DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA vs. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2912  OF 2022 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.26855 of 2018] DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA  ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI & ANR.     ...RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. Leave granted.  The present appeal challenges the judgment and order of 2. the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   for th Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, dated 24  April, 2018, passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3260 of 2017, thereby allowing the writ   petition   filed   on   behalf   of   the   respondent   No.1­Biyani 1 Shikshan   Samiti   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   respondent st No.1”) and striking down the Notification dated 21  May, 2012 (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   impugned   Notification”),   vide which   the   appellant­Dental   Council   of   India   (hereinafter referred to as “the Council”), had substituted Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Dental Council of India (Establishment of New Dental Colleges,   Opening   of   New   or   Higher   Course   of   Studies   or Training and Increase of Admission Capacity in Dental Colleges) Regulations, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulations”), on   the   ground   of   the   same   being   inconsistent   with   the provisions of the Dentists Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) and also being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India.   3. The facts in the present case are not in dispute.  The respondent No. 1 had submitted an application to the 4. Government of India for grant of permission for establishment th of   dental   college   from   academic   year   2012­2013   on   24 2 September, 2011.  This was after the Letter of Intent was issued rd by   the   State   Government   on   23   September,   2011.     The respondent No. 2 – Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of   Health   and   Family   Welfare   (Dental   Education   Section) [hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   respondent   No.2”),   noticed certain deficiencies in the proposal of the respondent No.1 and th vide its letter dated 7  October, 2011, required the respondent No.1 to cure the said deficiencies.   th 5. After exchange of certain communications, on 6  January, 2012,   the   respondent   No.2,   returned   the   application   of   the respondent No.1 along with demand draft of Rs.6 lakh, on the st ground that deficiencies pointed out were not cured prior to 31 December, 2011, i.e., the last date for curing the deficiencies.   6. In   the   meantime,   the   Government   of   Rajasthan   issued th Essentiality Certificate to the respondent No.1 on 11  January, th 2012. However, on 17   February, 2012, the respondent No.2 declined   to   reconsider   the   application/request   of   the 3 respondent No.1, on the grounds stated in its earlier letter, th dated   6   January,   2012.       As   such,   the   request   of   the respondent No.1 for reconsideration of its proposal came to be rejected by the respondent No.2, vide its communication dated th 17  February, 2012.   7. In the meantime, vide the impugned Notification, existing Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations   was   substituted   by st amended Regulation 6(2)(h) on 21   May, 2012.   Respondent th No.1 again submitted its fresh application on 28   September, 2012 for academic year 2013­2014.  The same was returned by st the respondent No.2 vide its order dated 31  December, 2012, on   the   ground   that   the   proposal/application   was   not   in compliance   with   the   amended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the rd Regulations.     On   23   January,   2013,   the   respondent   No.1 thereafter wrote a letter to the respondent No.2, stating therein th that   since   Essentiality   Certificate   was   issued   to   it   on   11 January, 2012, the impugned Notification was not applicable to 4 it and requested for reconsideration of its application under the unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations.     The respondent No.2 rejected the application of the respondent No.1 th vide its order dated 5  March, 2013.   The respondent No.1 challenged the order passed by the 8. respondent No.2 rejecting the request for reconsideration of its application before the learned single judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, by way of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15090 of 2016.  The respondent No.1 further sought a direction to reconsider the application submitted by it th on 24   September,   2011   for   establishment  of   a  new  dental college for academic session 2017­2018.   The learned single rd judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 3 November,   2016,   finding   no   merit   in   the   writ   petition, dismissed the same. The respondent No.1 thereafter filed a writ petition before the Division Bench being D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.   3260   of   2017,   challenging   the   impugned   Notification 5 amending   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations.     The respondent   No.1   also   sought   a   prayer   for   direction   to   the th respondent No.2, for reconsidering its application, dated 28 September, 2012, for establishment of a new Dental College for academic   session   2018­2019   and   for   subsequent   academic th sessions. By the impugned judgment and order dated 24  April, 2018, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the said writ petition by striking down the impugned Notification and directed the respondent No. 2 to reconsider the case of the respondent No.1 in the light of the observations made in the impugned judgment and order.   Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been preferred by the Council.  9. We   have   heard   Shri   Gaurav   Sharma,   learned   counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Council,   Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General (“ASG” for short) appearing on   behalf   of   the   respondent   No.2   and   Ms.   Shobha   Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1. 6 10. Shri Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel, would submit that the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   has   grossly   erred   in allowing the writ petition.   He submits that the Council is an expert statutory body duly constituted under the said Act.  He submits   that   the   said   Act   empowers   the   Council   to   make Regulations   for   various   aspects   concerned   with   Dental Education,   including   prescribing   requirement   of   minimum standards.     He   submits   that   the   Council,   after   examining various aspects, had found it necessary to amend Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations.  He submits that this was done for providing   better   teaching   facilities   to   the   students   and   for improving the standards of education.   He submits that the Division Bench has grossly erred in holding that it was beyond the powers of the Council to make delegated legislation.   He submits that, in any case, the finding of the High Court that the impugned Notification was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India, is totally erroneous.   7 11. Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati,   learned   ASG   also   supports   the submission made on behalf of the Council.   Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Dental Council of India 1 vs.   Subharti   K.K.B.   Charitable   Trust   and   Another ,   she submits that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the impugned Notification, since the Regulations were made by the expert body in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.   12. Ms. Shobha Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1, on the contrary, would submit that the High Court has rightly quashed the impugned Notification. She submits that the impugned Notification has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved.  She submits that there is a huge shortage of Dentists in the country and therefore, the object of the legislation should be to encourage establishment of more Dental Colleges rather than providing a requirement which will 1 (2001) 5 SCC 486 8 restrict  the   number   of   new  Dental  Colleges.     On  facts,   she submits that there is no medical college within the vicinity of 100 kms. from the place at which the respondent No.1 proposes to start a new Dental College.  She submits that the impugned Notification, therefore, violates the fundamental rights of the students to take dental education as well as the fundamental right   of   the   respondent   No.1   to   establish   an   educational institution under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.   13. For   considering   the   rival   submissions,   it   will   be appropriate   to   refer   to   certain   provisions   of   the   said   Act. Section 3 of the said Act requires the Central Government to constitute   a   Council   consisting   of   members   named   therein. Section   10   of   the   said   Act   deals   with   recognition   of   dental qualifications.     Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   deals   with permission for establishment of new dental college, new courses of study, etc.   Sub­section (1) of Section 10A of the said Act puts   restriction   on   the   establishment   of   an   authority   or 9 institution for a course of study or training which would enable a student of such course or training to qualify himself for the grant   of   recognized   dental   qualification;   it   also   imposes   a restriction   on   opening   a   new   or   higher   course   of   study   or training, or increase the admission capacity in any course of study or training, including a post­graduate course of study or training.     It   is   provided   that   no   person   can   establish   an authority   or   institution   for   dental   education   and   that   no authority or institution can open a new or higher course of study or training, including a post­graduate course of study or training, or increase its admission capacity without the prior permission of the Central Government.  Sub­sections (2) to (4) of Section 10A of the said Act deal with the procedure to be followed for making an application for permission to start a new or   higher   course   of   study   or   training   or   increase   of   intake capacity in any course of study or training.  Sub­section (5) of Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   is   a   deeming   provision,   which 10 provides that if the Central Government fails to pass an order on the scheme/application submitted by the applicant within a period   of   one   year   from   the   date   of   submitting   the scheme/application, such scheme/application shall be deemed to have been approved by the Central Government in the form in which it was submitted.  It also provides that the permission of the Central Government required under sub­section (1) shall also be deemed to have been granted. Sub­section (6) of Section 10A of the said Act provides for extension of the period provided in sub­section (5) by entitling an applicant for the extension of the   period   for   furnishing   the   particulars   called   for   by   the Council or by the Central Government.   14. It will be apposite to reproduce sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act, since the same fell for consideration before the Division Bench of the High Court while allowing the writ petition.  It reads thus:  11

12 its   admission   capacity   has adequate resources; ( c )   whether   necessary   facilities   in respect   of   staff,   equipment, accommodation,   training   and other   facilities   to   ensure   proper functioning   of   the   authority   or institution or conducting the new course   of   study   or   training   or accommodating   the   increased admission   capacity   have   been provided   or   would   be   provided within the time­limit specified in the scheme; ( )   whether   adequate   hospital d facilities,   having   regard   to   the number   of   students   likely   to attend   such   authority   or institution or course of study or training   or   as   a   result   of   the increased   admission   capacity have been provided or would be provided   within   the   time­limit specified in the scheme; ( e )   whether   any   arrangement   has been made or programme drawn to   impart   proper   training   to students   likely   to   attend   such authority or institution or course of   study   or   training   by   persons having   the   recognised   dental qualifications; 13 ( f ) the requirement of manpower in the field of practice of dentistry; and ( g )   any   other   factors   as   may   be prescribed.” It could thus be seen that the Council, while making its 15. recommendations and the Central Government, while passing an order, are required to take into consideration various factors as are enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act.   Section 20 of the said Act empowers the Council, with the 16. approval of the Central Government, to make Regulations.   It will be apposite to refer to the relevant part of Section 20 of the said Act, which reads thus: “ (1) The 20. Power to make regulations.­ Council   may,   with   the   approval   of   the Central   Government,   by   notification   in the Official Gazette, make regulations not inconsistent   with   the   provisions   of   this Act   to   carry   out   the   purposes   of   this Chapter. 14 (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such regulations may­ (a) …………………………………………… (b) …………………………………………… xxx xxx xxx (fb) prescribe   any   other   factors   under clause   (g)   of   sub­section   (7)   of section 10A” 17. It could thus be seen from the conjoint reading of clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A and clause (fb) of sub­ section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act that the Council is also empowered to take into consideration any other factors as may be   prescribed   and   also   entitled   to   make   Regulations   for prescribing any other factor under clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A.   18. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   provision   of Regulation   6(2)(h)   as   it   existed   prior   to   the   impugned Notification   and   the   amended   provision   after   the   impugned Notification was given effect to.  They read thus: 15 “ Regulation 6(2)(h) prior to impugned st   Notification dated 21      May, 2012 .  .­  6 Eligibility and qualifying criteria (1) ………………………………………….. (2)   The   organizations   under   sub­ regulation   (1)   shall   qualify   to   apply   for permission to establish a dental college if the following conditions are fulfilled:­  (a) ………………………………………….. (b)  ………………………………………….. xxx (h) the applicant owns and manages a General   Hospital   of   not   less   than   100 beds as per Annexure I with necessary infrastructure   facilities   including teaching   pre­clinical,   para­clinical   and allied medical sciences in the campus of the proposed dental college,  or the proposed dental college is located in the   proximity   of   a  Government   Medical College or  a Medical  College  recognised by the Medical Council of India and an undertaking of the said Medical College to the effect that it would facilitate training to   the   students   of   the   proposed   dental college   in   the   subjects   of   Medicine, 16 Surgery and Allied Medical Sciences has been obtained,  or where no Medical College is available in the   proximity   of   the   proposed   dental college, the proposed dental college gets itself tied up at least for 5 years with a Government   General   Hospital   having   a provision of at least 100 beds and located within   a   radius   of   10   K.M.   of   the proposed dental college and the tie­up is extendable till it has its own 100 bedded hospital in the same premises. In such cases,   the   applicant   shall   produce evidence   that   necessary   infrastructure facilities   including   teaching   pre­clinical, para­clinical and allied medical sciences are owned by the proposed dental college itself;  Regulation 6(2)(h) after the impugned st   Notification dated 21      May, 2012 6 .  Eligibility and qualifying criteria .­  (1) ………………………………………….. (2)   The   organizations   under   sub­ regulation   (1)   shall   qualify   to   apply   for permission to establish a dental college if the following conditions are fulfilled:­  (a) ………………………………………….. 17 (b)  ………………………………………….. xxx (h) the applicant shall attach its proposed dental college with a Government/Private Medical  College   approved/recognised   by the   Medical   Council   of   India   which   is located at the distance of 10 kms. by road from   the   proposed   dental   college   and produce   evidence   of   the   said   Medical College   to   the   effect   that   it   would facilitate training to the students of the proposed   dental   college   as   per syllabus/course curriculum prescribed in respective   undergraduate   and   post graduate   dental   course   regulations   as amended from time to time:­  Provided that not more than one dental college shall be attached with the medical college.”  It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   change   that   has   been 19. brought by the impugned Notification is that, though under the unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h),   an   applicant   was   entitled   to apply if he/she/it owned and managed a General Hospital of not less than 100 beds; by the impugned Notification, it has been   made   mandatory   that   the   applicant   has   to   attach   its 18 proposed Dental College with the Government/Private Medical College, approved/recognized by the Medical Council of India, which is located at a distance of 10 kilometers by road from the proposed Dental College.   The distance of 10 kilometers has th now been increased to 30 kilometers, vide amendment dated 5 July, 2017.   20.  The Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned th judgment and order dated 24  April, 2018, has allowed the writ petition   and   quashed   the   impugned   Notification   on   three grounds, viz.,  (i) that it is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India;  (ii) that it is beyond the scope of the powers of the Council to make delegated legislation as provided under sub­ section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act; and  (iii) that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India,   inasmuch   as   the   Dental   Colleges   established 19 prior to impugned Notification would be permitted to run   without   attachment   with   Medical   Colleges, whereas,   the   Dental   Colleges   established   after   the impugned Notification will be compelled to have such an attachment with the Medical Colleges.     21. We find that the learned judges of the Division Bench have erred on all counts.   22. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this   Court   in   the   case   of   Indian   Express   Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and others vs. Union of India and 2 others . “ 75.  A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent Legislature.   Subordinate   legislation   may   be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it 2 (1985) 1 SCC 641 20 is made. It may further be questioned on the ground   that   it   is   contrary   to   some   other statute.   That   is   because   subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned on the ground that it is   unreasonable,   unreasonable   not   in   the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.”  23. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the s ubordinate   legislation   may   be   questioned   on   any   of   the grounds   on   which   plenary   legislation   is   questioned.     In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not  conform to the  statute  under  which it is  made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute.  Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.   24. It has further been held by this Court in the said case  that for  challenging  the  subordinate  legislation  on the   ground of 21 arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.  It has further been held that it cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken   into   account   relevant   circumstances   which   the   Court considers relevant.  25. The judgment of this Court in the case of  Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd.  (supra) has been followed by a three­judge Bench of this Court in the case of   Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and others vs. State of Karnataka and 3 .     It   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following others observations of this Court in the said case: 

3 (1996) 10 SCC 304 22 which   is   a   guarantee   against   arbitrary action. However, one must bear in mind that what is being challenged here under Article   14   is   not   executive   action   but delegated   legislation.   The   tests   of arbitrary action which apply to executive actions   do   not   necessarily   apply   to delegated   legislation.   In   order   that delegated legislation can be struck down, such   legislation   must   be   manifestly arbitrary;   a   law   which   could   not   be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the law­making power.   In   the   case   of  Indian   Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd.  v.  Union of India  [(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 : (1985) 2 SCR 287] (SCR at p. 243) this   Court   said   that   a   piece   of subordinate legislation does not carry the same   degree   of   immunity   which   is enjoyed   by   a   statute   passed   by   a competent   legislature.   A   subordinate legislation   may   be   questioned   under Article   14   on   the   ground   that   it   is unreasonable;  “unreasonable  not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense   that   it   is   manifestly   arbitrary”. Drawing a comparison between the law in England and in India, the Court further observed   that   in   England   the   Judges would   say,   “Parliament   never   intended the authority to make such Rules; they are   unreasonable   and   ultra   vires”.   In India,   arbitrariness   is   not   a   separate 23 ground   since   it   will   come   within   the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. But   subordinate   legislation   must   be   so arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity   with   the   statute   or   that   it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.” In   the   case   of   26. State   of   T.N.   and   another   vs.   P. 4 Krishnamurthy   and   others   after   considering   the   law   laid down by this Court earlier in the cases of   Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd.   (supra),   Supreme Court Employees’  Welfare  Association. vs.  Union of  India and 5 ,   another Shri   Sitaram   Sugar   Company   Limited   and 6 another vs. Union of India and others ,  St. Johns Teachers Training Institute vs. Regional Director, National Council 7 for   Teacher   Education   and   another ,   Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal and others vs. State of Maharashtra 4 (2006) 4 SCC 517 5 (1989) 4 SCC 187 6 (1990) 3 SCC 223 7 (2003) 3 SCC 321 24   8 and others ,   Union of India and another vs. Cynamide 9   and   India Ltd. and another State of  Haryana vs. Ram 10 Kishan   and   others ,   this   Court   has   laid   down   certain grounds,   on   which   the   subordinate   legislation   can   be challenged, which are as under: 

8 (1981) 2 SCC 722 9 (1987) 2 SCC 720 10 (1988) 3 SCC 416 25 ( e )  Repugnancy  to  the   laws  of   the land, that is, any enactment. ( f )   Manifest   arbitrariness/ unreasonableness (to an extent where the   court   might   well   say   that   the legislature   never   intended   to   give authority to make such rules).” 27. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to examine the correctness of the findings of the learned judges of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment and order.   28. One of the grounds on which the impugned Notification has been struck down is that it is beyond the scope of powers of the   Council   under   Section   10A(7)(d)   of   the   said   Act.     The Division Bench of the High Court has relied on clause (d) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act to come to a conclusion that clause (d) refers to adequate hospital facilities, having regard to the number of students likely to attend the institution.    It  has held  that a  requirement of  hospital was already fulfilled in the pre­amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations. It has further held that clause (d) does not refer to 26 Medical   College.     It   was   therefore   held   that   the   impugned Notification requiring the Dental Colleges to be attached with the Government/Private Medical College was beyond the scope of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act and, therefore, inconsistent with the said Act.   29. We find that the Division Bench has failed to take into consideration clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act.  It is to be noted that whereas clauses (a) to (f) of sub­ section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act deal with various factors, clause (g) thereof, which can be said to be a residual clause, enables the Council to take into consideration also any other factor as may be prescribed.   30. We further find that the Division Bench of the High Court has also failed to take into consideration clause (fb) of sub­ section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act.  A conjoint reading of these   provisions   would   reveal   that   the   Council   is   also empowered to take into consideration any other factor as may 27 be prescribed and also to make a Regulation with regard to any other factor under clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the   said   Act.     It   could   thus   be   seen   that   it   is   within   the competence of the Council to make Regulations prescribing any other conditions, which are otherwise not found in clauses (a) to   (f)   of   sub­section   (7)   of   Section   10A   of   the   said   Act. Challenge to the same would be permissible only on the ground of manifest arbitrariness.   It is also equally settled that the presumption is always with regard to the validity of a provision. The burden is on the party who challenges the validity of such provision.     We   find   that   the   respondent   No.1   has   failed   to discharge the burden to show that the impugned Notification suffers from manifest arbitrariness.       31. Secondly, the Division Bench of the High Court found the st impugned Notification dated 21   May, 2012 to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, on the ground that the Dental Colleges established prior to impugned Notification would not 28 be required to be attached with the Medical Colleges, whereas, the   Dental   Colleges,   established   after   the   impugned Notification, will be compelled to be attached to such Medical Colleges.     We   are   of   the   considered   view   that   the   Colleges established prior to the impugned Notification and the Colleges established/to be established after the impugned Notification would form two separate classes.  The differential treatment for different   classes   would   not   be   hit   by   Article   14   of   the Constitution of India. The only requirement would be, as to whether   such   a   classification   has   a   nexus   with   the   object sought   to   be   achieved   by   the   Act.     For   the   reasons   given hereinafter, we find that the factors taken into consideration by the   Council,   while   amending   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the Regulations are relevant factors.  The factors have a nexus with the object sought to be achieved.   It has been submitted on behalf   of   the   Council   that   the   existing   recognized   Medical College already has a facility to impart education to about 500­ 29 700   students.   Such   Medical   Colleges   have   a   full­fledged teaching   faculty.     Such   a   faculty   would   enable   providing   a proper   education   to   the   students   of   the   Dental   colleges   on various   aspects   of   pre­clinical,   para­clinical   and   allied medicine, etc.   The Council has also taken into consideration the fact that the General Hospitals having bed­capacity of 100 beds or more do not have experts on full­time basis.   They usually engage the services of consultant doctors, who visit the Hospital for a very limited period.  The Council has also taken into consideration the fact that the private hospitals do not have  adequate  clinical facilities and/or  clinical material and therefore,   it   is   unlikely   that   they   will   be   able   to   impart education and training to students.  It has been submitted on behalf of the Council that the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations was brought into effect so that it would facilitate training to the students of the proposed Dental Colleges as per the   syllabus/course   curriculum   prescribed.     It,   therefore, 30 cannot be said that the Council has taken into consideration the factors, which are not relevant or germane for the purpose to be achieved.  The object to be achieved is to provide adequate teaching   and   training   facilities   to   the   students.     If   in   the wisdom of the expert body, this can be done by attaching a Dental College to the already existing Medical College, it cannot be faulted with.   32. The reason given for not permitting more than one Dental College to be attached to the existing recognized Medical College is that if one Dental College is permitted to be attached to a recognized Medical College, which is already having 500­750 students in different semesters of their 5­year MBBS course, the additional students of the Dental College may very well be absorbed   in   the   facilities   that   are   already   available   in   the recognized Medical College.  However, if more than one Dental College is permitted to be attached, it will lead to overcrowding of students in the Medical College.  31 33. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the amended Regulation   cannot   be   said   to   be   one,   which   is   manifestly arbitrary, so as to permit the Court to interfere with it.  On the contrary, we find that the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) has a direct   nexus   with   the   object   to   be   achieved,   i.e.,   providing adequate teaching and training facilities to the students.   34. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned judgment:  “We   fail   to   understand   as   to   how   the earlier provisions, in any manner, were not sufficient for the object sought to be achieved.     A   careful   reading   of   the unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   shows requirement of attachment with General Hospital   owned   and   managed   by   the applicant in the campus of the proposed Dental College.  It was with infrastructure facilities   including   teaching   pre­clinical, para­clinical and allied medical sciences. If we talk about practical training, it would be more in the hospital, therefore, the   unamended   provision   of   Regulation 32 6(2)(h) provided both i.e. attachment with General   Hospital   or   with   a   Medical College   with   required   facilities   of teaching.” 35. In this respect, we would gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of   Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and 11 another vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others : “ 14.  ….. whether a rule or regulation or other type of statutory instrument — is in excess   of   the   power   of   subordinate legislation conferred on the delegate has to be determined with reference only to the   specific provisions  contained  in  the relevant statute conferring the power to make the rule, regulation, etc. and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the various provisions of   the   enactment.   It   would   be   wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature or its delegate   as   to   what   principle   or   policy would   best   serve   the   objects   and purposes   of   the   Act   and   to   sit   in judgment   over   the   wisdom   and effectiveness   or   otherwise   of   the   policy 11 (1984) 4 SCC 27 33 laid down by the regulation­making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act. So long as the body entrusted with   the   task   of   framing   the   rules   or regulations acts within the scope of the authority   conferred   on   it,   in   the   sense that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the statute, the court should not   concern   itself   with   the   wisdom   or efficaciousness   of   such   rules   or regulations.” 36. This Court in unequivocal terms has held that it  would be wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act.  It has been held that it is not permissible for the Court to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation­making body and declare a regulation to be   ultra vires   merely on the ground that, in the 34 view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act.  37. We find that the observations quoted herein above of the Division Bench of the High Court are totally contrary to the view   expressed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Maharashtra State   Board   of   Secondary   and   Higher   Secondary Education and another  (supra).   38. The  Division   Bench   of   the  High   Court   has   erred   in substituting   its   wisdom   with   that   of   the   rule­making   body, which is an expert body.  In this respect, it will also be apposite to refer to the observations of this Court in the case of   All India Council for Technical Education vs. Surinder Kumar 12 Dhawan and others .   After considering various judgments on the issue, this Court observed thus: “  The courts are neither equipped nor 16. have   the   academic   or   technical 12 (2009) 11 SCC 726 35 background  to substitute  themselves  in place of statutory professional technical bodies   and   take   decisions   in   academic matters involving standards and quality of technical education. If the courts start entertaining   petitions   from   individual institutions or students to permit courses of   their   choice,   either   for   their convenience or to alleviate hardship or to provide better opportunities, or because they   think   that   one   course   is   equal   to another,   without   realising   the repercussions   on   the   field   of   technical education in general, it will lead to chaos in   education   and   deterioration   in standards of education. 17.  The role of statutory expert bodies on education and the role of courts are well defined   by   a   simple   rule.   If   it   is   a question of educational policy or an issue involving   academic   matter,   the   courts keep their hands off.” We are, therefore, of the considered view that it was not 39. permissible for the Division Bench of the High Court to enter into an area of experts and hold that the unamended provisions ought to have been preferred over the amended provisions.   36 40. That leaves us with the finding of the Division Bench of the   High   Court   that   the   amended   Regulation   is   violative   of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Reliance in this respect is placed on the Eleven­Judge Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of  T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others 13 .  In this respect, it will vs. State of Karnataka and others be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Eleven­ Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in the said case: “54.  The right to establish an educational institution   can   be   regulated;   but   such regulatory measures must, in general, be to   ensure   the   maintenance   of   proper academic   standards,   atmosphere   and infrastructure   (including   qualified   staff) and the prevention of maladministration by those in charge of management. The fixing   of  a  rigid  fee  structure,   dictating the   formation   and   composition   of   a governing   body,   compulsory   nomination of teachers and staff for appointment or nominating   students   for   admissions would be unacceptable restrictions.” 13 (2002) 8 SCC 481 37 41. It can thus clearly be seen that the Constitution Bench itself   has   held   that   the   right   to   establish   an   educational institution   can   be   regulated.     However,   such   regulatory measures must, in general, be to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and the prevention of maladministration.  42. The impugned Notification, undoubtedly, is made in order to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards and infrastructure and as such, the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of  T.M.A. Pai Foundation and (supra),   rather   than   supporting   the   case   of   the others   respondent No.1, would support the case of the Council.   43. We   further   find   that   the   impugned   judgment   of   the Division Bench of the High Court is also not sustainable on the ground of judicial propriety.  The respondent No.1 had already filed a writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15090 of 2016, challenging the action of the Council and the respondent 38 No.2 in returning the application of the respondent No.1 for grant of recognition to new Dental College and for a direction to th reconsider its application submitted on 24   September, 2011. The said writ petition was filed in the year 2016.  The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned single judge of the High rd Court by the judgment and order dated 3   November, 2016. rd After the said writ petition was rejected on 3  November, 2016, the respondent No.1 filed the present writ petition being D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3260 of 2017 before the Division Bench of st the High Court on 1  March, 2017.  In the said writ petition, the prayer was for challenging the validity of  the impugned Notification and for a direction to reconsider the proposal of the respondent No.1.   The impugned Notification could have very well been challenged in the earlier writ petition, which was filed in the year 2016 before the learned single judge of the High Court.   However, having failed in that writ petition before the learned single judge, the  respondent No.1 filed another writ 39 petition before the Division Bench of the High Court.  Though one   of   the   prayers   challenges   the   validity   of   the   impugned Notification,   another   prayer   claims   for   reconsideration   of  its proposal.   The said prayer has been granted by the Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment and order th dated 24  April, 2018.  It could thus be seen that the prayer for reconsideration of the proposal submitted by the respondent No.1, which was already rejected by the learned single judge of rd the High Court vide order dated 3   November, 2016 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15090 of 2016, has been renewed in the fresh writ petition filed in the year 2017 and granted by the Division Bench of the High Court.   44. We, therefore, find that on the ground of judicial propriety also the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition for a prayer, which already stood rejected. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment 40 th and order dated 24  April, 2018 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is not sustainable.  45. In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned th judgment   and   order   dated   24   April,   2018   passed   by   the Division Bench of the High Court is quashed and set aside.  The D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3260 of 2017 filed by the respondent No.1   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   stands dismissed.  No order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.  46. …..….......................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] …….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; APRIL 12, 2022 41