Full Judgment Text
‘REPORTABLE’
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3151 OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17367 of 2016)
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Appellant (s)
VERSUS
BHIM SAIN GOEL AND ORS. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
K. M. JOSEPH, J.
(1) Delay condoned.
(2) Applications for condonation of delay in filing
substitution, setting aside abatement and substitution are
allowed.
Mr. Pranab Kumar Mullick, learned counsel, appears for
the legal representatives of deceased respondents.
(3) Leave granted.
(4) A notification dated 21.03.2003 was issued under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
referred to as ‘1894 Act’) purporting to acquire lands
Digitally signed by
Nidhi Ahuja
Date: 2022.05.04
17:22:44 IST
Reason:
belonging to the respondents. This was duly followed up by
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declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act on 18.03.2004.
On 22.08.2005, an Award was passed in the matter. Writ
Petition No. 21639/2005 came to be filed before the High
Court laying challenge to the declaration under Section 6.
What is more pertinent is that, the High Court directed on
18.11.2005 that status quo with regard to nature, title and
possession of the land in question be maintained. It is the
case of the appellant that the authority could not take
possession of the land as a result of the interim order.
The writ petition came to be dismissed. However, on the
application of the respondents, by order dated 18.09.2007,
the High Court extended the stay order by a week. The
respondents approached this Court by filing SLP (C)No.
17504-08/2007. This was later converted into Civil Appeal
No. 4116-4120/2009. Again, what is apposite to note is that
an interim order of stay was passed. In the meantime, the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as ‘2013 Act’) came into force with
effect from 01.01.2014. In the meantime, the respondents
filed Writ Petition No. 3209/2015. This writ petition was
premised on the lapsing of the proceedings under the 1894
Act, based on Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The writ
petition came to be allowed by the High Court on 02.02.2016.
Thereafter, the respondents withdrew Civil Appeal No. 4116-
4120/2009. It is this judgment of the High Court dated
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02.02.2016 which is the subject matter of the present
appeal.
(5) The findings of the High Court can be gleaned from the
following paragraphs:
“2. The Land Acquisition Collector claims that
possession of the said land was taken on 24.12.2008.
Interestingly, they claim that immediately on taking
over possession of the subject land the same was
handed to the DDA. However, the affidavit filed on
behalf of the DDA states that possession was not
handed over by the Land Acquisition Collector to the
DDA. Apart form this the learned counsel for the
petitioners points out that the respondents/LAC could
not have taken possession of the subject land because
there was a status quo order which had been passed by
a Division Bench of this court on 18.11.2005 in W.P.
(C) 21639/2005. That writ petition was dismissed on
20.08.2007. Thereafter a special leave petition was
filed before the Supreme Court being S.L.P. (C)No.
17504/2007 (later the special leave petition was
admitted and has now become Civil Appeal Nos. 4116-
4120 of 2009) in which stay was granted on 19.09.2007
and that has continued till date. Therefore,
according to the learned counsel for the petitioners,
possession of the said land has not been taken by the
respondents. Insofar as the issue of compensation is
concerned, it is an admitted position that the same
has not been offered or paid to the petitioners.
3. Without going into the controversy of physical
possession, this much is clear that the Award was made
more than five years prior to the commencement of the
2013 Act and the compensation has also not been paid.
The necessary ingredients for the application of
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as interpreted by the
Supreme Court and this Court in the following cases
stand satisfied: -
(1) Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v.
Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors.: (2014) 3
SCC 183;
(2) Union of India and Ors. v. Shiv Raj and Ors:
(2014) 6 SCC 564;
(3) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v.
State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No.
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8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014;
(4) Surender Singh v. Union of India & Others:
WP(C)2294/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this
Court; and
(5) Girish Chhabra v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and
Ors: WP(C)2759/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this
Court.”
(6) We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and
the learned counsel for the respondents.
(7) Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that
the impugned judgment will not stand scrutiny of this Court
in the light of the later Constitution Bench judgment of
this Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and
Others (2020) 8 SCC 129 hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution Bench decision. It is his case that the
conduct of the respondents in filing the writ petitions we
have adverted to and the special leave petition later
converted into civil appeal and what is more important,
obtaining interim orders prevented the appellant from taking
possession of the property in question clearly, disentitles
the respondents from claiming the benefit of the alleged
lapsing of the proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act.
This position is clear from the perusal of the
judgment of the Constitution Bench which we have adverted
to. He would submit that the respondents cannot be
permitted to take advantage of order obtained by them from
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the Court and then set up a case under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act.
(8) Per contra , learned counsel for the respondents would
point out that quite apart from the issues which arise from
judgment of the Constitution Bench, there is another
dimension which has unfolded. This later development
consists of the following:
The National Highways Authority of India came to
notify the lands in question acting under the National
Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1956 Act’
for brevity) by issuance of a notification under Section 3A
of the said Act on 01.12.2018. The notification under
Section 3A comprehend the lands in question. What is more,
the matter progressed further to the stage of declaration
under Section 3D. The declaration was published on
22.03.2019. He would, therefore, submit that whatever would
be the effect of the later judgment in the facts of this
case, the interest of justice demands, that the respondents
are given the benefit of the compensation under the 2013
Act.
(9) This is sought to be countered by the learned counsel
for the appellant by pointing out that again, on the facts,
the respondents are not entitled to any benefit based on the
subsequent developments. He does not dispute that a
notification was indeed issued under Section 3A of the 1956
Act on 01.12.2018 including the lands of the respondents in
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question in this case. He also does not dispute that the
declaration under Section 3(D) followed on 22.03.2019.
However, he points out that the Collector, finding that the
lands of the respondents which are the subject matter of the
appeal before this Court stood already vested, has excluded
the lands when it made the final Award on 05.11.2020.
Learned counsel for the appellant would also point out that
this Court has held that State cannot acquire land which is
already vested with it [ See in this regard (2010) 9 SCC
782 ].
(10) There is no dispute about certain facts. Notification
came to be issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act on
21.03.2003. This was followed up by declaration under
Section 6 on 18.03.2004 which was followed up by Award
passed on 22.08.2005.
An interim order is passed undoubtedly which
effectively prevented the appellant from taking possession
of the lands in question. Though the writ petition came to
be dismissed on 20.08.2007, the respondents carried the lis
to this Court and it is again not in dispute that the
interim order continued to haunt the appellants as it
prevented the appellants from taking possession of the lands
which it could otherwise have taken. With the enactment of
the 2013 Act with effect from 01.01.2014, even when the
civil appeal was pending, the respondents filed a fresh
round of litigation in the form of a writ petition. Therein
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the claim was that the earlier Award has lapsed on the basis
of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This argument, as we have
noted, has found favour with the High Court in the impugned
judgment.
It is thereafter, that the civil appeal came to be
withdrawn. It is the case of the appellant that except for
81 days, there was an interim order prevailing, which
effectively prevented the appellant from taking possession
of the lands at the instance of the respondents.
(11) At this juncture, it is appropriate to take note of
what this Court has laid down in the Constitution Bench
decision regarding the effect of orders by Courts operating
as an obstacle in the path of Acquiring Authority taking
possession of the land which is acquired:
“300. In our considered opinion, litigation which
initiated by the landowners has to be decided on its
own merits and the benefits of Section 24(2) should
not be available to the litigants. In case there is no
interim order, they can get the benefits they are
entitled to, not otherwise as a result of fruit of
litigation, delays and dilatory tactics and sometime
it may be wholly frivolous pleas and forged documents
as observed in V. Chandrasekaran [ V. Chandrasekaran v.
Administrative Officer , (2012) 12 SCC 133 : (2013) 2
SCC (Civ) 136 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 587 : (2013) 3 SCC
(L&S) 416] mentioned above.
306. When the authorities are disabled from performing
duties due to impossibility, would be a good excuse
for them to save them from rigour of provisions of
Section 24(2). A litigant may be right or wrong. He
cannot be permitted to take advantage of a situation
created by him of interim order. The doctrine
“ commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet ” that is
convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own
wrong. Provisions of Section 24 do not discriminate
litigants or non-litigants and treat them differently
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with respect to the same acquisition, otherwise,
anomalous results may occur and provisions may become
discriminatory in itself.
309. It may not be doubtful conduct to file frivolous
litigation and obtain stay; but benefit of Section
24(2) should not be conferred on those who prevented
the taking of possession or payment of compensation,
for the period spent during the stay.
314. The maxim “ lex non cogit ad impossibilia ” means
that the law does not expect the performance of the
impossible. Though payment is possible but the logic
of payment is relevant. There are cases in which
compensation was tendered, but refused and then
deposited in the treasury. There was litigation in
court, which was pending (or in some cases, decided);
earlier references for enhancement of compensation
were sought and compensation was enhanced. There was
no challenge to acquisition proceedings or taking
possession, etc. In pending matters in this Court or
in the High Court even in proceedings relating to
compensation, Section 24(2) was invoked to state that
proceedings have lapsed due to non-deposit of
compensation in the court or to deposit in the
treasury or otherwise due to interim order of the
court needful could not be done, as such proceedings
should lapse.
We may notice further that the Court elaborately dealt
with the principle of restitution and had this to say:
338. A wrongdoer or in the present context, a litigant
who takes his chances, cannot be permitted to gain by
delaying tactics. It is the duty of the judicial
system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing of
undue advantage, by using the court as a tool. In
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania
[ Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath
Narichania , (2010) 9 SCC 437 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 808]
, it was observed that courts should be careful in
neutralizing the effect of consequential orders passed
pursuant to interim orders. Such directions are
necessary to check the rising trend among the
litigants to secure reliefs as an interim measure and
avoid adjudication of the case on merits. Thus, the
restitutionary principle recognizes and gives shape to
the idea that advantages secured by a litigant, on
account of orders of court, at his behest , should not
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be perpetuated; this would encourage the prolific or
serial litigant, to approach courts time and again and
defeat rights of others — including undermining of
public purposes underlying acquisition proceedings. A
different approach would mean that, for instance,
where two landowners (sought to be displaced from
their lands by the same notification) are awarded
compensation, of whom one allows the issue to attain
finality — and moves on, the other obdurately seeks to
stall the public purpose underlying the acquisition,
by filing one or series of litigation, during the
pendency of which interim orders might inure and bind
the parties, the latter would profit and be rewarded,
with the deemed lapse condition under Section 24(2).
Such a consequence, in the opinion of this Court, was
never intended by Parliament; furthermore, the
restitutionary principle requires that the advantage
gained by the litigant should be suitably offset, in
favour of the other party.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the
window period of five years excluding the period
covered by an interim order of the court, then
proceedings shall continue as provided under Section
24(1)( b ) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it
has not been repealed.
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or more
before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding
for land acquisition pending with the authority
concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of
interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in
the computation of five years.
(12) On the application of the aforesaid principles to the
facts of this case, there cannot be any doubt that the
respondents cannot take shelter under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act. This is for the simple reason that it is by their
conduct in approaching the Courts and obtaining interim
orders that the appellant was prevented from taking
possession of the lands. We are clear in our minds that
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this is indeed one such case where the respondents have
launched litigation, obtained orders and it has clearly
prevented the appellant from taking possession and
therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court would
have to be set aside.
(13) The problem, however, is sought to be projected by the
learned counsel for the respondents based on the subsequent
developments which we have already noted.
It is true that a notification has been issued under
Section 3A of the 1956 Act also. It is equally true that
acting upon the notification after calling for the
objections, declaration has been made under Section 3D of
the 1956 Act.
The scheme of the 1956 Act essentially consists of
issuance of notification under Section 3A corresponding to
Section 4 of the 1894 Act, followed up by an inquiry
ordinarily and culminating in a declaration under Section
3D. It is undoubtedly true that the legal effect of the
declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act is that the
property would vest thereupon.
(14) Here, therefore, we are presented with a situation
where , on the one hand, the vesting has already taken place
under Section 16 of the 1894 Act. No doubt, under Section
16, possession is to be taken on passing of the Award. But
here, it is only solely on account of the conduct of the
respondents in filing a writ petition and orders being
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passed by courts that possession could not be taken. On the
other hand, during the pendency of the challenge against the
impugned judgment, undoubtedly, proceedings have been
launched under the 1956 Act, as already noted. Here, we
must bear in mind that the land in question was needed for a
public purpose-construction of the road. It is apparently,
no doubt, during the pendency of the litigation before this
Court that proceedings under Section 3A have been taken,
followed up by declaration under Section 3D.
(15) At this juncture, we must notice the principles laid
down in Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahesh Sharma and
Another (2010) 9 SCC 782:
“26. Despite vesting of the land with the Government
under the provisions of the Jagir Act and also
resumption of the said land measuring 29 bighas and 17
biswas by the Government, a notification proposing
acquisition of the said land was issued by the
Government under Section 4(1) of the Act followed by
the notification under Section 6 of the Act. The Land
Acquisition Officer even proceeded to pass an award in
respect of the land, which already belonged to the
Government, by determining compensation, and proceeded
further in directing retention of interim compensation
paid under the Jagir Act and also by directing the
allotment of a plot of developed land measuring 2500
sq yd. Although there was no law supporting such
action, the said action on the part of the Land
Acquisition Officer directing the payment of
compensation and also allotting a plot of land in
favour of the respondent indicates as to how
government officials, who are protectors of the
government property, abuse their power and trust under
the camouflage of performance of their public duty.
32. In State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma [1995 Supp
(3) SCC 249] this Court has held that the Land
Acquisition Act does not contemplate or provide for
the acquisition of any interest belonging to the
Government in the land on acquisition. It reiterated
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the settled position of law that the Government being
the owner of the land need not acquire its own land
merely because a person mistakenly resorted to acquire
the land and later on mistakenly published
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
33. The aforesaid position was reiterated in a
subsequent decision of this Court in Meher Rusi Dalal
v. Union of India [(2004) 7 SCC 362] . In SCC para 15
of the said judgment, this Court has held that the
High Court has clearly erred in setting aside the
order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer
declining a reference since it is settled law that in
land acquisition proceedings the Government cannot and
does not acquire its own interest. While laying down
the aforesaid law, this Court has referred to its
earlier decision in Collector of Bombay v.
Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri [AIR 1955 SC 298 : (1955)
1 SCR 1311].
34. We may at this stage appropriately refer to the
decision of this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman
Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 : (1955) 1 SCR 117] . In the
said case this Court has held that judgment passed by
a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and such a
judgment could be challenged even in execution or
collateral proceedings. The Court at SCR p. 121 at
para 6 held thus: (AIR p. 342, para 6)
“ 6 . … It is a fundamental principle well established
that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction
is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up
whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or
relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even
in collateral proceedings.”
36. In view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court,
it is crystal clear that the issuance of notifications
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act as also the award
passed for acquisition of the land was a nullity and
the subsequent action of the Government
derequisitioning land by issuance of notification
under Section 48 was just and proper as that was an
action for rectification of the mistake. The
subsequent Land Acquisition Officer was justified in
refusing to refer to the Reference Court in view of
the fact that the land was already a government land
and was so described in the revenue record itself. The
Land Acquisition Officer, who passed the award,
committed an illegality by not only determining the
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act but also
directing for retention of the interim compensation
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paid under the Jagir Act and also in directing for
allotment of a developed plot of land admeasuring 2500
sq yd.
(16) We have to call into play certain principles in view
of the peculiar nature of the facts.
On the one hand, it is a case where the so-called
subsequent developments had taken place during the pendency
of the appeal before this Court. On the other hand, the
authority obviously realizing the need to acquire the land
for public purpose that is for construction of road resorted
to the provisions of the 1956 Act. Here again, we must bear
in mind the principle that the Government cannot acquire the
land which has already vested in it. The other aspect we
must also bear in mind is realizing the fact that the lands
in question are the subject matter of the appeal and what is
more, they would stand vested in terms of the Constitution
Bench judgment of this Court the lands have been excluded
when the final Award was passed under the 1956 Act. We may
note here that the respondents do not have a case that they
have laid any challenge to the exclusion of their lands in
the final Award. Whatever that may be, the fact remains
that all these developments took place during the pendency
of the appeal.
(17) When the Court finally decides the lis, it is
undoubtedly, open, particularly this Court, having powers as
it has under Article 142, to do complete justice between the
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parties and we take it that the learned counsel for the
respondents is seeking to invoke the said jurisdiction.
(18) If it is the principle of estoppel which can be
invoked as it would appear to us from the line of argument
taken by the learned counsel for the respondents, we are of
the view that it is not tenable. Estoppel flows from
equity.
th
(19) In the work SPENCER BOWER: RELIANCE-BASED ESTOPPEL 5
Edition, we notice the following discussions.
“1.68 The requirement of unconscionability is that B
cannot in good conscience assert that which he is
estopped from asserting. Its use derives from
equitable jurisprudence, ‘… reflecting in the word
“conscience” the ecclesiastical origins of the long-
departed Court of Chancery’ sitting as a court of
conscience. Honesty and innocence of intention will
not, however, excuse B from liability to estoppel:
what is material is not the state of B’s morals, but
the effect of his representation or silence on the
mind and will of A. B’s conduct need not, moreover, be
shocking in any particular degree, beyond that, absent
an estoppel, it would give rise to an unfair result.
Lord Walker in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd
referred to the need for the result, without an
estoppel, to ‘shock the conscience of the court’ but
should not, it is submitted, be understood as
requiring the court to find more than that B has by
his representation caused A so to act (or omit to act)
that the result would otherwise be unfair. The caution
of Lord Radcliffe in Bridge v Campbell Discount as to
its use in the context of equitable mitigation of the
common law must also be exercised here.
“Unconscionable” must not be taken to be a panacea for
adjusting any contract between competent persons when
it shows a rough edge to one side or the other…’. A
flexible definition has been provided by Deane J in
Common-wealth of Australia v Verwayen:
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‘The doctrine of estoppel by conduct is founded
upon good conscience… The most that can be said
is that “unconscionable” should be understood
in the sense of referring to what one party
“ought not, in conscience, as between (the
parties) to be allowed” to do (see Storey,
nd
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 2 Eng Ed
(1892) para 1219; Thompson v Palmer).”
(20) No doubt it could be argued that perhaps it may be the
doctrine of election which is apposite. It is in connection
with the cases related to election that terms like approbate
and reprobate find mention. It could be contended that it may
not be fair to allow the appellant to proceed under the 1956
Act and for the proceedings to culminate in the vesting of
the property under Section 3D of the 1956 Act and having
elected to take proceedings under the 1956 Act apparently on
the basis of the impugned judgment namely that the proceeding
under the 1894 Act stood lapsed, the authorities cannot be
permitted to resile from their action. We would think that it
would be wholly inequitable on facts to deprive the appellant
of its rights when it is finally adjudicated in its favour in
the facts of this case. It is also a case where the appellant
has promptly approached this court against the impugned
judgment. Furthermore, in the facts the balancing of equity
must be worked out in favour of the appellant. In other
words, the mere fact that proceedings were taken during the
pendency of the case and it had reached the stage of
declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act cannot suffice
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to cloth the respondents with a right to claim the fruits of
the said proceedings, when on the final disposal of the
appeal by us we only find that in law as declared by this
court in the Constitution Bench, the land already would stand
vested under the 1894 Act and as already noticed there cannot
be vesting twice over.
(21) We would think that in the facts of this case having
regard to the fact that barring 81 days the respondents
succeed on the strength of interim order passed from
preventing the appellant from taking possession of the lands
must be the crucial aspect which we have referred to.
(22) The principle which has appealed to the Constitution
Bench of this Court is squarely applicable to the facts of
this case. The public authority which had set the law in
motion under the earlier regime cannot be put to a loss when
at the end of the day or on the day of reckoning it is found
that they must succeed in law. Here we have found that the
appellant is fully justified in contending that but for the
orders passed by the High Court and this Court, the
possession would have been taken, and the land would have
vested under the law. We must proceed on the basis that but
for the interim orders passed which cannot survive the final
disposal of the cases, the land would have stood vested with
the Government under the earlier regime. The subsequent
vesting which is attributed to Section 3D of the 1956 Act, in
our view must pale into insignificance and cannot estop the
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appellant from contending that in law the land would vest
under the notification/ award issued under the 1894 Act.
(23) Having seen the background of the facts, we do not
think that there is any right for the respondents to plead
equity for they have by their acts effectively prevented the
public authority from enjoying the fruits of law by which, in
the exercise of power embedded in the 1894 Act, the land is
vested with the appellant, and the land is one which is
needed for an important public project like construction of
the road for that matter.
(24) It is clear as daylight that it would be completely
antithetical to public interest were the Government be
compelled to shell out public funds under the 2013 Act to
acquire land which already belongs to it. We cannot be
oblivious to the said sublime principle as well.
(25) We must again also bear in mind the restitutionary
principle which has been adverted to by the Constitution
Bench. As we have already noticed, realizing that the lands
are already vested, the lands are already excluded under the
final award. The inevitable outcome of the above discussion
is that the appellant must succeed.
(26) However, in the facts of this case and in the interest
of justice, we think it fit to direct that if the
respondents have not filed any application under Section 18
of the 1894 Act seeking reference and claiming enhanced
compensation pursuant to the Award dated 22.08.2005, the
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respondents should be granted an opportunity to make an
application under Section 18 and the matter be adjudicated
under the earlier Act. The impugned judgment came to be
passed based on the law as it was laid down by this Court.
Accordingly, we direct that in case, the respondents have
already not filed an application within the meaning of
section 18 of the 1894 Act, they are permitted to file
application under Section 18 of the 1894 Act within a period
of one month from today. In case such an application is
made, it will be dealt with in accordance with law as it
stood under the 1894 Act.
The application will not be dismissed on the ground of
delay. We make this order in the peculiar facts of this
case and taking note of the fact that it is with our
judgment rendered today that we are giving our imprimatur to
the Award dated 22.08.2005 under the 1894 Act.
The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment will
stand set aside.
Parties to bear their own costs.
…………………………………………………………………….., J.
[ K.M. JOSEPH ]
…………………………………………………………………….., J.
[ HRISHIKESH ROY ]
New Delhi;
April 25, 2022.
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ITEM NO.26 COURT NO.10 SECTION XIV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 17367/2016
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 02-02-2016
in WPC No. 3209/2015 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi)
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
BHIM SAIN GOEL AND ORS. Respondent(s)
(With IA No. 2166/2022 - APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTION and IA No.
49076/2022 - APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTION and IA No. 194362/2019 -
APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS and IA No. 33179/2022 - CONDONATION
OF DELAY IN FILING SUBSTITUTION APPLN. and IA No. 49077/2022 -
CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING SUBSTITUTION APPLN. and IA No.
194363/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. and IA No. 49079/2022 -
SETTING ASIDE AN ABATEMENT and IA No. 33180/2022 - SETTING ASIDE AN
ABATEMENT)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 17311/2016 (XIV)
Date : 25-04-2022 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY
For parties Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Vishnu B. Saharya, Adv.
Mr. Viresh B. Saharya, Adv.
M/s. Saharya & Co., AOR
Mr. Akshay Dhatwalia, Adv.
Ms. Kumud Nijhawan, Adv.
Mr. Ashwani Kumar, AOR
Mr. Pranab Kumar Mullick, AOR
Ms. Soma Mullick, Adv.
Mr. Biswaranjan Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Sebat Kumar Deuria, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Singla, AOR
Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Adv.
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CA NO. 3151/2022 (@ SLP (C) No. 17367/ 2016)
Mr. Praveen Swarup, AOR
Mr. Shivam Goel, Adv.
Mr. Anil Kumar Goel, Adv.
Mr. Pratish Goel, Adv.
Mr. Ramya Goel, Adv.
Ms. Payal Swarup, Adv.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG.
Mr. Manvendra Singh, Adv.
Ms. Shivika Mehra, Adv.
Ms. BLN Shivani, Adv.
Mr. Aman Sharma, Adv.
Ms. Priyanka Das, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Sarkar, Adv.
Ms. Noor Rampal, Adv.
Mr. Raghvendra S. Srivatsa, Adv.
Mr. Atul Kumar, AOR
Ms. Sweety Singh, Adv.
Mr. Rahul Pandey, Adv.
Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
SLP (C) No. 17367/2016
Delay condoned.
Applications for condonation of delay in filing
substitution, setting aside abatement and substitution are
allowed.
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed
reportable judgment.
Pending applications stand disposed of.
SLP(C) No. 17311/2016
List the matter in August, 2022.
(NIDHI AHUJA) (RENU KAPOOR)
AR-cum-PS BRANCH OFFICER
[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.]
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