Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2023INSC848
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5780-5781/2023
(@ SLP (C) No(s). 19975-19976/2022)
HEMAVATHI & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
V. HOMBEGOWDA & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
These are two more appeals which arise from the High Court of
Karnataka within a short period of time wherein, without framing
the substantial question of law, Regular Second Appeal filed under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (For short the
“CPC”) is allowed. Additionally notice to respondent Nos. 1, 3 and
4 may not have been issued and served as the Second Appeal was
allowed at the stage of admission and if notice had been issued and
served no counsel for the said respondents had been heard. It is on
the basis of the aforesaid two grounds alone, the appeals would
have to be allowed and the impugned order(s) of the High Court
passed in RSA No.291/2022 disposed of on 13.04.2022 and in Review
Petition No.536/2022 disposed on 23.06.2022 would have to be set
aside.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2023.09.21
17:04:34 IST
Reason:
Briefly stated the facts are that the appellants herein had
filed Original Suit No.552/2003 before the Court of II Additional
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Senior Civil Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru, Karnataka
seeking the relief of partition and separate possession of their
respective shares in the suit schedule property. By judgment and
decree dated 07.02.2012, the suit was decreed granting ¼ share to
each of the plaintiffs (appellants herein).
Being aggrieved, the defendants in the said suit preferred
Regular Appeal No. 1/2021 before the II Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Bengaluru Rural District at Bengaluru seeking condonation of
delay of 2945 days in filing the appeal. By order dated
07.02.2022, the application seeking condonation of delay was
dismissed and consequently the appeal also stood dismissed and as a
result the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was not
interfered with.
Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Regular Appeal, the
defendants preferred the RSA No.291/2022. By the impugned judgment
dated 13.04.2022, the appeal filed by the defendant No.1 has been
allowed by condoning the delay of 2945 days in filing the Regular
Appeal but the matter has been remanded to the Trial Court for a
fresh adjudication reserving liberty to file additional written
statement and directing the Trial Court to frame additional issues,
if necessary, and to take on record the evidence of plaintiffs well
as the defendant No.1 within a period of six months and to dispose
of the suit within a period of six months thereafter. Further
during the pendency of the suit, the parties were directed to
maintain status-quo in respect of the suit property as regards
possession and alienation while reserving all contentions to be
kept open to be urged before the Trial Court. At this stage itself,
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it may be pointed out that the learned Judge of the High Court also
lost sight of the fact that the first appellate court had not
considered the Regular Appeal on merits but the matter has been
remanded to the trial court by passing the first appellate court.
Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 13.04.2022 the
appellants herein, who were plaintiffs in the suit which had been
decreed, preferred Review Petition No.536/2022. By order dated
23.06.2022, the review petition has been dismissed. Hence, these
appeals.
We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned
senior counsel for the contesting respondent No.1.
Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that respondent
No.2 Venkataramanappa died during the pendency of the matter(s)
before this Court on 12.01.2023 and his legal representatives have
not been brought on record. He further submitted that the said
Venkataramanappa had preferred R.A. No.62/2012 but had withdrawn
the same and the said appeal(s) was dismissed as withdrawn on
10.08.2018.
In the circumstances, in view of our proposed judgment, we do
not think at this stage the matter(s) would require the legal
representatives of the deceased-respondent No.2 to be brought on
record.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there are
two main serious errors in the impugned judgment: firstly, the
Regular Second Appeal has been allowed at the stage of admission
without framing a substantial question of law which is contrary to
the mandate of Section 100 of the CPC; Secondly, it was submitted
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that all respondents before the High Court were not heard in the
matter(s) and this is evident on a reading of the cause title of
the impugned judgment wherein only respondent No.2 was represented
by a counsel as a caveator. Therefore, in the absence of hearing
respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4 before the High Court, the Second Appeal
could not have been allowed. Thirdly, it was contended that the
High Court was not right in condoning the delay of 2945 days in
filing Regular Appeal No.1/2021 inasmuch as the first appellate
court by a detailed order had dismissed the said appeal on the
ground of delay and laches. Therefore, the impugned order/judgment
of the High Court dated 13.04.2022 as well as the order passed in
the Review Petition dated 23.06.2022 may be set aside.
Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the first
respondent who is the contesting respondent and appellant in R.A.
No.1/2021 supported the impugned order and submitted that since the
matter(s) was being remanded to the Trial Court reserving all
contentions to be left open and by giving additional opportunity to
all parties the non-framing of the substantial question of law and
non-hearing of some of the respondents before the High Court, is
immaterial. She further submitted that ultimately pursuant to the
remand made by the High Court full opportunity will be given to all
parties and therefore, the impugned judgment and impugned order of
the High Court may not be interfered with.
Learned counsel appearing for deceased-respondent No.2
submitted that in the event this Court is to remand these matters
to the High Court for fresh consideration then an opportunity may
be given to the legal representatives of deceased Respondent No.2
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to come on record so as to contest the appeals in accordance with
law.
The aforesaid narration of facts and contentions would not
require reiteration. Learned counsel for the appellants has brought
to our notice the following three serious lacunae in the impugned
judgment as well as the order passed in the review petition by the
High Court:
(i) In the absence of framing any substantial questions of law, the
Regular Second Appeal has been allowed. This is in breach of the
mandate under Section 100 of the CPC;
(ii) That the impugned judgment does not indicate that respondent
Nos.1, 3 and 4 were heard by the High Court inasmuch as the cause
title indicates that only the second respondent as caveator was
heard and in the absence of the said respondents being heard, the
order and judgment passed by the first appellate court in their
favour has been set aside.
(iii) That a delay of 2945 days has been condoned which has
compounded the aforesaid serious infirmity in the impugned judgment
of the High Court.
(iv) We may also add that the matter has been remanded to the trial
court for a fresh consideration when the first appellate court had
not considered the Regular Appeal on merits. If the High Court
thought it fit to condone the delay in filing the Regular Appeal
then the matter had to be remanded to the first appellate court to
consider the Regular Appeal on merits and not just set aside the
trial court decree and remand the case to the trial court for a
fresh adjudication.
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The jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a Second
Appeal is well-known. It is a unique jurisdiction of the High Court
where the High Court can entertain a Regular Second Appeal purely
on a “substantial” question of law not even a question of law or a
question of fact. It is a settled law that the first appellate
court is the final Court insofar as the question of facts are
concerned and it is only when substantial questions of law would
arise in a case that the High Court can entertain a Regular Second
Appeal and if at the stage of admission such substantial questions
of law are discerned by the High Court the same would have to be
framed and the appeal(s) would have to be admitted. It is only
thereafter that the parties have to be heard on the substantial
questions of law that are framed by the High Court at the stage of
admission.
However, the CPC gives power to the High Court to frame
additional substantial questions of law or to mould the substantial
questions of law already framed on hearing the parties at the time
of final hearing of a Second Appeal. In the event the respondents
before the High Court are on record even at the stage of admission
of a Regular Second Appeal and the same is to be disposed of
finally even at this stage substantial questions of law must be
framed and answered before the Regular Second Appeal is admitted
and disposed.
On a perusal of the impugned order, we find that the same has
not been framed. The said error is compounded by the learned Judge
stating in the order passed in the review petition that no such
substantial question of law arose in the appeal(s). In fact, it is
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necessary to highlight this aspect by quoting the learned judge by
what he has stated in paragraph ‘3’ of the order passed in the
review petition as under:
“3. A perusal of the Judgment dated 13.04.2022 in RSA
No.291/2022 shows that the respondent No.2 had
entered Caveat. When the appeal was listed for
admission, this Court held that the explanation
offered by the appellant in not filing the written
statement was not completely acceptable but was
probable. This Court also found that the appeal
filed by the appellant before the First Appellate
Court was dismissed as barred by time. Hence this
Court felt that the appellant was deprived of an
opportunity to defend the action brought by the
respondents therein. Hence cost of Rs.50,000/- was
imposed and the case was remitted for disposal within
six months. This Court did not express any opinion
on the merits of the case. This Court was aware of
the requirement to frame the substantial question of
law before disposing a second appeal, as declared by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decisions cited by the
learned counsel. However, this was not a case where
any substantial question was involved, as the Trial
Court did not adjudicate question was involved, as
the Trial Court did not adjudicate the dispute on
merits.”
The aforesaid paragraph would speak for itself vis-a-vis the
infirmities in the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.
If no substantial question of law arose in the case then the appeal
could not have been entertained and ought to have been dismissed at
the stage of admission. But on the other hand, in the absence of
framing any substantial question of law the appeal has been
allowed, that too, at the stage of admission, without issuance of
notice to the other respondents Nos.1, 3 and 4 and by hearing only
learned counsel for the respondent No.2 before the High Court who
was on caveat. The aforesaid errors are compounded by the fact that
a sum of Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand only) cost was awarded
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to the successful plaintiffs who were respondents before the High
Court in lieu of any notice being issued to them! The aforesaid
infirmities cannot be overlooked and compensated by ordering a sum
of Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the first respondent herein (appellant
in the Second Appeal before the High Court) to the respondent-
plaintiff(s).
In this context, the law on the practice to be followed while
considering a regular second appeal, has been re-iterated by
this Court in C.A. No. 4935 of 2023 in Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar
vs. Narendra @ Nagesh Bharma Holkar and Anr. dated 07.08.2023,
and the relevant extracts in this regard are exposited as under:
a) Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708, as relied upon
in C.A. Sulaiman vs. State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee (2006) 6 SCC
392:
“7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC juris-
diction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is
confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial
question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on
the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.”
b) State Bank of India vs. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 9215:
“15. It is a matter of concern that the scope of second ap-
peals and as also the procedural aspects of second appeals
are often ignored by the High Courts. Some of the oft-re-
peated errors are:
(a) Admitting a second appeal when it does not give rise to a
substantial question of law.
(b) Admitting second appeals without formulating substantial
question of law.
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| (c) Admitting second appeals by formulating a standard or<br>mechanical question such as “whether on the facts and circum-<br>stances the judgment of the first appellate court calls for<br>interference” as the substantial question of law. | |
|---|---|
| (d) Failing to consider and formulate relevant and appropri-<br>ate substantial question(s) of law involved in the second ap-<br>peal. | |
| (e) Rejecting second appeals on the ground that the case does<br>not involve any substantial question of law, when the case in<br>fact involves substantial questions of law. | |
| (f) Reformulating the substantial question of law after the<br>conclusion of the hearing, while preparing the judgment,<br>thereby denying an opportunity to the parties to make submis-<br>sions on the reformulated substantial question of law. | |
| (g) Deciding second appeals by reappreciating evidence and<br>interfering with findings of fact, ignoring the questions of<br>law. | |
| These lapses or technical errors lead to injustice and also<br>give rise to avoidable further appeals to this Court and re-<br>mands by this Court, thereby prolonging the period of litiga-<br>tion. Care should be taken to ensure that the cases not in-<br>volving substantial questions of law are not entertained, and<br>at the same time ensure that cases involving substantial<br>questions of law are not rejected as not involving substan-<br>tial questions of law.” | |
c) Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13
SCC 216:
“16 A second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable
grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law,
which is something distinct from a substantial question of
fact. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless
a substantial question of law is involved, as the second ap-
peal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact
based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The exist-
ence of a substantial question of law is a condition preced-
ent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so,
9
| the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a sub-<br>stantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise<br>of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It<br>is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of<br>the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the<br>same.” | |
|---|---|
| “11. In our view, the very jurisdiction of the High Court in<br>hearing a second appeal is founded on the formulation of a<br>substantial question of law. The judgment of the High Court<br>is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard and<br>judgment and decree appealed against is reversed without for-<br>mulating a substantial question of law. The second appellate<br>jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 is not akin<br>to the appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code;<br>it is restricted to such substantial question or questions of<br>law that may arise from the judgment and decree appealed<br>against. As a matter of law, a second appeal is entertainable<br>by the High Court only upon its satisfaction that a substan-<br>tial question of law is involved in the matter and its formu-<br>lation thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the<br>second appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated.<br>It is, however, open to the High Court to reframe substantial<br>question of law or frame substantial question of law afresh<br>or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at<br>the time of hearing the second appeal but reversal of the<br>judgment and decree passed in appeal by a court subordinate<br>to it in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the<br>Code is impermissible without formulating substantial ques-<br>tion of law and a decision on such question.” | |
|---|---|
“18. In the instant case, the High Court has not yet admitted
the matter. It is not in dispute that no substantial question
of law has been formulated as it could not have been when the
appeal has not been admitted. We say so, as appeal under Sec-
tion 100 CPC is required to be admitted only on substantial
question/questions of law. It cannot be formal admission like
an appeal under Section 96 CPC. That is the fundamental imper-
ative. It is peremptory in character, and that makes the prin-
ciple absolutely cardinal.”
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In the circumstances, the impugned judgment dated 13.04.2022
and impugned order dated 23.06.2022 passed in the Regular Second
Appeal as well as the Review Petition are set aside. The matters
are remanded to the High Court to consider the same in accordance
with law and by being mindful of the aforementioned flaws in the
impugned judgment and order.
Since the parties are before the High Court, it is necessary
to ensure that the legal representatives of the deceased-Respondent
No.2 herein are brought on record (R-4 before the High court) by
the first respondent herein who was the appellant in the High court
by filing the necessary applications so as to bring his legal
representatives on record and thereafter to dispose of the Regular
Second Appeal in accordance with law.
Appeals are allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
No costs.
It is needless to observe that with the cooperation of the
learned counsel for respective parties, the Regular Second Appeal
shall be disposed of expeditiously.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
.......................J.
( B.V. NAGARATHNA )
.......................J.
( UJJAL BHUYAN )
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 11, 2023
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ITEM NO.48 COURT NO.15 SECTION IV-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.19975-19976/2022
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 23-06-2022
in RP No. 536/2022 13-04-2022 in RSA No. 291/2022 passed by the
High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru)
HEMAVATHI & ORS. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
V. HOMBEGOWDA & ANR. Respondent(s)
Date : 11-09-2023 These petitions were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
For Petitioner(s) M/S. Nuli & Nuli, AOR
Mr. Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Adv.
Mr. Agam Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Dharm Singh, Adv.
Mr. Shiva Swaroop, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shanthakumar V. Mahale, Adv.
Mr. Harisha S.R., AOR
Mr. Rajesh Mahale, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
Civil Appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable
judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(RADHA SHARMA) (MALEKAR NAGARAJ)
COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
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