Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 1473
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. /2025
(Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 11287/2025)
K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran ….Appellant(s)
Versus
State by Peenya Police ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2. The instant case lays bare the deeply disturbing reality of child
trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation in India, an offence
that strikes at the very foundations of dignity, bodily integrity and
the State’s constitutional promise of protection to every child
against exploitation leading to moral and material abandonment.
The facts before us are not isolated aberrations but form part of a
wider and entrenched pattern of organised exploitation that
continues to flourish despite legislative safeguards.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. On the fateful day of 22.11.2010, the complainant, H.Sidappa
(PW-1) received information from NGO workers, Tojo and Dominic
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ARJUN BISHT
Date: 2025.12.19
16:02:09 IST
Reason:
(PW-11) that minor girls were being kept for prostitution at a
rented house in Peenya, T. Dasarahalli, Bangalore. After obtaining
Page 1 of 15
the requisite verbal permission from senior officers, he, along with
the raiding party, proceeded to the spot. One Jaikar (PW- 8), an
associate of PW-11 was sent to the premises as a decoy with
Manjunath (PW-12). Jaikar offered money to the appellant (A1) for
having sex with the minor victim (PW-13) who was in the house.
After handing over the money, PW-8 intimated PW-1.
Consequently, PW-1 along-with other officers and PW-11 rescued
the minor victim. Upon search, the currency notes handed over to
the appellant were recovered. A mobile phone and Rs. 620 were
seized from the appellant’s wife (A2). A condom was also found on
the cot. PW-1 lodged a written complaint bearing FIR No.
778/2010 at Peenya Police Station, Bangalore against A1 & A2
1
u/s. 366A, 372, 373 & 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 r/w.
2
s.3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 .
Charge-sheet was filed u/s. 366A, 372, 373 & 34, IPC r/w. s. 3, 4,
5 & 6, ITPA.
4.
The case was registered as C.C. No. 5438/2011 and taken up for
trial. Charges were framed under the aforesaid provisions.
Prosecution proceeded to examine 16 prosecution witnesses,
arrayed as PW-1 to PW-16, to prove its case.
1
Hereinafter “IPC”.
2
Hereinafter “ITPA”.
Page 2 of 15
Brief description of the witnesses is set out hereunder:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 1473
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. /2025
(Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 11287/2025)
K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran ….Appellant(s)
Versus
State by Peenya Police ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2. The instant case lays bare the deeply disturbing reality of child
trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation in India, an offence
that strikes at the very foundations of dignity, bodily integrity and
the State’s constitutional promise of protection to every child
against exploitation leading to moral and material abandonment.
The facts before us are not isolated aberrations but form part of a
wider and entrenched pattern of organised exploitation that
continues to flourish despite legislative safeguards.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. On the fateful day of 22.11.2010, the complainant, H.Sidappa
(PW-1) received information from NGO workers, Tojo and Dominic
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ARJUN BISHT
Date: 2025.12.19
16:02:09 IST
Reason:
(PW-11) that minor girls were being kept for prostitution at a
rented house in Peenya, T. Dasarahalli, Bangalore. After obtaining
Page 1 of 15
the requisite verbal permission from senior officers, he, along with
the raiding party, proceeded to the spot. One Jaikar (PW- 8), an
associate of PW-11 was sent to the premises as a decoy with
Manjunath (PW-12). Jaikar offered money to the appellant (A1) for
having sex with the minor victim (PW-13) who was in the house.
After handing over the money, PW-8 intimated PW-1.
Consequently, PW-1 along-with other officers and PW-11 rescued
the minor victim. Upon search, the currency notes handed over to
the appellant were recovered. A mobile phone and Rs. 620 were
seized from the appellant’s wife (A2). A condom was also found on
the cot. PW-1 lodged a written complaint bearing FIR No.
778/2010 at Peenya Police Station, Bangalore against A1 & A2
1
u/s. 366A, 372, 373 & 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 r/w.
2
s.3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 .
Charge-sheet was filed u/s. 366A, 372, 373 & 34, IPC r/w. s. 3, 4,
5 & 6, ITPA.
4.
The case was registered as C.C. No. 5438/2011 and taken up for
trial. Charges were framed under the aforesaid provisions.
Prosecution proceeded to examine 16 prosecution witnesses,
arrayed as PW-1 to PW-16, to prove its case.
1
Hereinafter “IPC”.
2
Hereinafter “ITPA”.
Page 2 of 15
Brief description of the witnesses is set out hereunder:
| S.No. | Particulars | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | P.W. 1 (H.Sidappa) | Head of the raiding team3; de<br>facto complainant |
| 2. | P.W. 2 (Nagabhushan) | Member of the raiding team |
| 3. | P.W. 3 (Premkumari) | Member of the raiding team |
| 4. | P.W. 4 (Kavitha) | Member of the raiding team |
| 5. | P.W. 5 (Prasanna Kumar) | Member of the raiding team |
| 6. | P.W. 6 (Muddumahadevayya) | Member of the raiding team |
| 7. | P.W. 7 (H.R. Nataraj) | Headmaster of Shree Uma<br>Pragathi High School; He<br>issued the certificate recording<br>date of birth of P.W. 13/Minor<br>victim |
| 8. | P.W. 8 (Jaikar) | NGO Worker/ decoy witness |
| 9. | P.W. 9 (Roopa) | Police constable at Peenya<br>Police Station; She took the<br>sealed items to Madiwala FSL<br>for examination |
| 10. | P.W. 10 (Chandrakala) | Police constable at Peenya<br>Police Station;<br>She collected articles and<br>certificate related to P.W. 13<br>from Vanvilas Hospital. |
| 11. | P.W. 11 (Dominic) | NGO Worker/ Informant |
| 12. | P.W. 12 (Manjunath) | Independent Witness; He<br>accompanied P.W. 8 to the<br>rented premises |
| 13. | P.W. 13 | Minor victim |
| 14. | P.W. 14 (Umadevi) | Wife of P.W. 15, the owner of<br>rented premises; turned<br>hostile |
| 15. | P.W. 15 (Rangappa) | Owner of the rented premises |
| 16. | P.W. 16 (Mallikarjunayya) | Investigating Officer |
(i) Trial Court:
5. Trial Court placed substantial reliance upon the testimony of
minor victim, PW-13, which stood amply corroborated by the
3
P.W. 2 to P.W. 6 constituted the raiding team.
Page 3 of 15
testimonies of PW-8 and PW-12. The victim’s testimony revealed
that four unknown individuals had forcibly removed her from the
Chikkabanavara bus stand and placed her in the custody of A1 &
A2 at a rented premises in Dasarahalli. She further stated that the
appellant subsequently sent her to the house of one Naveen, where
she was coerced into prostitution. Owing to her ensuing
reluctance, she was taken back to the rented premises and forced
to indulge in illicit sexual intercourse. A1 & A2 also wrongfully
confined her within the rented premises and prevented her from
establishing any contact with the outside world. Upon considering
the witness testimonies, the Court observed that the ingredients of
the charged offences stood proved, particularly in the absence of
any credible evidence from the accused persons to demonstrate
that they bore any relationship with the victim. Therefore, the Trial
Court convicted A1 & A2 u/s. 366A, 373, 34 IPC r/w. s. 3, 4, 5 &
6 of the ITPA vide order dated 25.07.2013.
(ii) High Court:
6. Assailing the judgment passed by the Trial Court, Criminal Appeal
No. 860/2013 was preferred by A1 & A2 before the High Court.
The High Court, upon re-appreciation of the evidence on record,
held that the ingredients of the alleged offences stood established.
The defence failed to put forth any credible evidence while
responding to the incriminatory circumstances proved by the
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prosecution. Consequently, High Court concluded that the
prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal was dismissed vide order dated
05.02.2025. The Court further observed that no mitigating
circumstances were forthcoming on record to warrant any
reduction of sentence.
7. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High
Court, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.
ANALYSIS:
8. The prosecution case primarily hinges on the version of the victim
(PW-13). Driven by abject poverty, the victim left her residence
seeking respectful employment. Taking advantage of such
economic vulnerability, four unknown persons brought her to the
appellant’s house. In her presence, appellant made telephone calls
for sexually exploiting the victim. Pursuant to such negotiation,
some persons came to the house and the victim was asked to have
sex with them, which she refused. Thereupon, A1 & A2 compelled
her to accompany one Naveen, who took her to another place
where she was sexually exploited. Thereafter, she was brought
back to the appellant’s rented apartment where she had to satisfy
the lust of various customers. Finally, on 22.11.2020, the police
raided the apartment and rescued her. Her statement was
Page 5 of 15
recorded before the Magistrate which substantially corroborates
her version in Court.
9. Ld. Counsel for appellant has challenged the victim’s version on
various scores. He contends that the victim’s evidence regarding
forcible sexual intercourse is an embellished one. While in Court
the victim claimed that due to illicit sexual intercourse with two
persons, she had suffered injuries and blood oozed out of her
private parts, such fact does not transpire in her previous
statement before the Magistrate. The topography of the rented
apartment comprising two rooms, kitchen and a bathroom as
narrated by the victim is not corroborated by PW-8 or PW-12 who
claim that the apartment comprised a hall, kitchen and bathroom.
10. The Courts below rightly rebutted such contentions holding that
the contradictions are minor and the victim’s version has been
substantially corroborated by other evidence on record. We are of
the view that both Trial Court and High Court have correctly
appreciated the evidence of the minor trafficked victim,
considering the need for sensitivity and latitude while appreciating
the evidence of minor victims of sex trafficking and prostitution.
11. While appreciating the evidence of a minor victim of trafficking, the
Court ought to bear in mind:
Page 6 of 15
i.
Her inherent socio-economic and, at times, cultural
vulnerability when the minor belongs to a marginalised or
socially and culturally backward community.
ii. Complex and layered structure of organised crime networks
which operate at various levels of recruiting, transporting,
harbouring and exploiting minor victims. Such organised
crime activities operate as apparently independent verticals
whose insidious intersections are conveniently veiled through
subterfuges and deception to hoodwink innocent victims.
Such diffused and apparently disjoint manner in which the
crime verticals operate in areas of recruitment, transportation,
harbouring and exploitation make it difficult, if not impossible
for the victim, to narrate with precision and clarity the
interplay of these processes as tentacles of an organised crime
activity to which she falls prey. Given this situation, failure to
promptly protest against ostensibly innocuous yet ominous
agenda of the trafficker ought not to be treated as a ground to
discard a victim’s version as improbable or against ordinary
human conduct.
iii.
Recounting and narration of the horrible spectre of sexual
exploitation even before law enforcement agencies and the
Court is an unpalatable experience leading to secondary
victimisation. This is more acute when the victim is a minor
Page 7 of 15
and is faced with threats of criminal intimidation, fear of
retaliation, social stigma and paucity of social and economic
rehabilitation. In this backdrop, judicial appreciation of
victim’s evidence must be marked by sensitivity and realism.
iv.
If on such nuanced appreciation, the version of the victim
appears to be credible and convincing, a conviction may be
maintained on her sole testimony. A victim of sex trafficking,
particularly a minor, is not an accomplice and her deposition
is to be given due regard and credence as that of an injured
witness. We draw inspiration from the poignant remarks in
4
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Others , a locus
in victimology and gender justice:-
classicus
| “21. | Of late, crime against women in general and rape |
|---|---|
| in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while | |
| we are celebrating woman's rights in all spheres, we | |
| show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad | |
| reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society | |
| towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of | |
| sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only | |
| violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but | |
| inevitably causes serious psychological as well as | |
| physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a | |
| physical assault — it is often destructive of the whole | |
| personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the | |
| physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very | |
| soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, | |
| shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused | |
| on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases | |
| with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the | |
| broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by | |
| minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in | |
| the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal | |
| nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution |
4
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Others, (1996) 2 SCC 384.
Page 8 of 15
| case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires | |
|---|---|
| confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking | |
| corroboration of her statement in material | |
| particulars. If for some reason the court finds it | |
| difficult to place implicit reliance on her | |
| testimony, it may look for evidence which may | |
| lend assurance to her testimony, short of | |
| corroboration required in the case of an | |
| accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must | |
| be appreciated in the background of the entire | |
| case and the trial court must be alive to its | |
| responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with | |
| cases involving sexual molestations.” | |
| (Emphasis supplied) |
12. Weighing PW-13’s version on the aforesaid legal scales, we are
convinced that her testimony is most credible and establishes that
A1 & A2 had procured her for sexual exploitation and utilised her
for such immoral purposes. The minor’s version is also
corroborated by other evidence on record. PW-11, an NGO worker
had intimated the police with regard to prostitution being carried
out by the appellant in his rented premises. In order to work out
such information, PW-8, an associate of the NGO was sent as a
decoy. PW-12 accompanied him. PW-8 found the minor in the
premises and offered money to the appellant for sexual
gratification. Thereafter, he intimated the police who subsequently
raided the premises and rescued the minor. Police also recovered
cash received by the appellant, along-with other incriminating
articles namely, condom etc.
13. Defence sought to improbabilize the prosecution case on the
following grounds. They contended that while PW-1 claimed he
Page 9 of 15
had received a missed call from PW-8, PW -8 deposed that he had
a conversation with PW-1 prior to the raid. This has been rightly
rebutted by the courts below as a minor contradiction. Admittedly,
there was some form of communication between PW-8 and PW-1
prior to the raid and as such, slight variation with regard to the
manner in which such communication took place does not render
the unfolding of the prosecution case vulnerable. The other aspect
highlighted by the defence namely, failure on part of PW-12 to
identify the accused in the court is also rendered inconsequential.
PW-12 has otherwise substantially corroborated the prosecution
case and explained away such lapse of memory due to passage of
time. Admittedly, A1 & A2 were apprehended from the spot along-
with the minor victim clearly dispelling any shadow of doubt with
regard to their presence at the spot. The fact that A1 & A2 had
taken the premises on rent is also proved through the house-
owner PW-15’s testimony. The apparent variation in the
topography of the rented apartment i.e. whether there were two
rooms or one is also of no consequence. The decoy, PW-8 clearly
proves that appellant had received money in lieu of permitting him
to engage in sexual intercourse with PW-13 in the said apartment.
His version is corroborated by an independent witness, PW-12.
Cash and other incriminating articles i.e. condom were recovered
from the spot as per panchnama Ex. P-2. The evidence on record
Page 10 of 15
clearly proves beyond doubt that A1 & A2 were using the premises
for prostitution by sexually exploiting the minor victim, PW-13, for
commercial purposes, and thereby committed offences u/s. 3, 4, 5
and 6 of the ITPA in addition to the offences under the Penal Code.
14. Age of the victim on the date of the incident has been proved as 16
years and 6 months. The letter Ex. P-3 issued by the School
Headmaster (P.W. 7) records her date of birth as 24.04.1994. The
submission of the appellant that such evidence is unreliable as no
ossification test was conducted does not hold water. Age
determined through ossification test is a mere approximation and
cannot be held to have better probative value than a certificate
5
issued by the school. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana , this
Court held that determination of age of a minor victim of sexual
offence is to be done with reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 wherein the
date of birth recorded in the certificate from the school first
attended by the victim would take precedence over medical opinion
i.e. ossification test. The Court held as follows:
| “23. | Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to |
|---|---|
| determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are | |
| of the view that the aforesaid statutory | |
| provision should be the basis for determining age, even | |
| of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there | |
| is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority | |
| is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a |
5
Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263.
Page 11 of 15
| child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our | |
|---|---|
| considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to | |
| apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of | |
| the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining | |
| age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of | |
| Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, | |
| the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first | |
| available basis out of a number of options postulated in | |
| Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), | |
| an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has | |
| overriding effect over an option expressed in a | |
| subsequent clause. The highest rated option available | |
| would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the | |
| scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) | |
| certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated | |
| option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other | |
| evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the | |
| said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the | |
| date of birth entered in the school first attended by the | |
| child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, | |
| the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as | |
| final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied | |
| upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) | |
| postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a | |
| corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet | |
| again, if such a certificate is available, then no other | |
| material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for | |
| determining the age of the child concerned, as the said | |
| certificate would conclusively determine the age of the | |
| child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, | |
| that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the | |
| child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion.” |
must fail as the search and recovery of the minor was conducted
in violation of s. 15(2) of the ITPA. S.15(2) reads as follows:
“ 15. Search without warrant .
(2) Before making a search under sub-section (1), the special
police officer [or the trafficking police officer, as the case may
be] shall call upon two or more respectable inhabitants (at
least one of whom shall be a woman) of the locality in which
the place to be searched is situate, to attend and witness the
search, and may issue an order in writing to them or any of
them so to do:
Page 12 of 15
[Provided that the requirement as to the respectable
inhabitants being from the locality in which the place to be
searched is situate shall not apply to a woman required to
attend and witness the search.] ”
16. The aforesaid provision enjoins that, at the time of search under
the special law, the police officer shall call upon two or more
respectable inhabitants of the locality, including a woman (who
may not be a member of the locality) to attend and witness the
search and may issue an order in writing to such persons to do so.
The provision is akin to S.100 (4) of the Code of Criminal
6
Procedure, 1973 which requires search to be conducted in
presence of two or more respectable members of the locality. S.
7
15(2) fell for interpretation in Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat
wherein distinguishing the ratio in State (UT of Delhi) v. Ram
8
Singh (where search was conducted by an authorised police
officer), this Court held that infraction of such provision is an
irregularity and does not per se vitiate the trial unless it is shown
that there has been a failure of justice.
9
“ 6. … This case certainly supports one part of the
submission of the counsel for the appellant that the Act is
a complete Code with respect to what has to be done
under it. In that sense it would be legitimate to say that a
search which is to be conducted under the Act must
comply with the provisions contained in Section 15; but it
cannot be held that if a search is not carried out strictly in
accordance with the provisions of that section, the trial is
rendered illegal. There is hardly any parallel between an
6
Hereinafter Cr.P.C.
7
Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat, (1969) 1 SCC 43 .
8
State (UT of Delhi) v. Ram Singh, (1962) 2 SCR 694.
9
Ibid.
Page 13 of 15
officer conducting a search who has no authority under
and a search having been made which does not strictly
conform to the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. The
principles which have been settled with regard to the effect
of an irregular search made in exercise of the powers
under Section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would
be fully applicable even to a case under the Act, where the
search has not been made in strict compliance with its
provisions. It is significant that there is no provision in the
Act according to which any search carried out in
contravention of Section 15 would render the trial illegal. In
the absence of such a provision we must apply the law
which has been laid down with regard to searches made
under the provision of the Criminal Procedure Code.”
17. In the present case, the search was undertaken in presence of the
decoy PW-8 and PW-12. They are respectable and independent
persons residing in the same city, who had joined the search.
Nothing is brought on record to show that they are pocket
witnesses who had deposed for the police in other cases. It is also
relevant to note that PW-14 (wife of the owner of the premises) had
also been requested to witness the search. Unfortunately, she
turned hostile and denied having made any previous statement to
the police, but during cross-examination, the prosecution
confronted her with her earlier statement, wherein it is noted that
she had requested the police to undertake the search.
18. In this factual background, we are of the view that statutory
requirements u/s. 15(2) were substantially complied with and the
conviction cannot be doubted on such score.
Page 14 of 15
19.
Therefore, we uphold the conviction and sentence awarded by the
High Court and dismiss the appeal. Pending application(s), if any,
shall stand disposed of.
……..…..……...……………………….J.
(MANOJ MISRA)
……..…..……...……………………….J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
NEW DELHI,
DECEMBER 19, 2025.
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