Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5882 OF 2010
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 20604 of 2009)
Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi & Anr. .... Appellant (s)
Versus
State of Gujarat & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 12.01.2009 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 5663 of 1990
with Civil Application No. 3458 of 2006 whereby the High
Court dismissed the petition preferred by the appellants
herein.
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3) Brief facts:
a) According to the appellants, they are owners of the
land in question measuring 848.66 sq.m., Nandh No.
2190/P, Ward No.4 of Surat City. The State of Gujarat
initiated acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”)
for construction of a school in the land in question under
the Surat Municipal Corporation. The appellants objected
to the said acquisition on the ground that:
(i) this is the only land for them for carrying on the
business of washermen and they are using this land for
the purpose of their livelihood.
(ii) There are vacant/open lands adjoining to the land in
question.
(iii) Within a radius of 1 km., number of schools are
available particularly being run by the Surat Municipal
Corporation.
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(iv) While acquiring the land, the respondents have not
followed the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6 and 11A of the
Act.
b) On the other hand, it is the stand of the State
Government that:
(i) the land is required for establishing a primary school by
the Surat Municipal Corporation.
(ii) They fully complied with the statutory notices and
other requirements.
(iii) The appellants did not avail the opportunity of
participating in the 5A enquiry by filing objections.
(iv) The declaration made under Section 6 of the Act is
within time.
(v) Award under Section 11A has been passed within the
statutory period. Since the establishment of school is for
a public purpose and in view of compliance of all the
statutory formalities, there is no merit in the appeal and
prayed for dismissal of the same.
3
4) Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for
the appellants and Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned senior
counsel for the Surat Municipal Corporation and Ms.
Hemantika Wahi, learned counsel for the State of Gujarat.
5) Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellants has raised the following contentions:
a) there was no hearing/enquiry in terms of Section 5A
of the Act which is mandatory;
b) the locality publication was not effected under
Section 6(2);
c) the Award passed under Section 11A was not made
within two years from the date of last publication of
notification under Section 6, therefore the acquisition is
vitiated;
d) after change of classification of the land in question,
namely, residential use, the respondents are not permitted
to establish a primary school which is not permissible;
e) In view of the fact that the area being designated as
residential congested by houses on either side, it is not a
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fit place for establishing a school as observed by this
Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. Union of India and
Others , (2009) 6 SCC 398.
6) On the other hand, Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned
senior counsel for the Surat Municipal Corporation has
submitted that in view of Section 12 (2) (b) and Section 20
(1) of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development
Act, 1976, the State Government is well within their
powers in establishing a primary school in Surat. He
further submitted that all the statutory provisions have
been strictly complied with and the declaration under
Section 6 and Award under Section 11A were duly made
within the prescribed time. Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned
counsel appearing for the State, by drawing our attention
to specific averments in the counter affidavit submitted
that the appellants having not filed objections in the
enquiry under Section 5A, all the three modes of
publication as contemplated under Section 6 were duly
published and made and Award passed within the
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prescribed period, there is no infirmity in the acquisition
proceedings and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
7) We have considered the rival contentions and
perused the relevant materials.
8) With regard to the first objection as to enquiry under
Section 5A of the Act though the appellants have stated
that they were not given an opportunity of being heard, in
the counter affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Surat before the High Court it has been
specifically asserted that notification under Section 4 in
the Official Gazette was published on 09.03.1989, public
notice displayed at the office of Mamlatdar of the
concerned Ward on 20.04.1989 and hearing of objections
under Section 5A was fixed on 20.05.1989. In para 4 of
the counter affidavit, the Land Acquisition Officer has
specifically stated that appellants were given several
opportunities for hearing their objections from time to
time. The hearing was fixed on 29.05.1989, 05.06.1989,
12.06.1989, 20.09.1989, 28.09.1989 and 16.10.1989 and
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the appellants were heard through their lawyer Mr.
Kashyap H. Shukla. In view of the above specific
information the contention contrary to the same is liable
to be rejected.
9) The second objection is that locality publication was
not effected under Section 6(2) of the Act. In the same
counter affidavit, the Land Acquisition Officer has
asserted that publication of notification under Section 6
was published in the Gazette dated 21.03.1990. Public
Notice displayed at the office of Mamlatdar of the
concerned Ward on 19.04.1990. In the light of the said
information, the claim that no publication of notice in the
locality under Section 6(2) cannot be accepted.
10) The third and the important objection relates to
passing of Award under Section 11A. It is the stand of the
appellants that Award was not made within two years
from the date of last publication of Notification under
Section 6 hence the acquisition is vitiated. Since heavy
reliance was placed on the said objection, it is useful to
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refer Section 6 and Section 11A of the Act which reads
thus:
“6. Declaration that land is required for a public
purpose.- (1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of this Act,
when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after
considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-
section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public
purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to
that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such
Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its
orders and different declarations may be made from time to
time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the
same notification under section 4, sub-section (1)
irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or
have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-
section (2);
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular
land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section
(1)-
(i) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1
of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the
expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the
notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the
expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the
notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be made
unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is
to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public
revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local
authority.
Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods referred to
in the first proviso, the period during which any action or
proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification
issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order
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of a Court shall be excluded.
Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be awarded for
such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation
owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall
be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.
(2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official
Gazette, and in two daily newspapers circulating in the
locality in which the land is situated of which at least one
shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to
be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of
the dates of such publication and the giving of such public
notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the
publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall
state the district or other territorial division in which the
land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its
approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made
of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the
land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the
case may be; and, after making such declaration, the
appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner
hereinafter appearing.
11A. Period within which an award shall be made.- (1) The
Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a
period of two years from the date of the publication of the
declaration and if no award is made within that period, the
entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been
published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a
period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred
to in this section, the period during which any action or
proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration
is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”
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11) These provisions were considered by this Court in
various decisions. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti
and Another vs. Makrand Singh and Others , (1995) 2
SCC 497, the question that was posed for consideration
was whether the High Court was right in its conclusion
that the declaration under Section 6 was published after
three years and the last of the publications shall be the
last date for the purpose of computing three years’ period
envisaged in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 6 of the Act as amended by Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984. The discussion and conclusion
in paras 4 and 5 are relevant:
“4. The question, therefore, is that which date of the
publications in three steps i.e. publication in the Gazette,
two newspapers and local publication to be the last date for
the purpose of computing three years’ limitation prescribed
in clause ( i ) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. Prima
facie, it gives an impression that the last of any of the three
steps puts in motion, the running of limitation of three
years. But on deeper probe, it does not appear to be so and
such a construction would easily defeat the public purpose
and deflects the course of justice. So it is necessary to
understand the scheme and policy of the Act to get the crux
of the question. It is seen that sub-section (1) of Section 4
gives power of eminent domain to the State to acquire the
land, whenever it appears to it that the land is needed or
likely to be needed for any public purpose or for any
company, by a notification published in the Official Gazette
10
and two daily newspapers circulating in that area and at
least one of them should be in the regional language and
also the Collector is enjoined to cause public notice of the
substance of notification to be given at convenient places in
the said locality in which the land is situated. It is also
mentioned thereunder that the last date of such publication
and the giving of such public notice “ being hereinafter
referred to ” as the date of publication of the notification. It
would be seen that the purpose of notification under Section
4(1) is an intimation to the owner or person having an
interest in the land that Government exercised the power of
eminent domain in relation to his land and for public
purpose his land is needed or likely to be needed; puts an
embargo on his freedom to deal with the land as an
unencumbered land and also pegs the price of the land
prevailing as on that date. It also is a caveat to the Collector
to make the award under Section 11 as well as to determine
the market value prevailing as on the last of the dates to be
the date and the award should be made within a period
prescribed by Section 11-A, lest the entire acquisition shall
stand lapsed. The word ‘hereinafter’ is for such purposes as
well as for the purpose of determination of the compensation
under Chapter III of the Act as well. Therefore, the word
‘hereinafter’ referred to as the last date of the publication of
the notification is the date from which the prevailing prices
of the land is to be computed etc.
5. Clause ( i ) of the proviso to Section 6(1) mandates the
publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette and it
should be within three years from the date of the publication
of the notification under Section 4(1) i.e. the last of the dates
referred to in Section 4(1). The word ‘publish’ emphasises the
act accomplished i.e. declaration under Section 6(1) being
published in the Official Gazette. The last date under Section
6(2) shall be the date for the purposes “hereinafter referred
to” would be not for computing the period of three years
prescribed in clause ( i ) of proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act as
it was already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter.
Otherwise language would have been “hereinbefore done”.
Sub-section (2) as such did not prescribe any limitation
within which the declaration under Section 6(1) or other
steps hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be
taken thereafter in making the award under Section 11 or in
computation of the period prescribed in Section 11-A. The
publication of the declaration in two daily newspapers
having circulation in the locality one of which is in the
regional language and the publication of the substance of
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the declaration in the locality are ministerial acts and is a
procedural part. It appears that these publications are
required to be done to make the declaration published in the
manner, to be conclusive evidence of the public purpose
under Section 6(1) and also to provide limitation to make the
award under Section 11 by the Collector. In other words, the
limitation prescribed under Section 11-A is for the purpose
of making the award and if the Collector fails to do so, the
entire proceeds under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) shall stand
lapsed. If this consistent policy of the Act is understood
giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the scheme of the
Act and public purpose the Act seeks to serve, we are of the
considered view that publication in the Official Gazette
already made under clause ( i ) of proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 6 is complete, as soon as the declaration under
Section 6(1) was published in the Official Gazette. That will
be the date for the purpose of computation of three years’
period from the last of the dates of the publication of the
notification under Section 4(1). The procedural ministerial
acts prescribed under sub-section (2) are only for the
purpose of the procedure to be followed ‘ hereinafter ’, in other
words, the steps to be taken subsequent to the publication of
the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. We cannot
agree with Shri Rana, the learned Senior Counsel, that the
date of making the declaration by the Secretary to the
Government or the authorised officer is the date for
computing period of three years. Equally, we cannot agree
with the learned counsel for the respondents, Shri
Upadhyay, that publication of the substance being the last
date from which the period of three years needs to be
computed. Acceptance of either contention would easily
defeat the public policy under the Act by skilful manner of
management with the lower level officials.
12) In Eugenio Misquita and Others vs. State of Goa
and Others , (1997) 8 SCC 47, similar issue was
considered by this Court. K. Venkataswami, J. speaking
for the Bench has concluded as follows:
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“9. Let us examine whether the learned counsel is right in
his submission. As seen from the above extracts of relevant
provisions, while Section 4(1) commands publication of
notification under that section, Section 6 speaks of the
declaration being made to the effect that any particular land
is needed for public purpose or for a company. There are
judicial decisions that have interpreted the word “made” to
mean “published” for the reasons stated in those decisions.
Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial decisions
the date of making of the declaration under Section 6(1) will
be the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation.
However, in the interest of the general public, the courts
have taken the view that the declaration made will stand
accomplished only when it is published. This publication
has, therefore, nothing to do with the publication referred to
in Section 6(2) of the Act which is for a different purpose,
inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed under
Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by
the language employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. In
particular, the word “hereinafter” used in Section 6(2) will
amply prove that the last of the series of the publication
referred to under Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes
coming thereafter, namely, for making award under Section
11-A. The language employed in second proviso to Section
6(1) also supports this construction. Therefore, the
contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted.
10. This is also the view taken by this Court in Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Samiti case . The learned Judges framed the
question thus: (SCC p. 499, para 4)
“ 4 . The question, therefore, is that which date of the
publications in three steps i.e. publication in the Gazette,
two newspapers and local publication to be the last date for
the purpose of computing three years’ limitation prescribed
in clause ( i ) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act.”
11. It may be noted that this Court in that case was
considering a case which arose before the coming into force
of Amending Act 68 of 1984. The case on hand has arisen
after Amending Act 68 of 1984. The only difference is the
period of limitation; for the cases arising before the
Amending Act it was three years and one year for the cases
arising after the Amending Act. Otherwise, the principle is
the same.
16. The above view of this Court lends support to the view
that for the purpose of calculating the limitation prescribed
under clause ( ii ) of the first proviso to Section 6(1), it is not
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the last of the publication in the series that should be taken
into account, but the publication that was made in the first
instance under Section 6.
17. In the light of the law laid down by this Court, we have
no hesitation to hold that the declaration published under
Section 6 of the Act was well within one year and the
challenge to the same has been rightly rejected by the High
Court. However, the view taken in the judgment of the High
Court under appeal that the relevant date for reckoning the
period of limitation will be the date of making of the
declaration under Section 6, may not be correct. As held in
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti case mere making of
declaration is not enough. The making of declaration under
Section 6 is complete for the purpose of clauses ( i ) and ( ii ) of
the first proviso to Section 6(1) when it is published in the
Official Gazette.”
After holding so, since the Notification under Section 4
was lastly published on 06.08.1992 in the Official Gazette
and declaration under Section 6 was published in the
Gazette on 05.08.1993, this Court found that the same is
well within one year and accordingly dismissed the appeal
of the landowners.
13) In S.H. Rangappa vs. State of Karnataka and
Another , (2002) 1 SCC 538, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court speaking through Kirpal, J. has observed thus:
7. Declaration under Section 6 is preceded by issuance of a
notification under Section 4 which indicates the intention of
the Government to inter alia acquire land for a public
purpose. Pursuant to the issuance of the same, objections
can be filed and after hearing the same, Section 6(1) enables
the appropriate authority if it is satisfied, after considering
14
the report made under Section 5-A of the Act, that if any
particular land is needed for a public purpose, then a
declaration is to be made under the signature of an
appropriate officer. Where notification under Section 4 is
published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
Amendment Act, 1984, as in the present case, proviso ( ii )
requires that such a declaration shall not be made after the
expiry of one year from the date of the publication of Section
4 notification.
8. We wish to clarify that the words “publish” and “from the
date of publication of the notification” occurring in proviso
( ii ) to Section 6(1) refer to the publication of Section 4
notification and have no reference to the publication of any
notification under Section 6. Under Section 6(1), it is only a
declaration which is required to be made, the time-limit
being within one year of the publication of Section 4
notification. The main purpose for the issuance of a
declaration under Section 6 is provided by sub-section (3),
namely, that the declaration is conclusive evidence that the
land is needed inter alia for a public purpose and after the
making of the declaration the appropriate Government may
acquire the land in the manner provided by the Act. Sub-
section (2) requires the declaration to be published in the
Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in
the locality in which the land is situate and in addition
thereto the Collector is also required to cause public notice
of the substance of the declaration to be given in the
convenient places in the said locality.
9. It is pertinent to note that sub-section (2) of Section 6
does not prescribe any time-limit within which the
declaration made under Section 6(1) is to be published. It is
well known that after an order or declaration is made there
can be a time gap between the making of the order or a
declaration and its publication in the Official Gazette.
Whereas the time-limit for the making of an order is provided
under Section 6(1), the legislature advisedly did not provide
for any time-limit in respect of the steps required to be taken
under sub-section (2) of Section 6. If the contention of Mr
G.L. Sanghi, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is
correct, the effect would be that not only the declaration
would have to be published within the time prescribed under
the proviso to Section 6(1) but all other steps, like
publication in the daily newspaper and the Collector causing
public notice of the declaration to be given at convenient
places in the locality, must also be completed within a period
of one year of Section 4 notification. This could certainly not
be a consequence contemplated by the legislature. As
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already observed, the purpose of Section 6 notification being
to give a final declaration with regard to the need of the land
for public purpose, the interest of the landowners was
sufficiently safeguarded with the requirement of the making
of the declaration under Section 6(1) within a prescribed
period. It is difficult for us to read into sub-section (2) the
provisions of the proviso to Section 6(1) which relate to the
time-limit for issuance of the notification under Section 6(1).
10. This view which we have expressed hereinabove finds
support from a decision of a Bench of four Judges of this
Court in the case of Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P.”
14) In General Manager, Department of
Telecommunications, Thiruvananthapuram vs. Jacob
S/o Kochuvarkey Kalliath (Dead) By LRs. and others ,
(2003) 9 SCC 662, this Court again reiterated that period
of two years from the date of publication of the declaration
prescribed under Section 11A for passing the Award, must
be calculated from the last of the series of the publications
referred to under Section 6(2). After holding so,
Doraiswamy Raju, J. speaking for the Bench has held that
last of the series of publications being publication in daily
newspapers, the period of two years must be calculated
from the date of such publication.
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15) In Bihar State Housing Board vs. State of Bihar
and Others , (2003) 10 SCC 1, Arijit Pasayat, J. while
considering the rival contentions with reference to
Sections 4 (1), 6(1), 6(2) and 11A of the Act has held thus:
“9. If one takes note of the parenthesis appearing in
sub-section (2) of Section 6, it is clear that reference to
the subsequent provisions of the Act to the date of
publication of declaration has to be determined as the
last of the dates of the publication and the giving of
public notice. As the date of publication by local
publication was the last at that point of time i.e. 15-3-
1991, the award on 25-3-1992 was not beyond the
prescribed period of limitation.”
16) In Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by LRs vs. State of
U.P. and Others , (2007) 5 SCC 85, Panta, J. speaking for
the Bench held:
“17 . The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to
benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is
made within a period of two years from the date of the
declaration under Section 6. In ordinary course,
therefore, when the Government fails to make an award
within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the
land has still not vested in the Government and its title
remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are
still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section
11-A, the proceedings will lapse. The period of two years
referred to in Section 11-A shall be computed by
counting from the last of the publication dates, as per
the prescribed modes of publication.
25 . Again, in Bihar State Housing Board v. State of Bihar
this Court reiterating the proposition of law has held
that modes of publication of declaration prescribed
under Section 6(2) are conjoint and cumulative and all
of them must be resorted to and completed. Sub-section
(2) of Section 6 of the Act necessarily makes it
17
abundantly clear that the last of the dates of the
publication and giving of such public notice shall
“hereinafter” be referred to as the date of publication of
the declaration and limitation period of two years for
making award under Section 11-A has to be counted as
the last of the dates out of the three modes of
publication specified in Section 6 of the Act.”
17) In the case on hand, it is clearly indicated in the
reply affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer
that the notification under Section 6 was last published
on 19.04.1990, by affixing a copy of the Notification on the
notice board of the office of City Mamlatdar, Surat and
also by affixing the same in ward No.4 of Surat city.
Hence the period of two years stipulated in Section 11A
would begin to run from 19.04.1990 and, therefore, the
publication of the Award under Section 11 of the Act on
18.04.1992 was within the stipulated time limit of two
years. In such circumstances, this contention also is
liable to be rejected as devoid of any merit.
18) Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted
that inasmuch as the respondents, by a notification, has
changed the classification of the land in question and
designated as “residential use” at this moment, they are
18
not permitted to set up a school in the land in question.
In the counter affidavit filed by the Director of Planning,
Surat Municipal Corporation has highlighted that the land
in question has been reserved for school purpose in the
development plan sanctioned by the State Government
under the provisions of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
Development Act, 1976. As per Section 20 of the said Act,
the acquiring body, namely, Surat Municipal Corporation
is required to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition
Act as the impugned land is reserved for school purpose.
Further, inasmuch as the land in question is kept under
reservation for school in the sanctioned development plan
for the State Government under Section 17 of the Gujarat
Town Planning & Urban Development Act, it is the duty of
the Corporation to acquire the land for implementing the
provisions of the same. In view of the same, this
contention is also liable to be rejected.
19) Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellants has also submitted that in view of existence of
19
many schools in and around the vicinity, there is no need
to establish a school in the land of the appellants. In
respect of the said claim, the Director of Planning, Surat
Municipal Corporation, in the counter affidavit has stated
that there is no municipal school near the site in question
and that the schools of the Corporation which are located
in Begampura, Moti Talkies, Mumbaivad, Shetranjivad,
Viramgami Maholla are very far from the land under
acquisition and due to increase in population in the city of
Surat, they are justified in establishing a school for
providing primary education to the children in the said
area. In respect of ‘need’ and ‘necessity’, it is for the
Government and their authorities to take a decision
considering various aspects. If such a decision is taken
based on materials it is not for the Court to doubt their
claim. It is also stated that the Surat Municipal
Corporation is required to pay the amount of
compensation to the tune of Rs.10,54,901.95 and the said
amount has already been deposited with the Government
20
Treasury on 27.05.1992. In view of the above information,
the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellants
is to be rejected.
20) Finally, learned senior counsel for the appellants, by
drawing our attention to the recent decision of this Court
in Avinash Mehrotra vs. Union of India and Others ,
(2009) 6 SCC 398 submitted that in view of the strict
conditions issued by this Court for establishing a school
particularly in a crowded city, the respondents cannot
fulfill those conditions and on this ground also the
acquisition proceeding is liable to be dropped. It is true
that in view of what had happened in Lord Krishna Middle
School in Kumbakonam in the State of Tamil Nadu, this
Court issued several directions and conditions, safety
measures and standards for establishing a school. In our
view, it is the duty of the State and their educational
authorities to adhere to all those conditions before
commencing a school in the land in question.
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21) In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to
sustain any of the objections raised by the appellants. On
the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the stand
taken by the State as well as the conclusion arrived at by
the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and the
same is dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.
...…………………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
...…………………………………J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 23, 2010.
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