Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<br>CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | ||||||
| CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1931 OF 2011 |
ASHOK GULABRAO BONDRE …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
VILAS MADHUKARRAO DESHMUKH
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The appeal arises on a very narrow canvass.
2.
The appellant had filed a complaint against the respondents
alleging that the respondents had committed the offence punishable
under Sections 191, 192, 196, 463, 464, 465, 467, 470 and 471 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”).
3.
The main allegation made by the appellant is that respondent
No.2 Ramprasad Pancheshwar had prepared false and forged
documents, namely, personal recognizance bond and surety bond in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Singh
Date: 2023.04.17
17:31:56 IST
Reason:
Criminal Case No. 19 of 2003 and the rest of the respondents
conspired and actively helped respondent No.2 for forging the said
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documents.
4. It is the case of the appellant that those documents had been
eventually filed on record in Criminal Case No. 19 of 2003 pending
against the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Ramtek (hereinafter referred to as the “JMFC”).
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5. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class vide order dated 6
November 2004 dismissed the complaint. Being aggrieved thereby, the
revision petition came to be filed.
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6. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur vide order dated 14
March 2005 has held that such a complaint could not have been filed
except in writing of the Court concerned or some other Court, that too
a subordinate one.
7. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, found that the
allegations made by the revision petitioners were serious in nature,
and therefore, directed that if any application is filed by the appellant
under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short,
“Cr.P.C.”), the learned JMFC would make a suitable preliminary
enquiry and thereafter, record his finding to that effect as
contemplated under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C.
8. The said order passed by the Revisional Court came to be
challenged by the appellant before the High Court in an application
filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The same came to be rejected.
Hence, the present appeal.
9. We have heard Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearing for
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the appellant and Mr. Rahul Chitnis and Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha
Pande, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
10. Mr. Sachin Patil submits that the alleged forgery had not been
committed during the pendency of the proceedings. It is submitted
that it is the contention of the appellant that the respondents had
forged the documents earlier and used them in the proceedings
initiated against the appellant. It is, therefore, submitted that the bar
of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would not be applicable.
11. Mr. Sachin Patil has relied on the judgment of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwa and Another
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v. Meenakshi Marwah and Another .
12. Mr. Sachin Patil further submits that though the judgment of the
Constitution Bench was cited before the learned Single Judge of the
High Court, it did not consider the same in correct perspective.
13.
Mr. Rahul Chitnis, on the contrary, submits that the appellant
has already accepted the order passed by the Revisional Court and
filed an application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned
Magistrate. He further submits that, on account of the interim relief
granted in the present appeal, the said application could not be
proceeded further. He submits that as such, the question that is
involved in the present matter is purely an academic question in which
the Court should not go.
14. Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, supports the submission made by
1 (2005) 4 SCC 370
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Mr. Rahul Chitnis.
15. The narrow question that requires to be considered is as to
whether the embargo under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would be
applicable when the allegation that the documents which are sought to
be used as evidence were already fabricated and forged prior to filing
in evidence.
16.
This Court, in the case of Surjit Singh and Others v. Balbir
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, had taken a view thus:
Singh
“ 10. It would thus be clear that for taking cognizance
of an offence, the document, the foundation of forgery, if
produced before the court or given in evidence, the bar
of taking cognizance under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets
attracted and the criminal court is prohibited from
taking cognizance of offence unless a complaint in
writing is filed as per the procedure prescribed under
Section 340 of the Code by or on behalf of the Court.
The object thereby is to preserve purity of the
administration of justice and to allow the parties to
adduce evidence in proof of certain documents without
being compelled or intimidated to proceed with the
judicial process. The bar of Section 195 is to take
cognizance of the offence covered thereunder."
17.
Subsequently, this Court, in the case of Sachida Nand Singh
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, took the view thus:
and Another v. State of Bihar and Another
“ 11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in
Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any
offence affecting administration of justice has been
committed in respect of a document produced in court
or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In
other words, the offence should have been committed
2
(1996) 3 SCC 533
3 (1998) 2 SCC 493
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during the time when the document was in custodia
legis.
It would be a strained thinking that any offence
12.
involving forgery of a document if committed far outside
the precincts of the Court and long before its production
in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting
administration of justice merely because that document
later reached the court records.
*
23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar
contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not
applicable to a case where forgery of the document was
committed before the document was produced in a
court."
18. Finding the two conflicting views taken with regard to the
interpretation of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., the question was referred
to the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
Iqbal Singh
Marwa (supra). It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 7 of the said
judgment, which is as under:
“ 7. On a plain reading clause (b)(ii) of subsection (1)
of Section 195 is capable of two interpretations. One
possible interpretation is that when an offence
described in Section 463 or punishable under Section
471, Section 475 or Section 476 IPC is alleged to have
been committed in respect of a document which is
subsequently produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any Court, a complaint by the Court
would be necessary. The other possible interpretation is
that when a document has been produced or given in
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evidence in a proceeding in any Court and thereafter an
offence described as aforesaid is committed in respect
thereof, a complaint by the Court would be necessary.
On this interpretation if the offence as described in the
Section is committed prior to production or giving in
evidence of the document in Court, no complaint by
Court would be necessary and a private complaint
would be maintainable. The question which requires
consideration is which of the two interpretations should
be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act and
object sought to be achieved.”
19. After observing the aforesaid and considering the entire scheme
under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., so also under Section 340 of the
Cr.P.C., this Court observed thus:
“ In view of the discussion made above, we are of the
33.
opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly
decided and the view taken therein is the correct view.
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only
when the offences enumerated in the said provision
have been committed with respect to a document after it
has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in any Court i.e. during the time when the document
was in custodia legis.
34. In the present case, the will has been produced in
the Court subsequently. It is nobody's case that any
offence as enumerated in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was
committed in respect to the said will after it had been
produced or filed in the Court of District Judge.
Therefore, the bar created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii)
Cr.P.C. would not come into play and there is no
embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of
the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the
respondents. The view taken by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge and the High Court is perfectly correct
and calls for no interference.”
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20. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court, on unequal terms,
has held that the view taken in the case of
Sachida Nand Singh
(supra) that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. would be attracted only
when the offence enumerated in the said provision was committed in
respect of a document after it has been produced or filed in evidence
during proceedings before any Court, i.e. during the time when the
document is custodia legis . The Court has clearly held that, insofar as
the Will which is alleged to have been fabricated before it was
produced in the Court, the embargo created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of
Cr.P.C. would not come into play.
21.
It has been held that in such a case, the Court will be entitled to
take cognizance of the offence only on the basis of the complaint made
by the complainant.
22.
In that view of the matter, we find that the view taken by the
Revisional Court as well as the High Court is not sustainable.
23. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Revisional
Court as well as the High Court are quashed and set aside.
24. The matter is remitted back forthwith to the learned JMFC,
Ramtek for considering the complaint of the appellant on its own
merits.
25.
Taking into consideration that the litigation is pending for almost
a decade, we request the learned JMFC to decide the complaint of the
appellant on merits as expeditiously as possible and in any case
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within a period of one year from today.
26. We further make it clear that we may not be understood to have
expressed any opinion on merits and nothing observed herein should
be construed to have bearing on the merits of the matter.
27.
The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
28. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
….........................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
...........................J.
[SANJAY KAROL]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 12, 2023.
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ITEM NO.104 COURT NO.8 SECTION II-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 1931/2011
ASHOK GULABRAO BONDRE Appellant(s)
VERSUS
VILAS MADHUKARRAO DESHMUKH & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 12-04-2023 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KAROL
For Appellant(s)
Ms. Anagha S. Desai, AOR
Mr. Sachin Patil, Adv.
Mr. Satyajit A Desai, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Gautam, Adv.
Mr. Gajanan N Tirthkar, Adv.
Mr. Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Adv.
Mr. Yougant Dhillon, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Mr. Rahul Chitnis, Adv.
Ms. Shwetal Shepal, Adv.
Mr. Aditya Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Chander Shekhar Ashri, AOR
Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.
Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv.
Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.
2. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
(DEEPAK SINGH) (ANJU KAPOOR)
COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]