Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 315
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
\
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 13345 - 13346 OF 2015
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 13229 - 13230 of 2009)
SYED MOHAMMED GHOUSE PASHA KHADRI
… APPELLANT
versus
SYED MOHAMMED ADIL PASHA KHADRI & ORS. ETC.
… RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J.
1. These are the civil appeals challenging the common judgment
and order dated 15.04.2008 passed by the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 1574 of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEHA GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.02
17:46:34 IST
Reason:
2005 and 1575 of 2005, whereby the High Court dismissed the
second appeals filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
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Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “ the CPC” ), and
affirmed the concurrent judgments and decrees of the Courts
below, which had declared Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri
(Respondent No. 1 herein) as the lawful Sajjadanashin of the
Hazarath Mardane-e-Gaib Dargah, Shivasamudram, located in
Chamarajanagar District, Karnataka.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. The present dispute concerns succession to the office of
Sajjadanashin of the Hazarath Mardane-e-Gaib Dargah,
Shivasamudram, located in Chamarajanagar District,
Karnataka.
3. The original Sajjadanashin of the Dargah was Peer Pasha
Khadri, as per the Wakf Board’s Notification dated 01.04.1965.
Thereafter, Peer Pasha Khadri appointed his eldest son, Akhil
Pasha Khadri, as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada (i.e. successor of the
Sajjadanashin) of the Dargah. On 27.10.1980, Akhil Pasha
Khadri passed away, predeceasing his father.
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4. On 26.02.1981, at a religious function held in the presence of
Sajjadanashins of other dargahs and elders in the community,
Peer Pasha Khadri appointed and nominated Syed Mohammed
Adil Pasha Khadri (respondent no. 1 herein), his grandson and
son of late Akhil Pasha Khadri, to be the Jan-Nasheen Sajjada
of the Dargah. The appointment and nomination was reduced
in writing as Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72). On
06.10.1988, the original Sajjadanashin passed away and the
respondent no. 1 became the Sajjadanashin of the Dargah.
5. The appellant (Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri), being
the youngest son of the original Sajjadanashin, asserts a rival
claim to the office of the Sajjadanashin, relying upon certain
documents, including a General Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1), a
handwritten Khilafatnama (Ex. D-13) and an affidavit (Ex. D-
23) executed by the predecessor. Whereas, the respondent no.
1, being the grandson of the original Sajjadanashin, claims
succession to the same office on the basis of a nomination made
by the predecessor in Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-
72).
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6. Thus, two civil suits came to be instituted before the Principal
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mysuru:
A. O.S. No. 724 of 1988 (renumbered as O.S. No. 342 of
1995), instituted by the appellant, asserting his claim as
Sajjadanashin of the Dargah. Respondent No. 1 was not
made a party to the suit and later filed an impleadment
application.
B. O.S. No. 233 of 1989, instituted by the respondent no. 1,
seeking declaration that he was the duly nominated
Sajjadanashin of the Dargah and for consequential reliefs.
7. By a common judgment and decree dated 14.11.2000, the Trial
Court decreed O.S. No. 233 of 1989 and dismissed O.S. No. 342
of 1995, holding that the office of Sajjadanashin was hereditary
in nature, and thus, the respondent no. 1 had been validly
nominated through Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72)
and the documents relied upon by the appellant, including Ex.
D-1, Ex. D-13 and Ex. D-23, did not confer Sajjadanashin-ship.
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8. The appellant preferred two separate appeals, namely R.A. No.
8 of 2004 (against the decree in O.S. No. 233 of 1989) and R.A.
No. 9 of 2004 (against the dismissal of O.S. No. 342 of 1995).
Both the Regular Appeals were dismissed by the First Appellate
Court and the findings of the Trial Court were upheld, by a
common judgment and order dated 07.07.2005.
9. The Regular Second Appeals preferred by the appellant, namely
R.S.A. Nos. 1574 and 1575 of 2005, were dismissed by the High
Court of Karnataka, by the impugned common judgment and
order dated 15.04.2008.
10. Vide the impugned judgment, the High Court recorded that the
Trial Court had decreed O.S. No. 233/1989 in favour of the
respondent no. 1 and O.S. No. 342/1995 (appellant’s suit) was
dismissed, the First Appellate Court had reappreciated the
evidence and affirmed the findings. Thus, there were concurrent
findings of fact in favour of the respondent no. 1. The High
Court accepted the concurrent finding that the office of
Sajjadanashin is hereditary in nature and succession was
governed by established practice and nomination. It was held
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that the Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72) was duly
proved and executed by the original Sajjadanashin, and thus,
the nomination of the respondent no. 1 was valid and further
rejected allegations of fabrication or interpolation with Ex. P-72.
It was further held that Ex. D-1, Ex. D-13 and Ex. D-23 relied
upon by the appellant did not amount to nomination and these
documents did not confer Sajjadanashin-ship.
11. Thus, the High Court concluded that the findings were factual
in nature, no perversity was demonstrated and no substantial
question of law arose under Section 100 of the CPC.
Accordingly, the Regular Second Appeals were dismissed and
the Trial Court and First Appellate Court judgments were
affirmed, thereby declaring the respondent no. 1 as the rightful
Sajjadanashin.
12. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant filed Special
Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos. 13229 and 13230 of 2009 before this
Court. This Court, by the interim order dated 14.09.2009,
directed the parties to maintain status quo and, by the order
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dated 04.11.2015, leave to appeal was granted, culminating
into the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
13. Mr. Rabin Majumder, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, at the outset, disputes the fact that the father of
the respondent no. 1 was appointed as Jannasheen Sajjada in
1966. It is stated that the father of the respondent no. 1 was
never appointed as Jannasheen or Sajjadanashin of the
Dargah, nor did he hold any Khilafatnama at any time. The
record demonstrates that he permanently shifted to Bangalore
in 1966, after mortgaging certain Dargah lands and ceased to
participate in the affairs of the Dargah.
14. It is stated that during this period, the appellant was granted
Khilafatnama on 06.07.1969 (Ex. D-13) and thereafter
maintained and managed the Dargah continuously from 1966
to 1981 and subsequently from 1982 onwards. Only after the
demise of the original Sajjadanashin in 1988 did the respondent
no. 1 seek to intervene by getting himself impleaded in O.S. No.
724 of 1988 (renumbered as O.S. No. 342 of 1995), thereby
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disputing the appellant’s long-standing management of the
Dargah.
15. Learned Counsel submitted that the Courts below committed
serious errors in treating Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex.
P-72) as conferring Sajjadanashinship despite it being only a
record of Khilafat, and failing to properly interpret the Urdu,
Persian and Arabic terminology used in the original document.
It is stated that the document does not confer the office of
Sajjadanashin, as under Islamic practice, the status of Khalifa
or Jannasheen is distinct from that of Sajjadanashin, and the
Courts below erred in treating the document as conferring
succession to the office.
16. The office of Sajjadanashin primarily relates to spiritual
functions, including religious teaching, conduct of Urs, Sandal
ceremonies and spiritual discourse at the Dargah. It is
submitted that the Courts below erred in treating
Sajjadanashinship as a purely documentary right, contrary to
the principles laid down in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd.
Hanifa (1976) 4 SCC 780 . It is further submitted that the
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Courts below wrongly assumed the existence of a custom
without proof, contrary to the principle that custom must be
specifically pleaded and strictly proved, as held in the case of
Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand Dolwani, AIR 1953 SC
298 .
17. It is further submitted that the Courts below erred in ignoring
material evidence, including Ex. D-1 (registered GPA of 1981)
and Ex. D-23 (affidavit of the original Sajjadanashin), and the
testimony of several witnesses supporting the appellant’s claim
to the office of Sajjadanashin. It is submitted that the affidavit
executed by the predecessor Sajjadanashin was wrongly
disregarded, despite affidavits being admissible evidence of
intention and nomination, reliance is placed on Narbada Devi
Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal (2003) 8 SCC 745 .
18. It is further submitted that historically, movable and immovable
assets of the Dargah, including Golak collections, Tabeez,
Fateha offerings and other income, have been shared among the
descendants of the original Sajjadanashin, who constitute the
stakeholders of the Wakf property, and any declaration
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recognizing a new Sajjadanashin cannot extinguish the
established rights of other stakeholders, thus, the declaration
granted by the trial court disregards this long-standing practice
of shared management and benefit. In addition, it is submitted
that the Wakf Board should not open the Golak solely in the
presence of the Sajjadanashin, but in the presence of all
stakeholders, in accordance with the established practice
followed over generations.
19. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that Ex. P-72
suffers from the following serious suspicious circumstances:
A.
The original document only recorded the grant of Khilafat
to the respondent no. 1.
B. The word “Jannasheen” was subsequently inserted in the
document by the same scribe, who was the maternal uncle
of the respondent no. 1.
C. This interpolation occurred nine years after the death of
the original Sajjadanashin and the addition was not
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countersigned or authenticated with the proper seal of the
original authority.
20. It is stated that these serious suspicious circumstances
surrounding Ex. P-72 were ignored by the Courts below, despite
the requirement of a heightened standard of proof as held in the
case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmaiamma, AIR
1959 SC 443 . It is therefore prayed that Ex. P-72 be sent to the
Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) for examination, in
the interest of justice before final adjudication, to determine
whether the word “Jannasheen” was inserted later, whether the
ink and handwriting differ, and the approximate time of the
original writing and subsequent additions.
21. Learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the
burden of proof was wrongly shifted onto the appellant, though
the respondent no. 1, as the propounder of Ex. P-72, bore the
primary burden, reliance was placed on Rangammal v.
Kuppuswami (2011) 12 SCC 220 .
22. Learned Counsel for the appellant further relied upon extensive
documentary evidence, including 163 documents and
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correspondence with the Wakf Board, demonstrating that the
appellant had been recognized and functioning as
Jannasheen/Sajjadanashin both during the lifetime of the
original Sajjadanashin and thereafter.
23. In light of the above submissions, learned Counsel for the
appellant submitted that the findings of the Courts below are
legally unsustainable, having been based on misinterpretation
of documents, failure to consider material evidence and
incorrect application of legal principles governing succession to
the office of Sajjadanashin. It is therefore submitted that the
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 1
24. Ms. Pritha Srikumar Iyer, learned Counsel for the respondent
no. 1, at the outset, submitted that the Sajjadanashin is the
spiritual head and manager of the Dargah, superior to the
Mutawalli and responsible for religious guidance and
administration. The position is traditionally hereditary and the
founder or incumbent Sajjadanashin has the authority to
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nominate a successor (Jan Nasheen) from among his disciples
(Khalifas).
25. It is submitted that the Trial Court declared the respondent no.
1 as Sajjadanashin and dismissed the appellant’s suit, the First
Appellate Court dismissed both appeals filed by the appellant,
and the High Court of Karnataka dismissed the Second Appeals,
thereby confirming the findings in favour of the respondent no.
1.
26. Thus, all three courts (Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and
High Court) concurrently held that:
A.
Peer Pasha Khadri was the original Sajjadanashin and the
office of the Sajjadanashin was hereditary in nature.
B. The respondent no. 1 was validly appointed successor (Jan
Nasheen) through a religious ceremony witnessed by
fakirs, murids and other Sajjadanashins.
C. The appointment was documented contemporaneously in
Ex. P-72 dated 26.02.1981.
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D. The appellant was present at the ceremony and attested
the document as a witness, demonstrating
acknowledgment of the appointment.
E. The documents relied upon by the appellant do not
constitute a valid nomination of successor, as the General
Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1) operated only during the
lifetime of Peer Pasha Khadri and the Affidavit (Ex. D-23)
does not amount to a Khilafathnama or appointment as
Sajjadanashin.
27. Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 submitted that the
contention of the appellant that only a living son can succeed
as Sajjadanashin was never pleaded in the written statement
and is an afterthought. In earlier proceedings, the appellant
himself admitted that a Sajjadanashin can nominate any
successor and there is no rigid rule of succession.
28. It is further submitted that the argument of the appellant that
the respondent no. 1 resided in Bangalore was examined and
rejected by both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.
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It is stated that the evidence shows that the respondent no. 1
also resided in Shivasamudram.
29. Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 submitted that three
courts have concurrently found, on facts and law, that the
respondent no. 1 was validly appointed successor (Jan
Nasheen) and is the rightful Sajjadanashin of the Dargah. In
addition, the contentions raised by the appellant lack pleading,
legal basis or evidentiary support, and therefore, the findings in
favour of the respondent no. 1 deserves to be upheld.
ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
30. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and
having carefully perused the pleadings, documentary material
and the judgments of the Courts below, the principal question
which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the
High Court was justified in dismissing the Regular Second
Appeals filed under Section 100 of the CPC, on the ground that
no substantial question of law arose for consideration,
particularly in the light of the concurrent findings recorded by
the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court with respect to the
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succession to the office of Sajjadanashin of Hazarath Mardane-
e-Gaib Dargah, Shivasamudram.
31. At the outset, it must be emphasised that the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Section 100 of the CPC is confined to
examination of substantial questions of law arising from the
judgment of the First Appellate Court, as held in the case of
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 .
It is well settled that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Courts below cannot ordinarily be interfered with in second
appeal unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on
no evidence, or arrived at by ignoring material evidence or by
applying erroneous legal principles.
32. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court, upon detailed appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence, have recorded concurrent findings that Syed
Mohammed Peer Pasha Khadri was the original Sajjadanashin
of the Dargah and that the office was hereditary in nature, with
the incumbent Sajjadanashin possessing the authority to
nominate a successor.
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33. In this regard, the First Appellate Court relied upon the
admission made by the official witness of the Wakf Board. The
appellate court recorded the following extract from the cross-
examination of DW-6:
“In column No.4 there is mention that Mohammed Peer
Pasha Khadri is the Sajjadanasheen… Instead of
pronging as Mutatwlli by mistake it has been printed
as Sajjadanasheen. It is a true that the said
notification has not been so far corrected or
cancelled… It is true that the designation of
Sajjadanasheen is a hereditary post.”
Therefore, the appellate court rightly rejected the contention
that the predecessor was merely a Mutawalli and held that the
office of Sajjadanashin was hereditary in character.
34. Apart from the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts
below, it is necessary for this Court to independently examine
the legal principles governing succession to the office of
Sajjadanashin, particularly in the context of religious
endowments and Wakf institutions.
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35. The office of Sajjadanashin occupies a distinctive position in
Islamic religious institutions connected with Dargahs and Sufi
shrines. The Sajjadanashin is not merely an administrative
manager of Wakf property but is primarily the spiritual head of
the shrine, responsible for preserving the spiritual lineage
(silsila), guiding disciples (murids), conducting religious
ceremonies such as Urs and Sandal, and maintaining the
spiritual traditions associated with the shrine.
36. The legal position in this regard has been recognised by this
Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (supra) , wherein it was
observed that the office of Sajjadanashin is fundamentally
spiritual in character, though it may carry with it certain
incidental rights relating to the management of the shrine.
Similarly, Mulla: Principles of Mahomedan Law (20th
Edition) in Chapter XII , defines the office of Sajjadanashin as
under:
“The word “sajjadanashin” (spiritual superior) is
derived from sajjada, that is, the carpet used by
Mahomedans for prayer, and nashin, that is, sitting.
The sajjadanashin takes precedence on the carpet
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during prayers. The office of a mutawalli is a secular
office; that of a sajjadanashin is a spiritual office, and
he has certain spiritual functions to perform. All
dargahs are not Khankhas but there is nothing
uniform or rigid. All Sajjadanashins are not
necessarily mutawallis of the properties of the
institution. The office of mutawalli may be in another
person. A Sajjadanashin was said in this case to
resemble a Mahant of a Hindu Math. A sajjadanashin
of a Khankhah enjoys the unique position of being a
spiritual preceptor and a mutawalli. Differences
between a sajjadanashin and a mutawalli were
pointed out in Ikramiul Haq Shah v. Board of Wakfs
(Rajasthan). The founder is generally the first
sajjadanashin and after his death the spiritual line is
continued by a succession of sajjadanashins.”
37. At the same time, Indian courts have consistently held that
succession to such religious offices is ordinarily determined by
custom, usage, or nomination by the incumbent, depending
upon the particular traditions governing the institution. In the
context of Muslim religious institutions, the Supreme Court has
recognised that offices such as that of a Sajjadanashin or
Mutawalli may devolve in accordance with the established
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customs of the institution, including nomination by the
predecessor rather than strict rules of inheritance, as held in
Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (supra) . Mulla: Principles of
Mahomedan Law (20th Edition) in Chapter XII
, provides for
the same as under:
“In the absence of a direction in the wakfnama the
succession to the office of sajjadanashin is regulated
by custom. One custom is that the “bhek” or order i.e.,
an electoral body consisting of fakeers and murids,
instal a competent person generally a son or nominee
of the late sajjadanashin. In a case before the Privy
Council the “bhek” delegated their power to elect a
sajjadanashin and it was held that the appointment
of the sajjadanashin made in this manner was valid.
If the Court is appointing a sajjadanashin, it should
take account of the spiritual tradition and appoint if
possible a descendant of the founder. As to the
importance of nomination by the last sajjadanashin
see the observations of Agha Haider J., in Ghulam
Mahommad v Abdul Rashid. The Lahore High Court
has decided that in the absence of directions in the
Deed of Trust, or usage, a sajjadanashin can
nominate his successor.”
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38. From the record it transpires that the respondent no. 1 had
been nominated as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada by the original
Sajjadanashin through the Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex.
P-72). The said document was accepted through a religious
ceremony attended by members of the fraternity and other
Sajjadanashins. It also transpired from the record that
prevailing practice governing the Dargah recognises nomination
by the incumbent Sajjadanashin as a valid mode of succession.
It would, however, emerge that the document Ex. P-72,
originally written in Urdu, Persian and Arabic, had been
translated into English for the purpose of the proceedings. Upon
analysing the document together with the surrounding
circumstances and the oral evidence adduced by the parties, it
can be said that the Khilafatnama conferred upon the
respondent no. 1, the spiritual authority previously exercised
by the incumbent Sajjadanashin and thereby constituted a
valid act of nomination.
39. At this stage, it is relevant to observe that the execution of the
said document was supported by the testimony of the attesting
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witnesses. One of the witnesses, who was himself associated
with another Dargah, deposed that the predecessor
Sajjadanashin had formerly conferred spiritual authority upon
the respondent no. 1 in the presence of several people. We find
that the testimony of the said witness is credible and in fact the
present appellant had failed to elicit any material in cross-
examination that could discredit the evidence of the aforesaid
witness.
40. From the record it also transpires that another witness also
corroborated the circumstances in which the Khilafatnama was
executed and described the religious ceremony during which
the respondent no. 1 was nominated. Thus, the appellant has
failed to point out from the documentary as well as oral evidence
that the document Ex. P-72 is a fabricated document.
41. Now, it is the contention of the appellant that Ex. P-72 merely
conferred Khilafatnama and did not amount to nomination as
Sajjadanashin. From the examination of the aforesaid
document as a whole and considering the surrounding evidence
as well as the findings recorded by the Courts below, it can be
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said that the document might not expressly use the term
“Sajjadanashin”, but, it clearly conveyed the intention of the
incumbent Sajjadanashin to confer his spiritual authority upon
the respondent no. 1 and to designate him as a successor. It is
also the contention of the appellant herein that the word “Jan-
Nasheen” had been subsequently interpolated in the said
document. With regard to the said contention, we may observe
that the appellant himself had admitted the existence and
acceptance of the document, and once such admission was
made, the burden shifted upon the appellant to establish the
alleged interpolation. However, the appellant neither effectively
cross-examined the attesting witnesses on this issue nor sought
examination of the said document by a hand writing expert.
Thus, in the absence of any substantive evidence supporting
the allegation, the contention of the appellant is required to be
rejected. We may add that at this stage it is not open for the
appellant to contend that the said document be sent for
necessary examination to the concerned expert.
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42. It is a settled principle that mere suspicion cannot displace a
document which has otherwise been duly proved. The burden
of establishing forgery or interpolation lies on the party alleging
H. Venkatachala
it and this principle has been reiterated in
Iyengar (supra) . In the present case, the appellant failed to
produce any cogent evidence to substantiate the allegation of
interpolation before this Court as well.
43. It is also required to be observed at this stage that the appellant
himself had earlier admitted the practice of succession through
nomination by the incumbent Sajjadanashin. Thus, the
admission of the appellant demonstrated that the office was not
confined strongly to succession by a living son and that
nomination by the incumbent Sajjadanashin was recognised in
practice. Significantly, the material on record does not establish
any rigid rule that the office must invariably devolve upon the
eldest son of hereditary succession. Thus, the contention raised
by the appellant that under Mohammadan law, only a living son
may succeed to the office of Sajjadanashin is without factual
basis and no material is produced by the appellant to support
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this argument. The extracts produced by the appellant from
Mulla (supra) in the course of oral submissions pertain to
succession to property and not to appointment of a successor
as Sajjadanashin.
44. On the contrary, the evidence produced before the Courts below
indicates that the prevailing practice recognises the authority of
the incumbent Sajjadanashin to nominate his Jan-Nasheen. We
have gone through the reasoning recorded by the Courts below
with regard to the aforesaid aspect based on documentary as
well as oral evidence and we are of the view that the Courts
below have not committed any error while recording the findings
to the aforesaid effect.
45. The appellant has also relied upon certain documents, namely
the General Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1), the Khilafatnama dated
06.07.1969 (Ex. D-13) and the Affidavit (Ex. D-23), to assert his
claim to the office of Sajjadanashin.
46. We have examined the aforesaid documents upon which the
appellant has placed reliance. From the General Power of
Attorney (Ex. D-1), it can be said that the said document was
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merely a power of attorney authorizing the appellant to act on
behalf of the executant and did not confer any right of
succession to the office. This view is consistent with the settled
legal principle that a power of attorney creates only an agency
relationship and does not transfer title or confer independent
rights. The authority granted under such an instrument is
ordinarily co-terminus with the life and authority of the
principal. Consequently, a power of attorney cannot operate as
a mode of succession to a religious office.
47. This position has been authoritatively affirmed by this Court in
Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,
(2012) 1 SCC 656 , where it was held that a power of attorney
is merely an instrument of agency and cannot by itself transfer
ownership or create proprietary rights. Applying the same
principle, a document which merely authorises another person
to act on behalf of the executant cannot be construed as
conferring succession to a spiritual office such as that of a
Sajjadanashin.
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48. So far as the affidavit (Ex. D-23) is concerned, the same cannot
be recorded as a valid instrument of nomination. It is required
to be observed that from the evidence on record, it transpires
that an act as significant as the appointment of a successor to
the office of Sajjadanashin would ordinarily be performed
through a clear and formal act consistent with the traditions of
the institution. Thus, in absence of any other reliable
corroborative evidence demonstrating that the affidavit
represented such an act of nomination, we are of the view that
the Courts below have rightly declined to treat the said
document conferring any right of succession.
49. Another contention raised by the appellant is with regard to
certain correspondences, photographs and oral testimonies to
suggest that the appellant had been managing the affairs of the
Dargah for several years. We have examined the said evidence
and we are of the view that, at best, the said evidence indicated
that the appellant had participated in certain managerial or
ceremonial activities associated with the Dargah, however, such
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 27 of 30
participation by itself cannot establish succession to the office
of Sajjadanashin.
50. With regard to the contention raised by the appellant that the
respondent no. 1 resided in Bangalore and not at
Shivasamudram, it is a specific finding recorded on the basis of
the evidence by the Courts below that the respondent no. 1 was
also a resident of Shivasamudram, and therefore, when a
concurrent finding of the fact is recorded by the Courts below,
at this stage, the said finding of fact cannot be interfered with.
51. The appellant has further contended that recognition of the
respondent no. 1 as Sajjadanashin would extinguish the rights
of other family members or stakeholders in the Wakf property.
This submission is misconceived. The present litigation
concerns succession to the office of Sajjadanashin and not the
proprietary rights of descendants in Wakf property or income.
The recognition of one individual as Sajjadanashin does not
determine or extinguish the independent legal rights of other
beneficiaries under Wakf law.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 28 of 30
52. Considering the entire evidence on record, we are of the view
that the respondent no. 1 was nominated as Jan-Nasheen by
the original Sajjadanashin through the Khilafatnama dated
26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72) and lawfully succeeded to the office of
Sajjadanashin upon the demise of the predecessor in the year
1988.
53. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the High
Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the
CPC, we are of the view that the High Court has correctly held
that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
54. In fact, the entire challenge raised before this Court essentially
seeks a re-appreciation of evidence and reconsideration of
factual findings recorded by three courts. It is well settled that
this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution, does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent
findings of fact unless such findings suffer from manifest
illegality or result in grave miscarriage of justice.
55. Having examined the record, we find no such infirmity in the
judgments of the Courts below.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 29 of 30
56. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the
present appeals.
CONCLUSION
57. Accordingly, the present Civil Appeals are dismissed.
58. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.
59. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
…………………………… J.
[M.M. SUNDRESH]
…………………………… J.
[VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]
NEW DELHI
nd
02 April, 2026
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 30 of 30
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
\
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 13345 - 13346 OF 2015
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 13229 - 13230 of 2009)
SYED MOHAMMED GHOUSE PASHA KHADRI
… APPELLANT
versus
SYED MOHAMMED ADIL PASHA KHADRI & ORS. ETC.
… RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J.
1. These are the civil appeals challenging the common judgment
and order dated 15.04.2008 passed by the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 1574 of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEHA GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.02
17:46:34 IST
Reason:
2005 and 1575 of 2005, whereby the High Court dismissed the
second appeals filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 1 of 30
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “ the CPC” ), and
affirmed the concurrent judgments and decrees of the Courts
below, which had declared Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri
(Respondent No. 1 herein) as the lawful Sajjadanashin of the
Hazarath Mardane-e-Gaib Dargah, Shivasamudram, located in
Chamarajanagar District, Karnataka.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. The present dispute concerns succession to the office of
Sajjadanashin of the Hazarath Mardane-e-Gaib Dargah,
Shivasamudram, located in Chamarajanagar District,
Karnataka.
3. The original Sajjadanashin of the Dargah was Peer Pasha
Khadri, as per the Wakf Board’s Notification dated 01.04.1965.
Thereafter, Peer Pasha Khadri appointed his eldest son, Akhil
Pasha Khadri, as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada (i.e. successor of the
Sajjadanashin) of the Dargah. On 27.10.1980, Akhil Pasha
Khadri passed away, predeceasing his father.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 2 of 30
4. On 26.02.1981, at a religious function held in the presence of
Sajjadanashins of other dargahs and elders in the community,
Peer Pasha Khadri appointed and nominated Syed Mohammed
Adil Pasha Khadri (respondent no. 1 herein), his grandson and
son of late Akhil Pasha Khadri, to be the Jan-Nasheen Sajjada
of the Dargah. The appointment and nomination was reduced
in writing as Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72). On
06.10.1988, the original Sajjadanashin passed away and the
respondent no. 1 became the Sajjadanashin of the Dargah.
5. The appellant (Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri), being
the youngest son of the original Sajjadanashin, asserts a rival
claim to the office of the Sajjadanashin, relying upon certain
documents, including a General Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1), a
handwritten Khilafatnama (Ex. D-13) and an affidavit (Ex. D-
23) executed by the predecessor. Whereas, the respondent no.
1, being the grandson of the original Sajjadanashin, claims
succession to the same office on the basis of a nomination made
by the predecessor in Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-
72).
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 3 of 30
6. Thus, two civil suits came to be instituted before the Principal
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mysuru:
A. O.S. No. 724 of 1988 (renumbered as O.S. No. 342 of
1995), instituted by the appellant, asserting his claim as
Sajjadanashin of the Dargah. Respondent No. 1 was not
made a party to the suit and later filed an impleadment
application.
B. O.S. No. 233 of 1989, instituted by the respondent no. 1,
seeking declaration that he was the duly nominated
Sajjadanashin of the Dargah and for consequential reliefs.
7. By a common judgment and decree dated 14.11.2000, the Trial
Court decreed O.S. No. 233 of 1989 and dismissed O.S. No. 342
of 1995, holding that the office of Sajjadanashin was hereditary
in nature, and thus, the respondent no. 1 had been validly
nominated through Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72)
and the documents relied upon by the appellant, including Ex.
D-1, Ex. D-13 and Ex. D-23, did not confer Sajjadanashin-ship.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 4 of 30
8. The appellant preferred two separate appeals, namely R.A. No.
8 of 2004 (against the decree in O.S. No. 233 of 1989) and R.A.
No. 9 of 2004 (against the dismissal of O.S. No. 342 of 1995).
Both the Regular Appeals were dismissed by the First Appellate
Court and the findings of the Trial Court were upheld, by a
common judgment and order dated 07.07.2005.
9. The Regular Second Appeals preferred by the appellant, namely
R.S.A. Nos. 1574 and 1575 of 2005, were dismissed by the High
Court of Karnataka, by the impugned common judgment and
order dated 15.04.2008.
10. Vide the impugned judgment, the High Court recorded that the
Trial Court had decreed O.S. No. 233/1989 in favour of the
respondent no. 1 and O.S. No. 342/1995 (appellant’s suit) was
dismissed, the First Appellate Court had reappreciated the
evidence and affirmed the findings. Thus, there were concurrent
findings of fact in favour of the respondent no. 1. The High
Court accepted the concurrent finding that the office of
Sajjadanashin is hereditary in nature and succession was
governed by established practice and nomination. It was held
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 5 of 30
that the Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72) was duly
proved and executed by the original Sajjadanashin, and thus,
the nomination of the respondent no. 1 was valid and further
rejected allegations of fabrication or interpolation with Ex. P-72.
It was further held that Ex. D-1, Ex. D-13 and Ex. D-23 relied
upon by the appellant did not amount to nomination and these
documents did not confer Sajjadanashin-ship.
11. Thus, the High Court concluded that the findings were factual
in nature, no perversity was demonstrated and no substantial
question of law arose under Section 100 of the CPC.
Accordingly, the Regular Second Appeals were dismissed and
the Trial Court and First Appellate Court judgments were
affirmed, thereby declaring the respondent no. 1 as the rightful
Sajjadanashin.
12. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant filed Special
Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos. 13229 and 13230 of 2009 before this
Court. This Court, by the interim order dated 14.09.2009,
directed the parties to maintain status quo and, by the order
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 6 of 30
dated 04.11.2015, leave to appeal was granted, culminating
into the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
13. Mr. Rabin Majumder, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, at the outset, disputes the fact that the father of
the respondent no. 1 was appointed as Jannasheen Sajjada in
1966. It is stated that the father of the respondent no. 1 was
never appointed as Jannasheen or Sajjadanashin of the
Dargah, nor did he hold any Khilafatnama at any time. The
record demonstrates that he permanently shifted to Bangalore
in 1966, after mortgaging certain Dargah lands and ceased to
participate in the affairs of the Dargah.
14. It is stated that during this period, the appellant was granted
Khilafatnama on 06.07.1969 (Ex. D-13) and thereafter
maintained and managed the Dargah continuously from 1966
to 1981 and subsequently from 1982 onwards. Only after the
demise of the original Sajjadanashin in 1988 did the respondent
no. 1 seek to intervene by getting himself impleaded in O.S. No.
724 of 1988 (renumbered as O.S. No. 342 of 1995), thereby
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 7 of 30
disputing the appellant’s long-standing management of the
Dargah.
15. Learned Counsel submitted that the Courts below committed
serious errors in treating Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex.
P-72) as conferring Sajjadanashinship despite it being only a
record of Khilafat, and failing to properly interpret the Urdu,
Persian and Arabic terminology used in the original document.
It is stated that the document does not confer the office of
Sajjadanashin, as under Islamic practice, the status of Khalifa
or Jannasheen is distinct from that of Sajjadanashin, and the
Courts below erred in treating the document as conferring
succession to the office.
16. The office of Sajjadanashin primarily relates to spiritual
functions, including religious teaching, conduct of Urs, Sandal
ceremonies and spiritual discourse at the Dargah. It is
submitted that the Courts below erred in treating
Sajjadanashinship as a purely documentary right, contrary to
the principles laid down in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd.
Hanifa (1976) 4 SCC 780 . It is further submitted that the
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 8 of 30
Courts below wrongly assumed the existence of a custom
without proof, contrary to the principle that custom must be
specifically pleaded and strictly proved, as held in the case of
Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand Dolwani, AIR 1953 SC
298 .
17. It is further submitted that the Courts below erred in ignoring
material evidence, including Ex. D-1 (registered GPA of 1981)
and Ex. D-23 (affidavit of the original Sajjadanashin), and the
testimony of several witnesses supporting the appellant’s claim
to the office of Sajjadanashin. It is submitted that the affidavit
executed by the predecessor Sajjadanashin was wrongly
disregarded, despite affidavits being admissible evidence of
intention and nomination, reliance is placed on Narbada Devi
Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal (2003) 8 SCC 745 .
18. It is further submitted that historically, movable and immovable
assets of the Dargah, including Golak collections, Tabeez,
Fateha offerings and other income, have been shared among the
descendants of the original Sajjadanashin, who constitute the
stakeholders of the Wakf property, and any declaration
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 9 of 30
recognizing a new Sajjadanashin cannot extinguish the
established rights of other stakeholders, thus, the declaration
granted by the trial court disregards this long-standing practice
of shared management and benefit. In addition, it is submitted
that the Wakf Board should not open the Golak solely in the
presence of the Sajjadanashin, but in the presence of all
stakeholders, in accordance with the established practice
followed over generations.
19. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that Ex. P-72
suffers from the following serious suspicious circumstances:
A.
The original document only recorded the grant of Khilafat
to the respondent no. 1.
B. The word “Jannasheen” was subsequently inserted in the
document by the same scribe, who was the maternal uncle
of the respondent no. 1.
C. This interpolation occurred nine years after the death of
the original Sajjadanashin and the addition was not
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 10 of 30
countersigned or authenticated with the proper seal of the
original authority.
20. It is stated that these serious suspicious circumstances
surrounding Ex. P-72 were ignored by the Courts below, despite
the requirement of a heightened standard of proof as held in the
case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmaiamma, AIR
1959 SC 443 . It is therefore prayed that Ex. P-72 be sent to the
Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) for examination, in
the interest of justice before final adjudication, to determine
whether the word “Jannasheen” was inserted later, whether the
ink and handwriting differ, and the approximate time of the
original writing and subsequent additions.
21. Learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the
burden of proof was wrongly shifted onto the appellant, though
the respondent no. 1, as the propounder of Ex. P-72, bore the
primary burden, reliance was placed on Rangammal v.
Kuppuswami (2011) 12 SCC 220 .
22. Learned Counsel for the appellant further relied upon extensive
documentary evidence, including 163 documents and
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 11 of 30
correspondence with the Wakf Board, demonstrating that the
appellant had been recognized and functioning as
Jannasheen/Sajjadanashin both during the lifetime of the
original Sajjadanashin and thereafter.
23. In light of the above submissions, learned Counsel for the
appellant submitted that the findings of the Courts below are
legally unsustainable, having been based on misinterpretation
of documents, failure to consider material evidence and
incorrect application of legal principles governing succession to
the office of Sajjadanashin. It is therefore submitted that the
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 1
24. Ms. Pritha Srikumar Iyer, learned Counsel for the respondent
no. 1, at the outset, submitted that the Sajjadanashin is the
spiritual head and manager of the Dargah, superior to the
Mutawalli and responsible for religious guidance and
administration. The position is traditionally hereditary and the
founder or incumbent Sajjadanashin has the authority to
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 12 of 30
nominate a successor (Jan Nasheen) from among his disciples
(Khalifas).
25. It is submitted that the Trial Court declared the respondent no.
1 as Sajjadanashin and dismissed the appellant’s suit, the First
Appellate Court dismissed both appeals filed by the appellant,
and the High Court of Karnataka dismissed the Second Appeals,
thereby confirming the findings in favour of the respondent no.
1.
26. Thus, all three courts (Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and
High Court) concurrently held that:
A.
Peer Pasha Khadri was the original Sajjadanashin and the
office of the Sajjadanashin was hereditary in nature.
B. The respondent no. 1 was validly appointed successor (Jan
Nasheen) through a religious ceremony witnessed by
fakirs, murids and other Sajjadanashins.
C. The appointment was documented contemporaneously in
Ex. P-72 dated 26.02.1981.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 13 of 30
D. The appellant was present at the ceremony and attested
the document as a witness, demonstrating
acknowledgment of the appointment.
E. The documents relied upon by the appellant do not
constitute a valid nomination of successor, as the General
Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1) operated only during the
lifetime of Peer Pasha Khadri and the Affidavit (Ex. D-23)
does not amount to a Khilafathnama or appointment as
Sajjadanashin.
27. Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 submitted that the
contention of the appellant that only a living son can succeed
as Sajjadanashin was never pleaded in the written statement
and is an afterthought. In earlier proceedings, the appellant
himself admitted that a Sajjadanashin can nominate any
successor and there is no rigid rule of succession.
28. It is further submitted that the argument of the appellant that
the respondent no. 1 resided in Bangalore was examined and
rejected by both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 14 of 30
It is stated that the evidence shows that the respondent no. 1
also resided in Shivasamudram.
29. Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 submitted that three
courts have concurrently found, on facts and law, that the
respondent no. 1 was validly appointed successor (Jan
Nasheen) and is the rightful Sajjadanashin of the Dargah. In
addition, the contentions raised by the appellant lack pleading,
legal basis or evidentiary support, and therefore, the findings in
favour of the respondent no. 1 deserves to be upheld.
ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
30. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and
having carefully perused the pleadings, documentary material
and the judgments of the Courts below, the principal question
which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the
High Court was justified in dismissing the Regular Second
Appeals filed under Section 100 of the CPC, on the ground that
no substantial question of law arose for consideration,
particularly in the light of the concurrent findings recorded by
the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court with respect to the
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 15 of 30
succession to the office of Sajjadanashin of Hazarath Mardane-
e-Gaib Dargah, Shivasamudram.
31. At the outset, it must be emphasised that the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Section 100 of the CPC is confined to
examination of substantial questions of law arising from the
judgment of the First Appellate Court, as held in the case of
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 .
It is well settled that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Courts below cannot ordinarily be interfered with in second
appeal unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on
no evidence, or arrived at by ignoring material evidence or by
applying erroneous legal principles.
32. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court, upon detailed appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence, have recorded concurrent findings that Syed
Mohammed Peer Pasha Khadri was the original Sajjadanashin
of the Dargah and that the office was hereditary in nature, with
the incumbent Sajjadanashin possessing the authority to
nominate a successor.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 16 of 30
33. In this regard, the First Appellate Court relied upon the
admission made by the official witness of the Wakf Board. The
appellate court recorded the following extract from the cross-
examination of DW-6:
“In column No.4 there is mention that Mohammed Peer
Pasha Khadri is the Sajjadanasheen… Instead of
pronging as Mutatwlli by mistake it has been printed
as Sajjadanasheen. It is a true that the said
notification has not been so far corrected or
cancelled… It is true that the designation of
Sajjadanasheen is a hereditary post.”
Therefore, the appellate court rightly rejected the contention
that the predecessor was merely a Mutawalli and held that the
office of Sajjadanashin was hereditary in character.
34. Apart from the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts
below, it is necessary for this Court to independently examine
the legal principles governing succession to the office of
Sajjadanashin, particularly in the context of religious
endowments and Wakf institutions.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 17 of 30
35. The office of Sajjadanashin occupies a distinctive position in
Islamic religious institutions connected with Dargahs and Sufi
shrines. The Sajjadanashin is not merely an administrative
manager of Wakf property but is primarily the spiritual head of
the shrine, responsible for preserving the spiritual lineage
(silsila), guiding disciples (murids), conducting religious
ceremonies such as Urs and Sandal, and maintaining the
spiritual traditions associated with the shrine.
36. The legal position in this regard has been recognised by this
Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (supra) , wherein it was
observed that the office of Sajjadanashin is fundamentally
spiritual in character, though it may carry with it certain
incidental rights relating to the management of the shrine.
Similarly, Mulla: Principles of Mahomedan Law (20th
Edition) in Chapter XII , defines the office of Sajjadanashin as
under:
“The word “sajjadanashin” (spiritual superior) is
derived from sajjada, that is, the carpet used by
Mahomedans for prayer, and nashin, that is, sitting.
The sajjadanashin takes precedence on the carpet
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 18 of 30
during prayers. The office of a mutawalli is a secular
office; that of a sajjadanashin is a spiritual office, and
he has certain spiritual functions to perform. All
dargahs are not Khankhas but there is nothing
uniform or rigid. All Sajjadanashins are not
necessarily mutawallis of the properties of the
institution. The office of mutawalli may be in another
person. A Sajjadanashin was said in this case to
resemble a Mahant of a Hindu Math. A sajjadanashin
of a Khankhah enjoys the unique position of being a
spiritual preceptor and a mutawalli. Differences
between a sajjadanashin and a mutawalli were
pointed out in Ikramiul Haq Shah v. Board of Wakfs
(Rajasthan). The founder is generally the first
sajjadanashin and after his death the spiritual line is
continued by a succession of sajjadanashins.”
37. At the same time, Indian courts have consistently held that
succession to such religious offices is ordinarily determined by
custom, usage, or nomination by the incumbent, depending
upon the particular traditions governing the institution. In the
context of Muslim religious institutions, the Supreme Court has
recognised that offices such as that of a Sajjadanashin or
Mutawalli may devolve in accordance with the established
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 19 of 30
customs of the institution, including nomination by the
predecessor rather than strict rules of inheritance, as held in
Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (supra) . Mulla: Principles of
Mahomedan Law (20th Edition) in Chapter XII
, provides for
the same as under:
“In the absence of a direction in the wakfnama the
succession to the office of sajjadanashin is regulated
by custom. One custom is that the “bhek” or order i.e.,
an electoral body consisting of fakeers and murids,
instal a competent person generally a son or nominee
of the late sajjadanashin. In a case before the Privy
Council the “bhek” delegated their power to elect a
sajjadanashin and it was held that the appointment
of the sajjadanashin made in this manner was valid.
If the Court is appointing a sajjadanashin, it should
take account of the spiritual tradition and appoint if
possible a descendant of the founder. As to the
importance of nomination by the last sajjadanashin
see the observations of Agha Haider J., in Ghulam
Mahommad v Abdul Rashid. The Lahore High Court
has decided that in the absence of directions in the
Deed of Trust, or usage, a sajjadanashin can
nominate his successor.”
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 20 of 30
38. From the record it transpires that the respondent no. 1 had
been nominated as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada by the original
Sajjadanashin through the Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex.
P-72). The said document was accepted through a religious
ceremony attended by members of the fraternity and other
Sajjadanashins. It also transpired from the record that
prevailing practice governing the Dargah recognises nomination
by the incumbent Sajjadanashin as a valid mode of succession.
It would, however, emerge that the document Ex. P-72,
originally written in Urdu, Persian and Arabic, had been
translated into English for the purpose of the proceedings. Upon
analysing the document together with the surrounding
circumstances and the oral evidence adduced by the parties, it
can be said that the Khilafatnama conferred upon the
respondent no. 1, the spiritual authority previously exercised
by the incumbent Sajjadanashin and thereby constituted a
valid act of nomination.
39. At this stage, it is relevant to observe that the execution of the
said document was supported by the testimony of the attesting
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 21 of 30
witnesses. One of the witnesses, who was himself associated
with another Dargah, deposed that the predecessor
Sajjadanashin had formerly conferred spiritual authority upon
the respondent no. 1 in the presence of several people. We find
that the testimony of the said witness is credible and in fact the
present appellant had failed to elicit any material in cross-
examination that could discredit the evidence of the aforesaid
witness.
40. From the record it also transpires that another witness also
corroborated the circumstances in which the Khilafatnama was
executed and described the religious ceremony during which
the respondent no. 1 was nominated. Thus, the appellant has
failed to point out from the documentary as well as oral evidence
that the document Ex. P-72 is a fabricated document.
41. Now, it is the contention of the appellant that Ex. P-72 merely
conferred Khilafatnama and did not amount to nomination as
Sajjadanashin. From the examination of the aforesaid
document as a whole and considering the surrounding evidence
as well as the findings recorded by the Courts below, it can be
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 22 of 30
said that the document might not expressly use the term
“Sajjadanashin”, but, it clearly conveyed the intention of the
incumbent Sajjadanashin to confer his spiritual authority upon
the respondent no. 1 and to designate him as a successor. It is
also the contention of the appellant herein that the word “Jan-
Nasheen” had been subsequently interpolated in the said
document. With regard to the said contention, we may observe
that the appellant himself had admitted the existence and
acceptance of the document, and once such admission was
made, the burden shifted upon the appellant to establish the
alleged interpolation. However, the appellant neither effectively
cross-examined the attesting witnesses on this issue nor sought
examination of the said document by a hand writing expert.
Thus, in the absence of any substantive evidence supporting
the allegation, the contention of the appellant is required to be
rejected. We may add that at this stage it is not open for the
appellant to contend that the said document be sent for
necessary examination to the concerned expert.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 23 of 30
42. It is a settled principle that mere suspicion cannot displace a
document which has otherwise been duly proved. The burden
of establishing forgery or interpolation lies on the party alleging
H. Venkatachala
it and this principle has been reiterated in
Iyengar (supra) . In the present case, the appellant failed to
produce any cogent evidence to substantiate the allegation of
interpolation before this Court as well.
43. It is also required to be observed at this stage that the appellant
himself had earlier admitted the practice of succession through
nomination by the incumbent Sajjadanashin. Thus, the
admission of the appellant demonstrated that the office was not
confined strongly to succession by a living son and that
nomination by the incumbent Sajjadanashin was recognised in
practice. Significantly, the material on record does not establish
any rigid rule that the office must invariably devolve upon the
eldest son of hereditary succession. Thus, the contention raised
by the appellant that under Mohammadan law, only a living son
may succeed to the office of Sajjadanashin is without factual
basis and no material is produced by the appellant to support
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 24 of 30
this argument. The extracts produced by the appellant from
Mulla (supra) in the course of oral submissions pertain to
succession to property and not to appointment of a successor
as Sajjadanashin.
44. On the contrary, the evidence produced before the Courts below
indicates that the prevailing practice recognises the authority of
the incumbent Sajjadanashin to nominate his Jan-Nasheen. We
have gone through the reasoning recorded by the Courts below
with regard to the aforesaid aspect based on documentary as
well as oral evidence and we are of the view that the Courts
below have not committed any error while recording the findings
to the aforesaid effect.
45. The appellant has also relied upon certain documents, namely
the General Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1), the Khilafatnama dated
06.07.1969 (Ex. D-13) and the Affidavit (Ex. D-23), to assert his
claim to the office of Sajjadanashin.
46. We have examined the aforesaid documents upon which the
appellant has placed reliance. From the General Power of
Attorney (Ex. D-1), it can be said that the said document was
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 25 of 30
merely a power of attorney authorizing the appellant to act on
behalf of the executant and did not confer any right of
succession to the office. This view is consistent with the settled
legal principle that a power of attorney creates only an agency
relationship and does not transfer title or confer independent
rights. The authority granted under such an instrument is
ordinarily co-terminus with the life and authority of the
principal. Consequently, a power of attorney cannot operate as
a mode of succession to a religious office.
47. This position has been authoritatively affirmed by this Court in
Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,
(2012) 1 SCC 656 , where it was held that a power of attorney
is merely an instrument of agency and cannot by itself transfer
ownership or create proprietary rights. Applying the same
principle, a document which merely authorises another person
to act on behalf of the executant cannot be construed as
conferring succession to a spiritual office such as that of a
Sajjadanashin.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 26 of 30
48. So far as the affidavit (Ex. D-23) is concerned, the same cannot
be recorded as a valid instrument of nomination. It is required
to be observed that from the evidence on record, it transpires
that an act as significant as the appointment of a successor to
the office of Sajjadanashin would ordinarily be performed
through a clear and formal act consistent with the traditions of
the institution. Thus, in absence of any other reliable
corroborative evidence demonstrating that the affidavit
represented such an act of nomination, we are of the view that
the Courts below have rightly declined to treat the said
document conferring any right of succession.
49. Another contention raised by the appellant is with regard to
certain correspondences, photographs and oral testimonies to
suggest that the appellant had been managing the affairs of the
Dargah for several years. We have examined the said evidence
and we are of the view that, at best, the said evidence indicated
that the appellant had participated in certain managerial or
ceremonial activities associated with the Dargah, however, such
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 27 of 30
participation by itself cannot establish succession to the office
of Sajjadanashin.
50. With regard to the contention raised by the appellant that the
respondent no. 1 resided in Bangalore and not at
Shivasamudram, it is a specific finding recorded on the basis of
the evidence by the Courts below that the respondent no. 1 was
also a resident of Shivasamudram, and therefore, when a
concurrent finding of the fact is recorded by the Courts below,
at this stage, the said finding of fact cannot be interfered with.
51. The appellant has further contended that recognition of the
respondent no. 1 as Sajjadanashin would extinguish the rights
of other family members or stakeholders in the Wakf property.
This submission is misconceived. The present litigation
concerns succession to the office of Sajjadanashin and not the
proprietary rights of descendants in Wakf property or income.
The recognition of one individual as Sajjadanashin does not
determine or extinguish the independent legal rights of other
beneficiaries under Wakf law.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 28 of 30
52. Considering the entire evidence on record, we are of the view
that the respondent no. 1 was nominated as Jan-Nasheen by
the original Sajjadanashin through the Khilafatnama dated
26.02.1981 (Ex. P-72) and lawfully succeeded to the office of
Sajjadanashin upon the demise of the predecessor in the year
1988.
53. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the High
Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the
CPC, we are of the view that the High Court has correctly held
that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
54. In fact, the entire challenge raised before this Court essentially
seeks a re-appreciation of evidence and reconsideration of
factual findings recorded by three courts. It is well settled that
this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution, does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent
findings of fact unless such findings suffer from manifest
illegality or result in grave miscarriage of justice.
55. Having examined the record, we find no such infirmity in the
judgments of the Courts below.
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Civil Appeal Nos. 13345 - 13346 of 2015 Page 29 of 30
56. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the
present appeals.
CONCLUSION
57. Accordingly, the present Civil Appeals are dismissed.
58. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.
59. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
…………………………… J.
[M.M. SUNDRESH]
…………………………… J.
[VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]
NEW DELHI
nd
02 April, 2026
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