Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.98009801 OF 2010
Krishna Kumar Rawat & Ors. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors. …Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No.9901 2010
Union of India & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Mithlesh Kumari & Ors. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHOK RAJ SINGH
Date: 2019.07.29
18:00:10 IST
Reason:
1
C.A. Nos.98009801/2010
1. These appeals are directed against the final
judgment and order dated 31.05.2007 passed by the
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at
Jaipur in D.B. Special Appeal No.744 of 1994 whereby
the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
special appeal filed by the appellants herein and the
final judgment and order dated 24.07.2007 in D.B.
Civil Review Petition No.80 of 2007 by which the
review petition arising out of SA 744/94 was also
dismissed.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in
these appeals, it is necessary to set out the relevant
facts infra.
3. The appellants are the writ petitioners whereas
the respondents are the respondents of the writ
petition out of which these appeal arise.
2
4. The dispute relates to a land measuring around
9500 sq. yards/7945 sq. meters along with two
Godowns (Nos.13 and 14) and certain other structures
standing thereon, which are part of Khasra No. 126
situated in village Durgapur, Tahsil Sanganeer, Jaipur
(hereinafter referred to as the "suit land”).
5. OneSmt. Mithilesh Kumari [respondent No. 3
herein (since deleted)] and Smt. Krishna Kumari
Roongta jointly owned the suit land. The suit land
then became a property of a firm called M/s Rajasthan
Industrial Company, which consisted of several
partners along with Smt. Mithilesh Kumari and Smt.
Krishna Kumari Roongta. This partnership was later
dissolved by a dissolution deed dated 31.03.1986
executed by the partners. In terms of the dissolution
th
deed, two godowns (Nos.13 and 14) together with 1/4
undivided share in the suit land fell to the share of
Smt. Mithilesh Kumari.
3
6. On 11.11.1993, the appellants (prospective
buyers) herein entered into an agreement with Smt.
Mithilesh Kumari for purchase of the suit land for a
total consideration of Rs.99,84,500/ (Rs. 1051/ per
sq. yard). The appellants paid a sum of Rs.40,00,000/
to Smt. Mithilesh Kumari towards the advance for
purchase of the suit land. According to the appellants,
they were placed in possession of the two godowns and
other structures standing on the suit land. So far as
th
1/4 land was concerned, the appellants were given
symbolical possession of the suit land.
7. The appellants then furnished the information
about the purchase of the suit land in accordance with
the requirements of Section 269UC of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) to the
appropriate authority in Form No. 37 and submitted
the copy of the agreement dated 11.11.1993.
8. The valuation officer of the Income Tax
Department vide his letter dated 18.01.1994 informed
4
the appellants that he would inspect the suit land on
21.01.1994. He also sought certain information from
the appellants in relation to the suit land. The
valuation officer then made an inspection of the suit
land and submitted his report to the appropriate
authority.
9. The appropriate authority, on receipt of the
report, issued a show cause notice on 08.03.1994 to
the appellants under Section 269 UD (1A) of the Act
stating therein that the apparent sale consideration, as
disclosed by the appellants in the sale agreement, was
on lower side for various reasons and that, as a matter
of fact, the value of the suit land was much higher
than the agreed rate specified in the agreement.
10. It was mentioned in the show cause notice dated
08.03.1994 that the Jaipur Development Authority on
07.11.1992 had sold a plot of land at A90 Triveni
Nagar, Near Durga Pura Railway Station in auction at
the rate of Rs.1781/ per sq. meter. It was pointed out
5
that if an adjustment of 5% is made towards less
development whereas 10% is allowed on account of
large size of the suit land and further 12% is allowed
on account of time gap, the rate of the suit land would
work out to Rs.1692/ per sq. meter, i.e.,
Rs.1,34,39,556/ as against the agreed value of
Rs.99,84,568/. It was further pointed out that the
value determined by the appropriate authority at
Rs.1,34,39,556/ does not include the value of existing
two godowns nor it takes into account the commercial
potential of the suit land.
11. It was thus pointed out that after taking into
consideration all these aspects, the value of the suit
land would still be higher than what was agreed
between the parties in the agreement and what the
appropriate authority has determined. The show cause
notice, therefore, concluded in saying as to why pre
emptive purchase order, as envisaged by Section 269
UD (1) of the Act, be not made against the appellants
6
in relation to the suit land. The appellants were asked
to file reply to the show cause notice.
12. The appellants (prospective buyers) and the
vendor (R3) filed their respective replies to the show
cause notice. According to them, firstly, comparison of
small developed plot of land in Triveni Nagar with the
suit land for determination of the value of the suit land
was not justified; Second, development of land would
need 40% deduction for amenities such as park,
roads, electricity, water supply and all other civic
amenities; third, the market rate of the area in
question as on 01.04.1991 for the first category was
fixed at Rs.550/ per sq. meter and for the second
category, it was fixed at Rs.450/ per sq. meter and if
one would add 12% due to time element of two years,
it would work out to Rs.690/ per sq. meter; fourth,
subdivision of the suit land would be required to be
got approved from the JDA and, if it is done, it would
leave 30% to 40% of the land open for civic amenities;
7
and lastly, one plot measuring 116.3 sq. meters was
sold at the rate of Rs.861.10 per sq. meter whereas the
rate of the area was fixed by the DAC at Rs.600/ per
sq. meter and, therefore, in no case, the value
determined by the Department in the show cause
notice appears to be justified and hence the show
cause notice be withdrawn by allowing the parties to
give effect to the sale agreement, as agreed, for the
consideration shown in the agreement.
13. The appropriate authority, after making inquiries
and hearing the parties passed an order dated
30.03.1994 under Section 269UD (1) of the Act. The
appropriate authority overruled the appellants’
objections and directed compulsory purchase of the
suit land by the Central Government at an amount
equal to the apparent consideration fixed by the
parties in the agreement dated 11.11.1993. The
authority further directed the Income Tax Department
to serve a copy of the order passed for purchase of the
8
suit land by the Central Government to the appellants
for their information. The order also directed that in
terms of Section 269UE (1) of the Act, the suit land
stood vested in the Central Government with effect
from 30.03.1994. The appellants were directed to
deliver possession of the suit land to Shri RS Sagar,
DVO, Income Tax Department, Jaipur who, in turn,
wrote to the appellants to intimate the time and the
date of handing over the possession to the Income Tax
Department.
14. With these background facts, the appellants
herein felt aggrieved by the preemptive purchase
order dated 30.03.1994 passed by the appropriate
authority of the Income Tax Department and filed a
writ petition (W.P. No.1899/1994) on 13.04.1994 in
the High Court of Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur
questioning therein the legality and correctness of the
order dated 30.03.1994. The respondents (Income Tax
Department) contested the writ petition and defended
9
the preemptive purchase order as being legal and
proper on the reasoning stated therein.
15. The Single Judge, by order dated 14.09.1994,
dismissed the writ petition and upheld the order dated
30.03.1994 as being legal and proper. The appellants
felt aggrieved and filed appeal (D.B.S.A. No.744/1994)
before the Division Bench of the High Court. The
vendor (respondent No.3) also filed appeal (SAW
No.188/95) against the order of the Single Judge.
Both the appeals were disposed of by the Division
Bench consisted of (Chief Justice S.M. Jha and Justice
Mohammad Rafiq) by order dated 31.05.2007. So far
as the appellants’ appeal (No.744/1994) is concerned,
it was dismissed and so far as the vendor’s appeal
(SAW No.188/1995) is concerned, it was partly allowed
with the direction that upon department taking over
possession of the suit land, prospective buyers would
be entitled to claim refund of the amount paid to the
vendor together with interest @ 6% p.a., out of the
10
maturity amount of the FDR (created by the
department) and the remaining amount shall be paid
to the vendor.
16. The appellants felt aggrieved and filed review
petition in the High Court. The Division Bench, which
heard the review petition, was consisted of (Justice
R.M. Lodha (as His Lordship then was and later
became the CJI) and Justice Rafiq because in the
meantime, the Chief Justice S M Jha, who was
member of the main judgment had retired).
17. The Review Court dismissed the review petition
by a reasoned order dated 24.07.2007 which gave rise
to filing of C.A. Nos.98009801/2010 in this Court by
the prospective buyers. So far as C.A. No.9901/2010
is concerned, it is filed by the Union of India (Income
Tax Department) against that part of the order which
allowed the appeal (SAW 188/1995) filed by the vendor
wherein directions mentioned above were issued for
11
compliance. This is how these three appeals are
clubbed for their analogous hearing.
18. So, the question, which arises for consideration
in the appeals (CA Nos.98009801/2010), is whether
the High Court (Single Judge, Division Bench and
Review Bench) was justified in dismissing the
appellants’ writ petition, intra court appeal and review
petition and thereby was justified in upholding the
preemptive order dated 30.03.1994 passed by the
appropriate authority.
19. Mr. S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellants, in substance, elaborated the same
submissions, which were urged by the appellants in
the writ petition, writ appeal and review petition before
the High Court and also added some new arguments,
which were not urged before the High Court.
20. In reply, learned senior counsel Shri Mukerjee
appearing for the respondents (Union of India) while
supporting the impugned order contended that no case
12
has been made out to interfere in the reasoning and
the conclusion arrived at by the High Court and,
therefore, the appeals deserve dismissal.
21. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
at length and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals.
22. At the outset, it is apposite to mention that the
constitutional validity of Chapter XXC inserted in the
Income Tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1986 of
which Section 269 UE(1) is its part was challenged in
this Court in the case of C.B Gautam vs Union of
India and Others (1993) 1 SCC 78. Chapter XXC
deals with compulsory acquisition of property and
provides for preemptive purchase at apparent
consideration by the Government of any immovable
property.
23. The then learned Chief Justice M.H.Kania,
speaking for the constitution bench, upheld the
constitutional validity of Chapter XXC.
13
24. The question involved in these appeals is,
therefore, required to be examined keeping in view the
law laid down in the case of C.B Gautam (supra).
25. Coming first to the order dated 30.03.1994
(Annexure P11) of the appropriate authority, which
was impugned in the writ petition, we find from its
perusal that it was passed by the authority, which is
constituted under Section 269 UB of the Act. This
consisted of three members, who are senior officials of
the Income Tax Department. The order runs into 16
pages and deals with all the issues on facts and law
raised in the show cause notice and its reply.
26. After setting out the facts in detail up to Para 3,
the appropriate authority examined in Paras 4 and 5
the location of the suit land, its area, and its proximity
with the main roads, industries and residential
colonies situated in the nearby areas etc. The
appropriate authority then found that having regard to
14
the topography of the suit land, it has a potential
market value.
27. Thereafter, the appropriate authority in Para 7
examined the condition of the two existing godowns
bearing Nos. 13 and 14 and other structures standing
on the suit land and found as a fact that the condition
of the two existing godowns was very good and these
godowns were actually being used by the appellants
for commercial purposes.
28. Considering the rates applicable as in the case of
CPWD structures by cost index and keeping in view
the relevant factors such as size, location, condition
and the commercial use of the godowns, the
appropriate authority fixed Rs.42 lakhs as being the
market value of the two godowns.
29. The appropriate authority then in the same para
worked out the rate of the suit land at Rs.1727.5 per
sq. meter and accordingly determined the market
15
value of the suit land at Rs.1,79,21,532/ as against
its declared value of Rs.99,84,500/ in the agreement.
30. It is apposite to reproduce Paras 6 and 7 infra :
“6. The subject property is very close to
Tonk Road and on the main road leading to
Durgapura station and connecting to Tonk
Road. On the north side of the subject
property is the main Road and on the eastern
side, there is public road leading to
residential colonies which have come up in
its neighbourhood. There are residential
colonies of Vishnu Puri and Mahavir Nagar
across the road on the north side and
residential colonies of Green Nagar and Arjun
Nagar on the eastern side across the road.
Immediately after this khasra No.126, there
is vegetable oil factory of M/s Rohtas
Industries Ltd. on the western side.
7. We have carefully considered the facts of
the case and contentions of the ld.
representatives of the transferor and
transferees. As stated earlier, there are
existing godowns bearing Nos.13 and 14.
Besides, there are offices and guard room etc.
Considering the rates applicable as in the
case of CPWD structures as up date by cost
index, the value of the structure including
godowns is estimated at Rs.42 lakhs. The
main godown are of 2929 sq. meters and
other structure 171 sq. meter. The godowns
are lead bearing structure with Tubler trusses
and AC sheet roofing having CC flooring in it.
Proper electric installation and other services
are provided as per the norms. It is not
correct to say that the cost of removal of
debris will be more than the cost of
16
structure. As a matter of fact, even entire
iron used has a lot of value be godowns are
having internal height of 18 feet and raised
platform. These were constructed some
times in 1980 and are in very good condition.
In view of the fact that commercial use of the
property has been allowed by the Distt.
Magistrate and Jaipur Development
Authority, there is no need to demolish them
unless the property is being exploited fro
better gains. The declared land value will
come to Rs.99,84,700/ minus
Rs.42,00,000/ = 57,84,500/. Therefore, the
declared land rate works out to
Rs.57,84,500/ divided by 7943 sq. meters =
Rs.728/ per sq. meter as against the
prevailing land rate of the sale instance
property at Rs.1727.5 per sq. mt. The land
value of the subject property on this basis
works out to Rs.1727.5 x 7943
=Rs.1,37,21,532/. If the value of depreciated
structure of Rs.42 lakhs is added, the total
value of the subject property comes to
Rs.1,79,21,532/ as against the declared
value of Rs.99,84,500/.”
31. The appropriate authority then in para 8
considered the appellants’ objections to the effect that
while determining the market value of suit land,
deduction of 30% to 40% should have been given and,
if it had been given, there would have been no
difference of 15% in the value of the suit land as was
17
required to be made out for invoking powers under
Chapter XXC by the appropriate authority for pre
emptive purchase of the suit land.
32. The appropriate authority, however, rejected this
submission finding no merit therein. The appropriate
authority then examined the issue in the light of Rule
11 of the Rajasthan Urban Areas (sub division) Rules,
1975 and other relevant facts and came to a
conclusion that, if several other aspects such as the
location of the suit land and its commercial value is
taken into consideration, the market value of the suit
land would be substantially enhanced and would come
to Rs.1,46,58,548/ as against the apparent
consideration of Rs.99,84,500/ fixed in the
agreement. The appropriate authority, therefore, held
that in any case, value of the suit land was 15% higher
than the amount of the apparent consideration fixed in
the agreement.
18
33. It is apposite to reproduce paras 8 and 9, which
deal with this question:
“8. Even though the contention of the Ld.
representatives regarding deduction of 30%
to 40% for roads and parks etc. is not
acceptable in principle. We may work out the
value of the subject property even on this
basis as follows:
Saleable area as per rule 11 of
Rajasthan Urban Areas(sub division)
Rules, 1975 is about 6%. This rule
further provides that this may be more
if the plot size is small.
Assuming for arguments sake that 66% of
7,943 which is equal to 5242.38 sq. meters is
available for sale, the land rate will have to be
worked out on the basis of sale instance by
adjustment of time gap of +12% only. In
other words, the rate of sale instance will be
1718x1.12 = 1994.72 per sq. meter. It is so
because of the fact that the deduction of 34%
contemplates absence of large size as well as
“less developed”. On that basis, the land
value will be 1995x5242.38=1,04,58,548/ if
the value of structure of Rs.42 lakhs is
further out to Rs.1,46,58,548/ as against
declared apparent consideration of
Rs.99,84,500/.
9. While coming to the above noted
valuation of Rs.1,46,58,548/ adjustment on
account of the following aspects have not
been made. If these were further considered
the value arrived at will still be higher:
i) Deduction of 34% only has been
allowed. The deduction can be still less
if the plot is of smaller size. This will
19
enhance the saleable land area and land
value.
ii) Triveni Nagar is in the interior from
main Tonk Road. The development
along Tonk Road is certainly very
prestigious and valuable. No factor has
been added in the sale instance on this
account. It has been ascertained that
sale instances referred to by the Ld.
representative in his written
submissions dated 24.3.94 of Triveni
Nagar are not at all comparable for
several reasons. Plot No.B44, Triveni
Nagar (copy of sale deed in respect of
this property has been filed) is near/on
the nullah. The surroundings are very
poor. Besides, this sale instance is not
reliable as it has not been examined for
preemptive purchase as the alleged
apparent consideration is only Rs.1
lakh. Details of another sale instance
property at A256 Triveni Nagar have
not been made available but this
property is again very close to the
nullah and its surroundings are also
very poor. Both of these sale instances
cannot be compared with the subject
property whereas the sale instance
relied by us can be comparable subject
to adjustment of time gap, commercial
nature etc.
iii) The subject property is on main road
connecting Durgapura station to Tonk
Road. It is very close to Tonk Road.
The vacant land adjacent to two
godowns of the subject property falls on
the side of main road leading to newly
developed colonies. In other words, the
subject property has vacant land area
20
on the main station road as well as on
other side road leading to colonies.
This factor has not been added while
coming to the valuation;
iv) As pointed out earlier, the nature of the
subject property is commercial. The
value of commercial properties is also
about 50% more than the residential
properties. If this factor is added, the
present market value of the subject
property will be substantially
enhanced.”
34. The appropriate authority then in para 10 also
examined the case keeping in view the market rates
notified by the subRegistrar, Jaipur for the purpose of
paying stamp duty on the sale deed in relation to the
lands situated in an area called "Triveni Nagar" and
“Durgapura". The appropriate authority was, however,
of the view that the rates notified in the circular
support the case of Income Tax Department rather
than the case of the appellants because the minimum
reserved price notified for commercial use was at
Rs.1800/ Per sq. meter.
21
35. The appropriate authority then in para 12 dealt
with another argument of the appellants that the
adjustment of Rs.10 lakhs payable towards
registration charges and Rs.15 lakhs has to be
provided for roads, water and electricity supply. The
appropriate authority rejected this argument because
it found that this amount was not a part of the
apparent consideration between the parties.
36. It is after recording the aforementioned factual
findings, the appropriate authority came to a
conclusion that the case for preemptive purchase of
the suit land as contemplated under Section 269UD(1)
is made out against the appellants.
37. Now coming to the order of the writ Court(Single
Judge) dated 14.09.1994, we find on its perusal that
the writ Court rightly observed that it could not act as
an appellate Court to examine the legality and
correctness of the preemptive order dated 30.03.1994
passed by the appropriate authority under Section
22
269UD(1) of the Act but its jurisdiction was confined
only to examine as to whether any relevant material is
ignored or any erroneous material is considered or
whether the order of the appropriate authority has
violated the principle of natural justice or any case is
made out for infraction of any statutory provision or
whether the decision taken by the appropriate
authority for preemptive purchase is such that no
reasonable person could ever take such decision.
38. Despite observing this, the writ Court examined
all the issues of facts arising in the case like an
appellate Court and found no merit therein.
39. When the matter came up in intra court appeal at
the instance of the appellants herein before the
Division Bench, the appellate Court also, in detail,
examined each factual issue.
40. The Division Bench, in its judgment dated
31.05.2007, minutely dealt with the contentions urged
on behalf of the appellant and concurred with the
23
reasoning and conclusion of the Single Judge and the
appropriate authority. We consider it apposite to quote
the relevant extract from the judgment with a view to
show as to how the issue in relation to process of
valuation of the suit land was dealt with by the
Division Bench. It reads as under:
“….But on examination of the impugned
order of preemptive purchase, we find that
the Appropriate Authority in para 8 of the
order has categorically noted this argument
with reference to Rule 11 of the Rajasthan
Urban Areas (SubDivision, Reconstruction
and improvement of Plots) Rules, 1975 and
noted that the said rule provides that the
saleable are would be about 66% and this may
be more if the plot size is smaller but
assuming that only 66% would have available
are for sale, yet out of 7,943 sq. mtrs. An
area equal to 5242.38 sq. mtrs. Would have
been available for sale. Appropriate Authority
therefore by this alternative mode worked
out the rate of the land on the basis of
comparable sale instance i.e. 5242.38 sq.
mtrs. by adjustment of time gap of +12%
which then would come to Rs. 1994.72 per
sq. mtrs. It was noted that this was so
because the deduction of 34% land
contemplates absence of larger size as well as
less development. On this basis the land
value will be Rs. 1995 x 5242.38 =
1,04,58,548/. Value of the constructed
godowns of Rs. 42 lacs being added thereto,
total value of the said property would come
to Rs. 1,46,58,548/ as against declared
24
apparent consideration of Rs. 99,84,500/.
We do not find any error in the approach
taken by the Appropriate Authority because
deduction of 34% of the land for making the
provision of civic amenities like roads, parks,
open spaces, electricity, water, sewerage,
drainage, would essentially exclude the
element of the land area being a large size
agricultural chunk of land, which is the
alternative argument made by the
respondents and this would then also exclude
the element of the land being less
developed/under developed. In other words,
rd
making use of 1/3 land would in fact make
rd
the remaining 2/3 land developed and with
the sub division of lands into plots of smaller
sizes, it would no longer remain a large size
undeveloped agricultural land. In fact,
making provision of all these civic amenities
rd
and facilities by using 1/3 of the land would
considerably enhance its saleability and
rd
appreciate the value of the remaining 2/3 of
the land.”
41. Now coming to the order of the Review Court,
when the matter was taken up in review jurisdiction at
the instance of the appellants herein against the
judgment of the appellate Court, Justice Lodha
speaking for the Bench, again went into each issue on
facts and law in detail and found no merit in any of
25
the issues. The Review Court, therefore, also
dismissed the review petition by a well reasoned order.
42. It is in the light of the findings recorded by the
appropriate authority, writ Court, appellate Court and
lastly, review Court consistently against the
appellants, the question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal is whether any case is
made out to interfere in the impugned order.
43. Though learned counsel for the appellants with
his usual fairness vehemently reiterated more or less
the same submissions, which were addressed in the
High Court and also added some new submissions but
we are unable to accept his submissions. In our view,
the appropriate authority and the High Court were
right in their respective approach, the reasoning and
the conclusion. This we say for the following reasons.
44. It is not in dispute that the appropriate authority
laid a factual foundation in the show cause notice to
prove the value of suit land, which, according to the
26
authority, was 15% higher than the apparent
consideration. It is also not in dispute that a
categorical finding was recorded by the appropriate
authority that the fair market value of the suit land
was 15% more than the apparent consideration
mentioned in the agreement of sale by the parties. As
mentioned above, these findings were examined by the
writ Court, intra appellate Court and lastly the review
Court in their respective jurisdiction. They were
upheld.
45. In our considered opinion, these findings are
based on appreciation of evidence. We do not find
these findings to be either arbitrary or illegal or
against any statutory provisions and nor they can be
regarded as being perverse to the extent that no
reasonable man could ever reach to such conclusion.
We also find that these findings are in conformity with
the requirements of Section 269 UD of the Act and the
27
law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of
C.B. Gautam (supra).
46. Learned counsel for the appellants, however,
argued that since there was no reference of the two
godowns in the show cause notice and secondly, the
appellants were also not served with the copy of the
valuation report of the two godowns, the impugned
orders are rendered bad in law on account of these two
infirmities.
47. We find no merit in this submission for three
reasons. First, the appellants did not raise this
objection at any stage of the proceedings. We cannot,
therefore, entertain this submission at this stage:
Second, in any event, no prejudice was caused to the
appellants because all relevant documents were filed
on this issue in the writ proceedings. The appellants,
therefore, had full opportunity to deal with these
documents which they also availed of and lastly, this
issue was also argued on its merits. It is for all these
28
reasons, we do not find any substance in this
submission.
48. Learned counsel for the appellants then took us
to the factual issues, such as location of the suit land,
comparable sales relied on by the Department to prove
the value of the suit land etc. These submissions were
urged essentially with a view to show that the value of
the suit land mentioned in the show cause notice was
not the real market value and, therefore, the order of
preemptive purchase of the suit land is bad in law.
Learned counsel, in support of his submissions, also
placed reliance on the decisions in
Sahib Singh Kalha
& Ors. vs. Amritsar Improvement Trust & Ors.,
(1982) 1 SCC 419, Lal Chand vs. Union of India &
, (2009) 15 SCC 769, and
Anr. Executive Engineer,
Karnataka Housing Board vs. Land Acquisition
Officer, Gadag & Ors. , (2011) 2 SCC 246. We have
examined the submissions keeping in view the
decisions cited.
29
49. As mentioned above, these issues were gone into
at four stages, i.e., first by the appropriate authority
then by writ Court followed by intra court appeal and
lastly by review Court on facts and were rejected
finding no merit. In an appeal filed under Article 136
of the Constitution, we cannot hold de novo inquiry
into these issues again. In our view, these findings
have been recorded in conformity with the
requirements of Section 269UD(1) of the Act and hence
deserve to be upheld. They are accordingly upheld.
50. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no
merit in C.A. Nos.98009801/2010. The appeals are
accordingly dismissed.
CIVIL APPEAL No.9901 2010
1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 31.05.2007 passed by the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in
Division Bench Special Appeal No.188 of 1995
whereby the appeal filed by the vendor (respondent
30
No.1 in this appeal) was partly allowed with a direction
to the appellants(Income Tax Department) that the
prospective buyers would be entitled to the refund of
the amount paid to the vendor together at the rate of
6% p.a. out of the maturity amount of the aforesaid
FDR and remaining amount be paid to the vendor.
2. On perusal of the record, we find that the Single
Judge of the High Court had passed an interim order
dated 14.09.1994 directing the parties to maintain
status quo. He also directed that the period of stay
order would be excluded for making the payment by
the respondent to the seller depending upon the
outcome of the writ petition. This order was later
modified on 27.09.1994. While extending the stay
order, the Single Judge, however, clarified that in case,
if the action impugned is held bad in law, the vendor
would be entitled for reimbursement of the loss
occasioned to her. It was, however, submitted before
the Division Bench of High Court in the appeal that
31
the concerned authorities had invested the amount of
apparent sale consideration, i.e., Rs.99,88,500/ in a
fixed deposit (FDR) and the period of FDR was being
extended from time to time, pending appeal.
3. Taking into consideration these facts and other
relevant circumstances, the Division Bench while
dismissing the appeal filed by the prospective buyers,
partly allowed the appeal filed by the vendor and
issued the following directions:
“ ……..but the appeal filed by the vendor
(SAW No. 188/95) is partly allowed with the
direction that upon department taking over
possession of the subject property,
prospective buyers would be entitled to
refund of the amount paid to the vendor
together with interest @ 6% p.a., out of the
maturity amount of the aforementioned FDR
and remaining amount shall be paid to the
vendor. In the facts of the case, however, we
leave the parties to bear their own costs.”
4.
We find that while passing the aforesaid order,
the provisions contained in Section 269UG (4) of the
Act were not taken into consideration by the Division
Bench, which inter alia provide as to how the issue in
32
relation to amount of consideration is finally required
to be dealt with by the appropriate authority in a case
of this nature.
5. Section 269UG (4) of the Act reads as under:
“(4) Where any amount of consideration has
been deposited with the appropriate
authority under this section, the appropriate
authority may, either of its own motion or on
an application made by or on behalf of any
person interested or claiming to the
interested in such amount, order the same to
be invested in such Government or other
securities as it may think proper, and may
direct the interest or other proceeds of any
such investment to be accumulated and paid
in such manner as will, in its opinion, give
the parties interested therein the same
benefits therefrom as they might have had
from the immovable property in respect
whereof such amount has been deposited or
as near thereto as may be."
6. We are, therefore, of the view that instead of
issuing the aforementioned impugned directions in
relation to the disbursement of the amount of FDR, the
High Court should have left the matter to be decided
by the appropriate authority as required under Section
269UG (4) of the Act.
33
7. We are, therefore, inclined to allow the appeal
filed by Union of India to the extent that the above
mentioned directions issued by the High Court are
hereby set aside and the matter is left open for the
decision to be taken by the appropriate authority as
required under Section 269UG(4) of the Act in
accordance with law.
8. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part. The
impugned directions contained in the concluding para
of the impugned order are set aside.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
July 29, 2019
34