Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
VARIAVAN SARASWATHI AND ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
EACHAMPI THEVI AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/11/1992
BENCH:
[R.M. SAHAI AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.]
ACT:
Kerala Land Reform Act, 1964:
Section 4(A)(1)(a)- Acquisition of right of tenant-Junior
member of Tarwad redeeming mortgage and continuing in
possession of land for more than five years-Whether can be
deemed to be a mortgage- Whether can acquire the rights of
tenant.
HEADNOTE:
Two junior member of a Tarwad (somewhat like a joint
family) redeemed a mortgage executed in 1870 by the Karnavan
(akin to Manager) of the Tarwad. They paid the amount in
1886, got the property released, obtained possession and
they or their descendants continued in possession as such.
In 1967 a suit for partition was filed by sucessors, of
other members of the Tarwad, in whose favour equity of
redemption, of the suit land was transferred in a family
partition in 1962. The suit was resisted amongst others on
acquisition of right of tenant under section 4A(1)(a) of the
Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964.
The trial court and first appellate court held that the
junior members, as a result of getting the property
released, were holders of special right under
Marumakkathayam Law and they could not be held to be
mortgages and, therefore, they did not acquire any right
under the Land Reform Act.
The High Court, however, held that the junior member
being assignee of mortgage in possession for fifty years, on
the date the Kerala Land Reform Act, 1964, was amended and
Section 4(1)(a) was added by Amendment Act of 1969, were
entitled to rights as tenants, and thus, accepted the claim
of junior members, because the members of the Tarwad treated
the mortgage to be continuing on the date the suit was
filed. It also held that a junior member of the Tarwad,
paying off the debt of Tarwad, became a mortgagee of the
excess share in his own right.
Allowing the appeals of the sucessors of other members
of Tarwad, this Court,
HELD: 1. A co-mortgagor or a junior member of the
Tarwad who continued in possession over the excess share,
got redeemed by him, could not be deemed to be mortgagee so
as to acquire right under Section 4A(1)(a) of the Kerala
Land Reform Act, 1964. This position does not alter either
because during partition equity of redemption in respect of
property redeemed by junior members was transferred or
because in the plaint it was claimed that mortgages
subsisted. None of these actions could affect the operation
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of law. [425-D-E]
2.1 Mortgage is creation of an interest in the property
for payment of debt. Once the mortgage debt is discharged by
a person beneficially interested in equity of redemption,
the mortgage comes to an end by operation of law.
Consequently, the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee
cannot subsist. [423-E, F]
2.2 In law, the status of a person paying off debt to
secure the property either with consent of others or on own
volition is that the becomes the owner, entitle to hold and
possess the property. But, in equity the right is to hold
the property till he is reimbursed. In other words, the may
hold the property in surety or he may bring the claim for
contribution. Similarly, the co-mortgagor whose share has
been got redeemed is entitled, in equity, to get possession
over his share of property on payment of the amount of his
share. But these rights in equity, either in favour of the
person who discharge the debt or the person whose debt has
been discharged, do not result in resumption of relationship
of mortgagor and mortgagee. [423-F, G; 424-B]
2.3 A plain reading of Section 92 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 does not warrant a construction that the
substitutee become a mortgagee. The expression is ‘right as
the mortgagee’ and not right of mortgagee. The legislative
purpose was statutory recognition of the equitable right to
hold the property till the co-mortgagor was reimbursed. And
not to create relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee. The
section confers certain rights on co-mortgagor and provides
for the manner of its exercise as well. The rights are of
redemption, foreclosure and sale. And the manner of exercise
is as mortgagee. The word, ‘as’ means, ‘in the manner
prescribed’. [425-B-C]
2.4 A co-mortgagor in possession of excess share
redeemed by him can thus enforce his claim against non-
redeeming mortgagor by exercising rights or foreclosure or
sale as is exercised by mortgagee under section 67 of the
Transfer of Property Act. But that does not make him
mortgagee.
[426-C-D]
Raghavan Nair v. Anandavally Amma, 1986 K.L.T. 623,
approved.
Kochuni v. State of Madras Kerala, A.I.R. 1960 S.C.
1080; Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Pershad, [1953] S.C.R. 243 and
Valliamma Champaka Pillay v. Sivathanu Pillay & Ors., [1980]
1 S.C.R. 354, referred to .
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8244 of
1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.7.1980 of the
Kerala High Court in Second Appeal No. 171 of 1976.
E.M.S. Anam of the Appellants
N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.M. SAHAI, J. Whether a junior member of the Tarwad,
in Kerala, who redeems the mortgage and is in possession for
more than 50 years is a ‘mortgagee holding the land
comprised in a mortgage’ so as to acquire rights of tenant
of tenant under Section 4(A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act,
is the legal issue that arises for consideration in this
appeal, by successors of other members of the Tarwad who
suit for partition was dismissed in second appeal by the
High Court.
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In the year 1045 (1870) a mortgage was executed by the
Karnavan (akin to Manager) of the Tarwad, (somewhat like a
joint family). Two junior members, of the Tarwad, paid the
amount in the year 1061 (1886), got the property released,
obtained possession and they or their descendants continued
in possession as such. In 1967 a suit for partition was
filed by sucessors, of other member of the Tarwad, in whose
favour equity of redemption, of the land in suit, was
transferred in a family partition in 1962.
The suit was resisted amongst others on acquisition of right
of tenant under Section 4(1)(a) of the Land Reforms Act.
Since there was no dispute on basic facts, namely,
redemption of mortgage by two junior members and their
continuance in possession for more than fifty years on the
date Section 4(1)(a) was added to the Land Reforms Act the
rights of parties were decided, more, as a matter of law.
According to the trial court and first appellate court the
junior members, as a result of getting the property
released, were holder of special right under Marumakkathayam
Law. They could not be held to be mortgagee, therefore, they
did not acquire any right under the Land Reforms Act. But
the High Court held otherwise, mainly because in 1962 when
the Tarwad was partitioned the property was treated as under
mortgage since equity of redemption for the same was given
to the plaintiff-appellant. It was found that, even, in the
plaint it was averred that in consequence of release the
mortgagee right vested in the predecessor of defendants who
were junior members of the Tarwad. The High Court,
therefore, held that the defendants being assignee of
mortgage in possession for fifty years, on the date the Land
Reforms Act was amended and Section 4(1)(a) was added by
Act XXXV of 1969, were entitled to rights as tenants.
The High Court, thus, accepted the claim of defendants
because the member of the Tarwad treated the mortgage to be
continuing on the date the suit was filed. This, apart, it
was held that junior member of the Tarwad paying off the
debt of Tarwad becomes a mortgagee of the excess share in
his own right. But this enunciation, of law, was not
accepted, as correct by a division bench of the Kerala High
Court itself in Raghavan Nair v. Anandavally Amma, 1986 KLT
623. The question, therefore, is if a junior member of the
Tarwad who redeems the properly, and gets release, is holder
of special right only or he steps into the shoes of
mortgagee.
Nature of right of a junior member in the Tarwad, a family
corporation, in which every member male or female possesses
equal right has been explained by this Court in Kochuni v.
States of Madras & Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 at 1099, thus:-
" The incidents of a tarwad are so
well-settled that it is not
necessary to consider the case-law,
but it would be enough if the
relevant passages from the book
"Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law" by
Sundara Aiyar are cited. The
learned author says at p.7 thus:
"The joint family in a
Marumakkathayam Nayar tarwad
consists of a mother and her male
and female children, and the
children of those female children,
and so on. The issue of the male
children do not belong to their
tarwad but to the tarwad of their
consorts. The property belonging to
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the tarwad is the property of all
the males and females that compose
it. Its affairs are administered by
one of those persons, usually the
eldest male, called the karnavan.
The individual members are not
entitled to enforce partition,
but a partition may be effected by
common consent. The rights of the
junior members are stated to be (1)
if males, to succeed to management
in their turn, (2) to be
maintained at the family house,
(3) to object to an improper
alienation or administration of the
family property, (4) to see that
the property is duly conserved,
(5) to bar an adoption, and (6) to
get a share at any partition that
may take place. These are what may
be called effective rights.
Otherwise everyone is a proprietor
and has equal rights."
One of the rights according to this decision which
vests in the junior member is to see that the property is
duly conserved. Such a right, obviously, includes a right to
redeem the property by paying the debts outstanding against
the Tarwad. It is an incidence of co-ownership or co-
proprietorship which flows from the nature of Tarwad. But
whether the person who thus conserves the property steps
into shoes of mortgagee and holds the same rights and
interests or he is a surety holding the property on behalf
of the Tarwad subject to right of contribution has to be
decided on general principles of mortgage as the customary
law of Tarwad does not throw any light on it. Mortgage has
been defined in Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act
as transfer of an interest in specific immovable property
for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced.
The definition brings out clearly the nature of mortgage. It
was understood and followed in same sense, even, before the
Act came into force. In Gopal v. Parsotam 1883 5 All. 121.
137 F.B. it was observed :
"Mortgage as understood in this
country cannot be defined better
than by the definition adopted by
the Legislature in section 58 of
the Transfer of Property Act (IV of
1882). That definition has not in
any way altered the law, but, on
the contrary, has only formulated
in clear language the notions of
mortgage as understood by all the
writers of text-books on Indian
mortgages. Every word of the
definition is borne out by the
decisions of lndian Courts of
Justice."
It was not different where customary law prevailed.
Even in customary Marumakkathayam Law, governing section of
people inhabiting the West Coast, the law of mortgage was
understood in no different sense.
Since the transfer in a mortgage is, only, of interest
and not of the entire right and title, as takes place in
sale, the mortgagor and the mortgagee can transfer or assign
their interest. A mortgagor may assign or transfer the
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equity of redemption or may even create second mortgage.
Similarly a mortgagee may assign his interest or create
another mortgage. What happens when a mortgagee assigns his
interest in favour of another person? Since an assignor can
pass interest that he has, the assignee becomes holder of
the same interest that a mortgagee has. In other words, he
steps into the shoes of the mortgagee. Can the same be said
where a co-mortgagor or anyone on behalf of mortgagor
authorised under law, pays the amount and brings to an end
the interest the mortgagee had? Mortgage is creation of an
interest in the property for payment of debt. Once the
mortgage debt is discharged by a person beneficially
interested in equity of redemption the mortgage comes to an
end by operation of law. Consequently the relationship of
mortgagor and mortgagee cannot subsist. What then is the
status of a person paying off debt to secure the property
either with consent of others or on own volition? In law he
becomes the owner, entitled to hold and possess the
property. But in equity the right is to hold the property
till he is reimbursed. In other words, he may hold the
property in surety or he may bring the claim for
contribution. In Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Pershad, [1953[ SCR
243, it was held;-
"....Equity insists on the ultimate
payment of a debt by one who in
justice and good conscience is
bound to pay it and it is well
recognised that where there are
several joint debtors, the person
making the payment is a principal
debtor as regards the part of the
liability he is to discharge and a
surety in respect of the shares of
the rest of the debtors...."
Similarly the co-mortgagor whose share has been got
redeemed is entitled, in equity, to get possession over his
share of property on payment of the amount of his share. In
Valliamma Champaka Pillay v. Sivathanu Pillay & Ors.,
[1980] I SCR 354 the principle was explained thus:
"From what has been said above it
was clear that where the Transfer
of Property Act is not in force and
a mortgage with possession is made
by two persons, one of whom only
redeems discharging the whole of
the common mortgage debt, he will,
in equity, have two distinct
rights: Firstly, to be subrogated
to the rights of the mortgagee
discharged, vis-a-vis the non-
redeeming co-mortgagor, including
the right to get into possession of
the latters portion or share of the
hypotheca. Secondly, to recover
contribution towards the excess
paid by him on the security of that
portion or share of the hypotheca,
which belonged not to him but to
the other co-mortgagor. It follows
that where one co-mortgagor gets
the right to contribution against
the other co-mortgagor by paying
off the entire mortgage debt, a co
related right also accrues to the
latter to redeem his share of the
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property and get its possession on
payment of his share of the
liability to the former. This
corresponding right of the ’ non-
redeeming’ co-mortgagor, to pay his
share of the liability and get
possession of his property from the
redeeming co-mortgagor, subsists
as long as the latter’s right to
contribution subsists "
But these rights in equity, either in favour of the
person 2who discharges the debt or the person whose debt has
been discharged, do not result in resumption of relationship
of mortgagor and mortgagee. Even under subrogation, a legal
concept, meaning substitution, applied, on English Law
principle, even earlier, inserted now as Section 92 in
Transfer of Property Act since 1929, the rights that are
created in favour of a co-mortgagor as a result of
discharge of debt are ’so far as regards redemption,
foreclosure or sale of such property, the same rights as
the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems’. What is the
meaning of expression ’right as mortgagee’? Does a person
who, in equity, gets subrogated becomes mortgagee? Or his
rights are confined to foreclosure or sale? A plain reading
of the section does not warrant a construction that the
substitutee becomes a mortgagee. The expression is, ’right
as the mortgagee’ and not right of mortgagee. The
legislative purpose was statutory recognition of the
equitable right to hold the property till the co-mortgagor
was reimbursed. And not to create relationship of mortgagor
and mortgagee. The section confers certain rights on co-
mortgagor and provides for the manner of its exercise as
well. The rights are of redemption, foreclosure and sale.
And the manner of exercise is as mortgagee. The word, ’as’
according to Black’s Legal Dictionary means, ’in the manner
prescribed’. Thus a co-mortgagor in possession, of excess
share redeemed by him, can enforce his claim against non-
redeeming mortgagor by exercising rights of foreclosure or
sale as is exercised by mortgagee under section 67 of the
Transfer of Property Act. But that does not make him
mortgagee. Therefore, a co-mortgagor or a Junior member of
the Tarwad who continued in possession over the excess
share, got redeemed by him, could not be deemed to be
mortgagee so as to acquire right under Section 4A(1)(a) of
the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
Legal position explained above does not alter either
because during partition equity of redemption in respect of
property redeemed by junior members was transferred or
because in the plaint it was claimed that mortgage
subsisted. None of these actions could effect the operation
of law.
In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The
judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the
order of the trial court decreeing the suit for partition
is restored. Parties shall bear their own costs.
N.P.V.
Appeals allowed.
STATE bank of india and anr.
v.
V. PARTHASARATHY ETC.
NOVEMBER 9, 1992
[KULDIP SINGH AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]
Civil Services:
State Bank of India-Promotion to the post of Head Clerk-
Circular No. 42-Clause Three options-Outside the city-within
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city and within the same office-Debarment on refusal of
third and final offer-Local Head Office and five other
offfices to be considered as one Unit-Final offer made in
one such office Whether valid and debars the optees
permanently on refusal to accept.
The appellant-Bank issued Circular No. 42 containing an
understanding reached with the Staff-union laying down the
policy for promotion of clerks to the post of Head Clerks.
As per clause 1(d) of the Circular the employees who decline
to accept Head Clerk s post at a branch office outside the
city in which they work, will have a further option when a
vacancy arises at any one of the Bank’s offices within that
city. However, this was subject to the condition that at the
material time there was no other senior employee who had
similarly declined the post outside his branch office, in
which case the senior-most would have the first choice. It
was further provided that if an employee declines to accept
the post of Head Clerk at an office within the same city,
his case would be considered only when a vacancy arises at
his office. This was also subject to the condition that
there was no senior employee similarly situated at the
material time. If the third and final offer is declined,
there would be a permanent debarment of promotion.
Since there were six offices at the Madras Local Head
Office, a common seniority was maintained and all the six
offices were considered as one office, viz. local Head
Office of which the other five offices were only parts.
The Respondents declined their first, second and final
offers, though indisputably the final offer was made to them
for being posted in an office forming part of the local Head
Office. Both the Respondents moved the High Court by way of
Writ Petitions and the High Court took the view that the
final offer made was not in the same office and so they were
entitled to be posted as Head Clerks in the same office.
Being aggrieved by the said two decisions of the High
Court, the appellant-Bank preferred the present appeals.
On the question of interpretation of clause 1(d) of the
circular in question:
Allowing the appeals, this Court,
HELD :1. The High Court’s interpretation of cl. 1(d) of
the Circular that the third offer made was not in the office
where the Respondents were working and therefore their
refusal to accept the post did not exhaust the third option
and they were entitled to be posted as Head Clerks in the
Office where they were working is incorrect in view of the
fact that the local Head Office was split into six different
offices which together constituted one unit. By refusing to
accept the third and final offer, the Respondents had
clearly exhausted all the three options and had become
permanently debarred from seeking promotion to the post of
Head Clerk. [366-E-G]
2. This Court does not intend to interfere with the
appointment of the respondents to the post of Head Clerk in
the Regional Office in the facts and circumstances of these
matters which show that in one case a fortuitous appointment
had arisen due to death of an employee within almost a month
of the Respondent’s refusal to accept the offer, and in the
other case, the Respondent has already been accommodated in
the post of Head Clerk in the Regional Office itself.
However, this would not be treated as a precedent and this
would not affect the interpretation of clause 1(d) of the
Circular, placed by this Court. [366-H; 367-A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4799
4800 of 1992.
From the Judgments dated 4.3.1992 and 8.4.1992 in
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Madras High Court in W.P. No. 246/92 and W.A. No. 349 of
1992.
G. Ramaswamy Attorney General, K. Sankaran, A.
Rangananthan and A.V. Rangam for the Appellants.
M.K. Ramamurthi, M.A. Krishnmoorthy, M.A. Chinnaswamy,
H. Subramaniam and Ms. C. Ramamurthi for the Respondents.
Rajendra Sachhar, Ambrish Kumar and M.D. Pandey for the
Inter-vener.
The Order of the Court was delivered:
Intervention application is allowed.
Leave granted.
Civil Appeal No. 4799 of 1992.
2. The controversy in this case is in a narrow compass.
The appellant-Bank issued Staff Circular No. 42 containing
an understanding reached with the Bank staff-union laying
down the policy for promotion of clerks to the post of Head
Clerks. Clause 1(d) of the said circular states as follows:
Employees who decline to accept
Head Clerk’s post at a Branch
Office outside their place of
service, i.e., outside their city,
will again be offered the
appointment only when a vacancy
arises at any one of the offices
within that city, provided that at
the material time there is no other
senior employees at that office who
had earlier declined a posting
outside his Branch, as a Head Clerk
in which case the senior-most
employee will first be offered the
appointment. Also, if an employee
declines to accept the post of a
Head Clerk at an office within the
same city, his case for appointment
as Head-Clerk will be considered
only when a vacancy arises at his
office, in the order of his
seniority. His case cannot be
considered for a vacancy at any of
the other offices in the city."
3. It will be apparent from the above provision of the
said clause that those employees who decline to accept the
Head Clerk’s post at a branch office which is outside the
city in which they work will have a further option. Such
employees would be offered the post of Head Clerk again but
only when a vacancy arises at any one of the Bank’s offices
within that city. This is of course subject to the condition
that at the material time, there is no other senior employee
who had similarly declined the post outside his branch
office, in which case, the senior-most would have the first
choice. The further provision of this rule and with which we
are concerned in the present case is as follows. If an
employee declines to accept the post of Head Clerk at an
office within the same city his case for appointment as Head
Clerk would be considered only when a vacancy arises at his
office. This is also subject to the condition that there is
no senior employee similarly situated at the material time.
If the third and the final offer for the post of Head Clerk
is declined, there is a permanent debarment of the
promotion. One more thing necessary to be stated before we
come to the facts of the present case is that the appellant-
Bank has a local Head Office at Madras. In 1972, it was
split into two - the local Head Office and Madras Main
Branch. In 1976-77, there was a further splitting up of the
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local Head Office and the Main Branch and ultimately in
1979, the Madras Local Head Office was divided into
following six offices as part of the same Head Office:
"(i) Local Head Office
(ii) Madras Main Branch
(iii) Overseas Branch
(iv) Regional Office, which is
called Zonal Office
(v) The Commercial Branch
(vi) Siruthozhil Branch"
4. There is no dispute that as far as the Clerks and
the Head Clerks in all the six parts of the same local Head
Office are concerned, a common seniority list is maintained.
The effect of the aforesaid arrangements for the purposes of
the clause 1(d) is that "the employees" in the said clause
means the employees in all the said six parts of the local
Head Office. In other words, if a vacancy for a Head Clerk
occurred at any of the said six offices, it was considered
to be a vacancy in one office, viz.,the local Head Office of
which the other five offices were only parts.
5. It appears that respondent Parthasarathy was working
as a clerk in the Madras Regional Office (now called Zonal
Office) which is, as will be clear from above, a part of the
Local Head Office itself. On 21st August, 1973, he was
offered the post of Head Clerk at Deva Kottain which is
outside Madras city. This offer was declined by him. On 1st
July, 1980, he was offered the post of Head Clerk in the
Sowkarpet branch office in the same city which was less than
2 kms, from his Regional office where he was working. He
declined the said offer too. He was then entitled to be
considered for posting as Head Clerk only in his office
which meant in any of the six parts of the local Head
Office, that being the third and the final offer that could
be made to him. The third offer was made to him for the
post of Head Clerk at the Overseas branch, and that being
part of the same local Head Office, he was bound to accept
it. However, he declined the third and the final offer also,
and issued a lawyer’s notice to the Bank contending that the
Overseas branch was different from the Regional office where
he was working and, therefore, the offer given to him was
contrary to the said clause 1(d). The allegations made in
the notice were of course denied by the bank.
6. On 6th September, 1983, one A. Nizamuddin who was
working as Head Clerk in the Regional office passed away and
that post became vacant. On 24th September, 1983, the
respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court for
quashing the third and the final offer made to him on 4th
August 1983, and for a direction for posting him in the
Regional office where the vacancy had occurred. The High
Court took the view that the third offer made was not for
the post of the Head Clerk in the same office where the
respondent was working and, therefore, his refusal to accept
the post did not exhaust the third option and he was
entitled to the vacancy created by Nizamuddin’s death in the
Regional office where the respondent was working. We are
afraid this interpretation is incorrect in view of the
position explained above with regard to the local Head
Office which was split into six different offices which
together constituted one unit. The respondent, when he was
offered the third option in the Overseas branch, was offered
the post in the same office where he was working, the
Regional office being as much a part of the Head Office as
the Overseas branch. By refusing to accept the said third
and the final offer, the respondent had clearly exhausted
all his three options and had become permanently debarred
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from seeking promotion to the post of Head Clerk.
7. We, however, do not interfere with the appointment
of the respondent to the post of Head Clerk in the Regional
office in the facts and circumstances of the case which show
that a fortuitous appointment had arisen within almost a
month of his refusal to accept the offer. This, however,
will not be treated as a precedent nor does it affect the
interpretation that we have placed on the clause 1(d) as
above.
Civil Appeal No. 4800 of 1992
In this case also, the respondent Sampath was working
as a Clerk in Madras Regional Office. The first offer of the
post of Head Clerk was made to him on 6th August, 1973 at
Mudukulathur branch which is in Madras city. This was
declined by him. On 12th May, 1980, he was given the second
offer for the post of Head Clerk at Air Force Station
branch, Tambaram which was in Madras city. The third and
final offer was made to him on 4th August, 1983 to the post
of Head Clerk in the Stationery department of the Madras
Local Head Office. There is no dispute that Stationery
department of the Local Head Offfice and the Regional Office
form part of one unit, viz., Madras Local Head Office. The
respondent declined this offer as well, and on 23rd January,
1984 filed a writ petition in the High Court for quashing
the third offer and for posting him in his office, viz.,
Regional Office as the Head Clerk. The learned Single Judge
of the High Court quashed the order making the third offer
and allowed the petition following the earlier decision in
Parthasarathy’s case with which we have dealt with earlier.
The Division Bench of the High Court also confirmed the
order.
For the reasons we have given in C.A.No. 4799 of 1992,
we are unable to accept the interpretation given by the
High Court on clause 1(d) of Staff Circular No. 42. However,
if in the present case, the respondent has already been
accommodated in the post of Head Clerk in the Regional
Office itself, we do not intend to interfere with the same.
It is nonetheless made clear that it is the interpretation
that we have placed on the said clause that will prevail and
not the interpretation placed by the High Court.
With these observations, the appeals are allowed only
to the extent that the interpretation placed by the
appellant-Bank on clause l(d) of the Staff Circular No. 42
is correct and the decision of the High Court on the point
is incorrect. There will be no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeals allowed