Full Judgment Text
$~5
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 02.07.2025
+ C.R.P. 24/2024
M/S INDOJ CONSULTANT PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Swaty Singh Malik, Mr. C.M
Grover, Mr. Rohan Kumar, Ms.
Deepti Verma, Mr. Kashish Dhawan
and Ms. Payal Budhiraja, Advocates
versus
SHRI GOVIND MISHRA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Parvinder Chauhan, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Rishikant Singh along with
Respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J.: (Oral)
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as “CPC”] impugning the
Order dated 07.10.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
East, Karkardooma Court, Delhi [hereinafter referred to as “Impugned
Order”]. By the Impugned Order, the Application under Order XII Rule 6 of
the CPC filed by the Petitioner has been dismissed by the learned Trial
Court.
2. The brief facts which are relevant and as have been set out in the
Impugned Order for the present case are as follows:
(i) The Petitioner [Plaintiff before the Trial Court] is a private limited
company and is being represented through its Director Sh. Inder Malik. The
Petitioner is the owner of a property bearing no. B-26, Block-B, Preet Vihar,
Delhi-110092 [hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”]. The
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 1 of 28
Respondent [Defendant before the Trial Court] was inducted as a tenant at a
Flat on the second floor of the subject premises [hereinafter referred to as
“tenanted premises”] by a lease deed dated 13.03.2019. The duration of the
lease deed was from 20.02.2019 till 19.01.2020 [hereinafter referred to as
the “Lease Deed”]. The Lease Deed also provided that a payment of Rs.
20,000/- per month shall be paid as rent.
(ii) It is the case of the Petitioner that the Lease Deed expired by efflux of
time on 19.01.2020 and thereafter since the Respondent failed to vacate the
subject premises, a suit for ejectment, eviction, recovery of rent and arrears
and permanent injunction was filed by the Petitioner on 06.10.2022.
(iii) The Respondent entered appearance in the Suit and filed his Written
Statement.
(iv) Subsequently, an Application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC
[hereinafter referred to as “Application”] was filed by the Petitioner. It is the
case of the Petitioner that there were admissions made in the Written
Statement filed by the Respondent as well as in an undertaking given by the
Respondent, on the basis of which, the prayer for ejectment should be
granted.
(v) The case of the Respondent, on the other hand, is that no admissions
of the nature as is envisaged under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC have been
made by the Respondent. The Respondent has also denied the undertaking
that is relied upon by the Petitioner. In addition, it is the case of the
Respondent that there were two other lease deeds in addition to the Lease
Deed. The one lease deed dated 27.02.2019 for a period from 19.01.2020
upto 19.12.2020 [hereinafter referred to as “Second Lease Deed”] and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 2 of 28
another lease deed dated 09.07.2020 for a period from 20.03.2020 upto
20.02.2021 [hereinafter referred to as “Third Lease Deed”]. It is further the
case of the Respondent that the Second and the Third Lease Deeds were
executed between the Respondent and one Smt. S.D Malik. It was thus
contended on behalf of the Respondent that there exists no jural relationship
between the Petitioner and the Respondent and the Application is not
maintainable in these circumstances.
3. The learned Trial Court by the Impugned Order held that the
Respondent/Defendant has consistently maintained his version of the
defence and that no clear categorical specific admission has been made on
the basis of which a judgment on admissions can be passed. It was thus held
that since the Defendant had denied the jural relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties and the relief as sought for cannot be granted.
4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has made
following submissions:
(i) In the first instance, it is submitted that the Petitioner is the owner of
the tenanted premises. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that as
stated in the Certificate of Incorporation annexed along with the Plaint, the
Petitioner is a private limited company comprising of three Directors i.e.,
Mr. Inder Malik, Mr. Manoj Malik and Mrs. Shani Devi Malik or Mrs. S.D.
Malik. It is further averred by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the
Petitioner is a closely held company where Mrs. S.D. Malik is the mother of
the Directors of the Petitioner company, i.e., Mr. Inder Malik and Mr. Manoj
Malik.
(ii) It is further submitted that the Respondent was inducted as a tenant
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 3 of 28
since February 2019. She submits that the Respondent continued in
occupation of the tenanted premises and since at that time, Covid-19 had set
in, he requested for additional time to vacate the tenanted premises, which
was granted to the Respondent in pursuance of an undertaking to vacate,
executed by the Respondent on 05.06.2022. However, since the Respondent
did not vacate on that date, the Petitioner was constrained to file a suit for
ejectment. She further contends that, in any event, the tenancy expired by
efflux of time since the Lease Deed had expired on 19.01.2020.
(iii) It is also contended that the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 of the
CPC envisaged actual or constructive admissions. The pre requisites for a
suit for ejectment are existence of a relationship of a lessor and lessee or
entry in possession of the suit property by defendant as tenant. Reliance in
this behalf is placed on the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court
1
in Usha Rani Jain & Ors. v. Nirulas Corner House Pvt. Ltd & Ors.
(iv) It is further submitted that the admissions as have been made by the
Respondent have been made in its Written Statement. Reliance is placed on
paragraph 6 of the Written Statement filed by the Respondent as well as
paragraph 4 of para wise reply of the Written Statement, wherein the
Respondent has admitted the tenancy. The relevant extracts are extracted
below:
“PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
xxx xxx xxx
6. That the plaintiff has not come with clean hands before this Hon'ble
Court and has concealed the true and material facts before this Hon'ble
Court. The true facts are that the defendant is residing at B-26, 2nd Floor,
Preet Vihar, Delhi as tenant since February, 2019. The defendant was
1
2005 SCC OnLine Del 843
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 4 of 28
inducted as tenant in the above mentioned premises by Smt. S.D. Malik (at
the rate of rent of Rs. 20,000/- per month), to whom the defendant met at
N-16, Nirman Vihar, Delhi. It is pertinent to mention here that in this
regard initially a rent agreement dated 27.02.2019 was executed between
Smt. S.D Malik and defendant and thereafter another rent agreement dated
09.07.2020 was executed between Smt. S.D Malik and defendant. The copy
of rent agreements are annexed herewith for the kind perusal of Hon'ble
Court. It was agreed between Smt. SD. Malik and the defendant, that the
plaintiff shall provide maintenance, provide separate electricity meter,
water motor, PNG Meter etc., at that time Smt. S.D Malik introduced one
Pushpa Batra (who is the employee of plaintiff) to the defendant and
informed the defendant that she is care taker of building and it is her
responsibility to provide everything to the defendant. It was also agreed
between the parties that the above mentioned work shall be completed
before shifting of defendant in the above mentioned premises. It is pertinent
to mention here that at that time the defendant had paid a sum of Rs.
10,000/- as an advance payment. That when the defendant along with his
family shifted in the above mentioned premises he came to know that
maintenance work is pending in the above mentioned flat. After shifting, the
defendant also came to know that even basic maintenance work was not
completed like water pipeline, sewage pipeline, repairing of bathroom,
PNG Gas Pipeline, drawing room work, building use lightening etc.
However, as agreed by both the parties, the defendant had already paid an
advance amount as well as 1 month rent amount. It is pertinent to mention
here that the defendant many times told to Puspa Batra regarding the same
but she used to made one pretext to another. That when the defendant asked
Smt. S.D Malik as well as Pushpa Batra for his deposit rent as well as
expenses of shifting back and informed them he is going to vacate the said
premises then both of them denied for the same. In the meanwhile Puspha
again asked the defendant to pay the monthly rent and also gave assurance
to him that she will get the maintenance work complete soon and on the
assurance of Pushpa the defendant paid further rent to Pushpa but no
work had been done regarding the said maintenance.
xxx xxx xxx
REPLY ON MERITS
xxx xxx xxx
4. That the contents of para no. 4 of plaint are wrong, false and denied. It is
denied that the defendant merely paid a rent for one month i.e. March 2019,
it is denied that thereafter the defendant intentionally and deliberately
lingered upon to pay the monthly rent to the plaintiff on pretext of poor
financial condition due to pandemic of covid-19 and all the request made by
the plaintiff went into deaf and yielded no result. It is submitted that the
defendant had already paid the rent upto December, 2022@Rs. 20,000/-
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 5 of 28
per month cash to sometimes to Smt. S.D. Malik, sometimes to Pushpa
Batra and sometimes to other person on behalf of Smt. SD Malik and
Pushpa Batra who came to collect rent. It is further submitted that the
Preliminary objections may kindly be read as a part and parcel.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
.
(v) In addition, reliance is also placed on the undertaking dated
04.04.2022 [hereinafter referred to as “Undertaking”] executed by the
Respondent.
(vi) Learned Counsel also seeks to rely upon the judgment passed by the
2
Division Bench of this Court in Delhi Jal Board v. Surendra P. Malik to
submit that one of the tests on whether there is an admission of a nature as to
permit the Application would also be as to whether the objections which are
raised against the judgment are such which go to the root of the matter or are
inconsequential making it impossible for the parties to succeed even if
entertained.
(vii) Lastly, it is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the
3
Petitioner, while relying on the judgment in Deepak Jain v. Kamal Garg
that even though the Respondent has denied executing the undertaking, the
denial is a bare denial. Where there is no denial of executing the
undertaking, the denial cannot be said to be denial in law.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, on
the other hand, has made the following submissions:
(i) At the outset, learned Senior Counsel categorically denies the
relationship of landlord and tenant. He submits that the Respondent is not
2
2003 SCC OnLine Del 292
3
2016 SCC OnLine Del 5624
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 6 of 28
aware of who the owner is and was inducted into the subject premises by
one Mrs. S.D Malik. He further submits that the relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties has been categorically denied by the Respondent
including in his Written Statement and thus there is no question of an order
under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC being granted.
(ii) He further submits that as far as concerns the Undertaking, the same
has also been denied. He further submits that the learned Trial Court also
examined the Respondent under Order X of the CPC on 23.09.2023,
wherein the Respondent has denied executing the Undertaking. Thus, it is
contended that there is complete denial of the Undertaking.
(iii) Learned Senior Counsel, however, on instructions, does not deny the
fact the Respondent is in possession of the tenanted premises as a tenant and
did execute the Second Lease Deed and the Third Lease Deed with the said
Mrs. S.D Malik and also does not deny the fact that a rental of Rs. 20,000/-
per month was agreed to be paid in terms of the Lease Deed.
(iv) Lastly, learned Senior Counsel submits that the present case is not an
appropriate case for the exercise of revisionary jurisdiction by this Court.
Reliance in this behalf is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
4
Rahimal Bathu and Ors. v. Ashiyal Beevi to submit that the exercise of
revisionary jurisdiction is a discretionary power and cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. Reliance is also placed on the judgment passed by this Court
in Baby v. Office of Deputy Director Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement
5
Board wherein it was held that admission has to be clear, unambiguous and
4
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1226
5
2025:DHC:3625
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 7 of 28
unconditional for the court to exercise its discretion and pass a judgment on
admission. It is submitted that there is no admission by the Respondent
which would entitle the Respondent to a judgment in terms of Order XII
Rule 6 of the CPC.
(v) Reliance is also placed on the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench
6
of this Court in Sanuj Bathla & Anr. v. Manu Maheshwari & Anr. to
submit that the doctrine of corporate veil cannot be permitted to be lifted
except in special circumstances.
6. It is apposite to set out the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, which
are below:
“(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or
otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the
suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without
waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties,
make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to
such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall
be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the
date on which the judgment was pronounced.”
7. A plain reading of the provision shows that the admission may be
made in a pleading or otherwise, including orally and based on such
admission, the Court may pronounce judgment without waiting for the
determination on other issues.
8. It is no longer res integra that for an Application to be allowed under
Order XII Rule 6 of CPC for the recovery of possession of a tenanted
premises, a landlord is required to fulfil only three parameters:
(i) The relationship of landlord and tenant must be admitted;
6
Dated 12.04.2021 passed in C.R.P. 166/2018 & C.M. APPL.32378/2018 & 10441/2021
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 8 of 28
(ii) The tenancy must not be a protected tenancy under the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 with the rental of more than Rs. 3,500/-; and
(iii) The tenancy has been terminated or expired by efflux of time and the
Respondent tenant has failed to hand over possession.
7
9. The Supreme Court in Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika Choudhary , has
held that in order for a suit for recovery of possession of a tenant, where the
tenant is not protected under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958, where these three admissions are available, the Court can pass a
decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The relevant extract of the Payal
Vision case is reproduced below:
“ 7. In a suit for recovery of possession from a tenant whose tenancy is not
protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, all that is required
to be established by the plaintiff landlord is the existence of the jural
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the
termination of the tenancy either by lapse of time or by notice served by
the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. So long as
these two aspects are not in dispute the court can pass a decree in terms of
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, which reads as under :
“ 6. Judgment on admissions .—(1) Where admissions of fact have
been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in
writing, the court may at any stage of the suit, either on the
application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for
the determination of any other question between the parties, make
such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to
such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree
shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree
shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.
8. The above sufficiently empowers the court trying the suit to deliver
judgment based on admissions whenever such admissions are sufficient
for the grant of the relief prayed for. Whether or not there was an
unequivocal and clear admission on either of the two aspects to which we
have referred above and which are relevant to a suit for possession
7
(2012) 11 SCC 405
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 9 of 28
against a tenant is, therefore, the only question that falls for
determination in this case and in every other case where the plaintiff seeks
to invoke the powers of the court under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and prays
for passing of the decree on the basis of admission . Having said that we
must add that whether or not there is a clear admission upon the two
aspects noted above is a matter to be seen in the fact situation prevailing in
each case. Admission made on the basis of pleadings in a given case cannot
obviously be taken as an admission in a different fact situation. That
precisely is the view taken by this Court in Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd.
[(2010) 6 SCC 601 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 745] relied upon by the High
Court where this Court has observed: (SCC p. 604,
para 10)…”
[Emphasis Supplied]
10. The Petitioner has contended that the Respondent has made several
admissions. It is contended that these admissions made by the Respondent
have been reproduced in paragraphs 4, 5 and 9 of the Application under
Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, which are extracted below:
“4. That the defendant in para no. 6 of the written statement has admitted
the fact that he was inducted into the suit property as a tenant. For the
convenience of this Hon’ble Court the relevant portion is as below:
“the true facts are that the defendant is residing at B-26, Second
Floor, Preet Vihar, Delhi as a tenant since February 2019 ”.
Whereas the plaintiff has made a vague averment that he was inducted in
the suit property by Smt. S.D. Malik.
5. That the plaintiff apart from admission of this fact that he was inducted
into the property as a tenant has also admitted the rate of rent Rs. 20,000/-
per month. For the convenience of this Hon’ble Court the relevant portion
of the para no. 4 of the parawise reply of the written statement is
reproduced as below:
“ It is submitted that the defendant had already paid the rent upto
December 2022 @ Rs. 20,000/- per month in cash ”
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the defendant was inducted as a tenant of the plaintiff through its
director vide rent agreement dated 13.03.2019 and the defendant by
himself given an undertaking to the plaintiff dated 04.04.2022 to vacate
the suit property on or before 05.06.2022 which has not been denied by the
defendant even otherwise the defendant has himself admitted this fact that
he was inducted into the suit property as a tenant whereas merely making
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 10 of 28
the vague averments that he is a tenant of Smt. S.D. Malik to delay the
proceedings .”
[Emphasis supplied]
11. A review of the plaint also reflects that the Plaintiff in paragraph 7 of
the plaint has stated that on 04.04.2022, the directors of the Plaintiff
approached the Defendant to request him to vacate the tenanted premises
and in pursuance thereof, an Undertaking was also signed by the Defendant.
The relevant paragraph of the plaint is set out herein below:
“7. That on 04.04.2022, the directors of the plaintiff approached to the
defendant and requested him to vacate the tenanted premises on which the
defendant seek the time and assured the plaintiff to vacate the tenanted
premises on or before 05.06.2022 and in this regard the defendant also
issued an undertaking to the plaintiff but the assurance made by the
defendant was nothing but a delay tactics to avoid his illegal possession
from the tenanted premises.”
11.1 It is also apposite to set out the Undertaking dated 04.04.2022 which
is referred to in this paragraph, which is reproduced below:
“I, GOVIND MISHRA SON OF SHRI B.V. MISHRA RESIDENT OF D-85,
FIRST FLOOR, OPP. METRO HOSPITAL, PREET VIHAR, NEW DELHl-
110092, do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as under;
1. That I am an Indian Citizen.
2. That I am the Tenant in the BUILT-UP ONE FALT ON SECOND
FLOOR, UPTO THE EXTENT OF CEILING LEVEL, COMPRISING OF
THREE BEDROOMS, ONE DRAWING CUM DINING ROOM, ONE
KITCHEN, TOILET/BATHROOMS AND BALCONIES ETC., A PART of
PROPERTY BEARING NO. B-26, SITUATED AT PREET VIHAR, DELHl-
110092, by virtue of wide LEASE DEED dated 13.03.2019.
3. That I will hand over the peaceful vacant possession of the above rented
premises to M/s. INDOJ CONSULTANT PVT. LTD. acting through its
Director (1) Mr. MANOJ MALIK & (2) Mr. INDER MALIK on or before
05.06.2022.”
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION:
Verified at Delhi, on this 04.04.2022, that the contents of the above
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 11 of 28
affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and
nothing has been concealed therein
DEPONENT ”
12. It is the contention of the Respondent that the Undertaking has been
denied and that this denial also forms part of the statement under Order X
Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC which is recorded by the learned Trial Court on
23.09.2023. It is thus averred that there is no admission made by him and
thus, no relief under Order XII Rule 6 as envisaged in the Application can be
granted to the Petitioner/Plaintiff.
13. The Supreme Court in the Payal Vision case has held that whether or
not there is a clear and unambiguous admission by one party would depend
on the facts of each case as follows:
“10. … Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by one
party of the case of the other party is essentially a question of fact and the
decision of this question depends on the facts of the case . The question,
namely, whether there is a clear admission or not cannot be decided on the
basis of a judicial precedent. Therefore, even though the principles in
Karam Kapahi [(2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] may be
unexceptionable they cannot be applied in the instant case in view of totally
different fact situation.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. The Division Bench in the Delhi Jal Board case has held that one of
the tests for whether a judgment on admission can be granted is as to
whether the objections raised against rendering such judgments are such that
go to the root of the matter and whether these are consequential in making a
party succeed eventually in a matter. The relevant extract is as follows:
“9. The test, therefore, is (i) whether admissions of fact arise in the suit,
(ii) whether such admissions are plain, unambiguous and unequivocal,
(iii) whether the defense set up is such that it requires evidence for
determination of the issues and (iv) whether objections raised against
rendering the judgment are such which go to the root of the matter or
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 12 of 28
whether these are inconsequential making it impossible for the party to
succeed even if entertained . It is immaterial at what stage the judgment is
sought or whether admissions of fact are found expressly in the pleadings or
not because such admissions could be gathered even constructively for the
purpose of rendering a speedy judgment.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
15. The learned Trial Court has found that the issues raised by the
Petitioner would require a trial for adjudication. Thus, the enquiry by the
Court in the circumstances of the present case is as to whether there are clear
and unambiguous admissions and if so, whether the objections raised are
inconsequential.
15.1 The facts in the present case show the following:
(i) The Respondent has not disputed that he is a tenant in the tenanted
premises. It is the case of the Respondent that he was inducted as a tenant by
Smt. S D Malik while the Petitioner contends that the Respondent is a tenant
of the Petitioner/Plaintiff – Company.
(ii) The Respondent does not claim any ownership rights in the tenanted
premises. It is also not disputed that lease agreements which were stated to
be executed between the parties, have all expired by efflux of time and after
June 2022 there is no valid lease agreement executed by the Respondent
with any person/company for tenancy/possession of the tenanted premises.
(iii) The Respondent has continued in the tenanted premises as a tenant
holding over or in unauthorized possession after the lease has been
determined/expired and is paying a monthly rental of Rs. 20,000/- per month
upto December 2022.
16. The Supreme Court in Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar Huf v. Ashwin
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 13 of 28
8
Bhanulal Desai has, while explaining when it can be said that a tenancy
has been determined, held that the tenant who remains in possession after
the lease deed ends whether such end is by the expiry of time or termination
or forfeiture, is liable to pay mesne profits as well. It was further held that
once the lease expires or is determined, the lessee is termed as a tenant at
sufferance, which status is slightly higher that a trespasser. The relevant
extract reads as follows:
“18. Landlord-tenant disputes often make their way to this Court, and
obviously, the payment of rent/mesne profits/occupation charges/damages
becomes, more often than not a matter of high contest. Determination, as
alleged to have taken place by the petitioner, can take place at the instance
of both the landlord and the tenant. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn.,
Vol. 23 defines “determination by landlord” as follows:
“The tenancy is impliedly determined by the landlord when he does
any act on the premises which is inconsistent with the continuance
of tenancy ; for example, when he re-enters to take possession (b), or
puts in a new tenant (c), or cuts down trees or carries away stone (d),
the trees and stone not being excepted from the demise (e), and also
when he does an act off the premises which is inconsistence with the
tenancy, as when he conveys the reversion (f), or grants a lease of the
premises to commence forthwith (g). An act done off the premises,
however, does not determine the tenancy until the tenant has notice of
it (h).”
xxx xxx xxx
20. It would also be useful to refer to the concept of tenant at
sufferance. As defined in the very same treatise, such a tenant is a person
who enters upon a land by lawful title, but continues in possession after
the title has ended without statutory authority and without obtaining
consent of the person then entitled .
th
21. Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 17 Edn. discusses ‘tenancy at sufferance’ in
the following terms:
“ Sufferance, Tenancy at, This is the least and lowest estate which
can subsist in realty. It is in strictness not an estate, but a mere
possession only it arises when a person after his right to the
occupation, under a lawful title, is at an end, continues (having no
8
(2024) 8 SCC 668
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 14 of 28
title at all) in possession of the land, without the agreement or
disagreement of the person in whom the right of possession resides .
Thus if A is a tenant for yes, and his terms expires, or is a tenant at
will, and his lessor dies, and he continues in possession without the
disagreement of the person who is entitled to the same, in the one and
the other of these cases he said to have the possession by sufferance –
that is, merely by permission or indulgence, without any right : the
law esteeming it just and reasonable, and for the interest of the tenant,
and also of the person entitled to the possession, to deem the
occupation to be continued by the permission of the person who has
the right, till it is proved that the tenant withholds the possession
wrongfully, which the law will not presume. As the party came to the
possession by right, the law will esteem that right to continue either in
point of estate or by the permission of the owner of the land till it is
proved that the possession is held in opposition to the will of that
person.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
16.1 The Supreme Court further held that the terms determination, expiry,
termination, forfeiture when applied to a lessee has a similar effect to bring
the tenancy to an end, in the following terms:
“30. It is to be noted that the Court in Sudera Realty observed that
mesne profits become payable on continuation of possession after ‘expiry’
of lease. In our considered view, the effect of the words ‘determination’,
‘expiry’, ‘forfeiture’ and ‘termination’ would, subject to the facts
applicable, be similar, i.e., when any of these three words are applied to a
lease, henceforth, the rights of the lessee/tenant stand extinguished or in
certain cases metamorphosed into weaker iteration of their former selves .
Illustratively, Burton’s Legal Thesaurus 3rd Edn. suggests the following
words as being similar to ‘expire’ - cease, come to an end; ‘determine’ is
similar to - come to a conclusion, bring to an end; ‘forfeiture’ is similar to
– deprivation/destruction of a right, divestiture of property; and ‘terminate’
is similar to – bring to an end, cease, conclude. Therefore, in any of the
these situations, mesne profit would be payable .”
[Emphasis Supplied]
17. Concededly, the Respondent has continued in possession after the
expiry of the Lease Deed. Emphasis has been laid by learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Respondent on the fact that the Undertaking has been
denied and that the jural relationship has also been denied. However, what
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 15 of 28
the Respondent is unable to deny is the fact that he continues as a tenant in
occupation of the tenanted premises without a valid and legal subsisting
lease deed.
17.1 The Respondent has also in his Written Statement not denied that he
was put into possession by Mrs. S.D Malik and that he has paid rent to her
or one Pushpa Batra, the caretaker of the property. Clearly, thus, the
Respondent was paying rental also to a third party even though he admits to
Mrs. S.D Malik as his landlord.
18. It is the contention of the Respondent that the Respondent has raised
an issue which would go to the root of the case and thus, the Application
was rightly dismissed by the learned Trial Court. Since, he was inducted by
Mrs. S.D Malik and not the Petitioner, there is no jural relationship of
landlord and tenant.
19. It is no longer res integra that admissions can be inferred even from
vague and evasive denials or even from the facts and circumstances of a
case. The Respondent has clearly admitted to being a tenant and being in
occupation of the tenanted premises. He, however, denies the execution of
the Lease Deed but admits that the Second Lease Deed was executed
between him and Mrs. S.D Malik. He further contends that after the Second
Lease Deed, the Third Lease Deed was also executed with him by the said
Mrs. S.D Malik.
20. The tenancy is admitted by the Respondent as is the fact that he
continues to reside in the tenanted premises since February 2019, as a tenant
at an admitted rent of Rs. 20,000/- per month.
21. It is the case of the Petitioner Company that the Respondent was
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 16 of 28
inducted as a tenant through one of its Directors and a Lease Deed was
executed between the Respondent and the Petitioner Company for the period
from 20.02.2019 expiring on 19.01.2020 and signed by the Director of the
Petitioner Company – Mr. Inder Malik. The Plaint has been filed by Mr.
Inder Malik as Director of the Petitioner Company. The extract of Company
Master Data as available with the Registrar of Companies was filed along
with the Plaint. The relevant extract is reproduced below:
“Company Master Data
CIN U74899DL2001PTC109746
Company Name INDOJ CONSULTANTS PRIVATE LIMITED
ROC Code RoC-Delhi
Registration Number 109746
Company Category Company limited by Shared
Company
SubCategory
Non-govt company
Class of Company Private
…
Directors/Signatory Details
DIN/PAN Name Begin date End date Surrendered
DIN
01306923 INDER MALIK 20/02/2001 -
01593569 MANOJ MALIK 20/02/2001 -
08002197 SHANI DEVI
24/11/2017 -
MALIK
[Emphasis supplied]
21.1 As stated above, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has also
clarified that the said Mrs. S.D Malik is the mother of the other Directors of
the Petitioner Company - Mr. Inder Malik and Mr. Manoj Malik and that the
Petitioner Company is a closely held private limited company with these
three persons as its only members. The Petitioner has also not admitted to
the execution of any other Lease Deed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 17 of 28
22. A review of the Lease Deed which was executed between the
Respondent and Mr. Manoj Malik and Mr. Inder Malik on behalf of the
Petitioner Company shows that the Lease Deed has been executed for a
period from 20.02.2019 to 19.01.2020. The agreed rental as set out in this
Lease Deed is Rs. 20,000/- per month. The Lease Deed is witnessed by Mrs.
S.D Malik as the first witness.
22.1 The Respondent has purported to make a case that he is not aware of
the inter se relationship between the Petitioner and its Directors and Mrs.
S.D Malik and that he only executed the Second and Third lease deeds. It is
on the basis of this denial that the Respondent submits that this is not a fit
case for exercise of jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
23. This Court has examined the Lease Deed, Second Lease Deed and the
Third Lease Deed. The following undisputable facts can be set out:
(i) The (first) Lease Deed is for the period from 20.02.2019 till
19.01.2020 and is executed between the Petitioner through its directors, Mr.
Manoj Malik & Mr. Inder Malik and the Respondent with Mrs. S.D Malik as
the first witness.
(ii) The Second Lease Deed is for the period of 11 months commencing
from 19.01.2020 and contains no signatures under the term Lessor but
contains a signature of the Lessee, who is the Respondent herein. Thus, the
term of the Second Lease Deed commences the day the (first) Lease Deed
expires.
(iii) The Third Lease Deed is executed between Mrs. S.D. Malik and the
Respondent and is for the period of 11 months commencing from
20.03.2020 – exactly after the Second Lease Deed would expire.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 18 of 28
(iv) The description of the subject premises is exactly the same in the
Lease Deed and the Second Lease Deed as – “ONE FLAT ON SECOND
FLOOR COMPRISING OF THREE BEDROOMS, ONE DRAWING CUM
DINING ROOM, ONE KITCHEN, KITCHEN, TOILETS/BATHROOMS
AND BALCONIES ETC”. The subject premises in the Third Lease Deed is
referred to as: – “ONE FLAT ON SECOND FLOOR COMPRISING OF
TWO BEDROOM, ONE DRAWING CUM DINING ROOM, ONE
KITCHEN, KITCHEN, TOILETS/BATHROOMS AND BALCONIES
ETC.” Be that as it may, the possession of the subject premises in all three
lease deeds has not been denied by the Respondent.
(v) The rental in all three lease deeds is same at Rs.20,000/- per month,
which is admitted by the Respondent.
23.1 Although the Respondent denies executing the Undertaking in his
statement made without an oath under Order X of the CPC on 23.09.2023,
he does admit to being a tenant.
23.2 Thus, there is no denial by the Respondent that he is a tenant. In fact,
it is recorded in the Undertaking that the Respondent has paid the rent up to
December, 2022, which is the fixed rent of Rs.20,000/- per month and is
ready to pay rent thereafter as well.
24. The Petitioner had also placed before the learned Trial Court the Sale
Deed dated 16.12.2011 in respect of the tenanted premises which sets out the
sale of the subject premises to the Petitioner. It is the contention of the
Petitioner that the Second and Third lease deeds have been created by the
Respondent to create a false dispute to avoid and delay vacation of the
subject premises.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 19 of 28
24.1 The Sale Deed sets out that the property was purchased in the name of
“M/s Indoj Consultant (P) Ltd.” through its Director Shri R.P. Malik (dead)
who was husband of Mrs. S.D Malik. The said detail of Mrs. S.D. Malik
being wife of Late Shri R.P. Malik is also set out in Third Lease Deed,
which has been placed on record by the Respondent, thus this fact cannot be
disputed by the Respondent nor can the Respondent claim no knowledge of
the relationship.
24.2 These documents thus also prove the relationship inter-se Mrs. S.D.
Malik, Mr. Manoj Malik and Mr. Inder Malik.
25. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Usha Rani case has held that the
pre requisites for a suit for ejectment is the existence of the relationship of a
lessor and a lessee or entry in possession of the suit property by Defendant
as tenant and determination of such relationship in any of the contingencies
as are set out under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act would lead
to a judgment or decree of possession in favour of the Petitioner. The
relevant portion is extracted below:
“18. The object of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is to enable a party to obtain a
speedy judgment, at least, to the extent of the admissions of the defendant
to which relief the plaintiff is entitled to . The rule permits the passing of the
judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions.
It is equally settled that before a Court can act under Order 12 Rule 6, the
admission must be clear, unambiguous, unconditional and unequivocal.
Admissions in pleadings are either actual or constructive. Actual
admissions consist of facts expressly admitted either in pleadings or in
answer to interrogatories. In a suit for ejectment, the factors which
deserves to be taken into consideration in order to enable the Court to pass
a decree of possession favour of the plaintiff primarily are:
1) Existence of relationship of Lesser and lessee or entry in
possession of the suit property by defendant as tenant;
2) Determination of such relation in any of the contingencies as
envisaged in Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act .
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 20 of 28
19. The law as to when a decree of possession can be passed in favour of the
plaintiff on the existence of the above factors is well laid down by a catena
of judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts. In the case
of Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India and Ors. the
Supreme Court held that when a statement of admission is brought before
the Court, as long as the party making the statement is given sufficient
opportunity to explain such admission, judgment admission can be passed if
the explanation is not accepted by the Court. The Supreme Court reiterated
the legal position that no court should unduly narrow down the scope of
Rule 6, the object of which is to enable a party to obtain a speedy
judgment. It also ruled that admissions generally arise when a statement
is made by a party in any of the modes provided under Sections 18 to 23 of
the Evidence Act, 1872 and this may be considered as actually made if
they are either in the pleadings or in answer the interrogatories or implied
from the pleadings by non-traversal .”
[Emphasis Supplied]
25.1 It is averred by learned Counsel for the Petitioner that this case would
fall within the parameters of the expression “pleadings or otherwise” used in
Order XII, Rule 6 (a) of CPC.
26. The learned Trial Court has by the Impugned Order held that the
Respondent has set up a plea which would require trial and has thus
dismissed the Application. At first sight the plea of no jural relationship does
appear to give rise to an issue, but the core question is whether the
Respondent has put up for consideration, any issue which would require a
trial. This aspect was discussed by the Coordinate Bench in the Usha Rani
case holding that the core question for consideration is as to whether the
pleas put forth are a sham or have any substance or can be said to raise any
triable issues. If the facts remain uncontroverted and undisputed, the tenant
is not entitled to resist the suit on the relief of possession. The relevant
extract of Usha Rani case is reproduced below:
“21. Mr. V.K. Makhija, learned senior counsel for the defendants has not
disputed the legal position emerging out of the above decisions but has
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 21 of 28
vehemently urged that on the basis of several pleas and disputed questions
raised by the defendants, several triable issues arise in the present case
which can only be answered after a full-fledged trial and so , this is not a
fit case where this Court should pass a decree of possession at this stage of
the proceedings without any trial. Undoubtedly the defendants had set up
several pleas which could at first sight appear to give rise to some issues
also but the core question for consideration is as to whether the pleas so
put-forth are sham or have any substance or can be said to raise any
triable issues . It is will settled that sham pleas cannot raise a triable issue.
It is not uncommon that tenants facing a suit for ejectment raise several
irrelevant/non-existent and sham pleas with an oblique motive of delaying
and defeating the relief of ejectment, which has otherwise accrued in favour
of the landlord. In the present case defendants have not disputed the
existence of relationship of landlord and tenant created by the lease deed
dated 30.4.1974 and that they occupied the suit premises in terms of the
lease deed as also the factum of the said lease deed having expired in
2003, i.e. after the expiry of the 30 years period for which the lease was
created. These are the basis facts/admissions which by no stretch can be
said to have been controverted or disputed by the defendants. The
defendants are, therefore, not entitled to resist the suit, at least, so far as
the relief of possession is concerned by raising those pleas and by filing
subsequent suit for partition. ”
[Emphasis Supplied]
26.1 The Court in Usha Rani Case, while holding that the lessor is entitled
to a decree of possession of suit premises without undergoing the exercise of
trial, also held that the plaintiff is entitled to quantum of damages/mesne
profits which would be a subject matter of enquiry under the provision of
Order 20 Rule 12 of CPC. The relevant extract of Usha Rani case in this
regard are reproduced herein below:
“22. This Court on a consideration of all the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case, material obtaining on record and in view of the
foregoing discussion on various pleas raised by the defendants, has no
hesitation in holding that there is no dispute between the parties in regard
to the existence of relationship of lessor and lessee and that the lease
created by the plaintiffs-lessors in favour of the defendants has
expired/stood determined by efflux of time within the meaning of Section
111 of the Transfer of Property Act thereby entitling the plaintiffs to a
decree of possession of the suit premises forthwith and without
undergoing the exercise of the trial . The only issue which will be left out
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 22 of 28
for trial/enquiry would be in regard to the quantum of damages/mesne
profits, if any, to which the plaintiffs may be entitled from the defendants for
the period during which they remained in unauthorised occupation of the
suit premises after the determination of the lease. That would be a subject
matter of enquiry under the provisions of Order, 20 Rule 12 CPC.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
27. From an examination of the facts of this case, it is seen that the
defence taken by the Respondent is such that, even if the matter goes to trial,
it would not change the outcome of the Petition. The Respondent has not
denied being a tenant in the tenanted premises and has not raised any issue
that would require the matter to trial. The tenancy of the Respondent has
clearly expired by efflux of time even as per the case of the Respondent.
28. The denial of the jural relationship by the Respondent is basically a
denial that the landlord is not the Petitioner Company but a Director of the
Petitioner Company. This is clear from the Company Master Data produced
by the Petitioner Company that the Petitioner Company is a closely held
private limited company with its Directors being family members, which is
also evident from the Company Master Data placed on record. The Sale
Deed placed on record by the Petitioner also reflects the ownership of the
Petitioner Company. No doubt, the Petitioner Company is a separate legal
entity, but a Director/Authorized signatories of this Company include the
name of the admitted landlord – Mrs. S.D. Malik. In any event, it is matter
of public knowledge that the records of a company are public records and
are available at the website of Registrar of Companies. As discussed, the
plea of the Respondent that he is not aware of the relationship or that his
landlord is Mrs. S.D. Malik appears to be an afterthought and without merit.
29. Thus, the dispute which is sought to be raised by the Respondent
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 23 of 28
between the parties with respect to existence of relationship of lessor and
lessee between them is not a dispute which goes to the root of the matter or
require evidence. The landlord is admittedly a company and one of its
authorized signatory/Directors is Mrs. S.D Malik who has been
acknowledged as the landlord by the Respondent.
30. In any event, and as stated above, the Respondent’s tenancy has
expired by efflux of time. There is also no other person claiming to be the
owner/landlord of the tenanted premises so as to raise a triable issue. It is not
the case of the Respondent that Mrs. S.D. Malik has filed separate
proceedings for eviction or that she is denying the ownership of the subject
premises by the Petitioner Company.
30.1 The undisputed facts also are that the Respondent has continued in
possession of tenanted premises without a valid and legal subsisting lease
deed without denying his tenancy or the payment of rental in the sum of
Rs.20,000/- per month.
31. There is another aspect as well. Paragraph 3 of the plaint sets out that
the Respondent/Defendant was inducted as a tenant from 20.02.2019 to
19.01.2020. This contention has not been denied by the
Respondent/Defendant. In fact, the Respondent admits to being inducted as
a tenant since February, 2019. The Second Lease Deed, that the Respondent
states has been executed between him and Mrs. S.D. Malik only commences
on 19.01.2020. Thus, if the version of the Respondent/Defendant was to be
believed, the Respondent was in occupation of the subject premises from
February, 2019 to 18.01.2020 without executing a lease deed, which as per
him, was executed only in the year 2020 for a period of eleven months
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 24 of 28
commencing 20.03.2020.
31.1 The Second Lease Deed which is relied upon by the Respondent has a
commencement date of 19.01.2020. Thus, this lease deed, even if assumed
to be executed, has been executed one year after the commencement of the
tenancy. Since it is the admitted case of the parties that the tenancy
commenced in February, 2019, it seems unlikely that no lease deed would
have been executed for the tenancy at its commencement. In any event, the
(first) Lease Deed has been executed on stamp paper dated 13.03.2019 while
the Second Lease Deed has been executed on a stamp paper of February,
2019 but for a period commencing January, 2020, 11 months later. The
Second Lease Deed is thus also not stamped in accordance with the law.
31.2 Given these circumstances the undisputed fact is that there exists a
lease deed for the period commencing the date of tenancy, and the Second
Lease Deed which is admitted by the Respondent for a period of one year
thereafter.
32. Lastly, it has been averred by the learned Counsel for the Respondent
that this is not a fit case for the exercise of the revisionary jurisdiction by
this Court. This Court does not agree. The provisions of Section 115 CPC
are clear and unequivocal that where there is an error which goes to the root
of the jurisdiction, the revisionary jurisdiction can be exercised by this
Court.
32.1 There is no dispute with the proposition as has been laid down in the
Rahimal Bathu case that the revisionary jurisdiction is a discretionary
power to be exercised to pass a judgment on the admissions of a party
without waiting for determination of all the issues. No doubt these powers
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 25 of 28
cannot be claimed as a right but must be exercised judiciously keeping in
mind that a judgment on admissions is a judgment which permanently
denies any remedy to the Defendant. However, unless the Defendants have
raised an objection which goes to the root of the case, discretion ought to be
exercised under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC.
33. A review of the Written Statement as has been filed by the
Respondent shows that the only real dispute raised in the Written Statement
is that Mrs. S.D. Malik had prior to the commencement of the tenancy
agreed to provide separate electricity meter, water motor and PNG meter
and stated that she would take care of the building. However, when the
Respondent shifted into the building, maintenance work was still pending
into the subject premises and the maintenance in respect of water pipeline,
sewage pipeline, PNG pipeline and repair of bathroom was yet to be
completed. It is the case of the Respondent that the maintenance work was
not completed. The Respondent has also raised the issue of previous pending
water bill of Rs. 1 lac and other pending bills for utilities which were not
paid by the Petitioner. It is also stated therein that the Respondent also had
to pay the old electricity bills too in view of a threat of disconnection of the
electricity meters by the authorities. The Respondent also sets out that the
Respondent had to spend money to get done repair and maintenance work in
the premises.
33.1 The Written Statement references to a police complaint made by the
Respondent against the Petitioner at PS Preet Vihar on 05.09.2020. In
addition, the Written Statement only sets out the denial of the averments in
the plaint without giving reasons there for. In the entire Written Statement,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 26 of 28
the Respondent repeatedly states that the landlord is Mrs. S.D. Malik and
either she or the care taker would come to collect the rent.
34. A careful perusal of the statement as recorded on 23.09.2023 under
Order X of the CPC also shows that there is no denial of the tenancy. It is
stated therein that the negotiations for the tenancy were done with Mrs. S.D.
Malik who put the Respondent in possession. The relevant extract of the
statement is set out below:
“The above stated address is that of the premises of the flat which was let
out to me, wherein I am residing presently. I have no acquaintance with the
plaintiff i.e., M/s Indoj Consultant Pvt. Ltd. or the director thereof, Shri
Inder Malik. I cannot say, if the plaintiff is the owner of the premises in
question. I had negotiated the tenancy with Smt. S.D. Malik, who put me
in the possession of the premises. I had paid rent upto December 2022 and
I am ready to pay the rent thereafter. The rent fixed is Rs. 20,000/- per
month, exclusive of electricity but inclusive of water charges. ”
[Emphasis supplied]
34.1 The statement also shows that the Respondent is not aware as to who
the Petitioner is but is only aware of Mrs. S.D. Malik who put him in
possession of the subject premises. Clearly, thus the only real issue raised in
the Written Statement was the fact that the expenses incurred by the
Respondent/tenant on repair and maintenance of the subject premises, have
not been paid by the Petitioner.
35. As discussed above, in the present case, the Respondent admits to
being a tenant; admits that the tenancy has expired by the efflux of time and
that there is no renewal. The rental is also not disputed. No dispute between
the Petitioner Company or inter se its Directors, Mrs. S.D. Malik has been
shown either as to ownership of the suit property. Thus, the issues that have
been set up in defence by the Respondent are such that it would not be
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 27 of 28
possible for him to succeed even if these were entertained, so far as concerns
the recovery of possession of the subject premises. No useful purpose will
thus be served if the matter goes to trial on the prayer for recovery of
possession. On the remaining issues, however, a trial would be required.
36. In view of the aforegoing discussions, this Court finds that the learned
Trial Court has erred in failing to exercise jurisdiction under Order XII Rule
6 of the CPC given the admissions which have been made by the
Respondent.
37. Accordingly, the Petitioner is entitled to possession of the subject
premises without going through the rigours of trial in terms of Order XII
Rule 6 of CPC.
38. The Petition is allowed. The Impugned Order is set aside. The suit
shall, however, continue for examination on the aspect of recovery of arrears
of rent and the mesne profits.
39. The parties shall appear before the learned Trial Court on the date
fixed for further proceedings. The Petitioner is at liberty to take appropriate
steps for withdrawal of the user charges deposited amount deposited before
this Court in terms of Order dated 21.02.2025. The Respondent shall
continue to deposit these charges until vacant physical possession of the
property is handed over.
40. The parties will act based on digitally signed copy of the Order.
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J
JULY 2, 2025/ g.joshi /pa
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HONEY ARORA
Signing Date:28.07.2025
16:27:39
C.R.P. 24/2024 Page 28 of 28