Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 118 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Shailesh Jasvantbhai & Anr.
RESPONDENT:
State of Gujarat & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/01/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 1494 of 2004)
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 119 OF 2006
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3908 of 2004)
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Of these two appeals, one is by the State of Gujarat and
the other by the victim of the crime. They assail correctness of
the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Gujarat
High Court. By the impugned judgment while upholding the
conviction recorded by the trial court the High Court reduced
the sentence to the period already undergone; but awarded
compensation to the victims.
Background facts in a nutshell are as under:
On 30th March, 2002, first information report was lodged
alleging that the respondents Pratapji and Jayantubha
(hereinafter referred to as accused by their respective names)
assaulted the informant Sameer Kumar and the appellant
Shailesh Jasvantbhai causing serious injuries. On the basis
of the information lodged, investigation was undertaken and
the accused persons were tried for alleged commission of
offence punishable under Sections 307,324, 504 read with
Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code,1860( in short the ’IPC’)
and section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. The trial court held
the accused persons to be guilty and sentenced each to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of
Rs.3,000/- with default stipulation for the offences punishable
under Sections 307 and 114 IPC. No separate sentence was
imposed for the offences punishable under Sections 324 and
114 IPC. The accused persons were, however, acquitted of the
charges relating to Section 504 IPC and Section 135 of the
Bombay Police Act. The incident as described in the first
information report and as unfolded during trial was that the
incident in question happened on 30th March, 2002 when
complainant Sameer Kumar and his friend appellant Shailesh
were standing near a pan shop situated on Bhabhar Highway.
After having their pans, both the accused came there and
asked the complainant to pay the charges for their pans. A
quarrel started as the complainant refused to accept the
demand of the accused. Thereafter at about 9.30 p.m. on the
next day, when complainant and his friend’s, Balmukund and
Shailesh were standing at the pan shop situated opposite a
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PCO, both the accused came there, each was armed with a
knief and started abusing the complainant. Accused No. 2
Jayantubha caught hold of the complainant and accused No.
1 Pratap gave knife blow on the right hand of the complainant.
He also gave another blow on the left hand of the complainant.
When the complainant shouted for help, appellant Shailesh
intervened. Both the accused diverted their attention to
Shailesh by inflicting blows with knife on him. Shailesh
sustained injury on the left side of the neck and fell down on
the ground. Thereafter Balmukund and Bharat also
intervened. Accused thereafter fled. Both the injured were
taken to Dr. Dhirajbhai (PW1) for the treatment who also
informed the police. The police thereafter recorded the
complaint and started investigation, submitted the
chargesheet against accused. Trial was held as accused
persons pleaded innocence. As noted above, the trial court
found them guilty and convicted and sentenced them. Trial
Court’s judgment was assailed before the High Court.
During the hearing of the appeal before the High Court
conviction was not questioned, but it was submitted that the
accused Pratapji had appeared in Standard X examination
before a week of the incident, the sentence was harsh, had the
likelihood of spoiling the careers of the accused persons. It
was, therefore, submitted that a lenient view should be taken
in the matter by providing adequate compensation to the
injured persons. The plea was resisted by the State. But the
High Court was of the view that even though the conviction
was not seriously questioned, the same was rightly so done
because the conviction was in order. However, it was held
that as both the accused persons were in prison and one of
them had appeared in Standard X examination, and had no
criminal antecedent the sentence was restricted to the period
already undergone i.e. for about two years with the fine of
Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand) which was to be paid as
compensation to the injured.
In support of the appeal learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that no sympathy or leniency should
have been shown to the accused persons. The order was
passed even without any notice to the injured persons who
would have shown as to how no leniency was warranted. The
factor which weighed with the High Court i.e. the accused
persons being student with no criminal antecedent had merely
no relevance. It was also factually not correct that the
accused persons had no criminal antecedent. In reality they
were involved in large number of similar cases.
Learned Counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned judgment.
The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting
claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the
people is an essential function of the State. It could be
achieved through instrumentality of criminal law.
Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law
must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are
required to mould the sentencing system to meet the
challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine
social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and
stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law
which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence.
Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of "order" should
meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his
"Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal law
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continues to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection of social
consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the
sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery
or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation
sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered
with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given
circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the
manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for
commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the
nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances
are relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration.
Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and
society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is,
therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in
which it was executed or committed etc. This position was
illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v.
State of Tamil Nadu (1991 (3) SCC 471).
The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the
culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily
allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a
sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that
reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised
by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that
punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice
sentences are determined largely by other considerations.
Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that
are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of
keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic
results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a
departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and
create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and
widespread.
Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal
respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it
remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences.
The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal
severity is now unknown in civilized societies, but such a
radical departure from the principle of proportionality has
disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for a
single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed.
Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any
serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration
that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from
those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable
when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly
disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable
practical consequences.
After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate
sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and
mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has
been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of
really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by
the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It
has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha
v. State of Callifornia (402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711) that no
formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a
reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate
punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may
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affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof
formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to
correctly assess various circumstances germane to the
consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in
the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment
may be equitably distinguished.
In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. (1994 (2) SCC
220), this Court has observed that shockingly large number of
criminals go unpunished thereby increasingly, encouraging
the criminal and in the ultimate making justice suffer by
weakening the system’s creditability. The imposition of
appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Court
responds to the society’s cry for justice against the criminal.
Justice demands that Courts should impose punishment
befitting the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence
of the crime. The Court must not only keep in view the rights
of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime
and the society at large while considering the imposition of
appropriate punishment.
Similar view has also been expressed in Ravji v. State of
Rajasthan (1996 (2) SCC 175). It has been held in the said
case that it is the nature and gravity of the crime but not the
criminal, which are germane for consideration of appropriate
punishment in a criminal trial. The Court will be failing in its
duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime
which has been committed not only against the individual
victim but also against the society to which the criminal and
victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must
not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent
with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been
perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public
abhorrence and it should "respond to the society’s cry for
justice against the criminal". If for extremely heinous crime of
murder perpetrated in a very brutal manner without any
provocation, most deterrent punishment is not given, the case
of deterrent punishment will loss its relevance. In State of M.P.
vs. Ghanshyam Singh (2003(8) SCC 13), Surjit Singh Vs.
Nahara Ram and Anr. (2004 (6) SCC 513) and State of M.P.
Vs. Munna Choubey and Anr. (2005 (2) SCC 710) the position
was again highlighted.
We find from the record that before learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Deesa an affidavit was filed by the sub
inspector of Police that accused Pratapji was involved in large
number of cases and details of nine cases were given.
Similarly it was stated that the accused no.2 Jayantubha, who
was an accomplice of accused no.1 was also involved in nine
cases. The trial court while dealing with the bail application
filed by the accused also noted about the pendency of the
cases. It further appears that during pendency of the trial the
bail granted to accused Pratapji was cancelled for breach of
conditions imposed by the court for grant of bail. These
aspects do not appear to have been considered by the High
Court. It proceeded on factually erroneous premises without
keeping in view correct principles relating to punishment.
Above being the position we set aside the impugned
judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to the High
Court for a fresh hearing on the question of sentence,
uninfluenced by any observation made in these appeals.
The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.