Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 7116 of 2004
PETITIONER:
Ranju @ Gautam Ghosh
RESPONDENT:
Rekha Ghosh & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/12/2007
BENCH:
R.V. Raveendran & P. Sathasivam
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment and final
Order dated 30.1.2004 passed by the High Court at Calcutta
in S.A. No. 212 of 1992 whereby the High Court dismissed the
second appeal filed by the appellant herein.
2) Brief facts in nutshell are as follows:
Originally one Anil Kumar Ghosh was a tenant in respect
of the shop situated at 50-C Richi Road, Kolkata and
respondent Nos. 1-6/plaintiffs are the landlords of the
premises in dispute. The predecessor-in-interest of
respondent Nos. 1-6 purchased the said property from one
Smt. Manjusree Shyam Chowdhury. The predecessor-in-
interest of the appellant was paying a rent of Rs. 20/- per
month. The predecessor-in-interest of respondent Nos. 1-6
instituted a suit against the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellant for recovery of possession and mesne profit in
respect of the premises in question which was dismissed by
the learned Munsif, Ist Additional Court, Alipore, District 24
Parganas on 29.9.1986. Aggrieved by the said order, the
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents filed an appeal
before the Court of Assistant District Judge, 4th Court Alipore,
24 Parganas. During the pendency of the appeal the original
tenant Anil Kumar Ghosh passed away and his L.Rs were
brought on record. The said appeal was allowed with cost and
the respondents therein were directed to give the vacant
possession of the suit premises and also granted a decree for
mesne profit @ Rs.1/- per diem till the recovery of the
possession. Being aggrieved by the said order, the tenants
preferred a second appeal being S.A. No. 212 of 1992 before
the High Court of Calcutta. On 30.1.2004, the High Court
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the first
appellate Court and directed to vacate the premises within 90
days from the date of the delivery of judgment. Challenging
the said order, Ranju @ Gautam Ghosh filed this appeal before
this Court by way of special leave petition.
3) Heard Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant and Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondents.
4) The following points arise for consideration in this
appeal:-
1) Whether notice to quit was legal, valid and sufficient;
2) Whether the tenant did any act which violated clauses
(m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882;
3) Is the tenant guilty of causing act of nuisance and
annoyance?
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5) Let us consider the first issue which relates to notice. It
is not in dispute that the respondent-landlord filed a suit for
eviction and mesne profits in title suit No. 78 of 1976 under
Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (in
short the \021Tenancy Act\022). The trial Court on the issue of notice
disbelieved the service under certificate of posting and failed to
accept the tender of the ejectment notice to the defendant by
peon on 27.06.1973 and thereby concluded that there was no
valid notice to quit. In respect of other two issues, the trial
Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove any damage
to the suit premises. Based on the said finding it arrived at a
conclusion that the defendant did not violate the provisions of
sub-section (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (in short \023T.P Act\024). In the last issue the
trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed
to prove that the defendant is guilty of causing nuisance or
annoyance. With the said findings, the trial Court dismissed
the suit.
6) The appellate Court on appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence came to the conclusion that notice to
quit was duly served on the defendant and he was well aware
of the contents of the same. In respect of other two issues, the
learned Assistant District Judge found that the
defendant/tenant caused damage to his collapsible gate and
also caused nuisance and created annoyance. After arriving
such conclusion set aside the judgment and decree of the trial
Court and ordered eviction. In the second appeal filed by the
defendant/tenant, the High Court accepted those factual
findings, confirmed the same and dismissed the second
appeal. Aggrieved by the judgment, the tenant has filed this
appeal.
7) Before going into the merits of the claim on the above
issues, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions:-
Section 13 (1) (b) and (6) of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956 reads thus:
\023S. 13. Protection of tenant against eviction.-(1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law,
no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the
landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the
following grounds, namely:-
(a) xxx xxxx
(b) where the tenant or any person residing in the premises
let to the tenant has done any act contrary to the provisions
of clause (m), clause (o) or clause (p) of section 108 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882);
(c) xxx xxxx
xxx xxx xxx
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) xxx xxx xxx
(4) xxx xxx xxx
(5) xxx xxx xxx
(6) Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time
being in force, no suit or proceeding for the recovery of
possession of any premises on any of the grounds mentioned
in sub-section (1) except the grounds mentioned in clauses
(j) and (k) of that sub-section shall be filed by the landlord
unless he has given to the tenant one month\022s notice
expiring with a month of the tenancy.\024
Sub-sections (m) (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer
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of Property Act, 1882 reads thus:
\023108. Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee.- In the
absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, the
lessor and the lessee of immovable property, as against one
another, respectively, possess the rights and are subject to
the liabilities mentioned in the rules next followed, or such of
them as are applicable to the property leased:-
(m) the lessee is bound to keep, and on the termination of
the lease to restore, the property in as good condition as it
was in at the time when he was put in possession, subject
only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or
irresistible force, and to allow the lessor and his agents, at
all reasonable times during the term, to enter upon the
property and inspect the condition thereof and give or leave
notice of any defect in such condition; and, when such defect
has been caused by any act or default on the part of the
lessee, his servants or agents, he is bound to make it good
within three months after such notice has been given or left;
(o) the lessee may use the property and its products (if any)
as a person of ordinary prudence would use them if they
were his own; but he must not use, or permit another to use,
the property for a purpose other than that for which it was
leased, or fell or sell timber, pull down or damage buildings
belonging to the lessor, or work mines or quarries not open
when the lease was granted, or commit any other act which
is destructive or permanently injurious thereto;
(p) he must not, without the lessor\022s consent, erect on the
property any permanent structure, except for agricultural
purposes;\024
8) Under Section 13, a tenant is protected from eviction and
in sub-section (1) of Section 13 certain grounds have been
specified which would made the tenant liable to be evicted.
Such grounds have to be proved by the landlord and on the
proof of any such ground, the tenant will loose protection
against eviction. In such circumstances, the suit by the
landlord against the tenant governed by the Act will be
maintainable only when any of these grounds are proved. To
put it clear insistence of one or more grounds as stated in
Section 13(1) is mandatory for a decree for eviction.
9) As mentioned above, first we have to determine whether
there was valid notice to quit. We have already referred to
sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Tenancy Act which makes
it clear that unless the landlord has given to the tenant one
month\022s notice expiring with a month of the tenancy he cannot
avail any of the provisions either under the Tenancy Act or the
T.P Act for eviction. The language used in sub-section 6
makes it clear that it is obligation on the part of the landlord
to issue one month\022s notice expiring with the month of the
tenancy to the tenant. Learned counsel appearing for the
appellant placing reliance on Section 28 of the Bengal General
Clauses Act, 1899 (Bengal Act 1 of 1899) submitted that the
notice shall be by registered post. He further contended that
in view of the fact that notice to quit was sent only under
certificate of posting, the same is not valid in terms of Section
28 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, hence the eviction
order cannot be sustained. On going through the relevant
provisions, we are unable to accept the said contention. First
of all, the language used in sub-section (6) of Section 13 is
\023one month\022s notice expiring with a month of the tenancy to
the tenant\024. Neither in sub-section 6 nor in any other
provision mandates that notice \023to be served by registered
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post\024. (emphasis supplied) It is useful to refer to Section 28 of
the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 which reads as under:-
\02328. Meaning of service by post.- Where any Bengal Act or
West Bengal Act, made after the commencement of this Act
authorizes or requires any document to be served by post,
whether the expression \023serve\024 or either of the expressions
\023give\024 or \023send\024 or any other expression is used, then, unless
a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to
be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by
registered post, a letter containing the document, and,
unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the
time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary
course of post.\024
10) The above provision makes it clear that after the
commencement of the said Act any document to be served
(emphasis supplied) by post, the service shall be by
mentioning proper address, prepaying and posting by
registered post a letter containing the document. In our case,
as stated earlier, clause 6 provides mere \023one month notice\024,
in such event, the said notice can be served in any manner
and it cannot be claimed that the same should be served only
by registered post with acknowledgement due. The plaintiff as
PW 1 has stated that the defendant Anil Kumar Ghosh was
not present in his shop and the notice of eviction was handed
over to his son Ranju who accepted it but refused to put his
signature as a token of acceptance. In his evidence, PW 1
further asserted that Chittaranjan Ghosh was present at the
time and after a short while he affixed another coy of the
notice in the collapsible gate and that too was endorsed by
Chittaranjan Ghosh. Both PW 1 and Chittaranjan Ghosh
made an endorsement in Ex. 9. Chittaranjan Ghosh was
examined as PW 6 and he is a family physician of the
plaintiffs. According to PW 1, PW 6 holds good reputation.
Considering the above materials, the lower appellate Court
found that notice was duly served on the defendant and the
defendant was very well aware about the contents of the said
notice. On going through the evidence placed before us and
the relevant provisions, we agree with the conclusion of the
Assistant District Judge affirmed by the High Court and hold
that there was valid notice to quit.
11) Coming to clauses (m) (o) and (p), the appellate Court as
well as the High Court accepted the evidence of PW 1-plaintiff
No.1, PW 6 his neighbour and physician and other
documentary evidence such as complaint to the police, entry
in general diary, Ex. 17 and accepted the case of the plaintiff.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that in
the light of the report of the Advocate Commissioner which has
been marked as Ex. 13 the defendant neither caused any
damage to collapsible gate nor put up any additional
construction as claimed by the plaintiff. We also perused the
evidence of PW 1, PW 6 Ex. 13 and 17 and accept the factual
finding of the appellate Court affirmed by the High Court. As
rightly pointed out by the Assistant District Judge, the suit
premises was inspected by an Advocate Commissioner only on
12.03.1971 i.e. about 1= years after the alleged occurrence,
hence no credence be attached to the Commissioner\022s report.
The appellate Court based on the evidence of PW 1, PW 6
complaint, entry in General Diary, Ex 17 came to the
conclusion that the collapsible gate had been cut by 5/6\024 and
again it was replaced without the consent and permission of
the plaintiffs/landlords. In the light of the abundant material,
factual conclusion arrived by the appellate Court confirmed by
the High Court the same cannot be ignored lightly in the
absence of any contra evidence. On the other hand, we agree
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with the said conclusion.
12) Coming to the last issue, namely, nuisance and
annoyance, PW 1 Dr. Bhabani Charan Ghosh, in his evidence,
has categorically stated that on 16.09.1975 at about 6.30 p.m.
the tenants dismantled the collapsible gate of southern garage.
He further deposed that when they were cutting the same he
protested for which they threatened to kill him. He made a
complaint to the police. According to him, this was witnessed
by Chittaranjan and Sangana. As observed earlier, PW 1 is
none else than a Surgical Specialist (MS) of Government of
West Bengal. He also specifically referred to the threat made
by Ranju and Sailen. According to him, both of them
threatened him with dire consequences. It is further seen
from his evidence that at the time of cutting the collapsible
gate, the same was photographed and produced before the
Court in support of his claim. It also revealed that pursuant
to his complaint, criminal proceedings under Section 144
Cr.P.C was initiated. PW 5 - Mahim Biswas resident of No. 65
Motilal Nehru Road, Calcutta \026 29, in his evidence, has stated
that while he was returning to his house, he noticed group of
persons in front of the house of the appellant. He also referred
to the damage caused to the collapsible gate by the tenants.
PW 9-second plaintiff has stated that on 06.02.1973 Ranju
Ghosh-defendant in the said suit attacked their house.
According to him, at the time he was in his house and
studying in their verandah. He further deposed that when the
police came Ranju Ghosh and other miscreants set up by
them ran away. In addition to the above oral evidence, as
stated in the earlier paragraphs, the lower appellate Court and
the High Court adverted to complaint given to the police, the
subsequent criminal proceedings and other relevant materials
and came to the conclusion that the respondents-landlords
made out a case for eviction on the ground of nuisance and
annoyance which we concur with the said factual finding.
13) In view of the above, we agree with the following
conclusions of the First Appellate Court as affirmed by the
High Court in Second Appeal:
(a) that the activities of threatening to kill the plaintiff,
beating the son of the plaintiff and abusing him
with filthy language would amount to nuisance and
annoyance, furnishing a ground of eviction under
clause (e) of section 13 (1) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956;
(b) that causing damage to the collapsible gate of the
tenanted portion and putting up a concrete
elevation of the floor, would amount to doing acts
contrary to the provisions of clauses (m), (o) and (p)
of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
thereby furnishing a ground of eviction under
clause (b) of section 13(1) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
14) Consequently, we find no merit in this appeal and it is
dismissed accordingly. However, the appellant is granted two
months\022 time to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises
to the respondents. No costs.