Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
Dr. P K JAISWAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
Ms. DEBI MUKHERJEE AND ORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT07/01/1992
BENCH:
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
BENCH:
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 749 1992 SCR (1) 1
1992 SCC (2) 148 JT 1992 (1) 315
1992 SCALE (1)120
ACT:
Service Law : Assistant Director General (Prevention of
food Adulteration)-Recruitment to-Requisition to Union
Public Service Commission-Whether Government can withdraw
before process of selection commences.
HEADNOTE:
The Union government sent a requisition to the Union
Public Service Commission for selection of a candidate to
post of Assistant Director General (Prevention of Food
Adulteration)in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
which, under the extant rules, was to be filled in only by
direct recruitment. However, before the Commission could
advertise the post,the Government informed it not to proceed
with the process of selection as it was examining to fill up
the post by promotion of Assistant Secretary. But inspite of
this,the commission Advertised the post and the appellant
was called for an interview where upon Respondent No.1, an
Assistant Secretary who was expecting her promotion to the
post on amendment of the rules,obtained an interim order
from Central Administrative Tribunal, staying the process of
selection initiated by the Commission. The appellant,
feeling affected by the said order, unsuccessfully moved the
Tribunal for impleadment.Meanwhile two further layers above
that of Assistant Secretary, though in higher pay-scales but
with no separate designations, were created by an amendment
of rules in pursuance of this Court’s direction, The
Tribunal disposed of the application directing to provide
promotional avenues to Respondent No.1 who, while
functioning as Assistant Secretary, had also occasionally
held the charge of Assistant Director General. Aggrieved,
the appellant preferred the appeal by special leave to this
Court.
It was contended by the appellant that once the process
for selection had started, it was not open to the Government
as well as to the Tribunal to freeze the process and the
Commission was entitled to complete the selection; and that
the fact of creation of two layers by the amendment of the
rules was wrongly overlooked by the Tribunal.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
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HELD : 1.1 If the Government is at a given point of time
considering the question of amending the recruitment rules
with a view to providing for promotion to a particular post,
it can, before an advertisement is issued by the Commission
and the process of the selection is under way, request the
Commission to withhold the same till it decides on the
question of amending the the rules. (p.5E-F)
1.2 Whether to provide for promotion as a mode of
appointment to the post in question is a matter of policy
left to the government to decide.(p.6AB)
1.3 Once the decision of the Government to withdraw
the repuisition was communicated to the Commission before it
had set the process of selection in motion by issuing an
advertisement, it was not open to the Commission to go ahead
with the selection process as the Government could amend the
recruitment rules retrospectively, if it so desired, with a
view to providing for appointment by promotion .Such an
exercise by the Commission would be one in futility, waste
of public time and money and hardship to candidates who seek
appointment.(pp.5GH;6A)
The action of the Commission was somewhat hasty and
unjustified.(p.6B)
2.1 If the Commission issues an advertisement at the
behest of the Government and pursuant thereto calls a
candidate for interview, the candidate has a right to be
considered for selection but not a right to be selected or
to appointment to the post in question.The right to
selection crystalises only after the candidate is called for
interview pursuant to the advertisement.(p.5 C-D)
N.T. Devin Katti & Ors. v. Karnataka Public Service
Commission & Ors.(1990) 3 SCC 157 and Jatinder Kumar &
Ors.v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1985)1 SCR 899, referred to.
2.2 In the instant case, the decision of the Government
to withdraw the requisition sent to the Commission before
the issuance of the advertisement dose not interfere with
any vested right of selection because that stage had yet not
reached.(p.5F)
2.3 Before the appellant acquired a right to be
considered for selection the Government had already
intimated that it was examining the question of amending the
recruitment rules with a view to providing for appointment
by promotion to the post in question. (p.5G)
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2.4 The appellant, therefore, cannot claim any vested
right. Nor can the tribunal’s omission to notice that two
new layers were created have a bearing on the Government’s
decision to place the process of selection in hibernation
till a final decision is taken on the proposal to provide
for promotion to the post. (p.6BC)
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 138 of 1992
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.1991 of the Central
Administrative Tribunal,Principal Bench, New Delhi in
O.A.No. 1177 of 1987.
G.D. Gupta and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Appellant.
K.T.S. Tulsi, Hemant Sharma and Vijay K.Mehta for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AHMADI, J. Special leave granted.
Heard counsel on both sides. The facts giving rise to this
appeal, briefly stated, are as under :
One MR.Jaisani, a direct recruit, was holding the post of
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Assistant Director General (prevention of Food Adulteration)
in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the
Government of India. On his passing away sometime in july
1989, a vacancy arose which was required to be filled under
the extant recruitment rules. The recruitment rules which
were then in operation provided for the said post being
filled in by direct recruitment only. A requisition was sent
to the Union Public Service Commission (Commission’
hereafter) sometime in November, 1989, for selection of a
candidate for filling in the vacancy in question.
However, before the Commission could advertise the
post, the Union Government informed the Commission by letter
dated December 29, 1989 received by the Commission on
January 1, 1990 not to proceed with the process of selection
it was examining the question of opening up an avenue for
promotion from Assistant Secretary to the post in question
Notwithstanding the said communication, the commission
advertised the post in January 1990, The appellant applied
for the same and was called for an interview on December
13,1990. Thereupon the first respondent, Mrs. Debi
Mukherjee,who was then serving as Assistant Secretary, and
was hoping to be promoted as Assistant Director General on
the amendment of
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the recruitment rules approached the Central Administrative
Tribunal. New Delhi and obtained an interim order staying
the process of selection initiated by the Commission. It may
here be mentioned that in the meantime two further layers
above that of Assistant Secretary came to be created
providing for higher pay-scales by an amendment of the rules
pursuant to the directions given by this Court in Writ
petition No. 1118/89 read with the directions in the
Contempt Petition No. 5/90 dated May 4, 1990. The two layers
thus created provided for higher pay-scales but no separate
designations. The question regarding the appointment to the
vacancy created on the demise of Jaisani, however, had still
to be dealt with. The appellant who was affected by the
Tribuanl’s Order approached for impleadment/intervention but
the Tribunal did not allow the same although we are told
that the Tribunal gave a hearing to the counsel for the
appellant. The Tribunal ultimately disposed of the petition
with a direction to the concerned Ministry to provide
promotional avenues to the applicant who had functioned in
the post of Assistant Secretary for several years and had
held the charge of Assistant Director General as and when
the occasion arose. Three months’ time was granted to the
concerned Ministry to carry out the directions. The failure
to carry out the directions had led to the filing of a
Contempt Application also.
The grievance of the appellant is two-fold. Firstly, he
contends that once the process for selection had started it
was not open to the Government as well as the Tribunal to
freeze the process and the Commission was entitled to
complete the selection. The second point urged was that the
fact of the creation of tow layers by the amendment of the
relevant rules had been totally over-looked by the Tribunal
even though its attention was drawn to the same by counsel
for the appellant.
In support of the first contention, strong reliance was
placed on the decision of this Court in N.T. Devin Katti &
Ors. v. Karnataka Public Service Commission & Ors. [1990] 3
SCC 157. In that case this Court observed that a candidate
who is eligible and otherwise qualified in accordance with
the relevant rules and the terms of the advertisement
acquires a vested right of being considered for selection in
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accordance with the rules as they existed at the date of
advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right
on the amendment of rules during the pendency of selection
unless the amended rules are retrospective in nature. While
making these observations, it was made clear that a
candidate on making an application for a post pursuant to an
advertisement does not acquire any vested right of selection
or of appointment to the post in question. This is obvious
from the ratio of this Court’s decision in Jatinder Kumar &
Ors., [1985] 1 SCR 899. In that case, it was clarified that
an independent body like the
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Commission is established to ensure selection of best
available talent for appointment to the post in question to
avoid arbitrariness and nepotism in the matter of
appointment. The selection has to be made by the Commission
and on the basis thereof the Government has to fill up the
post adhering to the order of merit drawn up by the
Commission. This Court emphasised that the selection by the
Commission is only recommendary in nature and the final
authority for appointment is the Government, and if the
Government declined to accept the recommendation the
Constitution enjoins the Government to place on the table of
the legislature its reasons and report for so doing. Thereby
the Government is made answerable to the elected
representatives under the Constitution. This however, does
not clothe the selectee with any right to appointment that
is to say that he cannot force the Government to accept the
recommendation of the Commission but the Government has to
make the appointment strictly in accordance with the
recruitment rules and merits as determined by the Commission
and it cannot disturb the list at its sweet will. Nor can
the Government appoint a person whose name does not appear
in the list. It is obvious from the ratio of these two
decisions to which our attention was pointedly drawn that if
the Commission issued an advertisement at the behest of the
Government and pursuant thereto calls a candidate for
interviews, the candidate has a right to be considered for
selection but not a right to be selected or to appointment
to the post in question. The right to selection crystalises
only after the candidate is called for interview pursuant to
the advertisement. But in the instant case the question is
whether the Government can withdraw the requisition sent to
the Commission for initiating the process of selection
because at the point of time no right had crystalised in
anyone for being considered for selection. If the Government
is at a given point of time considering the question of
amending the recruitment rules with a view to providing for
promotion to the post in question, the Government can before
an advertisement is issued by the Commission and the process
of selection is under way request the Commission to withdraw
the same till it decides on the question of amending the
rules. The decision of the Government to withdraw the
requisition sent to the Commission in NOVEMBER 1989 before
the issuance of the advertisement does not interfere with
any vested right of selection because that stage had yet not
reached. In the instant case, that is exactly what happened.
Therefore, before the appellant acquired a right to be
considered for selection the Government had already
intimated that it was examining the question of amending the
recruitment rules with a view to providing for appointment
by promotion to the post in question. Once this decision was
communicated to the Commission before it had set the process
of selection in motion by issuing an advertisement, it was
not open to the Commission to insist that it will go ahead
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with the selection process as the extant rule provided for
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promotion by direct recruitment and the Government could
amend the recruitment rules retrospectively, if it so
desired, with a view to providing for appointment by
promotion. Such an exercise by the Commission would be an
exercise in futility, waste of public time and money and
hardship to candidates who seek appointment. Whether to
provide for promotion as a mode of appointment to the post
in question is a matter of policy left to the Government to
decide and if it desired that the selection process should
be held in abeyance till the question was examined and a
final decision was taken thereon, it was not open to the
Commission to ignore the communication of the Government in
that behalf and proceed to set the selection process in
motion. We think the action of the Commission was somewhat
hasty and unjustified. The appellant, therefore, cannot
claim any vested right as urged by his learned counsel. Nor
can the Tribunal’s omission to notice that two new layers
were created have a bearing on the Government’s decision to
place the process of selection in hibernation till a final
decision is taken on the proposal to provide for promotion
to the post.
For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the
decision reached by the Tribunal does not require any
interference at our hands in exercise of the power under
Article 136 of the Constitution. Hence, the appeal fails and
is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.
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