Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 174-175 OF 2016
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos.24809-24810 of 2008)
L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. …APPELLANT
VERSUS
SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. & ANR. ...RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
JUDGMENT
1. Delay condoned in filing the special leave petitions.
2. Leave granted.
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3. These appeals raise an interesting question on the true
construction of some of the provisions of the Hindu Law
Women’s Rights Act, 1933 (Mysore Act No.X of 1933). One
| two sons | Mahabal |
|---|
After the death of Venkatsubbaiah, the two sons and the wife
of Mahabalaiah constituted a joint Hindu family. Mahabalaiah
being the elder brother was the Karta of the said family. In the
year 1940-1941, Mahabalaiah and Thimmappa partitioned and
divided their joint family properties and got possession of their
respective shares. Thimmappa died on 9.10.1952, leaving
behind him his widow one Gowramma and three daughters.
The widow has executed a will on 9.5.1990 bequeathing her
share in the joint family property in favour of only one of the
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th
three daughters namely the third defendant. The 4 defendant
has been joined in the suit inasmuch as the first defendant
widow had sold one of the scheduled items of the suit property
th
namely item No.3 to the said 4 defendant during the pendency
of the suit.
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4. One of the said daughters namely Sunanda filed a suit
against defendant No.1 – her mother, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 –
her sisters, and defendant No.4 – the purchaser, being O.S.
| setting o | ut the re |
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Judge, Senior Division by judgment dated 28.3.2005 framed as
many as 12 issues and ultimately decided on application of
Section 10(2)(g) of the 1933 Act that the plaintiff would be
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entitled to a 1/4 share in the scheduled properties and the suit
was decreed accordingly.
5. In a first appeal filed by defendant No.1, the first Appellate
Court agreed with the conclusions both on facts as well as law
with the trial court. Accordingly, the first appeal was dismissed
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on 5.8.2005.
6. Thereafter, a review petition was filed and by the
judgment dated 24.11.2007, the review was dismissed but this
time adverting to Section 8(1)(d) of the 1933 Act and decreeing
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the suit with reference to the said Section. The review also was
accordingly dismissed.
| , learned | counsel a |
|---|
the appellant has urged before us that the applicable Section of
the 1933 Act is Section 4, and not Sections 8 and 10, and
accordingly the succession of a Hindu male dying intestate
vests property only in the widow to the exclusion of the
daughters and hence the plaintiff’s suit should have been
dismissed on this ground.
8. On the other hand, Shri S.N. Bhat, learned counsel,
invited our attention to Section 8(1)(d) of the Act and according
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to him since joint family property passed to Thimmappa who
was a single coparcener by survivorship, on partition in 1940-
1941, all the classes of females mentioned in Section 8 would
be entitled to a share in the said property which would include
not only his widow but also his unmarried daughters.
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9. For a proper appreciation of the controversy at hand, we
set out the relevant Sections of the Hindu Law Women’s Rights
Act, 1933 (Mysore Act No.X of 1933).
| “Pa | rt I |
|---|
INHERITANCE
4. Order of succession:-
(1) The succession to a Hindu male dying intestate
shall, in the first place, vest in the members of the
family of the propositus mentioned below, and in the
following order:-
i) the male issue to the third generation ;
ii) the widow ;
iii) daughters ;
iv) daughter’s sons
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XXX XXX XXX
8. Certain females entitled to shares at partition-
(1) (a) At a partition of joint family property between
a person and his son or sons, his mother, his
unmarried daughters and the widows and unmarried
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daughters of his predeceased undivided sons and
brothers who have left no male issue shall be
entitled to share with them.
| d unmar<br>divided b | ried dau<br>rothers w |
|---|
(c) Sub-sections (a) and (b) shall also apply
mutatis mutandis to a partition among other co-
parceners in a joint family.
(d) Where joint family property passes to a single
co-parcener by survivorship, it shall so pass subject
to the right to shares of the classes of females
enumerated in the above sub-sections.
XXX XXX XXX
.10. What is “stridhana” –
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(1) “Stridhana” means property of every
description belonging to a Hindu female, other than
property in which she has, by law or under the
terms of an instrument, only a limited estate.
(2) “Stridhana” includes :-
XXX XXX XXX XXX
(g) property taken by inheritance by a female
from another female and property taken by
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inheritance by a female from her husband or son, or
from a male relative connected by blood except
when there is a daughter or daughter’s son of the
propositus alive at the time the property is so
inherited.
(3) All gifts and payments other than or in addition
to, or in excess of, the customary presents of
vessels, apparel and other articles of personal use
made to a bride or bridegroom in connection with
their marriage or to their parents or guardians or
other person on their behalf, by the bridegroom,
bride or their relatives or friends, shall be the
stridhana of the bride.”
10. A cursory reading of Section 8 would reveal that various
females mentioned in the Section would be entitled to a share
of joint family property in the circumstances mentioned therein.
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Under Sections 8(1)(a) to 8(1)(c) there has necessarily first to
be a partition in the circumstances mentioned in each of the
said sub-sections whereas under sub-section (d) what is
required is that joint family properties should pass to a single
coparcener by survivorship. If this condition of sub-clause (d) is
met, then all the women mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (c)
would be entitled to a share therein.
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11. Shri Bhat relied upon a judgment delivered by B.P.
Singh,J. in Byamma v. Ramdev reported in I.L.R. 1991 KAR
| Section 8 | of the 19 |
|---|
“It is well settled that devolution of joint family
property, which come to the hands of a son from his
father or grand-father or great-grand-father as
unobstructed heritage is governed by the Rule of
Survivorship. A male coparcener acquires right to
such property by birth. This is different from
property that may come to the hands of a
coparcener in which he has no right by birth. This is
what is known as obstructed heritage, and such
property devolve by succession and not by
survivorship. Such a distinction is well known in
Hindu Law. Therefore, when Section 8(1)(d) of the
Mysore Act refers to the properties passing on to a
single coparcener by survivorship, it has reference
to the ancestral properties which come to his hands
upon partition or otherwise.
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It is also well settled that if a coparcener dies, his
interest devolves upon other coparceners by
survivorship. As long as the joint family is in
existence, all the coparceners jointly own all the
properties. Each coparcener is a full owner of each
property owned by the joint family. The effect of
partition is severance of status and, as a
consequence, each coparcener becomes entitled to
separate possession and enjoyment of his share in
the joint family properties. Partition by itself does not
create a right because the right of a coparcener
existed even before partition. It only brings about
demarcation of his interest with a right to separate
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| share in t<br>rlier, uno | he joint f<br>bstructed |
|---|
I, therefore, hold that the properties to which
Chowdappa became entitled, upon partition passed
on to him by survivorship. I find no substance in the
contention raised on behalf of the respondents that
it passed on to him by reason of partition and not by
survivorship.
In view of Section 8(1) of the Act, there can be no
doubt that a single coparcener such as Chowdappa
took the ancestral property, subject to the right to
shares of female members of the joint family
enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 8(1)
of the Mysore Act. The plaintiff, being a widow of a
pre-deceased son, was entitled to a share equal to
one half of the share to which her husband would
have been entitled if he were alive [vide Section
8(1) (a) of the Mysore Act]. I therefore hold that the
plaintiff is entitled to claim one half of the share
which her husband could have claimed if he was
alive. In the instant case her husband would have
got half share in the properties in a partition
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between his father and himself in the year 1946
when Chowdappa became a single coparcener.
Consequently, she is entitled to 1/4th share in the
suit schedule properties.” (at para nos.10, 11, 12
and 17)
| r Shri Bh | at, this C |
|---|
Manjunatha Gowda (Smt) v. Controller of Estate Duty,
Karnataka, (1997) 10 SCC 684, has taken a view which is
directly contrary to the view of the single Judge of the
Karnataka High Court.
13. In Sathyaprema’s case (supra), the question posed was
whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal
was correct in holding that neither the unmarried daughter nor
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the wife of the deceased had any interest in the joint family
property of the deceased while he was alive. This Court stated
that the only question for consideration is whether the estate
left by the husband and father of the widow and unmarried
daughter respectively on partition was obtained by survivorship
applying Section 8(1)(d) of the Act.
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14. This Court exhaustively discussed the meaning of the
expressions “survivor” and “survivorship” and ultimately held:-
| oncerned | with Ma |
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Under these circumstances, the conclusion reached
by the High Court that since it is by partition, not by
survivorship, clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section
8 does not get attracted, is not (sic) correct. No
doubt, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment
of this Court in Nagendra Prasad v.
Kempananjamma [AIR 1968 SC 209] which was
also considered by the High Court in the impugned
judgment. This Court therein has explained that the
object of Section 8(1)(d) is to give a right to claim a
share in the joint family property to all females
referred to in clauses (a) to (c) thereof. Merely
because partition by one of the coparceners under
clauses (a) to (c) is a condition for a class of family
members entitled to a share in the property, it does
not apply to a case where class of family members
entitled under clause 8(1)(d) since it stands
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Under these circumstances, family members
enumerated under Section 8(1)(d) are not entitled to
a share in the estate left by the deceased. Thus we
do not find any illegality in the view taken by the
High Court warranting interference.” (at paragraph
nos.13-15)
15. In fact, this follows from a reading of Section 8. Whereas
Sections 8(1)(a)(b) and (c) refers to a partition among
coparceners in a joint family, sub-section (d) refers to property
passing to a single coparcener only by survivorship. In this
behalf, in Nagendra Prasad v. Kempananjamma, [1968] 1
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SCR 124, this Court by a majority judgment held:-
“This intention can only be given effect to on the
basis that clause (d) does not restrict itself to finding
out females on the basis of an assumed partition
between the last two male coparceners. It is
significant that clause (d) gives a right
independently of a partition and we do not see why
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its scope should be restricted by assuming a
partition.” (at page No.128).
| dissenting | Judge h |
|---|
“Clause (d) applies to a case when the family
property passes by survivorship to a sole surviving
coparcener. In such a case there can be no
partition, as is the case under clause (a) or (b) or
(c). Indeed, the property becomes incapable of
partition and but for clause (d) no female relative
would have any right to a share. To save such a
result clause (d) provides that the rights of the
female relatives should not be lost only by reason of
the property passing to the sole surviving
coparcener. Sub-section 5, furthermore, gives such
female relatives as fall under sub-section 1 a right to
have their shares separated and thus makes them
co-sharers subject to whose rights the sole
surviving coparcener takes the property. Therefore,
whereas under clauses (a), (b) and (c) the rights
fluctuate according to the position of the female
relatives in the family when the partition takes place
there is no such uncertainty in the case falling under
clause (d) as the sole surviving coparcener takes
the property subject to the right to shares of female
relatives falling under the provisions of clause (a) or
(b) or (c). Such is the scheme of Section 8(1).”
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17. The dissenting Judge basically dissented on the point that
under sub-clause (d), a partition has to be assumed because it
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is only on such assumption that females on whom a right to
share is conferred can be ascertained. It is clear, therefore,
that Section 8(1)(d) can have no application to a case where
| passes t | o a singl |
|---|
survivorship but by partition.
A recent view of Section 8(1)(d) in Smt. Ramakka and
others v. Smt. Thanamma since deceased by LR, P.
Srinivas and Others, ILR 2014 Karnataka 1335, has been
taken by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. While
construing Section 8(1)(d), the Division Bench has held:-
“When the coparcenary property passes to a sole
surviving coparcener, provision has been made in
clause (d) of Section 8(1). This clause, in protecting
the rights of females, had necessarily to give
females the right to share in the coparcenary
property even if there be no partition at all, because,
on passing of property to a sole surviving
coparcener, there could not possibly be any
partition sought by the male members of the
coparcenary body. The right conferred by clause
(d) is, therefore, an independent right and not
connected with the rights granted to the females
under clauses (a), (b) and (c). The females who are
to get benefit are all those to whom a right to a
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| d the right<br>een partit | to a shar<br>ion in the |
|---|
This is the correct view of the law on Section 8(1)(d), and
we endorse it.
18. There is also another way of looking at the issue raised in
the present appeals. A partition of joint family property among
brothers is expressly mentioned in Section 8(1)(b). Therefore,
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upon partition of joint family property between Thimmappa and
his older brother, it is only their mother, their unmarried sisters
and widows and unmarried daughters of their pre-deceased
undivided brothers who have left no male issue who get a share
under the Section. Unlike sub-section (a), unmarried daughters
of Thimmappa do not get any share at the partition between
Thimmappa and his brother.
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19. The ground on which the judgments below rested, namely
| ood reaso | n. In orde |
|---|
apply, first and foremost the property referred to is “stridhana”
which is defined as property of every description belonging to a
Hindu female other than property in which she has by law or
under the terms of an instrument only a limited estate. Under
Section 10(1)(g) it is only property taken by inheritance by a
female from her husband that is included in stridhana. This
would not include the unmarried daughters as property taken by
inheritance by a female from her father is not included.
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20. In this view of the matter, Shri Hegde is right in saying
that the succession to a Hindu male dying intestate will vest
only in the widow under Section 4(1)(ii) to the exclusion of the
daughters who are mentioned in a subsequent clause i.e.
clause (iii) by virtue of the expression “in the following order”.
This being the case, it is clear that the appeals will have to be
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allowed and the judgments of the courts below set aside. The
suit will stand dismissed as a consequence.
……………………J.
(Kurian Joseph)
……………………J.
(R.F. Nariman)
New Delhi;
January 12, 2016.
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