Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DATTARAYA S/O KESHAV TAWALAY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHAIKH MAHBOOB SHAIKH ALl & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
24/10/1968
BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
SHAH, J.C.
GROVER, A.N.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 750 1969 SCR (2) 328
CITATOR INFO :
R 1975 SC1957 (2)
E 1989 SC2073 (12,17)
ACT:
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), O.20, r. 14--Suit
for preemption decreed--Court directs deposit of purchase
money by a certain time Appellate Court stays execution of
decree--Purchase money deposited after the time
fixed--Effect.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant had obtained a decree for possession of
certain lands in a pre-emption suit which he had brought
against the respondents. The respondents’ appeal to the
District Court was dismissed. The District Court directed
the appellant to deposit purchase money by a certain date
and directed the respondents on the deposit to deliver
possession of the property. There was also a direction in
the decree that in case the amount was not paid on the due
date the suit shall stand dismissed with costs. The
respondents preferred a second appeal to the High Court and
pending disposal of the appeal the respondents prayed for
stay of the execution decree. Before the date fixed for
depositing the purchase money the High Court stayed the
execution of the decree of the lower appellate court. The
appellant deposited the purchase price 3 days after the date
fixed stating that he could not deposit in time as he fell
ill. Thereafter the High Court dismissed the second appeal,
and the appellant, obtained possession of the properties.
The respondents applied to the Executing Court for
restitution of properties on the ground that the appellant
had defaulted in depositing, the purchase money by the date
fixed by the lower appellate court’s decree. The appellant
contended that the stay order made by the High Court in the
second appeal prevented him from acting in accordance with
the terms of the lower appellate court’s decree, and in any
case the High Court had dismissed the second appeal and the
decree holder would get by necessary implication a fresh
starting point for depositing the purchase amount from the
Sate of the High Court’s decree.The Executing Court rejected
the claim of the respondents for restitution.This decision
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was affirmed, on appeal by the District Court.But the High
Court in appeal, took the’ view that there was default on
the part of the appellant in depositing the amount and
therefore the appellant’s suit stood dismissed
automatically and the appellant was-not therefore entitled
to possession in enforcement of the pre-emption decree.
HELD: The appeal must be allowed.
A decree in terms of 0.20 r. 14, Civil Procedure Code
imposes obligations on both sides and they are so
conditioned that performance by one is conditional on
performance by the other. To put it differently, the
obligations are. reciprocal and are inter-linked, so that
they cannot be separated. If the defendants by obtaining
the stay order from the High Court relieve themselves of the
obligation to deliver possession of the properties the
plaintiff-decree holder must also be deemed thereby to be
relieved of the necessity of depositing the money so long as
the stay order continue. [517 D, E]
The effect of the order of the High Court dismissing the
second appeal was to give by necessary implication a fresh
starting point
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depositing the amount from the date of the High Court’s
decree and the appellant could have deposited the amount
immediately after the High Court’s decree. But the
appellant had deposited the amount before the date of the
High Court’s decree and there was no default on the part of
the appellant in fulfilling the terms of the pre-emption
decree. [517 F--G]
Satwaji, Balajiray Deshamukh v. Sakharlal Atmaramshet,
I.L.R. 39 Bom. 175 and Sita v. Ramanth I.L.R. 28 Patna 371,
approved.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 329
of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated October 11, 14, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in
Appeal No. 30 of 1962 from the Appellate Decree.
D. Narsaraju and R.V. Pillai, for the appellant.
M.S.K. Sastri and M.S. Narasimhan, for respondent No. 1. The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by-
Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, on
behalf of the .plaintiff against the judgment of the Bombay
High Court dated October 11/14, 1963 in Appeal No. 30 of
1962 from the appellate order of the District Court,
Osmanabad whereby the High Court reversed the judgment of
the lower courts and declared that the appellant was not
entitled to execute the decree for pre-emption and that the
respondents were entitled to be put in possession of the
properties of which they were dispossessed in the
enforcement of the pre-emption decree.
The appellant had obtained a decree for possession of
certain lands in a pre-emption suit he had brought against
the respondents. The decree was made in March, 1945 and the
appellant was directed to pay the consideration of Rs. 5,000
within six months from the date of the decree on which the
appellant was to be put in possession of the suit lands. In
case of default in depositing the sum within the time the
plaintiff’s suit was to be deemed to have been dismissed.
The respondents preferred an appeal to the District Court
against the decree but the District Court confirmed the
decree on January 28, 1955. The amount of Rs. 5,000 was
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deposited in Court by the appellant on December 20, 1954
within the time granted in the trial court’s decree but it
was subsequently withdrawn by him under orders of the Court.
While dismissing the appeal of the respondents and
confirming the decree for pre-emption, the District Court
directed the appellant to deposit the sum of Rs. 5,000 on or
before April 30, 1955 and directed the respondents on such
deposit to deliver possession of the properties. There was
also a direction in the decree that in case the amount was
not paid on the due date the suit shall stand dismissed with
costs. The decree was passed in conformity with O.20, r.14
of the Civil Procedure Code. The respondents preferred a
Second Appeal to the High Court and
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pending disposal of the appeal the respondents prayed for
stay of the execution decree. On March 23, 1955 the High
Court passed the stay order in the following terms:
"Stay of execution of decree of the lower
appellate court is granted on condition that
the appellant furnishes security to the extent
of the amount of costs."
The order was received by the trial court on April 19, 1955.
The appellant who was directed under the terms of the lower
appellate court’s decree to deposit the sum of Rs. 5,000 on
or before April 30, 1955 made default in depositing the
amount on that date. He, however, deposited the amount on
May 2, 1955. Since the deposit was not made in time
according to the lower appellate court’s decree an
application was filed along with the deposit stating that
the amount could not be paid in time as the appellant fell
ill. The Second Appeal preferred by the respondents to the
High Court was dismissed on October 6, 1960 and the pre-
emption decree in favour of the appellant was confirmed.
Thereafter on February 3, 1961 the appellant flied a
Darkhast for possession of the suit properties. Since the
application was within a year of the decree of the High
Court a warrant for possession was issued by the Executing
Court without notice to the respondents and the appellant
also obtained possession of a portion of the suit properties
under the aforesaid warrant. On February 8, 1961 the
respondents filed an application in the Executing Court for
restitution of the properties taken possession of by the
appellant on the ground that the appellant had defaulted in
depositing the purchase money on or before April 30, 1955 as
required by the lower appellate court’s decree and the
Executing Court was in error in issuing the warrant for
possession of the suit properties. The application for
restitution was contested by the appellant on the ground
that the stay order made by the High Court in the Second
Appeal prevented him from acting in accordance with the
terms of the lower appellate court’s decree and in any case
the High Court had dismissed the Second Appeal and the
decree-holder would get by necessary implication a fresh
starting point for depositing the purchase amount from the
date of the High Court’s decree. The Executing Court
rejected the claim of the respondents for restitution and
’allowed the execution case of the appellant to proceed.
Against this order of the Executing Court the respondents
went up in appeal to the District Court which dismissed the
appeal and confirmed the order of the Executing Court. The
respondents thereafter took the matter in Second Appeal to
the Bombay High Court which differed from the view of the
District Court and allowed the appeal. The High Court took
the view that there was default on the part of the appellant
in depositing the amount and therefore the appellant’s
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517
suit stood dismissed automatically and the appellant was not
therefore entitled to possession in enforcement of the pre-
emption decree.
The first question arising in this appeal is whether the
High Court was right in taking the view that the effect of
the stay order dated March 23, 1955 was merely to stay the
delivery of possession by the judgment-debtors and not a
stay with regard to the deposit of purchase price by the
decree-holder. In our opinion, the High Court was in error
in taking this view. The decree framed under O.20, r. 14,
Civil Procedure Code requires reciprocal rights and
obligations between the parties. The rule says that on
payment into court of the purchase money the defendant shall
deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff. The
decree holder therefore deposits the purchase money with the
expectation that in return the possession of the property
would be delivered to him. It is therefore clear that a
decree in terms of O.20, r.14; Civil Procedure Code imposes
obligations on both sides and they are so conditioned that
performance by one is conditional on performance by the
other. To put it differently, the obligations are reciprocal
and are inter-linked, so that they cannot be separated. If
the defendants by obtaining the stay order from the High
Court relieve themselves of the obligation to deliver
possession of the properties the plaintiff-decree holder
must also be deemed thereby to be relieved of the necessity
of depositing the money so long as the stay order continues.
We are accordingly of the opinion that the order of stay
dated March 23, 1955 must be construed as an order staying
the whole procedure of sale including delivery of possession
as well as payment of price. The effect of the stay order
therefore in the present case is to enlarge the time for
payment till the decision of the appeal.
We are further of the opinion that the effect of the
order of the High Court dated October 6, 1960 dismissing
the Second Appeal was to give by necessary implication a
fresh starting point for depositing the amount from the date
of the High Court’s decree. The decree of the High Court
was dated October 6, 1960 and the appellant could have
deposited the amount immediately after this date. But the
appellant has deposited the amount on May 2, 1955, long
before the date of the High Court’s decree and there is no
default on the part of the appellant in fulfilling the terms
of the pre-emption decree. In the present case, when the
High Court dealt with the Second Appeal filed by the
respondents, the time limited by the trial court for making
the deposit had expired. It was open to the respondents to
press this point in the Second Appeal and for the High Court
to decide that, the time having expired, it was not open to
the plaintiff to make the deposit and there was nothing
before the
518
High Court for decision. It was equally open to the High
Court to dismiss the appeal and expressly extend the time
for making the deposit. When the High Court refrained from
following the first course and confirmed the trial court’s
decree, what was its intention ? Surely it wanted to give
the plaintiff an effective decree in his favour. If so, we
are justified in holding that the High Court intended to
exercise its power of extending the time for making the
deposit, and incorporated in its decree the relevant
provisions of the trial court’s decree. That is to say,
this is a case in which we must hold that a fresh starting
point is implied in the decree of the High Court in the
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Second Appeal. The view that we have expressed is borne out
by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Satwaji
Balajiray Deshamukh v. Sakharlal Atmatarnsher(1). In that
case, the plaintiff brought a suit to recover possession of
property as purchaser from defendants 1 to 6 and to redeem
the mortgage of defendant 7. The first court having
dismissed the suit, the appellate court, on plaintiff’s
appeal, passed a decree directing the plaintiff to recover
possession on payment to defendants 1 to 6 of a certain sum
within six months from the date of its decree and then to
redeem defendant 7, and on the plaintiff’s failure to pay
within six months from the date of the decree he should
forfeit his right to recover possession. All parties being
dissatisfied with the decree, the plaintiff preferred a
second appeal to the High Court and the two sets of
defendants filed separate sets of cross objections. The
High Court confirmed the decree and the plaintiff’s second
appeal and the defendants’ cross objections were dismissed.
Within six months from the date of the High Court’s decree
the plaintiff deposited in court the amount payable by him
and applied for execution. Defendant 7 contended that the
plaintiff not having complied with the terms of the decree
of the first appellate court, his right to recover
possession in execution was. forfeited. The lower courts
upheld the defendant’s contention and dismissed the
darkhast. On second appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court
reversed the decree of the lower court and held that the
time for executing a decree nisi for possession ran from the
date of the High Court’s decree confirming the decree of the
lower court, for what was to be looked at and interpreted
was the decree of the final appellate court. There is also
a decision to the similar effect in Sita v. Ramnath(2). For
the reasons already given we hold that the decree of the
High Court in Second Appeal should be construed in the
present case as affording by implication a fresh starting
point to the plaintiff for making payment to the Court.
For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal
should be allowed, the judgment of the, Bombay High Court
dated October
(1) I.L.R. 39 Bom. 175. (2) I.L.R. 28 Patna 371.
519
11/14, 1963 should be set aside and the application of the
first defendant made on February 8, 1961 for restitution
under s. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code should be
dismissed. In the circumstances of this case we do not
propose to make any order as to costs of this appeal.
T.P. Appeal allowed.
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