Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SHRI BALAGANESAN METALS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI M.N. SHANMUGHAM CHETTY & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/04/1987
BENCH:
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
BENCH:
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 1668 1987 SCR (2)1173
1987 SCC (2) 707 JT 1987 (2) 247
1987 SCALE (1)1110
CITATOR INFO :
R 1987 SC2166 (1)
RF 1989 SC 302 (4)
RF 1989 SC 682 (12)
F 1989 SC1420 (10)
ACT:
Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960:
ss. 2(2) and 10(3)(a) & (c)--Eviction--Bona fide requirement
for additional accommodation--Comparative hardship--Consid-
eration of Building’--Whether includes part of a building.
Statutory Interpretation.
Provisions of Statutes--Not to be interpreted so as to
render any other provision otiose.
Words & Phrases: Expression ’as the case may be--Connec-
tion of Word ’Any ’--Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
Clause (c) of sub-s. (3) of s. 10 of the Tamil Nadu
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, enables a
landlord occupying only a part of a building, whether resi-
dential or non-residential, to seek eviction of a tenant
occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of
the building, notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (a),
for bona fide requirement of additional accommodation. The
first proviso thereto enjoins the Rent Controller to reject
the application of the landlord under that clause even where
the need is found to be genuine, if the hardship caused to
the tenant would outweigh the advantage to the landlord.
Sub-clause (i) of cl. (a) of s. 10(3) enables eviction from
residential building if the landlord or any member of his
family is not occupying a residential building of his own in
the city, while sub-cl. (iii) enable eviction from non-
residential building if the landlord or any member of his
family is not occupying for purposes of a business a non-
residential building in the city. A ’building’ is defined in
s. 2(2) to mean any building or hut or part of a building or
hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-
residential purposes.
The respondent-legatees of the landlady, using the first
floor of the building for residence sought eviction of the
appellant-tenant from the ground floor used by him as a
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godown for storing his business wares on the ground that
they bona fide required additional accommodation
1174
for their residential needs. The Rein Controller upheld
their claim. The Appellate Authority reversed the findings
of the Rent Controller but in revision the High Court re-
stored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller.
In this Appeal by Special leave it was contended that
since the ground floor constituted a building by itself
within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Act. the respondents
could seek eviction of the appellant only under s.
10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under s. 10(3)(c), that even
if the respondents were entitled to invoke s. 10(3)(c) they
could seek eviction only if they required the ground floor
for non-residential purposes and not for residential pur-
poses, that the factors of relative hardship between the
parties weighed more in favour of the appellant than the
respondents, and that the High Court was in error in inter-
fering with the findings of fact rendered by the Appellate
Authority while exercising its revisional powers under s. 25
of the Act.
Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,
HELD: 1.1 The ground floor of the building in occupation
of the appellant did not constitute a distinct and separate
unit. The respondent-landlords could. therefore seek evic-
tion under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act.
1.2 A ’building’ has been defined in s. 2(2) of the Act
as not only a building or hut but also part of a building or
hut, let separately for residential or non-residential
purposes, which could only means that a part of a building
that has been let out or that has to be let out separately
can also be construed as a separate and independent building
without reference to the other portion or portions of the
building where it is not necessary to treat the entire
building as one whole and inseparable unit. A limitation has
thereby been placed by the Legislature itself, by providing
that the application of the definition is subject to the
contextual position. It follows therefrom that where the
context warrants. the entire building being construed as one
integral unit. It would be inappropriate to view the build-
ing as consisting of several disintegrated units and not as
one integrated structure.
1.3 In enacting s. 10(3)(c) the Legislature has intended
that the entire building. irrespective of one portion being
occupied by the landlord and the other portion or portions
being occupied by a tenant or tenants should be viewed as
one whole and integrated unit and not as different entities.
1175
1.4 There is vast difference between the words "residen-
tial building" and "non-residential building" used in s.
10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand and s. 10(3)(c) on the
other. While s. 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) refer to a building
only as residential or non-residential, s. 10(3)(c) refers
to a landlord occupying a part of a building, whether resi-
dential or non-residential. Furthermore, s. 10(3)(c) states
that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order of
eviction being passed against the tenant occupying the whole
or any portion of the remaining part of the building.
1.5 TO import the expansive definition of the word
"building" in s. 2(2) into s. 10(3)(c) would result in
rendering meaningless the words "part of a building" occu-
pied by the landlord and a tenant "occupying the whole or
any portion of the remaining part of the building", leaving
no scope for such a landlord to seek eviction.
1.6 The provisions of an Act should be interpreted in
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such a manner as pot to render any of its provisions otiose
unless there are compelling reasons for the Court to resort
to the extreme contingency. If a portion of a building let
out to a tenant is to be treated in all situations as a
separate and independent building then s. 10(3)(c) will be
rendered otiose because the landlord can never then ask for
additional accommodation since s. 10(3)(a) does not provide
for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional accommo-
dation for the landlord either for residential or non-resi-
dential purposes.
Saraswathi Sriraman v.P.C.R. Chetty’s Charities, [1972]
2 M.L.J. 515; Mohammed Jaffar v. Palaniappa Chettiar, [1964]
1 M .L.J. 112 and Cheilaromal v. Accommodation Controller,
[1967] 2 M.L.J. 453, approved.
2.1 It cannot be said that a landlord can seek addition-
al accommodation for residence only if the building is a
residential one and likewise he can seek additional accommo-
dation for business purposes only if the building is a non-
residential one.
2.2 Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations, viz.
a landlord occupying a part of a building which is residen-
tial or non-residential. The words used in it arc "any
tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be called upon to vacate
the portion in his occupation. Unless the legislature had
intended that both classes of tenant i.e. residential or
nonresidential, can be asked to vacate by the Rent Control-
ler for providing landlord the additional accommodation it
would not have used the
1176
words "any" instead of using the letter "a" to denote a
tenant. Further, the words "as the case may be" in cl. (0)
only mean "whichever the case may be", i.e. either residen-
tial or non-residential. They do not restrict the landlord’s
right to secure additional accommodation for residential
purposes only in respect of a residential building and in
the case of additional accommodation for business purposes
only to a non-residential building.
2.3 Section 10(3)(c) stands on a different footing from
s. 10(3)(a) (i) and s. 10(3)(a)(iii). The non-obstante
clause has been added to cl. (c) to give it an overriding
effect over both the restrictions placed by cls. (a)(i) and
(a)(iii), viz., landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should
not be occupying a building of his own and secondly the
nature of user of the leased property by the tenant must
correspond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord.
Thus, the requirement of additional accommodation under cl.
(c) is not a case of a landlord not occupying a residential
or non-residential building of his own but a case of a
landlord occupying a part of a residential or non-residen-
tial building of his own and putting it to such user as
deemed fit by him. If it was the intention of the legisla-
ture that only a tenant occupying a residential portion of a
building can be asked to vacate for providing additional
residential accommodation to the landlord and corresponding-
ly a tenant occupying a portion of a building for non-resi-
dential purposes alone being asked to vacate for the non-
residential requirements of the landlord. it would have
provided specific stipulation to that effect in cl. (c).
In the instant case. the requirement of additional
accommodation pertains to the need of the landlord and the
manner of user of the portion of the building already in his
occupation and consequently the bona fides of his require-
ment will outweigh all the restrictions imposed by s.
10(3)(a).
K. Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, (AIR 1965: 220). approved.
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Thirupathi v. Kanta Rao. [1981] Vol. 1 ILR Madras 128
overruled.
3. Once a landlord is able to satisfy the Controller
that he is bona fide in need of additional accommodation for
residential or nonresidential purposes and that the advan-
tage derived by him by an order of eviction will outweigh
the hardship caused to the tenant. then he is entitled to an
order of eviction irrespective of any other consideration.
1177
4. The Rent Controller has gone into the question of
comparative hardship and rendered a finding in favour or the
respondents. The Appellate Authority’s findings have been
vitiated because of its non advertance to the evidence and
application of wrong tests in assessing the comparative
hardship between the parties. The High Court, was. there-
fore, entitled to allow the revision.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1314 of
1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.9.1978 of the
Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 782 of
1977.
A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant.
S. Padmanabhan and M. Raghuraman for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
NATARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is by a
tenant against whom an order of eviction passed under Sec-
tion 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the "Act", by
the Rent Controller was restored by the High Court of Madras
after setting aside the dismissal of the eviction petition
by the Appellate Authority.
The facts are not in controversy and may briefly be set
out as under. A one-storeyed building in Wall Tax Road,
Madras was originally owned by one Unnamalai Ammal. She was
using the first floor for her residence and had leased out
the ground floor to the appellant herein to be used as a
godown for storing his business ware. It is common ground
the appellant’s shop is situate in an adjoining building.
The tease was for a period of 10 years with an option for
renewal for a further period of 5 years. Unnamalai Ammal
however refused to renew the lease and filed a suit against
the appellant for eviction on the ground she bona fide.
required the ground floor also for her residential use. The
suit did not meet with success. Unnamalai Ammal bequeathed
the property to her son-in-law and grand son who are the
respondents herein. As legatees of the premises the respond-
ents filed a petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act
praying for eviction of the appellant on the ground they
bona fide required additional accommodation for their resi-
dential needs. The Rent Controller upheld their claim, after
finding the relevant factors of bona fide need and com-
1178
parative hardship in their favour and ordered eviction. On
appeal by the appellant, the Appellant Authority reversed
the findings of the Rent Controller and further held that
the respondent were not entitled to recover possession of
non-residential premises for their residential requirements
and dismissed the petition for eviction. On further revision
to the High Court by the respondents Remaprasada Rao, C.J.
set aside the order of the Appellant Authority and resorted
the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. The
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aggrieved tenant has preferred this appeal.
The judgment under appeal is assailed by the appellant
on four grounds viz. (1) Since the ground floor constitutes
a building by itself within the meaning of Section 2(2) of
the Act, the respondents can seek eviction of the appellant
only under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under
Section 10(3)(c);
(2) Even if the respondents are entitled to invoke
Section 10(3)(c) they can seek eviction only if they require
the ground floor for non-residential purposes and not for
residential purposes;
(3) In any event the factors of relative hardship be-
tween the parties weigh more in favour of the appellant than
the respondent; and
(4) The High Court was in error in interfering with the
findings of fact rendered by the Appellate Authority while
exercising its revisional powers under Section 25 of the
Act.
Before proceeding to examine the merits of the conten-
tions, it will be relevant to state a few facts. The ground
floor, though used as a godown, is of a residential pattern
and consists of two rooms and a hall besides a kitchen and
toilet rooms. The first floor is being used as their resi-
dence by the respondents, the other members of the family
being the wife and daughter of the second respondent. The
first floor consists of only two rooms and it is the case of
the respondents that the accommodation in the first floor
has become inadequate for their growing residential needs.
It is also their case that the first respondent who is over
65 years of age finds it difficult to climb the stairs on
account of his old age and frail health. Their further plea
is that the water supply to the first floor is inadequate in
spite of the electric motor and pump set installed in the
ground floor to pump up water. In contrast the appellant is
said to have a spacious three-storeyed building in Door No.
39 adjoining the leased premises and also to have another
godown close by.
1179
One of the contentions of the appellant was that the
eviction proceedings were a continuation of the unsuccessful
attempt by Unnamalai Ammal herself to get the tenant evicted
and, therefore, the eviction petition lacked bona fides. The
High Court has rejected his contention and in our opinion,
rightly too, because the respondents who are the legatees of
the building cannot be attributed mala fides because of the
earlier eviction suit filed by their predecessor in title.
We may also dispose of another contention of the appellant
at this juncture itself which had found favour with the
Appellate Authority. The contention was that with the death
of Unnamalai Ammal the family had become smaller and hence
there was no need for additional accommodation. This argu-
ment overlooks the fact that additional accommodation is
sought for because of the difficulty experienced by the
first respondent in climbing the stairs in his old age and
the need for the second respondent’s daughter, growing in
years, to have a room all for herself for keeping her books
and reading at home.
We will now proceed to consider the legal contentions of
the appellant in seriatim. The first and foremost contention
was that under the Act the ground floor constitutes a sepa-
rate building and as such the respondents can seek recovery
of possession of the ground floor only under Section
10(3)(a)(i) and not under Section 10(3)(c). For dealing with
this contention, the relevant provisions of the Act need
setting out.
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Section 2 which is the definition Section
reads as under:-
"Definitions:- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires--
(2) "building" means any building or
hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be
let separately for residential or non-residen-
tial purpose and includes--
(a) .........
(b) .........
Section 10 sets out the grounds on which the
eviction of a tenant can be ordered. For our
purpose it is enough to refer to the following
provisions alone:-
"Section 10(3)(a):- A landlord may, subject to
the
1180
provisions of clause (d), apply to the Con-
troller for an order directing the tenant to
put the landlord in possession of the build-
ing--
(i) in case it is a residential
building, if the landlord requires it for his
own occupation or for the occupation of any
member of his family and if he or any member
of his family is not occupying a residential
building of his own in the city, town or
village concerned;
(ii) ommitted
(iii) in case it is any other non-residential
building if the landlord or any member of his
family is not occupying for purposes of a
business which he or any member of his family
is carrying on, non-residential building in
the city, town or village concerned which is
his own:
(b) ommitted.
(c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of
a building, whether residential or non-resi-
dential, may, notwithstanding anything con-
tained in clause (a), apply to the Controller
for an order directing any tenant occupying
the whole or any portion of the remaining part
of the building to put the landlord in posses-
sion thereof, it he requires additional accom-
modation for residential purposes or for
purposes of a business which he is carrying
on, as the case may be.
Provided that, in the case of an application
under clause (c), the Controller, shall reject
the application if he is satisfied that the
hardship which may be caused to the tenant by
granting it will outweigh the advantage to the
landlord:
Provided further that the Controller may give
the tenant a reasonable time for putting the
landlord in possession of the building and may
extend such time so as not to exceed three
months in the aggregate."
It is no doubt true that under Section 2(2) a building
has been. defined as not building or hut but also part of a
building or hut let separately for residential or non-resi-
dential purpose. That would, however, only mean that a part
of a building which has been let out or which is to be let
out separately can also be construed as a separate and
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1181
independent building without reference to the other portion
or portions of the building where it is not necessary to
treat the entire building as one Whole and inseparable unit.
A limitation on the definition has been placed by the Legis-
lature itself by providing that the application of the
definition is subject to the contextual position. Therefore,
it follows that where the context warrants the entire build-
ing being construed as one integral unit, it would be inap-
propriate to view the building as consisting of several
disintegerated units and not as one integerated structure.
Secondly there is vast difference between the words "resi-
dential building" and "non-residential building" used in
Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand and Section
10(3)(c) on the other. While Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii)
refer to a building only as residential or non-residential
Section 10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a pan of a
building, ’whether residential or non-residential. (Emphasis
supplied). Further-more, Section 10(3)(c) states that a
landlord may apply to the Controller for an order of evic-
tion being passed against the tenant "occupying the whole or
any portion of the remaining pan of the building" (Emphasis
supplied). If as contended by the appellant each portion of
a building let out separately should always be construed as
an independent unit by itself then there is no scope for a
landlord occupying "a part of a building" seeking eviction
of a tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building". It is, therefore, obvious
that in so far as Section 10(3)(c) is concerned the Legisla-
ture has intended that the entire building, irrespective of
one portion being occupied by the landlord and the other
portion or portions being occupied by a tenant or tenants
should be viewed as one whole and integrated unit and not as
different entities. To import the expansive definition of
the word "building" in Section 2(2) into section 10(3)(c)
would result in rendering meaningless the words "part of a
building" occupied by the landlord and a tenant "occupying
the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the build-
ing". The third factor militating against the contention of
the appellant is that if a portion of a building let out to
a tenant is to be treated in all situations as a separate
and independent building then Section 10(3)(c) will be
rendered otiose because the landlord can never then ask for
additional accommodation since Section 10(3)(a) does not
provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional
accommodation for the landlord either for residential or
non-residential purposes. It is a well settled rule of
interpretation of statutes that the provisions of the Act
should be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any
of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling reasons
for the Court to resort to that extreme contingency.
1182
Yet another noteworthy feature to be borne in mind is
that Section 10(3)(c) is governed by two provisos which is
not the case when eviction orders are made under any of the
sub-clauses of Section 10(3)(a). The first proviso enjoins
the Controller to reject the application of a landlord under
Section. 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation, even where
the need of the landlord is found to be genuine, if the
hardship caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will
outweigh the advantage to the landlord by the said order.
The second proviso empowers the Controller to give the
tenant a reasonable time not exceeding three months in the
aggregate to vacate the portion in his occupation and put
the landlord in possession thereof. Obviously the second
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proviso has been made to facilitate the tenant to find
alternate residential or non-residential accommodation
elsewhere, since the landlord who is already in possession
of a portion of the building can put up with the hardship of
inadequate accommodation for a period of three months at the
most.
The above analytical consideration of the relevant
provisions bring out clearly the fallacy contained in and
the untenability of the contention that the ground floor
occupied by the appellant is a distinct and separate unit
and as such the respondents cannot seek his eviction under
Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.
This aspect of the matter has been considered in varying
degrees in the following decisions and interpreted in ac-
cordance with our conclusion; vide Saraswathi Sriraman
v.P.C.R. Chetty’s Charities, [1972] 2 M.L.J. 515; Mohammed
Jarfar v. Palaniappa Chettiar, [1964] 1 M.L.J. 112 and
Chellammal v. Accommodation Controller, [1967] 2 M.L.J. 453.
Even the Division Bench ruling relied on by Mr. Sampath
concedes this position and has observed as follows:
"Therefore, if the context in a particular
provision requires that the word building
should not be understood as defined in Section
22, certainly it is open to the Court to give
the normal, natural and ordinary meaning which
it is capable of and for that purpose, it is
not necessary to rely upon any decision. (vide
page 153 of the report)."
Taking up now for consideration the second contention,
there were conflicting decisions in the Madras High Court
and this led to a reference of the case in Thirupathi v.
Kanta Rao, [1981] Vol. 1 ILR Madras 128 to a Division Bench.
While the Division Bench has taken one view. a Division
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has
1183
taken a contrary view on the identical issue. It is perti-
nent to state here that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh
Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act are in pari
tnetria with the provisions of the Madras Act in so far as
Sections 10(3)(a) and (c) are concerned. The conflict was
with reference to the interpretation of Section 10(3)(c)
viz. whether a landlord occupying a part of a building for
residential purposes is entitled to seek eviction of a
tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining
part of the building for non-residential purposes for his
(landlord’s) residential use and vice versa. While it was
held in Govindan v. Rajagopal Nadar, [1968] 2 M.L.J. 315
that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant under Section
10(3)(c) for additional residential purposes only if the
tenant also is putting the building to residential use and
likewise a landlord can seek additional accommodation for
business purposes only if the tenant is also putting the
building to non-residential use, it was held to the contrary
in Premchand Motichand v. Hatneed Sultan, [1958] 1 M.L.J. 32
(S.N.); P.I. Kurian v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 85 L.W. 364
and Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R. Chetty’s Charities
(supra). The latter view was taken by Ismail, J., also, as
he then was, in an unreported case viz. Rangaswami Reddiar
v. Minor N. Jayaraj (C.R.P. No. 2380 of 1977). Subsequently
in the referred case, the Division Bench consisting of
Ismail, C.J. and Rathnam J. rendered judgment in Thirupathi
v. Kanta Rao, (supra). (Ismail, C.J., changing his earlier
view) holding that a landlord will be entitled under Section
10(3)(c) to seek additional accommodation for residential
purposes only if it is a residential building in the occupa-
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tion Of a tenant and likewise a landlord can seek additional
accommodation for non-residential purposes only if the
building is a non-residential one.
The Division Bench has further taken the view that the
non obstante clause is only to entitle a landlord to seek
eviction even when he is in possession of a portion of a
building .belonging to him and nothing more.
In a later decision G.N. Rajaram v. Mukunthu N. Venkata-
rama Iyer. MLJ 1985(2) 173 the Division Bench ruling has
been followed and eviction was ordered of a tenant occupying
a room in the ground floor of a residential building for his
business purposes. On the other hand a Division Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma,
AIR 1965 220 has held that if a landlord satisfies the
Controller that he wants additional accommodation in the
same building for his residential or non-residential re-
quirements then notwithstanding the user to which the tenant
was putting the
1184
leased portion. the landord is entitled to an order of
eviction so that he can re-adjust the additional accommoda-
tion in the manner convenient to him and it is not necessary
that the additional accommodation sought for should be used
by the landlord for the same purpose for which the tenant
sought to be evicted was using it. In the words of the
Division Bench:-
"Clause (c) makes it twice clear that a land-
lord who occupies a part of a building, wheth-
er residential or nonresidential can ask for
eviction of a tenant occupying another portion
whatever may be his requirements, whether
residential or non-residential".
For holding so, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the
words "notwithstanding anything in clause (a)" as having
over riding effect over both the conditions laid down in
Section 10(3)(a) and (iii) viz. a landlord (1) not having a
building of his own for residential or nonresidential pur-
poses; and (2) seeking the eviction of a tenant from resi-
dential premises only for residential purposes; and (3)
seeking eviction of a tenant from non-residential premises
only for nonresidential purposes.
We will now examine for ourselves the interpretation to
be given to Section 10(3)(c). In so doing we will first see
the legislative intent behind Section 10(3)(c) before con-
sidering the thrust given by nonobstante clause in it. Since
Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations viz. a land-
lord occupying a part of a building which is residential or
non-residential, the sub-clause can be read separately so as
to have reference exclusively to a residential building or a
non-residential building. In Thirupathy v. Kanta Rao,
(supra) the learned Judges have noticed this position and
set out Section 10(3)(c) distinctively. But in so doing they
have restricted the relief of additional accommodation to
the landlord for residential purposes to residential build-
ings alone and the relief of additional accommodation for
business purposes to nonresidential buildings alone and
therein the error has crept in. In our view. this restric-
tion is not envisaged by Section 10(3)(c). The proper way of
distinctively viewing the Section should be as under:-
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a
residential building may notwithstanding
anything contained in clause (a), apply to the
Controller for an order directing any tenant
occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building to put the
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landlord in possession
1185
thereof. if he requires additional accommoda-
tion for residential purposes or for purposes
of a business which he is carrying on, as the
case may be."
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a
non-residential building may notwithstanding
anything contained in clause (a), apply to the
Controller for an order directing any tenant
occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building to put the
landlord in possession thereof, if he requires
additional accommodation for residential
purposes or for purposes of a business which
he is carrying on, as the case may be."
If clause (3) is construed in this manner there can be
no scope for a contention that a landlord cab seek addition-
al accommodation for residence only if the building is a
residential one and likewise he can seek additional accommo-
dation for business purposes only if the building is a non-
residential one.
There are several reasons which persuade us to take this
view. In the first place it has to be noted that Section
10(3)(c) stands on a different footing from Section
10(3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii). It is not a case of a
landlord not occupying a residential or non-residential
building of his own but a case of a landlord occupying a
part of a residential or non-residential building of his own
and putting it to such user as deemed fit by him. Since the
requirement of additional accommodation by the landlord is
with reference to the manner of his user of that part of the
building which is in his occupation it is the nature of that
requirement that should prevail over the manner of user of
the tenant of the portion leased out to him. In other words,
the additional accommodation is for extending the user of
the building by the landlord to the leased portion for the
same purpose for which the portion not leased out is being
put to. Such being the case which the landlord is genuinely
in need of additional accommodation for residential or non-
residential requirements, as the case may be, he can be
given relief only it the tenant occupying the other portion
of the building is asked to vacate. If it is to be held that
Section 10(3)(c) can be invoked only if the nature of the
requirement of the landlord and the nature of user of the
leased portion by the tenant coalesce then the landlord will
be left without any remedy when the nature of his need and
the nature of the user of the leased portion by the tenant
do not tally. Take for example, a case where a landlord has
got grown-up sons and daughters or there is a married son
and growing daughters or there
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are old parents who cannot climb stairs etc. If the landlord
is to be refused additional accommodation for residential
purposes merely because the tenant is making use of the
leased portion for nonresidential purposes the landlord
would be placed in an awful predicament. Similarly. if a
landlord bona fide requires additional accommodation for his
business and his business would suffer serious detriment if
he cannot secure additional accommodation, it would cause
great hardship and gave injustice to the landlord if he is
to be denied accommodation merely because the tenant is
making use of the leased portion for residential purposes.
It is, therefore, that the Legislature has provided Section
10(3)(c) in its present form so that a landlord bona fide
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requiring additional accommodation is not confronted with a
permanently irremediable situation. In its anxiety that
Section 10(3)(c) should fully serve the purpose for which it
has been enacted the Legislature has also added the non
obstante clause. Having regard to the object of Section
10(3)(c) and the terms in which it is worded there is war-
rant and justification for holding that the non obstante
clause has been provided to have overriding effect over both
the restrictions placed by Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii)
viz. landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should not be
occupying a building of his own and secondly the nature of
user of the leased property by the tenant must correspond to
the nature of the requirement of the landlord.
In construing Section 10(3)(c) it is pertinent to note
that the words used are "any tenant" and not "a tenant" who
can be called upon to vacate the portion in his occupation.
The word "any" has the following meaning:-
"Some; one out of many; an indefinite number.
One indiscriminately of whatever kind or
quantity."
Word "any" has a diversity of mean-
ing and may be employed to indicate "all"
or "every" as well as "some" or "one" and
its meaning in a given statute depends upon
the context and the subject matter of the
statute.
It is often synonymous with
"either", "every" or "all". Its generality may
be restricted by context; (Black’s Law Dic-
tionary; Fifth Edition).
Unless the legislature had intended that both classes of
tenants can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller for
providing the. landlord additional accommodation. be it for
residential or non-residential
1187
purposes. it would not have used the word "any" instead of
using the letter "a" to denote a tenant.
Thirdly it is significant to note that there is no
reference in clause (c) to the nature of the user of the
tenant occupying the leased portion of the building viz.
whether he is using it for residential or nonresidential
purposes. If it was the intention of the legislature that
only a tenant occupying a residential portion of a building
can be asked to vacate for providing additional residential
accommodation to the landlord and correspondingly a tenant
occupying a portion of a building for non-residential pur-
poses alone being asked to vacate for the nonresidential
requirements of the landlord, the legislature would have
provided specific stipulations to that effect in clause (c).
On that ground also it must be construed that clause (c) has
been provided. in order to enable a landlord to seek the
eviction of any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of
the remaining part of the building for residential or non-
residential purposes for satisfying the additional needs of
the landlord irrespective of whether the need is for resi-
dential or business purposes.
The words "as the case may be" in sub clause (c) have
been construed by the Division Bench of the Madras High
Court to mean that they restrict the landlord’s right to
secure additional accommodation for residential purposes
only in respect of a residential building and in the case of
additional accommodation for business purpose only to a
non-residential building. We are of the view that in the
context of sub-clause (c). the words "as the case may be"
would only mean "whichever the case may be" i.e. either
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residential or non-residential.
To sum up, the requirement of additional accommodation
pertains to the need of the landlord and the manner of user
of the portion of the building already in his occupation and
consequently the bona fides of his requirement will outweigh
all the restrictions imposed by Section 10(3)(a) i.e. nature
of the building. nature of user of the leased portion by the
tenant etc. Even so, the Legislature has taken care to
safeguard the interests of the tenant by means of the provi-
sos to the sub-clause. The first proviso enjoins the Con-
troller to balance the interests of the landlord and the
tenant and to refuse eviction if the hardship caused to the
tenant will outweight the advantage to the landlord by
reason of the evicton. The second proviso empowers the
Controller to grant adequate time to the tenant upto a
maximum of three months to vacate the building and secure
accommodation elsewhere. It. there.fore. follows that once a
landlord is able to satisfy the
1188
Controller that he is bona fide in need of additional accom-
modation for residential or non-residential purposes and
that the advantage derived by him by an order of eviction
will outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant, then he is
entitled to an order of eviction irrespective of any other
consideration.
In the light of our conclusion we approve the ratio in
K. Prasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, (supra) and disapprove the
ratio in Thirupathy v. Kanta Rao. (supra).
The third and fourth question posed for consideration do
not present any difficulty. The Rent Controller has gone
into the question of comparative hardship and rendered a
finding in favour of the respondents. The High Court has
observed that the Appellate Authority. while reversing the
order. has failed to take due note of relevant materials
placed by the respondents. The High Court has, therefore,
held that the Appellate Authority’s findings have been
vitiated because of its non-advertance to the evidence and
the apparent errors noticed in its assessment of the compar-
ative hardship between the parties. In so far as the High
Court interfering with the findings of the Appellate Author-
ity is concerned, the High Court has justified its action by
pointing out that Appellate Authority had applied wrong
tests and had also failed to give effect to unchallenged
findings of the Rent Controller and hence the order of the
Appellate Authority suffered from manifest errors in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The High Court was, therefore.
entitled to allow the revision and consequently the third
and fourth contentions also fail.
In the result we find no merit in the appeal and accord-
ingly it will stand dismissed. Mr. Sampath, learned counsel
for the appellant made a request that in the event of the
appeal being dismissed, the appellant should be given suffi-
ciently long time to secure another godown and shift his
stock of goods to that place. Mr. Padmanabhan learned coun-
sel for the respondents very fairly stated that the respond-
ents are agreeable to give time to the appellant till
31.12.87 to vacate the leased portion. Accordingly we order
that in spite of the dismissal of the appeal the appellant
will have time till 31.12.87 to vacate the ground floor
premises in his occupation and deliver peaceful and vacant
possession to the respondents subject however to the appel-
lant filing an under-taking in the usual terms in this
behalf within 4 weeks from today failing which the respond-
ents will be entitled to recover possession of the building
forthwith. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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P.S. S Appeal dis-
missed.
1189