upon the protest petition which, in the given fact-
situation, even otherwise had been rendered unnecessary.
17. As is clear from the narration of the chronology, the
supplementary charge sheet which was submitted in the wake of
“further investigation” in exercise of the power vested in the police in
terms of section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. has resulted in summoning as accused
of three more persons (two of whom are petitioners before this court),
by the impugned order dated 04.08.2018, the third of them (Narender
Kumar) having chosen not to challenge the said order till date.
18. It may be noted at the same time that the supplementary charge-
sheet had sought prosecution as additional accused not only of the said
three persons but also of three others (Manish Gupta, Rajiv
Maheshwari and Mr. K.P. Malik), order of the Metropolitan
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 11 of 31
Magistrate being conspicuously silent in their regard, there being no
grievance raised even by the complainant or the State in this respect.
19. It also needs to be noted again that as a result of the cognizance
being taken on the supplementary charge-sheet, the scope of proposed
trial stands expanded so as to include not merely the offence under
section 448 IPC but also the offences punishable under sections
419/451/474 and 120-B IPC. Further, as was conceded at the hearing
on these petitions, it is clear that the supplementary charge-sheet is
based, inter alia, not only on the version of witnesses who were
examined in the initial investigation but also certain others including
Ms. Zeenat Khader (Joint Secretary), Mr. Ratheesan (Accountant),
Mr. Mohd. Naushad (Accountant), Mr. I.J. Noata (Consultant), Mr.
Girish Chand Bhat (LDC), Mr. Komal Yadav (driver), Mr. Madan
Singh (driver), and Mr. Ashwani Kumar (driver).
20. To recapitulate, the Metropolitan Magistrate had summoned Dr.
(Mrs.) Sharda Nayak as accused, by order dated 01.03.2016, on the
basis of material submitted with the main charge sheet. As noted
earlier, by order dated 01.03.2017, she granted the prayer of the police
for further investigation and thereafter directed the matter to come up
for “status report” being submitted on 18.04.2017. The supplementary
charge-sheet was submitted in December, 2017. Even while the
further investigation was under-way, the Metropolitan Magistrate
proceeded to consider – prematurely, in opinion of this court – the
question of charge against Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak on the basis of
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 12 of 31
material presented with the main charge sheet that had been submitted
earlier.
21. By order dated 09.06.2017, the Metropolitan Magistrate
concluded that prima facie case was made out for putting the aforesaid
person (Dr. Sharda Nayak) on trial on charge for offences under
sections 416/451/467/471/474 IPC. The said order, and the charges
framed in its wake, have been set aside by the revisional court by
impugned order dated 15.09.2018. Noticeably, by virtue of
supplementary charge sheet the evidence gathered therewith had also
come on record and cognizance had been taken thereupon leading to
additional three accused having been summoned on 04.08.2018. The
factum of filing of the supplementary charge-sheet is noticed in the
proceedings of the revisional court. But then, it is not clear as to
whether the revisional court had taken a view based on consideration
of the evidence in entirety – that is to say as to whether the material
which was considered by said forum included the evidence presented
both with the main charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet.
22. There is, however, no doubt as to the fact that the revisional
court’s view, leading to the order of discharge of Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda
Nayak, is based on scrutiny of the material restricted to the role
attributed to her. It has, inter alia, noted that she was a life member of
the DPS society, and there was no evidence of forced entry as locks of
the office were not broken. It concluded that there was no case of
criminal trespass for the reason there was no intent to commit an
offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person. It held that no
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 13 of 31
person had accused her of having made any mis-representation leading
to the offence of cheating, none having been induced to deliver any
property or to do or omit to do anything which said person would not
have otherwise done. The revisioanl court has also held that there was
no impersonation indulged in by Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak inasmuch as
she had signed certain documents (to which reference is made by the
complainant side) in her own name. It accepted the argument of Dr.
(Mrs.) Sharda Nayak that merely signing the said documents in the
capacity of Chairperson of DPS society would not amount to
execution of a false document so as to incur liability to be prosecuted
on criminal charge of forgery.
23. The learned senior counsel for the DPS Society (which is
aggrieved), he being supported by Additional Public Prosecutor
pressing the petition of the State, has submitted that the revisional
court while directing discharge of Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak has fallen
into error not only by not appreciating the facts and circumstances
brought out through the evidence that has been presented in light of
correct position of law but also by overlooking the additional evidence
which was presented with the supplementary charge-sheet.
24. Petitioners Mr. Salman Khurshid and Mr. S.R. Vaish, on the
other hand, contend that it was unjust and unfair on the part of the
Metropolitan Magistrate to act upon the material gathered during
“further investigation” with the supplementary charge-sheet since it
was based on, as is their argument, “de novo” or “re-investigation”
rather than “further investigation”. It is their submission that the
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 14 of 31
material submitted with the main charge sheet itself had indicated that
no case was made out against either of them, the evidence gathered
and presented during the supplementary charge-sheet being not worthy
of reliance.
25. It is the argument of petitioner Mr. Salman Khurshid that the
summoning order dated 04.08.2018 does not disclose any reasons, and
therefore, it deserves to be set aside, reliance being placed on Sunil
Bharti Mittal vs. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609. It is submitted that the fact
that he (Mr. Salman Khurshid) is a life member of the DPS Society
cannot be lost sight of and that given his “legal right” to come to the
said office, he cannot be prosecuted in the present case only because
he had accompanied Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak and others to the said
place. He placed reliance, inter alia, on Vinay Tyagi vs. Irshad Ali,
(2013) 5 SCC 762 and Hathi Singh & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan,
(1979) 4 SCC 340. It is his argument that there is no evidence of any
inducement or deceit indulged in by him and the representation that
Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak had become the Chairperson of the society
would not constitute the offence of cheating and for this he relies on
Ms. Alverna B. Mcgrath vs. Dr. G.K. Francis & Anr.,
Crl.Rev.236/2009 of Madras High Court. It is also his argument,
based on rulings of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim vs. State of
Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751, and Sheila Sebastian vs. R. Jawaharaj &
Anr., (2018) 7 SCC 581 that there is no case of forgery made out
inasmuch as Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak had used her own name, though
in assumed capacity of Chairperson, the presence of the said person
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 15 of 31
and others accompanying her only giving rise to a civil dispute. An
alternative argument is raised that a prosecution for offence of
criminal conspiracy under section 120-B IPC read with sections 448
and 451 IPC is barred (in absence of sanction) under section 196(2)
Cr.P.C. and, in this context, reliance is placed on Rahul Kanwal &
Ors. vs. State & Anr., 2004 SCC Online Del 608.
26. The petitioner Mr. S.R. Vaish refers to a franchise that had been
given by DPS Society in favour of “Manav Vikas Society”, of which
he is the President, for opening of a school in Gurgaon and seeks to
justify his visit to the office of the society in that context. There is
reference (in the case for prosecution) to his services having been
availed by Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak during the period of her stay in
the office of DPS society for several hours on 30.03.2015 for purposes
of sending certain e-mails from the computer systems of the society
office. His argument is that only screen-shots of such e-mails have
been presented, no case being made out in absence of any better
evidence about such role having been played by him, also because
there was no certificate under section 65-B of Indian Evidence Act,
1872. In this context, he places reliance on Sanjaysinh Ramrao
Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabro, (2015) 3 SCC 123. He has argued that
since Mr. V.K. Shunglu was not in India at the time of alleged
incident, the entry into the office, and the acts of commission or
omission attributed to the accused persons, only constitute a “civil
trespass”, referring in this context to Abdul Hossain vs. Massadul
Haq, 1972 Crl.L.J. 1499. It is also his argument that no case of
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 16 of 31
criminal trespass is made out because none of the witnesses for the
prosecution would state that intent was to commit an offence or to
intimidate, insult or annoy any person. He refers in support to Mathri
vs. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 986, and Isaac Isanga Musumba &
Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 15 SCC 357.
27. Per contra, the complainant, and the State, submit grievance
that the evidence in entirety has been glossed over. Reference is made
not only to the statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. of the above
mentioned persons but also to the documentary evidence showing
presence of all the four persons (who are sought to be prosecuted) in
the office of the society from 8:30 a.m. onwards, at least one of the
witnesses (Sanju Kumar, safai karamchari ) describing those
accompanying Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak, and the three other accused,
as “bouncers” . Reference is also made by the complainant, and the
State, to the documentary evidence showing, inter alia, that Dr. (Mrs.)
Sharda Nayak had been in contact with another security agency (Super
Slueth Security Agency & Allied Services) even prior to the incident
of 30.03.2015, she having informed Mr. Aseem Khajuria (witness for
the prosecution), proprietor of the said security agency, through Mr.
Manish Gupta, in advance of the visit to the office of DPS Society on
30.03.2015, that she would be requiring security services at the DPS
Society office and that when called he should come prepared with all
the necessary documents such as agreement, etc. and he having
accordingly reached the society office sometime between 9:30 and
10:00 a.m. on 30.03.2015, alongwith agreement prepared in the format
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 17 of 31
which was in use, drawn on a non-judicial stamp paper. The
documentary evidence includes agreement purporting to have been
executed on 30.03.2015 by the said witness on behalf of security
agency and by Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak in her purported capacity of
Chairman of DPS Society. It is pointed out that the agreement was
printed on a non-judicial stamp paper that had been purchased on
03.01.2015. This, according to the complainant and State,
demonstrates prior design, concert and intent to take over the Society
office.
28. Along with the charge-sheet, the police also presented certain
other documents which had been executed, signed or issued by Dr.
(Mrs.) Sharda Nayak in the capacity of Chairperson of DPS Society
using its letter head or other stationery or e-mail IDs. These include a
letter of appointment bearing No.DPSS/ADMN/6019 addressed to Mr.
Rajeev Maheshwari appointing him as the administration in-charge of
DPS Society. Further material includes a communication addressed to
Mr. Omkar Misra, regional head of Premier Shift Pvt. Ltd. Sainik
Farms, New Delhi (security agency engaged by the society) requiring
security services to be removed with immediate effect and charge to
be handed over to new security agency. This communication was
issued by the Secretary of the DPS Society appointed in that capacity
by Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak. She issued a press note under her
signatures declaring herself to be the Chairperson of DPS Society,
referring to certain earlier events like elections held in January, 2014
and constitution of a Dispute Resolution Committee, etc. She
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 18 of 31
addressed a letter to Station House Officer of Police Station Amar
Colony, acknowledged by the said office vide DD No.4-B on
31.03.2015 on the subject of threats allegedly extended by two named
persons. She constituted a new working committee and addressed a
letter to the life members signing her name in the capacity of
Chairperson of DPS Society inviting accused Narender Kumar to be
the Chairman Emeritus. She appointed Mr. K.P. Malik a new Public
Relations Officer of DPS Society, addressing a communication to him
on the subject, on the letter head of the Society, signing in the capacity
of Chairperson. By two separate communications, also signed by Dr.
(Mrs.) Sharda Nayak as Chairperson of DPS Society, prepared on the
letter-heads of the Society, she informed Mr. Pramod Grover and Mr.
M.M. Chopra informing each of them that their membership of the
Society had been suspended, certain serious charges reported against
them intended to be investigated/inquired into by a retired Judge of the
Supreme Court. A similar communication was addressed to Mr. Rajiv
Taneja, Secretary of the Society, this being captioned as “office
order”, thereby communicating termination of his contract as
Secretary with immediate effect. Yet another communication was
addressed to Pro-Vice Chairman (Satellite Schools), inter alia,
informing about postponement of certain meetings, Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda
Nayak signing as a Chairperson using the letter-head of the Society.
29. There is further evidence presented which statedly indicates that
even after the FIR had been lodged on 31.03.2015 about the incident
of 30.03.2015, Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak continued declaring herself to
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 19 of 31
be the Chairperson of DPS Society sending various communications
in that capacity using the letter-heads of the Society, these including a
complaint dated 13.04.2015 to SHO of Police Station Amar Colony
alleging criminal trespass, destruction of evidence, etc. and a letter
dated 01.04.2015 addressed to the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India
making certain allegations of corruption and irregularities in the
affairs of DPS Society, which communication was made over by the
Ministry of Home Affairs, inter alia, to Commissioner Delhi Police,
the authorities in the government treating it as a communication
received from Chairman of DPS Society. Further, on 15.04.2015, she
addressed an e-mail to “Core School Principals” requiring certain data
to be sent to her, she being the Chairperson of DPS Society. Another
similar communication was addressed on 23.04.2015 to Pro-Vice
Chairperson, again on the letter-head of the Society, declaring herself
to be the Chairperson. Besides such communications on the letter-
heads, there is material presented indicating e-mails have been sent
using the e-mail IDs of the Society, at the instance of Dr. (Mrs.)
Sharda Nayak, reference to the role of petitioner Mr. S.R. Vaish being
in this context.
30. The grievances of the complainant, and the State, vis-à-vis the
revisional court’s order directing discharge of Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda
Nayak are correct. In fact, the error in the approach to the matter
began when the case was taken up by the Metropolitan Magistrate for
consideration of charge. As has been noted earlier, the deficiencies in
the investigation leading to the main charge-sheet had been pointed
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 20 of 31
out first by the complainant lodging protest petition, the investigating
agency conceding by making its own request seeking liberty to subject
the case to further investigation. The facts alleged and the evidence
presented, even with the main charge-sheet, had demonstrated the
possibility that the case might involve prosecution for offences beyond
the one punishable under section 448 IPC. Further, the deficiency in
the initial investigation related to the role of persons other than Dr.
(Mrs.) Sharda Nayak who alone had been sent up for trial at that stage.
It is against this backdrop that the Metropolitan Magistrate accepted
the request of the police for opportunity to be given for further
investigation. Though some argument was raised at the earlier hearing
on these petitions as to impermissibility of further investigation being
allowed after cognizance had been taken, the said ground of challenge
has been given up with due deference to the law authoritatively laid
down by the Supreme Court in recent decision reported as Vinubhai
Haribhai Malaviya & Ors. vs. The State of Gujarat & Anr., 2019 SCC
Online SC 1346.
31. Be that as it may, once the Metropolitan Magistrate had
accepted the submissions that the earlier investigation suffered from
deficiency and that the matter required further investigation not only
to collect additional evidence to examine what offences had been
committed but also to ascertain if any other persons were complicit in
such crimes as may have been committed, there was no question of
proceeding to hear the parties on the basis of main charge-sheet on the
issue of charge against the solitary accused summoned in its respect.
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 21 of 31
By the order whereby further investigation was allowed, the case was
taken to the next date only to await report regarding further
investigation. There was no occasion or justification to shift from the
said position. The fact that the Metropolitan Magistrate took a
decision on the question of charge against Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak
alone, that too on the basis of main charge-sheet, even while the
further investigation was still not concluded, only means the issue has
been adjudicated upon without the benefit of complete evidence being
taken into consideration. This has resulted in a situation wherein the
case for prosecution on what turns out to be a crucial accusation –
offence of criminal conspiracy involving all the four afore-mentioned
individuals – having also been overlooked.
32. The revisional court committed a similar error and impropriety
by proceeding to consider the case for framing of charge against Dr.
(Mrs.) Sharda Nayak on the basis primarily of the evidence that was
presented with the main charge-sheet. Technically speaking, since the
order that was impugned before it was based on scrutiny of such
limited material, the revisional court while examining its correctness
could not have gone into the additional evidence that was presented
with the supplementary charge sheet. But then, conscious as it was
that a supplementary charge-sheet had been presented even while the
revisional challenge was pending, such supplementary report having
also led to additional accused persons being summoned on basis of
additional material, the revisional court could not have proceeded to
determine the question of charge based on limited scrutiny. It was
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 22 of 31
instead desirable in such fact-situation that it should have remitted the
case to the trial Magistrate for re-consideration. The revisional court’s
order is perverse because it does not take into consideration substantial
part of the evidence that had come on record with the supplementary
charge-sheet and this may be illustrated by reference merely to the
evidence showing termination of the services of the existing security
agency and bringing along by Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak and others of
the proprietor of the new security agency engaged by her, by prior
concert, along with security guards of such new agency. Similar
deficiency on account of non-consideration of supplementary charge-
sheet also while directing discharge of an accused was dis-approved of
by the Supreme Court in Deepu @ Deepak vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, 2019 (2) SCC 393.
33. On the foregoing facts, and in the circumstances, the impugned
order of discharge passed by the revisional court cannot be sustained.
But, as has been observed earlier, since the order directing charges to
be framed against Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak passed by the
Metropolitan Magistrate is also perverse on account of deficient
scrutiny of the evidence in entirety, the said order also cannot be
allowed to stand. The appropriate course, in such fact-situation, would
be to remit the case for fresh consideration on the question of charge.
34. This court must reject the argument of the other two petitioners
(i.e. Mr. Salman Khurshid and Mr. S.R. Vaish) as to impermissibility
of the Metropolitan Magistrate directing further investigation. The
facts and circumstances taken note of at length above clearly show
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 23 of 31
that the initial investigation was perfunctory. The additional evidence
which has come on record through the supplementary charge-sheet
would itself justify the permission granted by the Metropolitan
Magistrate for further investigation, the power and jurisdiction to do
so in which regard is now duly acknowledged with reference, inter
alia, to decision in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra). This court
also finds no substance in the submission that the supplementary
charge sheet represents an endeavor of the police to carry out “re-
investigation” or “de novo” probe. Without doubt, some of the
witnesses were again examined. But then, given the deficiencies
which were pointed out, it was only appropriate to do so in the present
case.
35. The argument that the summoning order must be set aside only
because it does not give detailed reasons ignores the settled law on the
subject. In Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingaqppa Konjalgi, (1976) 3
SCC 736, the Supreme Court had held that it is not the province of the
Magistrate at such stage to enter into a detailed discussion on the
merits or demerits of the case.
36. In Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1 SCC
722, the Supreme Court ruled thus:-
“12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial
court should write an order showing the reasons for
framing a charge, why should the already burdened
trial courts be further burdened with such an extra
work. The time has reached to adopt all possible
measures to expedite the court procedures and to
chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 24 of 31
| avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed | |
|---|---|
| orders at different stages merely because the counsel | |
| would address arguments at all stages, the snail- | |
| paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would | |
| further be slowed down. We are coming across | |
| interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions | |
| Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate | |
| if such a detailed order has been passed for | |
| culminating the proceedings before them. But it is | |
| quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other | |
| stages, such as issuing process, remanding the | |
| accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over | |
| to next stages in the trial.” |
(emphasis supplied)
37. In Chief Controller of Imports & Exports vs. Roshanlal
Agarwal, (2003) 4 SCC 139, the legal position was reiterated thus:-
| “9. In determining the question whether any process | |
|---|---|
| is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be | |
| satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for | |
| proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground | |
| for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for | |
| supporting the conviction, can be determined only at | |
| the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of | |
| issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is | |
| not required to record reasons. This question was | |
| considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control Board | |
| v. Mohan Meakins Ltd.(2000) 3 SCC 745 and after | |
| noticing the law laid down in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. | |
| State of W.B. (2000) 1 SCC 722, it was held as | |
| follows: (U.P. Pollution case, SCC p. 749, para 6) |
“6. The legislature has stressed the need to
record reasons in certain situations such as
dismissal of a complaint without issuing
process. There is no such legal requirement
imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 25 of 31
| order while issuing summons. The process | |
|---|---|
| issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on | |
| the ground that the Magistrate had not passed | |
| a speaking order.” |
(emphasis supplied)
38. In Bhushan Kumar & Anr. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.,
(2012) 5 SCC 424, while addressing similar issues, the Supreme Court
referred to its decision reported as Chief Enforcement Officer vs.
Videocon International Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 492, and construed the
provisions of Sections 190 and 204 Cr.P.C. concerning “cognizance”
and “ issuance of process” and observed thus:-
| “13. | Section 204 | of the Code does not mandate | |
|---|---|---|---|
| the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for | |||
| issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the | |||
| opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an | |||
| offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, | |||
| then the summons may be issued. This section | |||
| mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to | |||
| whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons | |||
| to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section | |||
| that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, | |||
| meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for | |||
| deciding the validity of the summons issued.” |
(emphasis supplied)
39. The reliance by the petitioners on decisions in Mehmood Ul
Rehman vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda & Ors., (2015) 12 SCC 420,
Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC
409 and Birla Corporation Limited vs. Adventz Investments &
Holdings Limited & Ors., 2019 SCC Online SC 682, is misplaced.
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 26 of 31
Explaining the position of law, the Supreme Court in recent decision
reported as State of Gujarat vs. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta, 2019
SCC Online SC 132, has delineated the fine distinction respecting the
summoning order vis-à-vis in a case arising out of police report in
contrast to a case arising out of criminal complaint and has explained
the ruling in Mehmood Ul Rehman (supra). The following
observations of the court in the said case ( Afroz Mohamed Hasanfatta)
are, infact, complete answer to the contentions urged to the contrary
by the petitioners:-
“24. In summoning the accused, it is not necessary
for the Magistrate to examine the merits and demerits
of the case and whether the materials collected is
adequate for supporting the conviction. The court is
not required to evaluate the evidence and its merits.
The standard to be adopted for summoning the
accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C. is not the same at
the time of framing the charge. For issuance of
summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C., the expression
used is “there is sufficient ground for
proceeding…..”; whereas for framing the charges,
the expression used in Sections 240 and 246 IPC is
“there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence….. ”. At the stage of taking
cognizance of the offence based upon a police report
and for issuance of summons under Section
204 Cr.P.C., detailed enquiry regarding the merits
and demerits of the case is not required. The fact that
after investigation of the case, the police has filed
charge sheet along with the materials thereon may be
considered as sufficient ground for proceeding for
issuance of summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C.
25. In so far as taking cognizance based on the police
report, the Magistrate has the advantage of the
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 27 of 31
charge sheet, statement of witnesses and other
evidence collected by the police during the
investigation. Investigating Officer/SHO collects the
necessary evidence during the investigation
conducted in compliance with the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code and in accordance with the
rules of investigation. Evidence and materials so
collected are sifted at the level of the Investigating
Officer and thereafter, charge sheet was filed. In
appropriate cases, opinion of the Public Prosecutor is
also obtained before filing the charge sheet. The court
thus has the advantage of the police report along with
the materials placed before it by the police. Under
Section 190 (1)(b)Cr.P.C., where the Magistrate has
taken cognizance of an offence upon a police report
and the Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding, the Magistrate directs
issuance of process. In case of taking cognizance of
an offence based upon the police report, the
Magistrate is not required to record reasons for
issuing the process. In cases instituted on a police
report, the Magistrate is only required to pass an
order issuing summons to the accused. Such an order
of issuing summons to the accused is based upon
subject to satisfaction of the Magistrate considering
the police report and other documents and satisfying
himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. In a case based upon the police
report, at the stage of issuing the summons to the
accused, the Magistrate is not required to record any
reason. In case, if the charge sheet is barred by law
or where there is lack of jurisdiction or when the
charge sheet is rejected or not taken on file, then the
Magistrate is required to record his reasons for
rejection of the charge sheet and for not taking on
file. In the present case, cognizance of the offence has
been taken by taking into consideration the charge
sheet filed by the police for the offence under Sections
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 28 of 31
420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477A and 120B IPC, the
order for issuance of process without explicitly
recording reasons for its satisfaction for issue of
process does not suffer from any illegality.”
(emphasis supplied)
40. Given the abundant material that has been noted earlier, it
cannot be said that there are no grounds to proceed against these
petitioners who seek to assail the summoning order. The summoning
order confirms that in taking the view reflected therein, the
Metropolitan Magistrate had taken into consideration the material
submitted with the main charge-sheet as well as supplementary
charge-sheet and, thus, there is sufficient indication available on
record regarding application of mind. The challenge to the summoning
order, thus, cannot be accepted.
41. As a result of the view taken above vis-à-vis the question of
framing of charge against Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak, and the rejection
of the challenge to the summoning order for reasons set out above, it
would be appropriate that this court refrains from recording any
observations on the merits of the case pressed by the State for putting
the four above-mentioned accused persons on trial or, for that matter,
the contentions of the accused on question of charge, lest any view
recorded here prejudices the argument of either side. These are matters
that ought to be considered by the criminal court which is in seisin of
the case.
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 29 of 31
42. For the foregoing reasons, the petitions of Mr. Salman Khurshid
and Mr. S.R. Vaish (Crl.M.C. 4551/2018 and Crl.M.C.5069/2018)
along with applications filed therewith are dismissed.
43. The petitions of State (Crl.M.C. 175/2019) and of Delhi Public
School Society & Ors. (Cr.Rev.P. 950/2018) along with applications
filed therewith are allowed. The order dated 09.06.2017 of the
Metropolitan Magistrate along with formal charges framed in its wake
by said court on 22.07.2017 and judgment dated 15.09.2018 of the
additional sessions Judge in Crl.Rev. 493/2017 are set aside.
44. As a consequence of the above directions, the criminal case
against Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Nayak stands revived, she being obliged to
appear as an accused in the case before the concerned criminal court
on the date being fixed hereinbelow. She would also be obliged to
furnish fresh bail bonds to regulate her presence in the proceedings
hereinafter.
45. The criminal case of the State arising out of FIR No.421/2015
of Police Station Amar Colony, based on the two above mentioned
charge-sheets, shall be taken up by the concerned court of
Metropolitan Magistrate for consideration of the question of charge on
the date to be fixed for the purpose by the presiding officer of the said
court as per its convenience. Needless to add, however, that the
Metropolitan Magistrate in rendering a decision on the question of
charge against the four persons who stand summoned will not feel
bound or be influenced by the view taken on the said subject by the
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 30 of 31
orders which have been set aside or any observation of this court
recorded in this judgment.
46. Reference has been made in earlier part of this judgment to
another criminal case arising out of FIR No.605/2015 of Police Station
Amar Colony. As has been noticed, the said case relates to an incident
which seems to have a direct nexus with the incident which is the
subject matter of the case from which these petitions arise. Before
proceeding further, the Metropolitan Magistrate will consider if both
the cases require to be heard or tried together or jointly.
47. The parties are directed to appear before the concerned criminal
th
court on 16 December, 2019.
48. The petitions and the applications filed therewith are disposed
of in above terms.
(R.K. GAUBA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 27, 2019
vk
Crl. M.C. 4551/2018 & ors. Page 31 of 31