Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1227 of 2002
PETITIONER:
SANABOINA SATYANARAYANA
RESPONDENT:
GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/07/2003
BENCH:
DORAISWAMY RAJU & H.K. SEMA
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2003 Supp(1) SCR 874
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DORAISWAMY RAJU, J. The above appeal has been filed against the judgment
and order dated 11.7.2000 in Writ Petition No. 444 I of 2000 by a Division
Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissing the writ petition
along with some other writ petition also which came to be disposed of by a
common judgment. The claim of the petitioner Sanabolina Nelabala Chandrudu
in the writ petition filled before the High Court was that the convict, by
name, Sri Sanaboina Satyanarayana, (the appellant now before this Court)
the brother of the writ petitioner therein, was tried by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, West Godavari Division at Eluru along with four
others for the offence punishable under section 302, 498-A and 201 IPC in
Sessions Case No. 4 of 1990, that after completion of the trial the learned
Additional Sessions Judge convicted the brother of the writ petitioner who
stood charged as accused No. 1 under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him, to
undergo imprisonment for life. He was also said to have been convicted
under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to undergo three years’ rigorous
imprisonment, in addition to the payment of Rs. 1,000 as line in default of
which to suffer a further six months’ rigorous imprisonment conviction
under Section 201 IPC was also made for which he has been sentenced to
undergo four years’ rigorous imprisonment in addition to the payment of Rs.
1,000 as fine and in default to suffer six months’ rigorous imprisonment.
At appeal filed before the High Court, being Criminal Appeal No. 200 of
1992 was also dismissed on 04.05.1993. The convict was said to have been
taken into custody on 25.02.1992 and is under going imprisonment.
While so, it appears that the Governor of the first respondent - State has
passed GOMs. No. 18 HOME, (PRISONERS-C DEPARTMENT) dated 25.01.2000 in
exercise of the powers conferred under Article 161 of the Constitution of
India remitting the un-expired residue of sentence as on 26.01.2000, of the
various categories of prisoners in the State who have been convicted by
Civil Court of Criminal Jurisdiction for offences against laws relating to
a matter to which the Executive Power of the State extends, subject to the
conditions specified in paras (2) and (3) of the said Government order. The
said order came to be passed on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the
India becoming a Republic. The relevant part of the Government order which
needs reference for appreciating the grievance of the appellant is as
hereunder: -
"(a) All convicted prisoners sentenced to imprisonment for life who have
undergone an actual sentence of 7 years and a total sentence of 10 years
(including remission) as on 26.01.2000.
[(b) and (c) omitted as not relevant for the purpose of the case].
2. (Omitted as not relevant for the present case).
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3. The remission of sentence ordered in para 1 above shall not apply
to the following categories of prisoners, namely:-
(i) Prisoners convicted and sentenced by Courts situated outside the State
of A.P.
(ii) Prisoners convicted of offences against laws relating to a matter to
which the Executive Power of the Union extends.
(iii) Prisoners convicted under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of the
atrocities) Act, Explosive Substances Act, Indian Explosive Substances Act,
Indian Explosive Act and Indian Arms Act, while being sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
(iv) Prisoners convicted for crimes against women such as Section 376 and
354 IPC, while being sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(v) Prisoners convicted for the offences of theft, robbery, dacoity and
receiving stolen property (i.e. Section 379 to 411 IPC) while being
sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(vi) Prisoners who have overstayed on Parole furlough for cumulative
periods in excess of 10 years and,
(vii) Prisoners who have escaped while undergoing the sentence. 4.
......................................."
As indicated earlier, it makes explicit that the remission order is subject
to the conditions specified in paras (2) and (3) above, and therefore
subject to the stipulation contained in item (iv) of Para-3.
The grievance espoused before the High Court was that the appellant -
convict was entitled to the benefit of the said Government order and as
long as his conviction was not for a crime against women under"section 376
and 354 IPC, the benefit of the Government orders could not he denied to
the convict. It appears to have been also urged before the High Court that
the discrimination made in this regard against convicts for crimes against
woman suffers the wise of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and,
therefore, the Government order has to be read de-hors the said restriction
so as to extend the benefit of the remission granted there under to the
appellant also. The High Court rejected such a plea urged on behalf of the
appellant as well as the others observing that the power under Article 161
being purely a discretionary one it is for the Governor to grant remission
confined to certain categories of offenders/ convicts only and that there
was no discrimination involved in the same. As far the other issue relating
to the construction of category (iv) of para-3, it was observed, all
offences crimes against women are disabled from claiming the benefit of
remission under the orders in question and not merely those convicted under
section 376 and 354 IPC
When the matter came up before the Court on 24.07 2003 Mr. S. Muralidhar,
learned counsel appeared and made detailed submissions on behalf of the
appellant reiterating the same grounds as were urged before the High Court.
As the matter was about to be concluded, it was brought to our notice that
the Government seem to have also passed a subsequent order and that if any
benefit is given under the said Government order, it may ensure to the
advantage of the claim made in this appeal. At that stage, the matter was
adjourned to enable the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State
to produce the subsequent orders said to have been passed by the
Government. A copy of GOMs. No. 17 HOME (PRISONS-B -2 DE PARTMENT dated
17.01.2003 has been made available and it is seen from the said Government
order that the same was not in exercise of powers under Article 161 but
under Section 433 Cr. P.C. and Section 55 1PC and that several provisions
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of the IPC other than those which were already illustrated in the earlier
order of the Governor relating to crimes against women including the
conviction under the Dowry Prohibition Act have been specified to be the
class of convicts who cannot avail of the benefit of remission. The learned
counsel appearing for the appellant today would contend that the G.O. is of
a subsequent date and may not stand in the way of the benefits which are
claimed to have accrued to the appellant who has been convicted and
undergoing imprisonment, in terms of the earlier order of the Governor
dated 25.01.2000. As on the earlier date of hearing as well as today, the
learned counsel for the appellant tried to contend that there is no rhyme
or reason in making a further classification among the entire class of
convicts forming a larger group, based on offences or crime against women
and those falling under the other category, apart from contending that
stipulation contained in para 3- (iv) of the earlier order, noticed supra,
does not, by its very terms deny or disentitle a convict under section 498-
A IPC, to the benefits of remission granted under the earlier Government
order.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-state, while adopting the
reasoning of the High Court contended that the exception carved out denying
the benefit of remission in respect of convicts of crime against women is a
valid one, well merited and justifiable in public interest and the same is
not justiciable. It was also urged that the remission itself is a benefit
and concession sought to be granted to a few class of persons and being a
matter of policy, the State cannot be compelled to accord remission to all
category of convicts, even against the evolved policy of the State and no
discrimination which suffer the vice of Article 14 to the Constitution of
India, could be said to be involved in such classification and the High
Court was right in rejecting the claim on behalf of the appellant.
We have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel
appearing on either side. In our view, the rejection of the plea on behalf
of the appellant by the High Court was well merited and supported by sound
reasons. As pointed out earlier, the remission to be granted was in respect
of only a specified class of convicts and that too "subject to the
conditions" specified in the very Government order. Consequently, the claim
for remission cannot be made or countenanced de-hors the specific
conditions subject to which only it has been accorded and in as much as the
grant as well as the conditions formed a compendious single common pattern
or scheme of concession by way of remission, pregnated with a policy
designed in public interest and the safety and interests of the society,
either the remission could be availed of only subject to the conditions
stipulated or the entirety of the scheme fails as whole, and there is no
scope for judicial moditication or modulating the same so as to extend the
concession in excess of the very objective of the maker of the order which
seems to have been guided by considerations of State policy. In such class
or category of orders, there is no justification for any addition or
subtraction to facilitate enlargement of the scope and applicability of the
order beyond what was specifically intended in the order itself.
Clause (iv) of paragraph 3 of the Government order dated 25.01.2000
specifically stated that prisoners convicted for "Crimes against women such
as section 376 and 354 IPC while being sentenced to impisonment for life"
will fall outside scheme for remission granted under the said G.O. When the
clause noticed above, in the later portion referred to two of the
provisions of the IPC, after the words "such as" it was more by way of
illustration of the excepted category of offences relating to crimes
against women in general and not with an intention to be exhaustive of the
same and to merely confine the words "crimes against women" to only those
convicts for come against women under Section 376 and 354 IPC. Acceptance
of any such plea would amount to not only doing violence to the language of
the order of the Governor but also rewriting the same and that too in utter
distegard of the very intention, a laudable one in larger and greater
public interest. When keeping into consideration the societal needs and
dictates of the gruesome events happening in large scale all over the
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State, a conscions decision has been taken by the policy maker to keep out
a class of ,anti socials from availing the benefit of the remission, courts
cannot by stretching the language confer an undeserved benefit upon the
class of convicts, who in our view also have not only been designedly but
deservingly were kept out of the scheme for according the benefit of
remission.
The plea of discrimination needs mention only to be rejected. The remission
proposed in commemoration of the 50 years of Indian Republic itself is a
boon an concession to which no one had any vested right. As to what classes
of persons or category of offenders to whom the remission has to be
extended is a matter of policy particularly when it is also a constituent
power conferred upon the constitutional functionary and Head of the State
Government, larger area of latitude is to be conceded in favour of such
authority to decide upon the frame and limits of its exercise under Article
161 itself. The Constitution of India itself has chosen to countenance the
claims of women for favourable treatment and acknowledge the fact that sex
is a sound classification. The issue in question being one pertaining
purely to the area policy and political philosophy of the State, the Courts
except in the rarest of rare cases, cannot be called upon to adjudicate on
the desirability or wisdom of such decisions. It is no exaggeration to
place on record that instances of violence against women and children
particularly female, such as rape, dowry deaths, domestic violence, bride
burning, molestation, brazen, ill treatment of horror, vulgarity and
indecency are not only rampant but on phenomenal increase casting a shadow
of shame on the society, the culture and Governance in this country and it
seems that cruelty to women problems of battered wives have become
ironically almost a world wide phenomenon. Such a situation deserves a
special treatment in the hands of the State. Consequently, the
classification in this regard to keep/away convicts for crimes against
women from the benefits of remission under the order dated 25.01.2000
cannot be said to violate any reasonable principle or concepts of law so as
to call for its condemnation in exercise of the powers of judicial review.
The classification therefore sound just, reasonable, proper and
necessitated in the larger interest of society and greater public interest
and consequently cannot by any stretch of imagination be branded to be
invidious to attract the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A
careful scrutiny of the various excepted class of convicts only show that
the real object is to ensure that those who prey on the community and
violate fundamental values of mankind, society and national interest should
not get undeserved benefit.
Consequently, we see no merit whatsoever in the appeal and the same,
therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed..