Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Special Leave Petition (civil) 15178 of 1999
PETITIONER:
I.T.C. LTD. WORKERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE MANAGEMENT OF I.T.C. LTD. & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/01/2002
BENCH:
D.P. Mohapatra & P. Venkatarama Reddi
JUDGMENT:
P.Venkatarama Reddi, J.
Leave granted and appeal taken up for hearing.
The first appellant which seems to be a representative body of
the retired workmen of Munger Branch of ITC Ltd. and the second appellant
who is a member thereof, have assailed the legality of the judgment of the
Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 5693 of 1995 dated 10.11.1997. By that
judgment the High Court upheld the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal,
Patna, in Reference No.3/92, following the earlier decision of the High
Court reported in 1997 (1) PLJ 934, wherein the identical issues were
decided against the workmen. The Writ Petition out of which the appeal
arises was filed by the second appellant herein challenging the award passed
by the Industrial Tribunal on 13.12.1994.
The 1st appellant sought leave of this Court to file the SLP as it
was not a party in the Writ Petition out of which this SLP arises. Leave has
been granted by us. It may also be noticed that by an order of this Court
dated 31.08.2001 on IA 3 of 2001 the 2nd appellant herein, who was
respondent No.3 in SLP, has been transposed as petitioner in the SLP.
At the outset, it may be stated that the present SLP was filed
with a delay of 460 days. The delay in filing the SLP is sought to be
explained in a very casual manner, the only ground stated being "paucity of
funds" which on the face of it is as vague as it could be. In the normal
course, we should have dismissed the I.A. for condonation of delay and
rejected the SLP summarily. However, as arguments have been advanced at
length on the merits and as the grievance of retired employees is being
projected, we do not consider it appropriate to dismiss the SLP on the
ground of delay. Hence, leave has been granted and appeal decided on
merits.
The following dispute between the Management of ITC Ltd.
Basudevpur, Munger and their workmen represented by Munger Tobacco
Manufacturing Union which is a recognised union was referred for
adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal:
"Whether to enforce Platinum Jubilee Scheme
Pension Plan for the workers who retired from
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service on or after 24.8.1986 and to enforce other
pension scheme for the workers retired before the
24.8.1986 and to give two types of benefits to both
types of workers by the Management of I.T.C.
Ltd., Basudeopur Munger is legal and justified? If
not, whether the workers who retired before
24.8.1986 from I.T.C. Ltd. Basudeopur Munger
are also entitled for the benefits under Platinum
Jubilee Pension Plan?"
The learned Presiding Officer answered the reference in favour of the
Management and against the Union, having held that the workmen who
retired before 24.8.1986 were not entitled to the benefits under the Platinum
Jubilee Pension Scheme. By that scheme, the workmen who retired on or
after the date afore-mentioned were made eligible to get life pension. It was
the contention of the workers’-Union before the Tribunal and it is also the
contention of the appellants that the benefits should be extended to all those
workmen who retired during and after 1977 when the pension scheme was
first introduced in this industrial establishment.
To have a proper background of the dispute, it is necessary to
refer briefly to the pension scheme prevalent prior to the introduction of the
Platinum Jubilee Pension Scheme. A settlement entered into on 27.6.1977
paved the way for the introduction of pension scheme for the first time. It
applied to the permanent workmen on the rolls of the company who retired
on or after 1.6.1977. Under that scheme, the pension was payable for a
period of 10 years. By a subsequent settlement dated 22.4.1982, though the
period of drawal of pension remained the same, the formula was revised and
the maximum pension payable was enhanced to Rs.225/- per month. This
benefit under the settlement dated 22.4.1982 governed the workmen who
were on the Company’s pay roll on the date of signing of the settlement.
On the eve of commemoration of platinum jubilee of ITC Ltd., the
Management decided to introduce a scheme known as Platinum Jubilee
Pension Scheme. Under this scheme, eligible workmen will get the
pensionary benefits till their life time and on their demise, part of the
benefits go to their nominees or legal heirs. In order to implement the
pension scheme, a fund named "Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund" was
created under a trust deed dated 27.5.1987. As a follow up thereto, ITC
Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund scheme Rules were framed in the year 1988.
While so, pursuant to discussions and negotiations held in the course of
conciliation proceedings, there was a settlement under Section 12(3) of
Industrial Disputes Act on 10.4.1988. As it was agreed that the Platinum
Jubilee Pension Scheme should be made part of the service conditions of
employees, the following provisions were incorporated in the settlement
dated 10.4.1988 :-
"PENSION SCHEME
In supersession of clause 14 Part I read with Annexure
VII of Memorandum of Settlement dated 28.4.82, the
following Pension Scheme shall apply :-
(i) The company has by a Deed of Trust dated 27.5.87
setup a Trust Fund entitled the ITC Platinum
Jubilee Pension Fund for payment of pension to its
workmen. With effect from the date of signing of
this Memorandum of Settlement, all workmen on
the rolls of the company as at 24th August, 1986
and thereafter will be eligible to become members
of the aforesaid ITC Platinum Jubilee Pension
Fund and will be eligible to receive benefits in
accordance with the aforesaid Trust Deed and the
ITC Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund rules. A copy
of the said Trust Deed and Rules is attached
herewith as Annexure XII.
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(ii) With effect from 1.4.88, the ITC Workmen’s
Pension Fund Scheme as contained in clause 14,
Part I and Annexure VII of the Memorandum of
Settlement dated 28.4.82 will cease to be
applicable to workmen on the rolls of the company
as at 24.8.86 and thereafter. It is expressly agreed
and understood that such workmen will be
governed only by the ITC Platinum Jubilee
Pension Fund Deed and Rules.
(iii) It is clarified that workmen who were on the rolls
of the company prior to 24.8.86 and who are in
receipt of pension under the ITC workmen’s
Pension Scheme as contained in clause 14, Part I
and Annexure VII of the Settlement dated 28.4.82
will continue to be governed by the rules of the
ITC Workmen’s Pension Scheme. The ITC
Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund Deed and Rules
will not be applicable to them."
Under the Trust Deed dated 27.5.1987, ITC Ltd. constituted the ITC
Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund to be administered by the trustees who are
required to hold the fund in trust for the benefit of the members or other
persons set forth in the Rules. The Fund shall be vested in the trustees who
shall have the entire control of the funds. The Deed enjoins that no money
belonging to the members in the hands of the trustees shall be recovered by
the Company nor shall the Company have any lien or charge on the same.
The trustees are required to arrange for the investment of the funds and
payment of pension due to the members in accordance with the Rules.
Clause 6 stipulates that the funds of the Trust shall consist of accumulations
from the contributions received by the trustees in accordance with the Rules,
securities or other investments, interest and other accretion arising out of the
funds as reduced by payments and disbursements. The Trust Deed also
provides for possible contingencies.
Let us now advert to ITC Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund Rules. As
already noticed, the fund shall be deemed to have come into operation on or
from 24.8.1986 notwithstanding the date of the Trust Deed. Under the
caption ’Membership’, it is provided by Rule 8(a) that all confirmed and
regular workmen of the Company as defined in Rule 2(h) shall be eligible
for membership of the fund. An employee who is eligible for the
membership of the fund may make an application in the prescribed form and
furnish the particulars of the nominees in another form to the trustees
through the Company. The Company, on scrutiny of such application, has to
forward the same to the trustees with whose approval the employee shall be
admitted as a member. Under the heading ’Contribution’, it is provided that
the Company may pay to the trustees in respect of the members an initial
contribution as may be certified by the Actuary subject to Rule 88 of the
Income Tax Rules. Under clause (b) of Rule 9, it is enjoined that the
Company shall pay to the trustee in respect of each member an ordinary
annual contribution as may be certified by the Actuary subject to I.T. Rules
87 and 88. Under clause 11(b), the pension admissible as per the Rules shall
be payable through out the life time of the member and shall be computed at
the rate of 1/180 part of the pensionable salary for each year of pensionable
service. The maximum pension payable shall be Rs.400/- per month and
the minimum shall be Rs.100/- per month. Provisions for payment of
pension to the widow for her life time in the event of demise of the member
and for the payment of pension for a period of 10 years to his nominee if the
member is unmarried or widower are also made.
Thus the salient features of the Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund
are that a separate fund is created for the purpose of payment of pension and
the same is vested and controlled by the trustees; the eligible person should
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become member of the fund on an application submitted by him, the pension
is payable during the life time of the member and in the event of demise of
the member (retired workman), the pension at a stipulated rate is payable to
the widow or to a beneficiary nominated by member in case of an unmarried
or widower person. The ceiling limit has been raised to Rs.400/- per month.
Thus, the Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund is undoubtedly much more
beneficial to the retired workmen. At this juncture, we may notice that there
has been a controversy on the question whether the pension scheme
introduced in 1988 is in substance a new scheme or it is a revised or
liberalized scheme. But, it is unnecessary to resolve that issue.
The learned counsel for the appellants has reiterated the
contentions advanced before the Industrial Tribunal and the High Court in
the connected matter. While accepting that Article 14 as such has no
application because the Company-ITC Ltd. is not a ’State’ or ’other
Authority’, the counsel, however, urged that on the analogy of Article 14,
the relevant clauses in the settlement are to be held to be arbitrary, unjust
and irrational, that the prescription of cut-off date i.e. 24.8.1986 which has
the effect of denying greater benefits under the scheme to the workmen who
retired before that date is equally arbitrary, discriminatory and unjust and
therefore the settlement entered into on 10.4.1988 cannot defeat the
legitimate rights of the workmen who retired before 24.8.1986. It is further
submitted that all the workmen drawing pension under the Company’s Rules
settlements belong to one class and there cannot be sub-classification
amongst them by treating the workmen who retired between 24.8.1986 and
10.4.1988 as a different class. It is argued that when the benefit is given to
the workmen who retired within the two dates afore-mentioned, the same
benefit ought to have been extended at least to those who retired after the
date of the settlement of 1982 i.e. 28.4.1982. It is then contended that the
date 24.8.1986 has been fixed arbitrarily and the Management’s contention
that it coincided with the date of completion of 75 years of Company’s
existence is factually incorrect, in as much as 75 years would expire by
24.8.1985, the Company having been incorporated on 24.8.1910. It is also
submitted that notwithstanding the settlement which according to the
appellant’s counsel is unjust and discriminatory, all the workmen retiring
after 24th April, 1982, are entitled to the benefit of the Platinum Jubilee
Pension Scheme.
The learned Senior counsel for the respondent-Company while
drawing support from the reasoning and conclusions of the Division Bench
in the case reported in 1997 1 PLJR 934, has laid considerable stress on the
fact that the employees of the Company existing or retired cannot invoke
Article 14 and they as well as the Management and other workmen are only
governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The settlement
which was entered into under Section 12(3) as a result of conciliation
proceeding was binding on all the workmen and no workman much less any
individual workman or group of workmen can challenge the same, especially
after the recognised Union which espoused the cause of workmen and
participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal, chose to accept the
award. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the second petitioner is
also a member of the recognised Union and it is not open to him to assail the
settlement or the award. He was not even the person who filed the Writ
Petition in the High Court. The present SLP filed after the delay of 460 days
is liable to be dismissed in limine on the ground of unsatisfactory
explanation for the delay. On the facts of the case highlighted by the
Tribunal, there is no basis to hold that settlement is ex facie, unjust or
arbitrary. Giving the benefit to the employees who retired about two years
prior to the date of settlement does not invalidate the settlement on any
ground known to law, but on the other hand, it is the concession shown by
the Management on the occasion of celebrating Platinum Jubilee. It is
further submitted that one clause in the settlement cannot be legitimately
assailed and the settlement has to be viewed as a whole. When the
settlement as a whole, has not been attacked as unfair or mala fide, it is not
open to the Union much less to the individual workmen who are not parties
to assail one clause in the settlement dealing with the pension. It is
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submitted that an overall view has to be taken when the question of validity
of settlement is put in issue.
Before proceeding further, we shall advert to the findings of the
Industrial Tribunal. At the outset, the Tribunal overruled the contention of
the Management that the reference was without jurisdiction for the reason
that the retired employees on whose behalf the dispute was raised are not
workmen. The learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal then observed that
all the issues including the one relating to life time pension with effect from
the particular date were discussed threadbare by the office-bearers of the
Union, the Negotiating Committee of the Union, the Management
representatives and the Joint Labour Commissioner and then the settlement
was arrived at. The cut-off date i.e. 24.8.1986 was not picked up arbitrarily.
It was the date on which the Company completed 75 years of its existence.
The Tribunal after having referred to the various pronouncements of this
Court then observed that the cut-off date was introduced after due
deliberations and no material has been placed by the Union to show that the
fixation of cut-off date was arbitrary or mala fide. Earlier the Tribunal
clarified that the letter addressed by the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour
Commissioner subsequent to the settlement cannot be considered to be a
binding direction but it was only an appeal to the Management to take a
compassionate view in the matter of extending benefits to other retired
persons.
As already noticed, the learned single Judge affirmed the
award of Tribunal and dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the 1st Petitioner
herein following the earlier Division Bench judgment reported in ITC Ltd.
Vs. State of Bihar (1997 1 PLJR 934). To complete the narration, it is
necessary to refer to the views expressed by the Division Bench in that
case. The learned Judges concentrated on the issue whether the
fixation of cut-off date was irrational and arbitrary, and answered
the question in the negative. In reaching such conclusion, the
High Court inter alia took into account the fact that the scheme emanating
from the settlement dated 10.4.1988 was entirely a new scheme and
therefore, the ratio of the decision in Nakara’s case has no application.
"The present case is not one of liberalization of the existing pension
scheme, but one of the introduction of a new scheme", the High Court
observed. Treating the Platinum Jubilee day as the cut-off date was held to
be not an arbitrary decision.
In answering the reference the industrial adjudicator has to
keep in the forefront of his mind the settlement reached under Section 12(3)
of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once it is found that the terms of the
settlement operate in respect of the dispute raised before it, it is not open to
the Industrial Tribunal to ignore the settlement or even belittle its effect by
applying its mind independent of the settlement unless the settlement is
found to be contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Act or unless it is
found that there is non-conformance to the norms by which the settlement
could be subjected to limited judicial scrutiny. This is infact the approach of
the Tribunal in the instant case. The High Court which examined the issue
from a different angle as well was, in our view, justified in affirming the
award of the Tribunal.
As the settlement entered into in the course of conciliation
proceedings assumes crucial importance in the present case, it is necessary
for us to recapitulate the fairly well settled legal position and principles
concerning the binding effect of the settlement and the grounds on which the
settlement is vulnerable to attack in an industrial adjudication. Analysing
the relative scope of various clauses of Section 18, this Court in the case of
Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad vs. Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. (1991 (1) SCC 4) succinctly summarized the position thus:-
"Settlements are divided into two categories,
namely, (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation
proceedings (Section 18(i) and (ii) those arrived at
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in the course of conciliation proceedings (Section
18(3)). A settlement which belongs to the first
category has limited application in that it merely
binds the parties to the agreement. But a
settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings with a recognised majority union has
extended application as it will be binding on all
workmen of the establishment, even those who
belong to the minority union which had objected to
the same. To that extent it departs from the
ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is
to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with
the active assistance of the Conciliation officer and
to discourage an individual employee or a minority
union from scuttling the settlement. There is an
underlying assumption that a settlement reached
with the help of the conciliation Officer must be
fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be
made binding not only on the workmen belonging
to the union signing the settlement but also on the
others. That is why a settlement arrived at in the
course of conciliation proceedings is put on par
with an award made by an adjudicatory authority."
In General Manager, Security Paper Mill vs. R.S. Sharma (AIR 1986
SC 954), E.S. Venkataramiah, J. Speaking for the Court explained the
rationale behind Section 18(3) thus :-
"Even though a Conciliation Officer is not
competent to adjudicate upon the disputes
between the management and its workmen he is
expected to assist them to arrive at a fair and just
settlement. He has to play the role of an adviser
and friend of both the parties and should see that
neither party takes undue advantage of the
situation. Any settlement arrived at should be a
just and fair one. It is on account of this special
feature of the settlement sub-sec. (3) of S.18 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that a
settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceeding under that Act shall be binding on (i)
all parties to the industrial dispute, (ii) where a
party referred to in clause (i) is an employer, his
heirs, successors, or assigns in respect of the
establishment to which the dispute relates and (iii)
where a party referred to in clause (i) is comprised
of workmen, all persons who were employed in the
establishment or part of the establishment as the
case may be to which the dispute relates on the
date of the dispute and all persons who
subsequently become employed in that
establishment or part. Law thus attaches
importance and sanctity to settlement arrived at in
the course of a conciliation proceeding since it
carries a presumption that it is just and fair and
makes it binding on all the parties as well as the
other workmen in the establishment or the part of
it to which it relates as stated above."
Admittedly, the settlement arrived at in the instant case was in
the course of conciliation proceedings and therefore it carries a presumption
that it is just and fair. It becomes binding on all the parties to the dispute as
well as the other workmen in the establishment to which the dispute relates
and all other persons who may be subsequently employed in that
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establishment. An individual employee cannot seek to wriggle out of the
settlement merely because it does not suit him.
The next principle to be borne in mind is that in a case where
the validity of the settlement is assailed, the limited scope of enquiry would
be, whether the settlement arrived at in accordance with sub-section (1) to
(3) of S.12, is on the whole just and fair and reached bonafide. An unjust,
unfair or malafide settlement militates against the spirit and basic postulate
of the agreement reached as a result of conciliation and, therefore, such
settlement will not be given effect to while deciding an industrial dispute.
Of course, the issue has to be examined keeping in view the presumption
that is attached to the settlement under Section 12(3).
In Herbertsons Limited vs. The Workmen (1976 (4) SCC
736), this Court called for a finding on the point whether the settlement
was fair and just and it is in the light of the findings of the Tribunal that
the appeal was disposed of. Goswami, J. speaking for the three-Judge
Bench made it clear that the settlement cannot be judged on the touch
stone of the principles which are relevant for adjudication of an industrial
dispute. It was observed that the Tribunal fell into an error in invoking
the principles that should govern the adjudication of a dispute regarding
dearness allowance in judging whether the settlement was just and fair.
The rationale of this principle was explained thus:-
"There may be several factors that may influence
parties to come to a settlement as a phased
endeavour in the course of collective bargaining.
Once cordiality is established between the
employer and labour in arriving at a settlement
which operates well for the period that is in force,
there is always a likelihood of further advances in
the shape of improved emoluments by voluntary
settlement avoiding friction and unhealthy
litigation. This is the quintessence of settlement
which courts and tribunals should endeavour to
encourage. It is in that spirit the settlement has to
be judged and not by the yardstick adopted in
scrutinizing an award in adjudication."
The line of enquiry whether settlement was unfair and unjust
in K.C.P. Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer and others (1996 (10) SCC 446),
was adopted by a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through
Majmudar, J. It was observed at paragraph 21 that "under these
circumstances, respondents 3 to 14 also would be ordinarily bound by
this settlement entered into by their representative Union with the
Company unless it is shown that the said settlement was ex facie, unfair,
unjust or mala fide". The Court came to the conclusion that the
settlement cannot be characterised to be unfair or unjust. It was further
observed that "once this conclusion is reached it is obvious that another
industrial dispute should have been disposed of in the light of this
settlement". It was reiterated in the case of M/s. Tata Engineering and
Locomotive Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen (AIR 1981 SC 2163), that
"a settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question
whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles
different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is
under adjudication". Earlier, it was observed :-
"If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast
majority of the concerned workers with their eyes
open and was also accepted by them in its totality,
it must be presumed to be just and fair and not
liable to be ignored while deciding the reference
merely because a small number of workers (in this
case 71, i.e., 11.18 per cent) were not parties to it
or refused to accept it, or because the Tribunal was
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of the opinion that the workers deserved
marginally higher emoluments than they
themselves thought they did."
Another principle which deserves notice is the one firmly
laid down in Herbertsons case (supra). It was emphasised that the
settlement has to be taken as a package deal and it should not be
scanned ’in bits and pieces’ to hold some parts good and acceptable
and others bad. Then, it was observed "unless it can be demonstrated
that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all
the other advantages gained, the Court will be slow to hold a
settlement as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be accepted or
rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair
or unjust."
Having noted that the only objectionable feature of the
settlement as found by the Tribunal was reduction of dearness
allowance from cent per cent to 85 per cent, it was held that, that part
of the settlement cannot be held to be invalid or inoperative. This
proposition laid down in Herbertsons case was reiterated in K.C.P.
Ltd. case (supra), approvingly citing the said decision. The passages
in Herbertsons case were quoted in extenso and approved by the
three-Judge Bench in TELCO case (supra) as well.
What follows from a conspectus of these decisions is that a
settlement which is a product of collective bargaining is entitled to due
weight and consideration, more so when a settlement is arrived at in the
course of conciliation proceeding. The settlement can only be ignored
in exceptional circumstances viz. if it is demonstrably unjust, unfair or
the result of mala fides such as corrupt motives on the part of those who
were instrumental in effecting the settlement. That apart, the settlement
has to be judged as a whole, taking an overall view. The various terms
and clauses of settlement cannot be examined in piecemeal and in
vacuum.
Viewed in the light of these principles, it cannot be said that
the settlement in the present case which is otherwise valid and just suffers
from any legal infirmity merely for the reason that one of the clauses in
the settlement extends the benefits of life pension scheme only to the
employees retiring after a particular date i.e. 24.8.1986. Exclusion of
workmen retiring before that date is no ground to characterise the
settlement as unjust or unfair. Of course, the allegations of mala fides
such as corrupt motives have not been levelled against anyone and that
aspect becomes irrelevant here.
The High Court proceeded to consider whether even that
particular clause in the settlement dealing with the pension is per se
arbitrary or discriminatory and reached a conclusion that it is not so for
the reason that a new scheme for pension has been introduced by the
impugned settlement and that the question of arbitrariness in fixing the
cut-off date does not therefore arise. The High Court further held that the
fixation of cut-off date for the purpose of entitlement of life pension
cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational as such fixation becomes
imperative from financial point of view and moreover the date coincided
with the Platinum Jubilee Celebrations of the Company. The date was
not ’picked up from the hat’, the High Court observed. The High Court
approached the issue more from the angle of Article 14 and referred to
the decisions in which the State’s action in making the classification for
the purpose of extending the pensionary benefits or additional benefits
fell for consideration of this Court. Strictly speaking, such approach is
not apt and appropriate. The present case is one where Article 14 cannot
be applied as the respondent is not ’State’ or ’other Authority’. On this,
there is practically no dispute. If so, the approach should be as we
indicated earlier; that is to say, whether the settlement can be said to be
unjust, unfair or vitiated by mala fides. No mala fides is imputed to
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anyone. What remains to be considered is whether it is fair and just,
viewed from a broader angle and taking a holistic view of the matter. It
is true that certain considerations germane to Article 14 may also be
germane while deciding the issue whether the settlement is just and fair.
But, it does not follow that the doctrine of classification and the
principles associated with it should be projected wholesale into the
process of consideration of justness and fairness of the settlement. There
may be some overlapping and there may be some facets which apply in
common to determine the crucial issue whether the settlement on the
whole is just and fair, but that is not to say that the settlement is liable to
be tested on the touchstone of Article 14, more so when it has no
application in the instant case. Keeping this distinction in mind and
considering the grounds of attack on the particular clause of settlement,
we are unable to hold that it is vulnerable to challenge on any well-
recognised grounds. The facts on record do not establish that the
settlement which was reached was palpably unjust or unfair from the
point of view of the entire body of workmen. The preponderence of
circumstances and the material on record do not in our view, displace the
presumption attached to the settlement arrived at in the course of
conciliation.
Firstly, it is to be borne in mind that there was no challenge
at any time to any of the terms of the settlement other than the clause
relating to pension in so far as it confines the benefit of life-long pension
only to those who retire on or after 24.08.1986. Secondly, we must give
due weight to the fact that the settlement was reached as a result of
collective bargaining and with the assistance of Conciliation officer.
Invariably, there would be an element of give and take in the deal leading
to the settlement. Granting the benefit of life-long pension prospectively
or with limited retro-active effect does not make the settlement unjust or
unfair. It is certainly beneficial to the workmen in service and those who
retired few months earlier. The mere fact that the Management did not
go the whole hog to extend the benefit to all the retired employees does
not impart an element of unjustness or unreasonableness to the
settlement. Financial implications apart, the benefits granted to workmen
under various other clauses of settlement have to be kept in view. This
particular clause relating to pension cannot be considered in isolation.
The learned senior counsel for the petitioners argued that there was no
justification in making a sub-classification amongst the retired employees
by giving the benefit to those who retired only between 24.08.1986 and
the date of settlement. In our view, conferment of such additional benefit
to workmen who retired after the date of platinum jubilee celebration and
before the date of culmination of settlement, far from making it unjust or
irrational, tantamounts to extending benefit to some more workmen who
would not have got it otherwise, if the decision was implemented
prospectively. Apparently, such decision was taken to arrive at an
amicable settlement and to comply with the demands of the workmen to
the extent feasible and practicable. The argument that either all the
retired employees should be given the benefit or none at all cannot cut ice
if the principles of collective bargaining and justness of the settlement
viewed as a whole is kept in view. There is nothing which is palpably
unjust or irrational in giving the benefit only to those who retired during
and after the platinum jubilee year. Though there was some dispute as to
the correctness of the date on which the platinum jubilee falls, no
material has been placed before us excepting the date of incorporation of
the Company to establish the version of the appellants in this regard.
Picking up that date by going a little backwards from the date of
settlement cannot be regarded as a whimsical or arbitrary step, more so
when it was done with the consent of large majority of workmen. The
Tribunal while adjudicating the dispute and the High Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226/227 should be circumspect and
cautious in disturbing the terms of settlement founded on collective
bargaining and conciliation. The adjudicator of industrial dispute could
not have directed the benefit to be extended to all the retired employees
by substituting its own views to those reflected in the settlement, on an
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application of the usual principles governing industrial adjudication.
Another factor to be taken into account is that the recognised
union of workmen which espoused the cause of the retired employees
and contested the issue before the Industrial Tribunal did not pursue the
matter further obviously because they felt that in the larger interests of
maintaining industrial harmony and peace, the matter should be left off at
that stage. A member of that recognised union had taken up the issue
before the High Court.
Considering all these factors, we find no legal infirmity in the
award of the Tribunal which has been affirmed by the High Court and we
say so without going into the subtle question whether the scheme is a
new one for all practical purposes or only a revision or liberalization of
the pre-existing pensionary benefits.
In the view we have taken it is not necessary to dwell on the
contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondent
regarding the maintainability of the writ petition and SLP at the instance
of the appellants.
We see no merit in the appeal and it is hereby dismissed. No
costs.
.J.
(D.P. Mohapatra)
.J.
(P.Venkatarama Reddi)
January 29, 2002.
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