2024 INSC 106
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 843 OF 2024
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No. 10913 OF 2023
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NIRAJ TYAGI & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 844 OF 2024
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No. 14942 OF 2023
MOHIT SINGH …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
REENA BAGGA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 845 OF 2024
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No. 14935 OF 2023
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M3M INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Signature Not Verified
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2024.02.13
15:34:30 IST
Reason:
1. Leave granted.
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2. The appellants being aggrieved by the interim orders dated
13.07.2023, 08.08.2023 and 13.09.2023 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos.
10893/2023, 11837/2023 and 14053/2023 respectively, have
preferred the instant appeals. Vide the impugned orders, the High
Court has stayed the proceedings of the FIRs registered against the
concerned respondents-accused as also stayed the proceedings of
ECIR No.-ECIR/HIU-I/06/2023 registered by the Directorate of
Enforcement against the concerned respondents, and further directed
not to take any coercive action against the said respondents pending
the said writ petitions. All the appeals being interconnected with each
other, they were heard together and it would be appropriate to decide
them by this common judgment.
3. The respondent India Bulls Housing Finance Limited (IHFL) is a non-
banking financial institution incorporated under the provisions of the
Companies Act. IHFL deals with the public money. The major source
of funds for the loans to be advanced by IHFL, is either the loans from
the other banks or from the public in the form of non-convertible
debentures. The respondents Niraj Tyagi is the President (Legal) and
Reena Bagga is the authorized officer of the IHFL.
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4. M/s Kadam Developers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as M/s
Kadam) was one of the Shipra Group entities. M/s Kadam had a sub-
lease of a parcel of land admeasuring 73 acres in Sector 128, Noida,
which was allotted to it by the predecessor of Yamuna Expressway
Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the
YEIDA). The 100% equity shares of M/s Kadam were held by Shipra
Estate Limited (98%); Mohit Singh (1%) and Bindu Singh (1%).
5. Between 2017-2020, IHFL had sanctioned 16 loan facilities to the
tune of Rs. 2,801 crores to the Shipra Group/ Borrowers comprising
of Shipra Hotels Ltd., Shipra Estate Ltd. and Shipra Leasing Pvt. Ltd.
for the purposes of the construction and/or development of
Housing/Residential Projects. Against the said sanctioned loan, a
sum of approximately 1995.37 crores was disbursed. The financial
assistance was secured by the Shipra Group by executing 22 pledge
agreements whereby the shares of various companies were pledged
in favour of IHFL. A pledge agreement was also entered into by Shipra
Groups and M/s Kadam with IHFL pledging 100% equity shares
(dematerialized) of M/s Kadam to secure the loan. The mortgaged
properties also included 73 acres of land at Noida that had been sub-
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let to M/s Kadam by YEIDA, and the property called ‘Shipra Mall’ in
Ghaziabad.
6. There being defaults in the repayment of loan amount, IHFL had
issued notices recalling all the loans advanced to the Shipra Group
amounting to Rs. 1763 crores (approx.). The said notices came to be
challenged by the Shipra Group before the Delhi High Court, by filing
FAO(OS) COMM 59/2021. The Delhi High Court vide order dated
16.04.2021 recorded that IHFL could proceed further with the
recovery proceedings, however the sale of shares should be done at
a fair market value and in a transparent manner. It appears that a
series of litigations under the SARFAESI Act before the DRT and High
Court had ensued between the parties.
7. IHFL on 01.07.2021 ultimately sold the shares of M/s Kadam pledged
with it to one Final Step Developers P. Ltd., a subsidiary of M3M India
P. Ltd. for Rs. 750 crores. Since Final Step Developers (earlier known
as M/s Creative Soul Technology P. Ltd) had no source of funds of its
own, the funds to purchase the shares of M/s Kadam were provided
to the Final Step Developers by the M3M India, which managed to
take loan from the IHFL on the same day i.e. 03.07.2021. Thus, the
purchase of shares of M/s Kadam by Final Step from the IHFL was
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funded by the IHFL itself. The mortgaged properties-Shipra Mall at
Ghaziabad and the parcel of law admeasuring 73 acres at Noida also
eventually came to be sold by the IHFL towards the recovery of its
dues from the Shipra Group.
8. On 09.04.2023, an FIR being No. 427 of 2023 came to be filed by one
Amit Walia, a Director of Shipra Hotels, against IHFL and its officers
for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC, 323,
504 & 506 at Police Station Indirapuram, alleging inter alia that IHFL
had illegally showed the Shipra group to be the defaulters, so that
they may misappropriate the properties owned by the Group through
illegal means. The FIR also alleged that IHFL had conspired with M3M
India, and by forging and fabricating the documents sold 73 acres of
land of M/s Kadam to M3M India, for a sum of 300 crores when the
market value of the same was about 4000 crores. IHFL had also
undervalued the shares and securities on the basis of false and forged
documents and had caused great loss to the Shipra Estate Company
and its Directors.
9. On 15.04.2023, another FIR being No. 197 of 2023 came to be filed
by YEIDA against IHFL, M3M India, M/s Kadam and M/s Beacon
Trusteeship Ltd. for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471
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and 120-B at Police Station Beta-2, Greater Noida alleging inter alia
that the first charge of YEIDA was preserved in the permission issued
on 09.01.2018 for pledging the shares to IHFL however, the IHFL
neither informed nor sought any permission of YEIDA before
transferring the shares of M/s Kadam to M3M India. Thus, the terms
and conditions contained in the permission letter, indemnity certificate
and sub-lease document were violated by the financial institution and
the sub-lessee, due to which the YEIDA had suffered a financial loss
of about Rs. 200 crores.
10. On 22.07.2023, yet another FIR being No. 611 of 2023 came to be
filed by one Mohit Singh, authorized representative of Shipra Group,
against Reena Bagga in her capacity as an authorized officer of IHFL
and others for the offences under Section 420, 120B IPC and 82 of
Registration Act at Police Station Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad, alleging
therein that “Shipra Mall”, which formed a part of the properties
mortgaged with IHFL, had been sold in pursuance of recovery
proceedings on the basis of false and fabricated documents, for a sum
of Rs. 551 Crore to Himri Estate Pvt. Ltd. although the actual value of
the land was over 2000 crore. It has been alleged that illegalities were
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committed by the said accused, by not showing the actual value of
Shipra Mall and thereby had caused huge loss to the Shipra Group.
11. Since various FIRs came to be registered against the IHFL and its
officers, the same came to be challenged by them by filing the W.P.
(Crl) being no. 166 of 2023 before this Court ( Gagan Banga and Anr.
vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. ).
12. Pending the said W.P. No.166/2023, the Directorate of Enforcement
(ED) on the basis of the said FIR nos. 197/2023 and 427/2023
registered an ECIR bearing no. ECIR/HIU-I/06/2023 in Delhi on
09.06.2023, to investigate into the offences of money laundering
under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
13. According to the appellant-ED, this Court without giving the appellant
any opportunity of hearing, passed the following order on 04.07.2023
while disposing off the W.P. (Crl) No. 166/2023 and connected
Contempt Petition.
“1 to 3.……
4. Vide order dated 28.04.2023 passed in W.P. (Crl.) No.
166/2023, criminal proceedings in three such FIRs instituted by
borrowers in different States, namely FIR No. 646/2022 dated
26.10.2022 registered at P.S. Titagarh, FIR No. 427/2023 dated
09.04.2023 registered at P.S. Indirapuram and FIR No. 25/2021
dated 27.01.2021 registered at P.S. EOW, Delhi were stayed.
5. Further FIR No. 197/2023 dated 15.04.2023 was filed by
YEIDA at PS Beta-2, Greater Noida, UP, which also refers to the
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aforesaid FIR No. 427/2023 dated 09.04.2023 registered at P.S.
Indirapuram with some overlapping facts. It is stated that on the
basis of these two connected FIRs namely FIR No. 427/2023 and
197/2023, now the ED has registered ECIR bearing No.
ECIR/HIU-I/06/2023 in Delhi. The petitioners have now
challenged the said FIRs and ECIR.
6. In the circumstances, as it may also involve adjudication on
facts, we deem it appropriate to permit the petitioners to
approach the respective jurisdictional High Courts to challenge
all four FIRs and the ECIR within two weeks from today, with a
request to the respective High Courts to consider and decide the
petitions expeditiously, not later than six months of their
presentation.
7. We also direct DGPs of respective States to look into the
matter, examine the contentions of the petitioners in respect of
the contents of FIRs, and to take appropriate measures in
accordance with law within a period of one month.
8. Till final disposal of the respective petitions, interim order dated
28.04.2023 passed in W.P.(Crl.) No. 166/2023 would continue in
the three FIRs mentioned therein.
9. In so far as the further FIR No. 197/2023 dated 15.04.2023
filed by YEIDA and ECIR bearing No. ECIR/HIU-I/06/2023 are
concerned, no coercive steps would be taken against the
petitioner financial institution and its officers, representatives and
managers till final disposal of such petitions by the High Court,
and it would be open for the petitioners to seek stay of
proceedings which would be considered by the High Court on its
own merits. It is clarified that this interim protection would only be
applicable to the petitioner financial institution and its officers,
representatives and managers, and not to any other person.”
14. The respondent-Niraj Tyagi and IHFL thereafter filed a writ petition in
the High Court being Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 10893/2023
seeking issuance of appropriate writ, order and direction for declaring
Section 420 of IPC as arbitrary and ultra vires to the Constitution of India
and seeking quashing of the FIR No.197 of 2023 dated 15.04.2023 as
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also the consequential proceedings arising therefrom as initiated by the
ED in ECIR bearing No. ECIR/HIU-I/06/2023. Similarly, the respondent
Reena Bagga and IHFL filed another writ petition being Criminal
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 11837/2023 seeking quashing of the FIR
being No.611/2023 registered against them as also all the consequential
actions taken by any authority/agency in pursuance to the said FIR. The
respondent M3M India Pvt. Ltd. and Kadam Developers Pvt. Ltd. also
filed a writ petition being Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.14053/2023
seeking the reliefs similar to the reliefs prayed for in the Writ Petition
No.10893/2023.
15. The High Court passed the following impugned Order on 13.07.2023 in
Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.10893 of 2023: -
“ 19. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the
petitioners have made out a case for grant of the interim as relief
prayed for. Accordingly, in furtherance of the protection granted
by the Apex Court to the petitioners by the order dated 4th July,
2023, while disposing of the Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 774 of
2023, it is provided that further proceedings, including
summoning of the officers, consequent to the F.I.R. No. 197 of
2023 dated 15.4.2023 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and
120-B - IPC, Police Station Beta-2, Greater Noida, Gautam Budh
Nagar, registered by Respondent No.2 and consequent ECIR
No. ECIR/HIU-I/06/2023 registered by Respondent No. 4, shall
remain stayed so far as it confines to the petitioners only and no
coercive action shall be taken against them.”
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16. The High Court passed the other impugned orders on 08.08.2023 in
Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.11837/2023 and on 13.09.2023
in Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.14053/2023, following the
order dated 13.07.2023 passed in Writ Petition
No.10893/2023.Consequently, the proceedings of the FIR No.197/2023,
FIR No.611/23 as also the ECIR No. ECIR/HIU-I/06/2023 have been
stayed qua the concerned respondents herein pending the said three
writ petitions before the High Court, and the concerned respondents who
are the accused in the said FIRs have been protected from any coercive
action being taken against them. The present appeals stem out of the
aforesaid impugned orders passed by the High Court.
17. The ASG, Mr. Raju appearing for the appellant ED in all the three
appeals vehemently submitted that this Court had passed the order
dated 04.07.2023 in Gagan Banga’s case staying the proceedings of
ECIR and the FIRs registered against the concerned respondents
without hearing the ED, and therefore the ED has filed a Review Petition,
which is pending before this Court. He further submitted that the High
Court also without assigning any cogent reasons in the impugned orders
stayed the said proceedings of ECIR and FIRs under the guise of
following the said order dated 04.07.2023 passed by this Court. Placing
10
heavy reliance on the decision of the Three-Judge Bench in Neeharika
1
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and Others , he
submitted that this Court has strongly deprecated the practice of the
courts granting interim orders staying the investigation or directing the
investigating agencies not to take coercive actions against the accused.
The impugned orders passed by the High Court therefore being in the
teeth of the said settled legal position, the same deserve to be quashed
and set aside forthwith.
18. However, the learned Senior counsels appearing for the respondents in
the respective appeals, taking the Court to the proceedings which had
taken place under the SARFAESI Act and before the High Court and this
Court, submitted that the respondent-complainant Shipra Group having
failed in all the said proceedings had taken recourse to the criminal
proceedings to create a fear amongst the financial institution and its
officers. They further submitted that the High Court taking into
consideration the order passed by this Court in Gagan Banga’s case
had rightly protected the financial institution and its officers who had
discharged their duties for the recovery of the dues from the borrowers.
Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in K. Virupaksha and
1
(2021) SCC Online SC 315
11
2
Another vs. State of Karnataka and Another and in A.P. Mahesh
Cooperative Urban Bank Shareholders Welfare Association vs.
3
Ramesh Kumar Bung and Others , to submit that even in case of
Neeharika Infrastructure (supra), the discretion has been conferred on
the High Court to pass the interim orders in exceptional cases for not
taking coercive steps against the accused pending the proceedings,
particularly when the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were
initiated against the borrowers. According to them, bypassing the
statutory remedies available to the borrowers or having failed in such
proceedings, the borrowers should not be permitted to prosecute the
financial institution or its officers or the purchasers just to instill a fear in
their mind, which otherwise would have the potentiality to affect the
marrows of economic health of the nation.
19. At the outset, it may be noted that the impugned interim orders have
been passed by the High Court under the umbrella of the order dated
04.07.2023 passed by this Court in Gagan Banga’s case, creating an
impression that the impugned orders were passed in furtherance of the
2
(2020) 4 SCC 440
3
(2021) 9 SCC 152
12
said order, though this Court had passed the said order leaving it open
to the High Court to decide the writ petitions on their own merits.
20. In our opinion, it’s a matter of serious concern that despite the legal
position settled by this Court in catena of decisions, the High Court has
passed the impugned orders staying the investigations of the FIRs and
ECIR in question in utter disregard of the said settled legal position.
Without undermining the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of
Cr.PC to quash the proceedings if the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint prima facie do not constitute any offence against the accused,
or if the criminal proceedings are found to be manifestly malafide or
malicious, instituted with ulterior motive etc., we are of the opinion that
the High Court could not have stayed the investigations and restrained
the investigating agencies from investigating into the cognizable
offences as alleged in the FIRs and the ECIR, particularly when the
investigations were at a very nascent stage. It hardly needs to be
reiterated that the inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC do not
confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to
whims or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In a way, by passing such
orders of staying the investigations and restraining the investigating
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| agencies from taking any coercive measure against the accused | | |
|---|
| pending the petitions under Section 482 Cr.PC, the High Court has | | |
| granted blanket orders restraining the arrest without the accused | | |
| applying for the anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.PC. | | |
| 21. This Court in State of Telangana vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani and | | |
| Others4, while dealing with the contours of Section 482 and 438 Cr.PC | | |
| had emphasized that the direction not to arrest the accused or not to | | |
| take coercive action against the accused in the proceedings under | | |
| Section 482 Cr.PC, would amount to an order under Section 438 Cr.PC, | | |
| albeit without satisfaction of the conditions of the said provision, which | | |
| is legally unacceptable. | | |
| 22. Recently, a Three-Judge Bench in Neeharika Infrastructure (supra) | | | |
| while strongly deprecating the practice of the High Courts in staying the | | | |
| investigations or directing not to take coercive action against the accused | | | |
| pending petitions under Section 482 of Cr.PC, has issued the guidelines, | | | |
| which may be reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:- | | | |
| | “Conclusions | |
| | 33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our | |
| | final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High | |
| | Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of | |
| | investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the | |
| | pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC | |
4
2017 (2) SCC 779
14
| 33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the | |
|---|
| cognizable offences. | |
| 33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence | |
|---|
| of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the | |
| Court will not permit an investigation to go on. | |
| 33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with | |
|---|
| circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest of rare | |
| cases” (not to be confused with the formation in the context of | |
| death penalty). | |
| 33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is | |
|---|
| sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the | |
| reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in | |
| the FIR/complaint. | |
| 33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial | |
|---|
| stage. | |
| 33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather | |
|---|
| than an ordinary rule. | |
| 33.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the | |
|---|
| jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State | |
| operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to | |
| tread over the other sphere. | |
| 33.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are | |
|---|
| complementary, not overlapping. | |
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| 33.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would | |
|---|
| result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process | |
| should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. | |
| 33.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not | |
|---|
| confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its | |
| whims or caprice. | |
| 33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which | |
|---|
| must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. | |
| Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the | |
| court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. | |
| Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would | |
| be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts | |
| that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that | |
| it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the | |
| investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the | |
| application made by the complainant, the investigating officer | |
| may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned | |
| Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate | |
| in accordance with the known procedure. | |
| 33.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but | |
|---|
| conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. | |
| It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court. | |
| 33.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard | |
|---|
| being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint | |
| imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by | |
| this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 | |
| SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of | |
| Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) | |
| 426] , has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. | |
| 33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the | |
|---|
| alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under | |
| Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations | |
| in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. | |
| The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the | |
| merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the | |
| court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate | |
| the allegations in the FIR. | |
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| 33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the | |
|---|
| aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High | |
| Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in | |
| exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article | |
| 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay | |
| of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can | |
| be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not | |
| require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. | |
| Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are | |
| hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High | |
| Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the | |
| interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” | |
| and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail | |
| under Section 438CrPC before the competent court. The High | |
| Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of | |
| not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the | |
| investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the | |
| final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while | |
| dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section | |
| 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. | |
| 33.17. Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the | |
|---|
| opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim | |
| stay of further investigation, after considering the broad | |
| parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC | |
| and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to | |
| hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such | |
| an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so | |
| that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and | |
| the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High | |
| Court while passing such an interim order. | |
| 33.18. Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of | |
|---|
| “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid | |
| parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no | |
| coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to | |
| be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can | |
| be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” | |
23. The impugned orders passed by the High Court are in utter disregard
and in the teeth of the said guidelines issued by the Three-Judge Bench
17
of this Court. It was sought to be submitted by the Learned Counsels for
the respondents-accused that the allegations made in the FIRs are of civil
nature, and have been given a colour of criminal nature. According to
them, as discernible from the record, number of proceedings had ensued
between the parties pursuant to the actions taken by the IHFL against the
complainant-borrower for the recovery of its dues under the SARFAESI
Act, and the borrower M/s Shipra after having failed in the said
proceedings had filed the complaints with ulterior motives. We do not
propose to examine the merits of the said submissions as the writ
petitions filed by the concerned respondents-accused seeking quashing
of the FIRs on such grounds are pending for consideration before the
High Court. It would be open for the High Court to examine the merits of
the petitions and decide the same in accordance with law.
24. Without elaborating any further, suffice it to say that judicial comity and
judicial discipline demands that higher courts should follow the law. The
extraordinary and inherent powers of the court do not confer any arbitrary
jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whims and caprice.
25. The impugned orders passed by the High Court being not in consonance
with the settled legal position, the same deserve to be set aside and are
hereby set aside. The impugned interim orders passed by the High Court
18
qua the concerned respondents-accused in the present appeals stand
vacated forthwith.
26. We may clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of
the Writ Petitions which are pending before the High Court, and that it
would be open for the concerned respondents-accused to take all legal
contentions or take recourse to the legal remedies as may be available
to them in accordance with law.
27. The appeals stand allowed accordingly.
...……………………………... J.
[BELA M. TRIVEDI]
....….…………………………. J.
[PRASANNA B. VARALE]
NEW DELHI;
th
FEBRUARY, 13 2024
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