Full Judgment Text
CA 1363/2007
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1363 OF 2007
Lilawati Agarwal (D) By Lrs. Appellant(s)
and Others
Versus
State of Jharkhand Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J.
A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Lilawati Agarwal
1
(Dead) By Lrs. and Others vs. State of Jharkhand , after
referring to the paragraphs 31 and 34 of the
1 (2008 15 SCC 464
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pronouncement in Union of India and Another vs.
2
Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs. Etc . , expressed doubt
with regard to the correctness of the decision in K.S.
3
Paripoornan (II) vs. State of Kerala and Others and
eventually expressed thus:-
“In Raghubir Singh case two terminus points were
fixed i.e. award by the Collector or decision of the
Reference Court must have been taken between
3-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. It has been clearly
stated in the last line of para 34 that every case
“must” have been decided between the aforesaid
terminus. In Paripoornan II case at para 4 it was
observed that restrictive interpretation should not
be given. With great respect we are unable to
subscribe to the view. As a matter of fact a three-
Judge Bench was trying to give an interpretation
different from what was specifically given by the
Constitution Bench.
Therefore, we think it appropriate to refer the
matter to a larger Bench to consider correctness
of the view expressed in para 4 in Paripoornan II
case holding that a restricted interpretation
should not be given, on the face of what has been
stated in para 34 of Raghubir Singh case .
Records may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief
Justice of India for necessary details.”
JUDGMENT
On the basis of the aforesaid order, the matter has
been placed before us.
2. As we perceive, it is necessary to express an opinion
whether the correctness of the decision in K.S.
2 (1989) 2 SCC 754
3 (1995) 1 SCC 367
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Paripoornan (II) deserves to be considered by a
Constitution Bench as the pronouncement in the said case
is binding on us.
3. To appreciate the controversy, we think it appropriate
to reproduce paragraphs 30, 31 and 34 from Raghubir
Singh (supra):-
“30. We now come to the merits of the reference.
The reference is limited to the interpretation of
Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act of 1984. Before the enactment
of the Amendment Act, solatium was provided
under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act
(shortly, "the parent Act") at 15% on the market
value of the Land computed in accordance with
Section 23(1) of the Act, the solatium being
provided in consideration of the compulsory
nature of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition
Amendment Bill, 1982 was introduced in the
House of the People on 30 April, 1982 and upon
enactment the Land Acquisition Amendment Act
1984 commenced operation with effect from 24
September, 1984. Section 15 of the Amendment
Act amended Section 23(2) of the parent Act and
substituted the words '30 per centum' in place of
the words '15 per centum'. Parliament intended
that the benefit of the enhanced solatium should
be made available albeit to a limited degree, even
in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before
that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by
enacting Section 30(2) in the Amendment Act,
Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act provides:
JUDGMENT
"(2) the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section
23......of the principal Act, as amended by clause
(b) of Section 15........of this Act ....... shall apply
and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and
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in relation to, any award made by the Collector or
Court or to any order passed by the High Court
or Supreme Court in appeal against any such
award under the provisions of the principal Act
after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of
introduction of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the
People] and before the commencement of this
Act.”
31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well
to be clear that the award made by the Collector
referred to here is the award made by the
Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and
the award made by the Court is the award made
by the Principal Civil Court of Original
Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on
a reference made to it by the Collector under
Section 19 of the parent Act. There can be no
doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is
intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an award
made by the Collector between 30 April 1982 and
24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the
enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to
the case of an award made by the Court between
30 April 1982 and .24 September 1984, even
though it be upon reference from an award made
before 30 April, 1982.
JUDGMENT
xxxxx xxxxx
34. Our attention was drawn to the order made
4
in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh , but in the
absence of a statement of the reasons which
persuaded the learned Judges to take the view
they did we find it difficult to endorse that
decision. It received the approval of the learned
5
Judges who decided Bhag Singh , but the
4 (1986) 1 SCC 365
5 (1985) 3 SCC 737
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judgment in Bhag Singh, (supra) as we have said
earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all
the material provisions of Section 30(2), and
consequently we find ourselves at variance with it.
The learned Judges proceeded to apply the
principle that an appeal is a continuation of the
proceeding initiated before the Court by way of
reference under-Section 18 but, in our opinion,
the application of a general principle must yield to
the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself.
Learned counsel for the respondents has
strenuously relied on the general principle that
the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter,
but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground
in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the
respondents points out that the word 'or' has
been used in Section 30(2), as a disjunctive
between the reference to the award made by the
Collector or the Court and an order passed by the
High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and,
he says, properly understood it must mean that
the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984
is as much applicable to the appellate order of the
High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the
award made by the Collector or the Court. We
think that what Parliament intends to say is that
the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an
award by the Collector or the Court made between
the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of
the High Court or of the Supreme Court which
arises out of an award of the Collector or the
Court made between the said two dates. The word
'or' is used with reference to the stage at which
the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit
under-Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If
the proceeding has terminated with the award of
the Collector or of the Court made between the
aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2)
will be applied to such award made between the
aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed
to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the
Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the
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benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in
every case, the award of the Collector or of the
Court must have been made between 30 April,
1982 and 24 September, 1984.”
[Emphasis supplied]
4. In Raghubir Singh (supra), the question of law
referred to the Constitution Bench was:-
“Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
as amended by the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 the claimants are entitled
to solatium at 30 per cent of the market value
irrespective of the dates on which the acquisition
proceedings were initiated or the dates on which
the award had been passed?”
5. In the said case, the award with regard to
compensation was passed by the Collector in March, 1963
and the reference under Section 18 of the Act was disposed
of by the Additional District Judge on June 10, 1968. The
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reference court had enhanced the compensation granted by
the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for
brevity, ‘the Act’). The claimant had preferred an appeal to
the High Court claiming further compensation. During the
pendency of the appeal, the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Bill, 1982 was introduced in the Parliament on April 30,
1982 and became law as the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
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Act, 1984 when it received the assent of the President on
September 24, 1984. The High Court disposed of the appeal
by its judgment and order dated December 6, 1984. While
it raised the rate of compensation it also raised the rate of
interest payable on the compensation and taking into
account the amendment Act, awarded solatium at 30%.
The judgment and order of the High Court was under assail
before this Court and a two-Judge Bench keeping in view
the decisions in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special
6
Land Acquisition Officer , and Bhag Singh v. Union
7
Territory of Chandigarh thought it apt to refer the matter
to a larger Bench which ultimately resulted in the verdict in
Raghubir Singh (supra).
6. To understand the dictum in Raghubir Singh (supra),
JUDGMENT
it is necessary to understand what was stated in Bhag
Singh (supra) and what has been overruled in Raghubir
Singh (supra). In Bhag Singh (supra) a three-Judge Bench
was dealing with the question of law relating to
interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. In the
said case, the award was passed by the land acquisition
6 (1985) 1 SCC 582
7 (1985) 3 SCC 737
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collector on October 9, 1975 and the reference court had
passed the award on July 31, 1979. The award passed by
the reference court was assailed in appeal before the High
Court. The three-Judge Bench considered the decisions
8
in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh and K.
Kamalajammanniavaru (supra) and agreed with the view
expressed in Mohinder Singh is case and recorded therein
disagreement with the view taken in K.
Kamalajammanniavaru (supra). Be it stated, the three-
Judge Bench in Bhag Singh (supra) while agreeing with the
earlier three-Judge Bench decision has opined thus:-
“We may first consider what would be the posi-
tion if Section 30 sub-section (2) were not en-
acted and the amendments in Section 23 subsec-
tion (2) and Section 28 were effective only from
the date on which they were made, namely, Sep-
tember 24, 1984 when the Amending Act received
the assent of the President and was brought into
force. If at the date of the commencement of the
Amending Act, any proceedings for determination
of compensation were pending before the Collec-
tor under Section 11 of the Act or before the
court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act,
the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Sec-
tion 28 would admittedly be applicable to such
proceedings. This much indeed was conceded by
the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the re-
spondents and even in Kamalajammanniavaru
case (supra) it was accepted to be the correct po-
sition. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking on behalf of
JUDGMENT
8 Civil Appeal No. 3267 of 1979 decided on May 1, 1985
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the Court in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra)
observed (SCC p. 584): “The new Section 23(2), of
course, necessarily applies to awards made by
the Collector or court after the commencement”
of the Amending Act. …”
7. Regard being had to the both the aspects, it is
imperative to understand the issue that was referred to the
Constitution Bench. As is noticeable, the larger Bench
observed that the reference was limited to the interpretation
of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. The Constitution
Bench noted the intention of the Parliament, referred to
Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act and in that context
opined that:-
“32. The question is: What is the meaning of the
words “or to any order passed by the High Court
or Supreme Court on appeal against any such
award?” Are they limited, as contended by the ap-
pellants, to appeals against an award of the Col-
lector or the Court made between 30-4-1982 and
24-9-1984, or do they include also, as contended
by the respondents, appeals disposed of between
30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 even though arising
out of awards of the Collector or the Court made
before 30-4-1982. We are of opinion that the in-
terpretation placed by the appellants should be
preferred over that suggested by the respondents.
Parliament has identified the appeal before the
High Court and the appeal before the Supreme
Court by describing it as an appeal against “any
such award”. The submission on behalf of the re-
spondents is that the words “any such award”
mean the award made by the Collector or Court,
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and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in
this context, upon the language of Section 30(2),
the order in appeal is an appellate order made be-
tween 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 — in which case
the related award of the Collector or of the Court
may have been made before 30-4-1982. To our
mind, the words “any such award” cannot bear
the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel
for the respondents. No such words of description
by way of identifying the appellate order of the
High Court or of the Supreme Court were neces-
sary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierar-
chical structure of fora contemplated in the par-
ent Act those appellate orders could only be or-
ders arising in appeal against the award of the
Collector or of the Court. The words “any such
award” are intended to have deeper significance,
and in the context in which those words appear
in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended
to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court
between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. In other
words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act ex-
tends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to
cases where the award by the Collector or by the
Court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984
or to appeals against such awards decided by the
High Court and the Supreme Court whether the
decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court
are rendered before 24-9-1984 or after that date.
All that is material is that the award by the Col-
lector or by the Court should have been made be-
tween 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. We find our-
selves in agreement with the conclusion reached
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by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v.
1
Special Land Acquisition Officer , and find our-
selves unable to agree with the view taken in
2
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh . The
expanded meaning given to Section 30(2) in the
latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reason-
ably from the language of that sub-section. It
seems to us that the learned Judges in that case
missed the significance of the word “such” in the
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collocation “any such award” in Section 30(2).
Due significance must be attached to that word,
and to our mind it must necessarily intend that
the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme
Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced so-
latium is to be given, must be confined to an ap-
peal against an award of the Collector or of the
Court rendered between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-
1984”.
8. The aforesaid larger Bench decision, as we find, was
only concerned with the grant of solatium in respect of the
award passed between two dates, namely, April 30, 1982
and September 24, 1984. The issue before the Constitution
Bench was not relatable to any award as such passed after
the amended date.
9 . In K.S. Paripoornan (II) (supra) , the three-Judge
Bench appreciated the law laid down in Raghubir Singh’s
case and referred to Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition
JUDGMENT
(Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) which was a transitory
provision and reproduced paragraph 31 of the Constitution
Bench judgment and then proceeded to state thus:-
“This Court thereby clearly held that even in the
pending reference made before 30-4-1982, if the
civil court makes an award between 30-4-1982
and 24-9-1984, Section 30(2) gets attracted and
thereby the enhanced solatium was available to
the claimants. Since Section 30(2) deals with both
the amendments to Section 23(2) and Section 28
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of the Principal Act by Section 15(b) and Section
18, respectively, of the Amendment Act by parity
of the reasoning the same ratio applies to the
awards made by the civil court between those
dates. The conflict of decisions as to whether
Section 23(2) as amended by Section 15(b) of the
Amendment Act through Section 30(2) of the
transitory provisions would be applicable to the
pending appeals in the High Court and the
Supreme Court was resolved in Raghubir Singh
case 1 by the Constitution Bench holding that the
award of the Collector or the court made between
13-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 would alone get
attracted to Section 30(2) of the transitory
provision. The restricted interpretation should not
be understood to mean that Section 23(2) would
not apply to the award of the civil court pending
at the time when the Act came into force or
thereafter. In this case, admittedly the award of
the civil court was made after the Act had come
into force, namely, 28-2-1985.”
10. On a perusal of the principle stated in Raghubir
Singh case and what has been clarified in K.S.
Paripoornan (II) case , we do not find that the three-Judge
JUDGMENT
Bench decision runs counter to the authority in the
Constitution Bench. It also does not give a different
interpretation to Section 30(2) that what has been stated by
the Constitution Bench. In fact, K.S. Paripoornan (II)
clearly postulates about the awards that have been passed
by the court after the Act has come into force which is in
consonance with the ratio laid down in Raghubir Singh ’ s
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case . The three-Judge Bench has only observed that the
restricted interpretation placed by the Constitution Bench
in Raghubir Singh (supra) should not convey that Section
23(2) would not apply to the awards of the civil court
pending at the time when the Act came into force or
thereafter. Thus, the controversy with which the three-
Judge Bench was dealing with was absolutely different and
the view expressed by it is absolutely in accord with the
principles laid down in Raghubir Singh ’s case.
Additionally, it is also in consonance with the provisions
contained in Section 23(2) of the Act. Therefore, we do not
see any reason to disagree with the view expressed in K.S.
Paripoornan (II) as we are of the convinced opinion that it
has appositely understood the rule exposited in Raghubir
JUDGMENT
Singh ’s case .
11. Having so stated, ordinarily we would have directed
the matter to be placed before a two-Judge Bench, but it is
not necessary to do so. We have been apprised at the Bar
that the award in this case had been passed by the
th
reference court on 30 September, 1985. Therefore, there
cannot be any trace of doubt that principle stated in K.S.
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Paripoornan (II) would squarely be applicable.
12. The High Court by the impugned judgment has opined
that the principle stated in the K.S. Paripoornan (II)
(supra) would not be applicable. The said view is perceptibly
erroneous. We are of the considered opinion that the
appellant shall be entitled to the benefits as per the law laid
down in K.S. Paripoornan (II). It is not disputed at the Bar
that the appellants are not entitled to the benefits under
Section 23(1A) in view of the decision in K.S. Paripoornan
9
(I) vs. State of Kerala .
13. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of
another aspect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
10
Sunder vs. Union of India has opined that:-
JUDGMENT
“24. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes
the position further clear. The proviso says that
"if such compensation" is not paid within one
year from the date of taking possession of the
land, interest shall stand escalated to 15% per
annum from the date of expiry of the said period
of one year "on the amount of compensation or
part thereof which has not been paid or deposited
before the date of such expiry". It is inconceivable
that the solatium amount would attract only the
escalated rate of interest from the expiry of one
year and that there would be no interest on
solatium during the preceding period. What the
9 (1994) 5 SCC 593
10 (2001) 7 SCC 211
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legislature intended was to make the aggregate
amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach the
hands of the person as and when the award is
passed, at any rate as soon as he is deprived of
the possession of his land. Any delay in making
payment of the said sum should enable the party
to have interest on the said sum until he receives
the payment. Splitting up the compensation into
different components for the purpose of payment
of interest under Section 34 was not in the
contemplation of the legislature when that
section was framed or enacted.
xxx xxx xxx
27. In our view the aforesaid statement of law is
in accord with the sound principle of
interpretation. Hence the person entitled to the
compensation awarded is also entitled to get
interest on the aggregate amount including
solatium. The reference is answered accordingly.”
14. We have referred to the aforesaid authority by
abundant caution so that the respondent while computing
JUDGMENT
the amount shall take the same into consideration.
Needless to say, in case the respondent do not comply with
the judgment, execution can be levied and at that juncture
this aspect can also be taken note of as it forms a part of
the decree.
15. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and it is directed
that the appellants shall be entitled to the benefits as stated
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herein-above. The judgment and the decree passed by the
High Court stands modified. The respondents are directed
to deposit the amount before the executing court within six
weeks hence. If any amount has already been deposited,
that shall be taken into consideration while computing the
amount. In the fact and circumstances of the case, there
shall be no order as to costs.
..............................J.
(Dipak Misra)
…..........................J.
(V. Gopala Gowda)
…..........................J.
(Kurian Joseph)
New Delhi
April 01, 2016.
JUDGMENT
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