LOCHAN SHRIVAS vs. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 499­500 OF 2018 LOCHAN SHRIVAS        ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH    ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. The   appellant   has   approached   this   Court   being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High th Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur dated 17   November 2017, thereby   dismissing   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   appellant th challenging the judgment and order dated 17   June 2016, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Raigarh   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “trial   judge”)   vide which the trial judge convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i), 377, 201, 302 read   with   Section   376A   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860 1 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) and Section 6 of the Protection   of   Children   from   Sexual   Offences   Act,   2012 (hereinafter referred to as the “POCSO Act”). Vide the same judgment and order, the appellant was sentenced to death for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.  For the other offences for which the appellant was found guilty, sentences of rigorous imprisonment of 3 years, 5 years, 7 years   and   life   imprisonment   have   been   awarded   to   the appellant.   The trial judge has also made a reference being Cr. Ref. No. 1 of 2016 to the High Court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as  “Cr.P.C.”)   for   confirmation   of   death   penalty.     Vide   the impugned   judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court   while dismissing the appeal of the appellant, has confirmed the death penalty. The prosecution case in brief is thus: 2. Complainant­PW­1   Gudiya   Parveen   w/o   PW­2­Mohd. th Armaan resided at D­29,  4   Floor, Bajrangdheepa Colony with her husband  and her minor victim daughter aged 3 th years.  At about 10.00 am, on 24  February 2016, she had gone downstairs to wash clothes. At that time, she called her 2 husband for bathing the victim.  Her husband told her that the   victim   had   gone   downstairs   to   play.   PW­1   then   went upstairs   and   told   her   husband   that   the   victim   was   not downstairs.  Thereafter, her husband (PW­2) and she started looking   for   the   victim,   but   the   victim   was   not   found anywhere. Since the victim could not be found, PW­1 went to Jutemill Police Station and lodged a report of the victim going missing. They continued the search and ultimately returned to their house at around 03.00­04.00 am in the morning. PW­3­Mohd. Sahid alias Raju Khan told her that appellant­ Lochan Shrivas, a resident of D­15 in the same building had said that if they would allow him to conduct a worship, he could find their child in an hour.  Therefore, they agreed to conduct   the   worship.   After   the   worship,   the   appellant informed them that the child was tied and kept inside a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in Amlibhauna. On this,   PW­1   and   other   prosecution   witnesses   developed   a suspicion, and as such, PW­3 informed the police. The police interrogated the appellant, who confessed his crime before them. Thereafter, on a memorandum under Section 27 of the Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the 3 “Evidence   Act”),   a   sack   from   the   bushes   was   recovered, wherein the dead body of the deceased soaked in blood was found (Ex.­P.12).  On the basis of the oral report (Ex.­P.1) of PW­1, a First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as “FIR”)   (Ex.­P.36)   came   to   be   registered   for   the   offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC.  After completion of investigation, a charge­sheet came to be filed before the trial judge for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 376, 377, 302, 201 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.  3. Charges came to be framed for the offences punishable under   Sections   363,   376(2)(i),   377,   201,   302   read   with Section 376A of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The accused pleaded to be not guilty and claimed to be tried. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge recorded the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence.  Being aggrieved thereby, an appeal was preferred by the appellant and also a reference was made by the trial judge under Section 366 of the Cr.P.C.  By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   by   the   appellant   and confirmed the death sentence.  Hence, the present appeals. 4 4. We   have   heard   Shri   Anand   Grover,   learned   Senior Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and   Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent­State. 5. Shri Anand Grover, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the present case is a case based on circumstantial evidence.  He submitted that the   prosecution   has   utterly   failed   to   establish   the incriminating   circumstances   and   in   any   case,   failed   to establish   the   chain   of   events,   which   leads   to   no   other conclusion than the guilt of the accused.  He submitted that there are many missing links in the prosecution case, and as such, the judgment and order of conviction as recorded by the   trial   judge   and   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   is   not sustainable in law.   The learned Senior Counsel submitted that   the   main   incriminating   circumstance,   on   which   the prosecution relies, is the recovery of the dead body of the victim.  He submitted that the recovery is from an open place accessible to one and all.   He therefore submitted that the said recovery is of no assistance to the prosecution case.  He further submitted that the alleged recovery of black jeans 5 half pant (Ex.­P.15) of the deceased and the white  gamchha (Ex.­P.16)   is   from   a   place   accessible   to   one   and   all.     He submitted that in any case, the Forensic Science Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as the “FSL”) reports are inconclusive, and therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the link between the recovered materials and the crime. 6. Shri   Grover   submitted   that   the   evidence   of   PW­9­ Chameli Sarthi, Constable would reveal that she had gone to the spot from where the body of the victim was alleged to have been recovered at around 06.00 am.   It is thus clear that   the   police   were   already   aware   about   the   place   from where the  body  was alleged  to  have been  recovered on a memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 7. He   further   submitted   that   the   finger   nails   of   the appellant were cut by a barber PW­8­Kishore Shrivas and not by   any   forensic   expert.     He   therefore   submitted   that   the circumstance of finding human blood on the said nails is of no use to the prosecution case.   This is particularly so in view of the long delay in seizure of the nail samples and sending them to the FSL. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that it is improbable that the prosecution could 6 have called the photographer at such a short notice.   He submitted that the alleged recovery is at around 08.00 am which are not the business hours, and as such, the very evidence   regarding   photography   and   videography   becomes doubtful.  8. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submitted   that   the   entire   record   would   reveal   that   the appellant   was   not   given   an   opportunity   of   meaningfully defending the case.   He submitted that since the Raigarh District   Bar   Association   had   taken   a   resolution   that   no lawyer from the Bar would appear for the appellant, it was difficult for him to engage a lawyer.  The lawyer appointed by the court from a list of panel lawyers, also was not given sufficient opportunity to defend the case of the appellant.  He submitted that the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, the mother and the father of the victim, were recorded on the very same day on which the lawyer was appointed for the appellant.   He further submitted that the trial court recorded the judgment and order of conviction, and the sentence on the very same day   without   giving   an   appropriate   opportunity   to   the appellant.   The learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted 7 that   the   prosecution  has   failed   to   prove   the   case   beyond reasonable doubt and the appeals deserve to be allowed. 9. The learned Senior Counsel, in the alternative, would submit that in any case, the death penalty would not be warranted in the facts of the present case.   He submitted that the trial court as well as the High Court has taken into consideration only the aspect of crime and they have not dealt with the aspect regarding the criminal.  It is submitted that the trial court as well as the High Court has not taken into   consideration   the   socio­economic   background   of   the appellant   so   also   the   possibility   of   the   appellant   being reformed or rehabilitated. It is therefore submitted that the imposition of death penalty in the facts of the present case is not at all warranted. 10. Shri   Nishanth   Patil,   learned   counsel   appearing   on behalf of the respondent­State, on the contrary, submitted that   the   prosecution   has   established   the   case   beyond reasonable doubt.  It is submitted that the prosecution has proved   all   the   incriminating   circumstances   beyond reasonable doubt.  He further submitted that the prosecution 8 has also established the link of proved circumstances, which leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused. 11. Shri   Patil   further   submitted   that   the   appellant   has committed a heinous act of rape on a minor girl and then brutally killed her, and as such, the case warrants for no other penalty than the death penalty. With   the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the 12. parties, we have scrutinized the entire evidence on record in depth.  Normally, this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, would not go into detailed analysis of the evidence.  However, since in the present   case,   the   trial   court   has   imposed   death   penalty, which is confirmed by the High Court, we have scrutinized the evidence minutely.  13. The law with regard to conviction in cases based on circumstantial evidence has been very well crystalised in the celebrated case of  Hanumant, son of Govind Nargundkar 1 v. State of Madhya Pradesh . A three­Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Mehr Chand Mahajan, J., observed thus: 1 1952 SCR 1091 9 “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence   is   of   a   circumstantial   nature,   the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established,   and   all   the   facts   so   established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and   they   should   be   such   as   to   exclude   every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far   complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable ground   for   a   conclusion   consistent   with   the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act much have been done by the accused.”

of circumstantial evidence,  the circumstances from which the conclusion   of   guilt   is   to   be   drawn,   should   be   fully established,   and   all   the   facts   so   established   should   be consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved. There must be   a   chain   of   evidence   so   complete   as   not   to   leave   any reasonable   ground   for   a   conclusion   consistent   with   the innocence of the accused, and it must be such as to show 10 that within all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused.

2 Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , observed thus: 

2 (1984) 4 SCC 116 11

circumstantial evidence, before the case can be said to be fully established against an accused, it is necessary that  the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn,   should   be   fully   established,   and   all   the   facts   so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. They should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive   nature   and tendency. They should exclude every hypothesis except the one  to  be   proved.   There   must  be   a  chain  of   evidence   so 12 complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused.

this Court in a catena of decisions.

in   its   judgment   while   holding   that   the   prosecution   has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, are thus:  “1.  The accused telling PW5 Munni that he can tell the location of the missing victim in an hour if he does Pooja. 2.  PW5   Munni   telling   PW3;   Mo   Sahid   alias Raju Khan what the accused had told her as above. 3.  PW3 Mo Sahid alias Raju Khan telling the victim's parents of the above conversation. 4. The deceased's parents PW1 Gudiya Parveen and PW2 Mo Armaan asking the accused to perform the Pooja. 5.  The accused saying that the victim's body was in a gunny sack near an electricity pole on the side of the road in Amlibhauna. 6.  PW3 Mo Sahid alias Raju Khan telling the police   of   the   aforesaid   claims   by   the accused. 7.  Police   questioning   the   accused   and   the accused going along with the police to locate the victim's dead body in a gunny sack in Amlibhauna. 13 8.  The accused leading the police to recover the pillow and the towel from his home­ 9.  The   accused   leading   the   police   to   the rubbish   dump   where   he   had   thrown   the victim's pants. 10.  Material   used   in   a   Pooja   being   recovered from the home of the victim 11.  According to Ex P 46, the fact that blood was   found   under   the   accused's   nails   and that the victim's vaginal slide had traces of human sperm.”

has   held   that   the   prosecution   has   proved   the   chain   of incriminating   circumstances,   which   leads   to   no   other conclusion than the guilt of the appellant.

prosecution   to   establish   the   incriminating   circumstances against the appellant.

appellant lived downstairs in D­15 in the same building.  On

downstairs to wash clothes.  She had called her husband for bathing the victim.  However, her husband told her that the victim   had   gone   downstairs   to   play.     Thereafter,   they 14 searched for the victim but she was not found, and therefore, they went to Jutemill Police Station and lodged the report of the victim going missing.   On the basis of the oral report (Ex.­P.1), an FIR (Ex.­P.36) came to be registered.  The oral report   (Ex.­P.1)   is   duly   proved   in   the   evidence   of   PW­1 whereas, the FIR (Ex.­P.36) has been proved in the evidence of PW­16­Dinesh Bahidar, Assistant Sub­Inspector.  

the prosecution has proved, is that the victim went missing at around 10.00 am, and thereafter, they started searching for her.  When the victim was not found anywhere, an oral report (Ex.­P.1) came to be lodged at around 22.00 hours on

came to be registered. 

her  husband   PW­2­Mohd.   Armaan  tried  to  search  for  the child.  Since she could not be found, they returned at around 03.00­04.00   am.     When   they   returned   home,   Raju   Khan (PW­3)   informed   them   that   appellant­Lochan   Shrivas,   a resident of D­15, has stated that if they would allow him to conduct a worship, he could find the child in an hour.  Then, 15 PW­1 agreed for conducting the worship.   She arranged for the things required for worship – vermilion, lemons, earthen lamps, incense sticks and coal.  After these things had been brought, the appellant performed the worship in the room of PW­1.  He had asked them to cover all the pictures of Allah by a cloth. After performing the worship, the appellant told them that the child was inside a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in  Amlibhauna .  

husband of PW­1 and father of the victim.  PW­3­Raju Khan, who is a neighbour, had stated in his evidence that when they   could   not   find   the   victim,   they   returned   at   around 03.00­03.30 am.  He stated that when they returned, Munni alias   Sarbari   (PW­5)   told   them   that   appellant­Lochan Shrivas, who lived in D­15 was telling her that the child could be traced by worship.   Accordingly, the worship was performed,   and   after  that,   appellant­Lochan   said   that  the victim was inside a sack in the bushes near a pole beside Amlibhauna  road.

Bajrangdheepa colony, stated that she had also joined for 16 searching   the   victim.     However,   since   the   victim   was   not

February   2016,   the   appellant   met   her   and   said,   “If   you conduct worship, your child will be found.”   She told the same to Raju Khan (PW­3).   Then, the appellant conducted worship and said that the deceased was inside a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in  Amlibhauna .  

beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, on his own, told PW­5­Munni alias Sarbari that if a worship was performed, the whereabouts of the victim could be found.  PW­5­Munni alias Sarbari informed this fact to PW­3­Raju Khan, who in turn, informed the same to PWs 1 and 2.   Accordingly, a worship   came   to   be   performed.     After   the   worship   was performed, the appellant told them that the victim could be found in a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in Amlibhauna .

(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “IO”),   has   also   seized   the materials which were used for performing the worship (Ex.­ P.18).  The said panchnama is witnessed by Raju Khan (PW­ 17 3).  The said seizure panchnama therefore corroborates the ocular version of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5. It is thus clear that when PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5 returned to their place of residence, the appellant informed PW­5 that if they   perform   a   worship,   the   deceased   could   be   found. Accordingly, a worship was performed and after performing the said worship, the appellant said that the deceased could be found in a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in   Amlibhauna .  This  circumstance  could  be  an important circumstance for considering the conduct of the appellant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.  Reliance in this respect could be placed on the judgments of this Court in the cases

4 Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash

which the prosecution relies, is the recovery of dead body of the victim on a memorandum of the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.  The evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5 3 (1979) 3 SCC 90 4 (1972) 1 SCC 249 5 (2005) 7 SCC 714 18 would reveal that immediately after the appellant performing worship and telling them that the victim was inside a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in   Amlibhauna , a suspicion arose and Raju Khan (PW­3) immediately informed the police and the police arrived.  The evidence of all the four witnesses is consistent in that regard. Amit Patley, IO(PW­19) also corroborated this fact with regard to the police receiving the said information.  In his evidence, PW­19 stated that he

February 2016 at 06.10 am.  The said Rojnamcha entry has been exhibited at Ex.­P.38 and its attested copy is at Ex.­ P.38­C.

information, he immediately went to the spot and took the appellant into his custody and interrogated him.  He stated that the appellant, on being interrogated, stated thus: “The previous day on 24.02.2016, at about 10:00, he had been alone in his room. The deceased who lived in D­29 on the floor above his house was coming   downstairs   whom   she   persuaded   and took   into   his   room   and   closed   his   room   from inside and got the pants worn by the deceased removed and forcibly made physical relation with her.   Meanwhile,   the   deceased   started   crying loudly so he pressed the mouth and nose of the 19 deceased   with   a   pillow.   By   making   physical relation, excessive bleeding started, seeing which he   got   nervous   and   thinking   that   the   secret should   not   be   revealed,   he   murdered   the deceased by strangulating her and wipe the blood and the ejaculated sperm smeared on his penis with a towel kept in the room. He filled the dead body of the deceased in a plastic sack of lentil by twisting her hands and legs. He tied the bag with a plastic rope. He wore his clothes. He filled the pants worn by the deceased in a polythene and threw   it   from   the   balcony   to   the   place   where garbage is disposed and entering the room placed the dead body of the deceased that he had filled in a plastic sack, in a yellow bag. He locked the room, carried the bag in hands and went on foot to hide the dead body in a bush near electric pole at Amlibhouna road  and  stated  of  keeping  the bag in his home on returning and of keeping the pillow with which he had pressed the nose and mouth of the deceased and the towel with which he had wiped the blood and semen on his penis, in his room and stated of getting the dead body of the   deceased,   her   pants,   pillow   and   towel recovered.” 30. The memorandum statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was duly executed and the same was marked as   Ex.­P.11.     The   prosecution   has   examined   PW­3­Raju Khan, who is a witness to the said memorandum statement. 31. PW­19 further stated that thereafter, in the presence of the witnesses, he recovered a blue plastic bag bearing a map of India and the text “No.1 Dal Best Quality Dal”, which had been tied with a plastic rope.   He got the bag cut open by 20 Raju   Khan   (PW­3)   in   the   presence   of   the   father   of   the deceased (PW­2) and other witnesses.  In the said sack, the dead body of the victim soaked in blood and in a naked condition was found.  The body was identified by PW­2, who is the father of the deceased.   The recovery panchnama is duly executed under Ex.­P.12.  The prosecution has relied on the evidence of PW­3, who was a panch witness to the said panchnama. The said recovery on the memorandum of the appellant 32. under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, has been attacked by the defence on the ground that the same is from an open place, accessible to one and all.  In this respect, it is apposite to rely on the following observations of this Court in the case 6 of  :    State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh “26.  There   is   nothing   in   Section   27   of   the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused   inadmissible  if  recovery  of   the   articles was   made   from   any   place   which   is   “open   or accessible to others”. It is a fallacious notion that when recovery  of  any  incriminating  article  was made from a place which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27   of   the   Evidence   Act.   Any   object   can   be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried in 6 (1999) 4 SCC 370 21 the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disinterred, its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact   to   any   other   person.   Hence,   the   crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to  others   or   not  but  whether   it  was   ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others.”   It could thus be seen that this Court has held that what is relevant is not whether the place was accessible to others or not, but whether it was ordinarily visible to others.  If the place at which the article hidden is such where only the person hiding it knows until he discloses that fact to any other   person,   then   it   will   be   immaterial   whether   the concealed place is accessible to others. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following 33. observations of this Court in the case of   John Pandian v. 7 :  State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu “ 57.  It   was   then   urged   by   the   learned   counsel that this was an open place and anybody could have planted veechu aruval. That appears to be a very   remote   possibility.   Nobody   can   simply produce   a   veechu   aruval   planted   under   the 7 (2010) 14 SCC 129 22 thorny   bush.   The   discovery   appears   to   be credible. It has been accepted by both the courts below and we find no reason to discard it. This is apart from the fact that this weapon was sent to the forensic science laboratory (FSL) and it has been found stained with human blood. Though the blood group could not be ascertained, as the results were inconclusive, the accused had to give some   explanation   as   to   how   the   human   blood came   on   this   weapon.   He   gave   none.   This discovery   would   very   positively   further   the prosecution case.” A perusal of the material placed on record would reveal 34. that the dead body of the deceased was recovered on the basis of the information supplied by the appellant that he had concealed the body in a sack in the bushes near a pole beside   the   road   in   Amlibhauna.     The   evidence   of   PW­7­ Krishna Kumar Jaiswal, Photographer would reveal that after he received the notice, he went to the spot and clicked the photographs (Ex.­P.23).   He has further stated that he has also made the videography of the entire procedure. 35. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following observations made by the High Court in para (35) of the impugned judgment: “ 35.     We   have   gone   through   the   video   movie prepared and after watching the video, we are of 23 the view that the recovery of dead body was made from   a   place   which   cannot   be   said   to   be accessible   to   an   ordinary   person   without   prior knowledge   as   the   body   recovered   was   kept concealed   in   a   gunny   bag   inside   the   shrubs situated   at   sufficient   distance   from   the   main road. In the statement under Section 313 CrPC, the accused/appellant failed to explain how he came   to   know   that   the   deceased   had   been murdered   and   thrown   in   the   shrubs   after wrapping her in a gunny bag……..” It could thus be seen that the High Court had itself viewed the video and on seeing the same, it was of the view that the recovery of the dead body was made from a place, which cannot be said to be accessible to an ordinary person without prior knowledge since the body recovered was kept concealed   in   a   gunny   bag   inside   the   shrubs   situated   at sufficient distance from the main road.   36. Insofar as the reliance placed by the appellant on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Krishan Mohar Singh 8 Dugal v. State of Goa   is concerned, in the said case, the accused   was   convicted   for   the   offence   punishable   under Section   20(b)(ii)   of   the   Narcotic   Drugs   and   Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, solely on the basis of recovery at the 8 (1999) 8 SCC 552 24 instance   of   the   accused   on   the   basis   of   memorandum statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.  In the said case, the recovery was from a place under the coconut tree, which was accessible to one and all. It was not a case of concealment in a place, which was only within the knowledge of the person concealing it.  In any event, in the said case, the conviction was solely on the basis of the said recovery and as such, was found to be untenable.   Insofar as the reliance placed by the appellant on the 37. judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Nilesh   Dinkar 9 is concerned, in the Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra   said   case,   the   conviction   was   solely   on   the   basis   of identification  by  voice  and  as  such,  was  not  found  to be tenable.  As such, these cases would not be of any assistance to the case of the appellant. It   has   been   sought   to   be   urged   on   behalf   of   the 38. appellant that from the evidence of PW­9­Chameli Sarthi, it is clear that the police already knew about the place where the dead body was concealed.   PW­9 had taken the dead body of the deceased to District Hospital, Raigarh.  It will be 9 (2011) 4 SCC 143 25 apposite to refer to the relevant portion of the deposition of PW­9:  “We went to the place of incident Amlibhowna at 6 a.m. from the outpost.  From there, we directly went to the hospital with all.   Today, I cannot state at what time we left the place of incident Amlibhowna.  The witness now says, “Perhaps we left at 8­9 O’ clock.   Along with Prakash Tiwari, Sub­Inspector Amit Patle was also present with me and policemen from other police station were also present. Two person were going ahead taking the   dead   body   in   an   auto­rickshaw,   we   were following by our bikes.” PW­9   stated   that   she   went   to   the   place   of   incident Amlibhauna at 06.00 am from the outpost.  It is to be noted that according to the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 19, PW­3 informed PW­19 about the incident at around 06.00 am.  The said information was registered in the Rojnamcha at around 06.10 am.  What is stated by this witness is that she went to Amlibhauna   which   is   a   locality.     However,   that   by   itself would  not be  sufficient to  come  to  a  conclusion  that  the police already knew about the place from where the dead body was recovered.   She stated that she had left for the hospital at around 08.00­09.00 o’clock.   The evidence of a witness cannot be read in piecemeal.  The evidence has to be 26 read as a whole.  If the evidence of this witness is read as a whole, the attack on her evidence is not justified.   In any case, the recovery of the body on the information given by the appellant,   is   duly   proved   by   the   memorandum   of   the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (Ex.­P.11) and the recovery panchnama (Ex.­P.12). That apart, the oral testimony of PWs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 19 corroborates the same. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   the 39. prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the recovery   of   the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   on   the memorandum   of   the   appellant   under   Section   27   of   the Evidence   Act,   was   from   a   place   distinctly   within   the knowledge of the appellant.   Another   circumstance   against   the   appellant   is   the 40. recovery of the black jeans half pant of the deceased (Ex.­ P.15) from the dumping area and the   gamchha   and pillow (Ex.­P.16) from the house of the appellant.  PW­3 is a panch witness to the recovery of black jeans half pant (Ex.­P.15). He is also a witness to the spot panchnama (Ex.­P.17) where the worship was conducted.  It is further noted that on the 27 gamchha  seized from the house of the appellant, blood­stains were found.  Much attack has been made by the defence on the   ground   that   the   FSL   Report   does   not   connect   the appellant   with   the   said   blood   found   on   gamchha .     To consider   this   submission,   we   may   gainfully   refer   to   the following observations of this Court in the case of  R. Shaji v. 10 State of Kerala :   “ 30.  It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the blood group of the bloodstains found on the chopper could not be ascertained,   the   recovery   of   the   said   chopper cannot be relied upon. 31.  A failure by the serologist  to detect the origin of  the  blood  due  to  disintegration  of  the  serum does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe could   not   have   been   human   blood   at   all . Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain is insufficient in itself, or due to haematological changes   and   plasmatic   coagulation,   that   a serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood in question. However, in such a case, unless the doubt   is   of   a   reasonable   dimension,   which   a judicially conscientious mind may entertain with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused in this regard. Once the recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by the   accused,   the   matching   or   non­matching   of blood   group(s)   loses   significance.   (Vide  Prabhu Babaji   Navle  v.  State   of   Bombay  [AIR   1956   SC 51   :   1956   Cri   LJ   147]   ,  Raghav   Prapanna Tripathi  v.  State of U.P.  [AIR 1963 SC 74 : (1963) 10 (2013) 14 SCC 266 28 1   Cri   LJ   70]   ,  State   of   Rajasthan  v.  Teja Ram  [(1999)   3   SCC   507   :   1999   SCC   (Cri) 436] ,  Gura Singh  v.  State of Rajasthan  [(2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323 : AIR 2001 SC 330] ,  John   Pandian  v.  State  [(2010)   14   SCC   129   : (2011)   3   SCC   (Cri)   550]   and  Sunil   Clifford Daniel  v.  State   of   Punjab  [(2012)   11   SCC   205   : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 438] .) 32.  In view of the above, the Court finds that it is not possible to accept the submission that in the absence of a report regarding the origin of the blood, the accused cannot be convicted, for it is only because of the lapse of time that the blood could not be classified successfully. Therefore, no advantage can be conferred upon the accused to enable him to claim any benefit, and the report of disintegration of blood, etc. cannot be termed as a missing link, on the basis of which the chain of circumstances may be presumed to be broken.”   41. The next circumstance is the finding of the blood­stains on the nail clipping of the appellant.  PW­8­Kishore Shrivas is a barber.  He has stated that on being called by the police, he cut the nails of both the hands of the appellant.  The said nails   were   cut   under   the   panchnama   Ex.­P.19,   which   is signed   by   the   said   barber   as   well   as   PW­3.     The   said circumstance is attacked on the ground that the IO had not called   the   forensic   team   for   seizure   of   the   said   nails. However, even if this circumstance is excluded, we find that the other circumstances, which have been discussed in detail 29 by us in the foregoing paragraphs, conclusively bring home the guilt of the appellant.  42. The   panchnamas   are   sought   to   be   attacked   on   the ground   that PW­3  is  the   only  panch witness  to  all these panchnamas.   We   are   of   the   view   that   this   contention deserves no merit in the light of the following observations of this   Court   in   the   case   of   Himachal   Pradesh Administration  (supra):  “  Further having held this it nonetheless said 10. that there was no injunction against the same set of   witnesses   being   present   at   the   successive enquiries if nothing could be urged against them. In our view the evidence relating to recoveries is not similar to that contemplated under Section 103   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code   where searches are required to be made in the presence of two or more inhabitants of the locality in which the   place   to   be   searched   is   situate.   In   an investigation   under   Section   157   the   recoveries could be proved even by the solitary evidence of the   Investigating   Officer   if   his   evidence   could otherwise be believed. We cannot as a matter of law or practice lay down that where recoveries have to be effected from different places on the information   furnished   by   the   accused   different sets   of  persons   should  be   called  in   to  witness them. In this case PW 2 and PW 8 who worked with   the   deceased   were   the   proper   persons   to witness the recoveries as they could identify some of   the   things   that   were   missing   and   also   they could   both   speak   to   the   information   and   the recovery   made   in   consequence   thereof   as   a 30 continuous   process.   At   any   rate   PW   2   who   is alleged to be the most interested was not present at the time of the recovery of the dagger.”   43. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   the prosecution   has   established   the   following   circumstances beyond reasonable doubt: (i) The victim was reported missing and an FIR was lodged in this regard; (ii) The   appellant   had   claimed   that   he   could disclose   the  whereabouts  of   the   victim  by performing a worship; (iii) The said worship came to be conducted by th the   appellant   in   the   early   hours   of   25 February 2016 in the presence of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5 and the appellant disclosed to them that the dead body of the victim was inside a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in Amlibhauna; (iv) A suspicion arose in the minds of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5 and they immediately informed the police. The said information is recorded in Rojnamcha No. 2 under Ex.­P.38; (v) Police   immediately   reached   the   spot   and interrogated the appellant. On interrogation, a   memorandum   under   Section   27   of   the Evidence Act came to be recorded; 31 (vi) On   the   basis   of   memorandum   of   the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the dead body of the victim (Ex.­P.12) was   recovered   from   a   sack   which   was concealed   by   the   appellant   under   the bushes   from   a   place   distinctly   within   his knowledge; and (vii) On a memorandum of the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, a black jeans half   pant   of   the   victim   (Ex.­P.15)   and   a gamchha   of   the   appellant   (Ex.­P.16),   were recovered from the dumping area behind D Block in Nagar Nigam Colony and the house of the appellant respectively. 44. We are of the considered view that the aforesaid proven circumstances   establish   a   chain   of   circumstances,   which leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of the appellant. Apart from that, in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., though all these incriminating circumstances have   been   put   to   the   appellant,   he   has   not   offered   any explanation except saying that it is wrong and false.  In this respect, we may refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of  Sharad Birdhichand Sarda  (supra):   32 “ 151.  It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. This   is   trite   law   and   no   decision   has   taken   a contrary view. What some cases have held is only this   :   where   various   links   in   a   chain   are   in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence   may   be   called   into   aid   only   to   lend assurance   to  the   court.  In  other  words,  before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where   there   is   any   infirmity   or   lacuna   in   the prosecution   case,   the   same   could   be   cured   or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a court.   It is trite law that though the false explanation cannot 45. be   taken   to   complete   a   missing   link   in   the   chain   of circumstances,   it   can   surely   be   taken   to   fortify   the conclusion of conviction recorded on the basis of the proven incriminating   circumstances.   We   find   that   the   non­ explanation of the circumstances would fortify the finding, which is based on the chain of incriminating circumstances that   leads   to   no   other   conclusion   than   the   guilt   of   the appellant. 46. An   important   aspect   arises   for   consideration   in   the present appeals so also in the various other appeals where the   accused   is   not   given   an   appropriate   opportunity   of 33 defending the case.   In the present case, we find that the th th charges were framed on 6  May 2016.  On 6  June 2016, the accused appeared before the court and submitted that he was not competent to engage a lawyer at his own cost.  As such, the trial judge appointed Shri Kamlesh Saraf from the Panel as the lawyer to represent the accused.   Immediately on the next day, the evidence of PWs 3 to 7 were recorded. The trial judge passed the judgment and order of conviction th on 17   June 2016 and also awarded death penalty on the same day.   We find that though a speedy trial is desirable, however,   sufficient   time   ought   to   have   been   given   to   the counsel for the accused to prepare for the case after he was appointed.   Even   insofar   as   the   award   of   sentence   is concerned, some period ought to have been given between the date of conviction and the award of sentence, specifically when   a   death   penalty   was   awarded.     However,   from   the evidence which we have scrutinized in depth, we do not find that any prejudice was caused to the accused inasmuch as the   witnesses   have   been   cross­examined   in   detail   by   the lawyer appointed by the court. 34 47. That leaves us with the question of sentence.  We will have to consider as to whether the capital punishment in the present case is warranted or not.  48. Recently,   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Mohd.   Mannan 11 , after considering alias Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar earlier judgments of this Court on the present issue in the 12 cases of   Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab   and   Machhi 13 , observed thus:   Singh and Others v. State of Punjab   “72.  The proposition of law which emerges from the   judgments  referred   to above   is  itself  death sentence cannot be imposed except in the rarest of rare cases, for which special reasons have to be recorded, as mandated in Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In deciding whether a case falls within the category of the rarest of rare, the   brutality,   and/or   the   gruesome   and/or heinous   nature   of   the   crime   is   not   the   sole criterion. It is not just the crime which the Court is   to   take   into   consideration,   but   also   the criminal,   the   state   of   his   mind,   his   socio­ economic   background,   etc.   Awarding   death sentence is an exception, and life imprisonment is the rule.” 49. This Bench, recently, in the case of   Mofil Khan and 14 , has observed thus:  Another v. The State of Jharkhand 11 (2019) 16 SCC 584 12 (1980) 2 SCC 684 13 (1983) 3 SCC 470 14 RP(Criminal)   No.   641/2015   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.1795/2009   dated 26.11.2021 35 “ 8. One of the mitigating circumstances is the probability   of   the   accused   being   reformed   and rehabilitated.   The   State   is   under   a   duty   to procure   evidence   to   establish   that   there   is   no possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the accused.   Death   sentence   ought   not   to   be imposed,   save   in   the   rarest   of   the   rare   cases when   the   alternative   option   of   a   lesser punishment   is   unquestionably   foreclosed   (See: Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab   (1980) 2 SCC 684).   To   satisfy   that   the   sentencing   aim   of reformation   is   unachievable,   rendering   life imprisonment   completely   futile,   the   Court   will have to highlight clear evidence as to why the convict is not fit for any kind of reformatory and rehabilitation scheme. This analysis can only be done with rigour when the Court focuses on the circumstances relating to the criminal, along with other   circumstances   (See:   Santosh   Kumar Satishbhushan  Bariyar  v.  State   of   Maharashtra (2009)   6   SCC   498).   In   Rajendra   Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra   (2019) 12 SCC 460,   this   Court   dealt   with   the   review   of   a judgment of this Court confirming death sentence and observed as under:  “45.   The   law   laid   down   by   various decisions   of   this   Court   clearly   and unequivocally   mandates   that   the probability   (not   possibility   or improbability   or   impossibility)   that   a convict   can   be   reformed   and rehabilitated   in   society   must   be seriously and earnestly considered by the courts before awarding the death sentence. This is one of the mandates of the “special reasons” requirement of Section 354(3) CrPC and ought not to be   taken   lightly   since   it   involves snuffing   out   the   life   of   a   person.   To effectuate   this   mandate,   it   is   the obligation on the prosecution to prove 36 to the court, through evidence, that the probability is that the convict cannot be reformed or rehabilitated. This can be   achieved   by   bringing   on   record, inter alia, material about his conduct in jail, his conduct outside jail if he has been   on   bail   for   some   time,   medical evidence   about   his   mental   make­up, contact   with   his   family   and   so   on. Similarly,   the   convict   can   produce evidence on these issues as well.”” 50. In the present case, it is to be noted that the trial court had convicted the appellant and imposed death penalty on the very same day. The trial court as well as the High Court has only taken into consideration the crime but they have not taken into consideration the criminal, his state of mind, his socio­economic background, etc.  At this juncture, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of   Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of 15 Maharashtra : “ 47.  Consideration   of   the   reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration of the convict into society cannot be overemphasised. Until  Bachan Singh  [ Bachan Singh  v.  State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] , the emphasis given by the courts was primarily on the nature of the   crime,   its   brutality   and   severity.  Bachan Singh  [ Bachan Singh  v.  State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC   684   :   1980   SCC   (Cri)   580]   placed   the 15 (2019) 12 SCC 460 37 sentencing   process   into   perspective   and introduced   the   necessity   of   considering   the reformation   or   rehabilitation   of   the   convict. Despite the view expressed by the Constitution Bench, there have been several instances, some of   which   have   been   pointed   out in  Bariyar  [ Santosh   Kumar   Satishbhushan Bariyar  v.  State   of   Maharashtra ,   (2009)   6   SCC 498   :   (2009)   2   SCC   (Cri)   1150]   and in  Sangeet  v.  State   of   Haryana  [ Sangeet  v.  State of Haryana , (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri)   611]   where   there   is   a   tendency   to   give primacy to the crime and consider the criminal in a   somewhat   secondary   manner.   As   observed in  Sangeet  [ Sangeet  v.  State of Haryana , (2013) 2 SCC   452   :   (2013)   2   SCC   (Cri)   611]   “In   the sentencing   process,   both   the   crime   and   the criminal   are   equally   important.”   Therefore,   we should   not   forget   that   the   criminal,   however ruthless he might be, is nevertheless a human being   and   is   entitled   to   a   life   of   dignity notwithstanding his crime. Therefore, it is for the prosecution and the courts to determine whether such a person, notwithstanding his crime, can be reformed and rehabilitated. To obtain and analyse this information is certainly not an easy task but must nevertheless be undertaken. The process of rehabilitation is also not a simple one since it involves   social   reintegration  of   the   convict  into society.   Of   course,   notwithstanding   any information made available and its analysis by experts   coupled   with   the   evidence   on   record, there   could   be   instances   where   the   social reintegration of the convict may not be possible. If that should happen, the option of a long duration of imprisonment is permissible.” 51. In view of the settled legal position, it is our bounden duty to take into consideration the probability of the accused 38 being reformed and rehabilitated.  It is also our duty to take into consideration not only the crime but also the criminal, his state of mind and his socio­economic conditions.   52. The appellant is a young person, who was 23 years old at the time of commission of the offence. He comes from a rural background. The State has not placed any evidence to show that there is no possibility with respect to reformation and the rehabilitation of the accused.  The High Court as well as the trial court also has not taken into consideration this aspect of the matter.  The appellant has placed on record the affidavits   of   Leeladhar   Shrivas,   younger   brother   of   the appellant as well as Ghasanin Shrivas, elder sister of the appellant.  A perusal of the affidavits would reveal that the appellant   comes   from   a   small   village   called   Pusalda   in Raigarh district of Chhattisgarh.  His father was earning his livelihood as a barber.  The appellant was studious and hard­ working.   He did really well at school and made consistent efforts to bring the family out of poverty.  The conduct of the appellant in the prison has been found to be satisfactory. There are no criminal antecedents.   It is the first offence committed by the appellant. No doubt, a heinous one.  The 39 appellant is not a hardened criminal.  It therefore cannot be said   that   there   is   no   possibility   of   the   appellant   being reformed and rehabilitated foreclosing the alternative option of a lesser sentence and making imposition of death sentence imperative.   53. A bench consisting of three Judges of this Court had an occasion to consider similar facts in the case of   Sunil v. 16 State   of   Madhya   Pradesh .   In   the   said   case   too,   the appellant­accused   was   around   25   years   of   age   who   had taken away a minor girl.  The accused had committed rape on the said minor and caused her death due to asphyxia caused by strangulation.  The trial court had sentenced the accused   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 302 of the IPC and awarded him death penalty.  The same was upheld by the High Court.  In appeal, this Court held thus:  “ 12.  In the present case, we do not find that the requirements spelt out in  Bachan Singh  [ Bachan Singh  v.  State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC   (Cri)   580]   and   the   pronouncements thereafter had engaged the attention of either of the   courts.   In   the   present   case,   one   of   the compelling/mitigating   circumstances   that   must 16 (2017) 4 SCC 393 40 be   acknowledged   in   favour   of   the   appellant­ accused   is   the   young   age   at   which   he   had committed the crime. The fact that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated; the probability that   the   accused   would   not   commit   similar criminal acts; that the accused would not be a continuing   threat   to   the   society,   are   the   other circumstances   which   could   not   but   have   been ignored by the learned trial court and the High Court. 13.  We have considered the matter in the light of the above. On such consideration, we are of the view that in the present case, the ends of justice would   be   met   if   we   commute   the   sentence   of death   into   one   of   life   imprisonment.   We   order accordingly.   The   punishments   awarded   for   the offences under Sections 363, 367 and 376(2)( f ) IPC by the learned trial court and affirmed by the High Court are maintained.” 54. We are also inclined to adopt the same reasoning and follow the same course as adopted by this Court in the case of   (supra).   The appeals are therefore partly allowed. Sunil   The   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   for   the   offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i), 377, 201, 302 read   with   Section   376A   of   the   IPC   and   Section   6   of   the POCSO   Act   is   maintained.     However,   the   death   penalty imposed   on   the   appellant   under   Section   302   IPC   is commuted to life imprisonment.  The sentences awarded for 41 the rest of the offences by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court, are maintained. 55. Before we part with the judgment, we must appreciate the   valuable   assistance   rendered   by   Shri   Anand   Grover, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent­State. ……....….......................J.   [L. NAGESWARA RAO] ……....….......................J.  [B.R. GAVAI]        ……….........................J.        [B.V. NAGARATHNA] NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 14, 2021. 42