Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
D. S. REDDY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
CHANCELLOR, OSMANIA UNIVERSITY & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
09/12/1966
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ)
SHAH, J.C.
SIKRI, S.M.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1967 AIR 1305 1967 SCR (2) 214
ACT:
Constitution of India, Article 14-Appellant appointed Vice-
Chancellor under s. 12(1) of Osmania University Act, 1959
for 5 years--Amending Act II of 1966 by new s. 13(1)
reducing term of office of, Vice-chancellors to 3 years and
by new s. 12(2) providing procedure for their removal-Second
Amending Act XI of 1966 introducing new s. 13A providing for
appointment of new Vice-Chancellor within 90 days in place
of appellant-Thus benefit of s. 12(2) and s. 13(1) denied to
appellant-Whether classification of existing Vice-Chancellor
and future appointees justified or discriminatory.
HEADNOTE:
As a result of the Osmania University (Amendment) Act 11 of
1966, s. 12(1) of the Osmania University Act, 1959,. was
amended to provide for the appointment of the Vice-
Chancellor by the Chancellor alone; in s. 12(2) a provision
was introduced whereby he could only be removed from office
by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of mis-
behaviour or incapacity after enquiry by a person who was or
had been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court and
after the Vice-Chancellor had been given an opportunity of
making his representation against such removal Section 13(1)
of the 1959 Act was also amended so as to reduce the term of
office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 to 3 years.
The 1959 Act was again amended later in 1966 by the Osmania
University (Second Amendment) Act XI of 1966. Section 5 of
this amending Act introduced a new s. 13A into the 1959 Act
whereby it was provided that the person then holding the
office of Vice-Chancellor could only hold that office until
a new Vice-Chancellor was appointed; and that such new
appointment must be made within 90 days of the commencement
of the Act whereupon the old Vice-Chancellor would cease to
hold office.
The appellant filed a writ petition claiming, inter alia,
that s. 5 of the second amending Act introducing the new s.
13A was discriminatory as against him and therefore
violative of Art. 14. The High Court dismissed the
petition.
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In the appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended on
behalf of the respondents that as the term of office had
been reduced to 3 years by the first amending Act, the
legislature., in order to give effect to this provision and
to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act, had
enacted s. 13A which had, necessarily, to apply to a person
like the appellant who was in office at the time when the
provisions came into force. Such provisions could not, in
the nature of things, apply to Vice-Chancellors who were to
be appointed in future; the appellant was appointed from a
panel submitted by a committee constituted under the
unamended s. 12(2) whereas future Vice-Chancellors were to
be appointed by the Chancellor alone; furthermore, the
appellant had been the Vice-Cancellor for 7 years. Having
regard to these circumstances the legislature had chosen to
treat the appellant as a class by himself and had
differentiated him from persons to be appointed Vice-
Chancellors in the
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future; that such classification was reasonable and had a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
second amending Act i.e. bringing about uniformity in the
tenure of 3 years. of office fee all Vice-Chancellor; that
the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of s. 12(2)
and the legislature was competent to enact s. 13A so as to
give effect to the amended provisions as early as possible.
HELD: Section 5 of the second amending Act (XI of 1966)
introducing s 13A into the 1959 Act was discriminatory and
therefore violative of Art. 14. [232 E]
There was no intelligible differentia on the basis of which
a classification of Vice-Chancellors into two categories
i.e. the appellant as the then existing Vice-Chancellor and
the future Vice-Chancellors to be appointed under the Act,,
could be justified. The term of office of three years for
the Vice-Chancellor had already been fixed by the first
amending Act Therefore the differential principal adopted
for terminating the appellant’s service under s. 13A in
introduced by the second amending Act and directed as
against the appellant alone could not be considered to have
a rational relation to object sought to be achieved by the
second amending Act. Budhan Choudhary v. The State of
Bihar,[1955] 1 S.C.R.1045, 1049; Ram Krishna Dalmia v.Shri
Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959] S.CR. 279, 296; referred to.
[231 B-D]
While a Vice-Chancellor appointed under s. 12 could be
removed from office only by adopting the procedure under s.
12(2), the services of the appellant, who was also a Vice-
Chancellor and similarly situated were sought to terminated
by enacting s. 13A of the Act. There was no policy
underelying the Act justifying this differential treatment.
There was also no justification for the distinction whereby
the appellant would appointed under the Act would continue
in office for three years [231E-G]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2313 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
October 13, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ
Petition No. 853 of 1966.
M.C. Setalvad. D. Narasaraju, Anwar Ullah Pasha R. V.
Pillai and M. M. Kashatriya, for the appellant.
Niren De, Addl. Solicitor-General, P. Ram Reddy, S.
Ramachandra Reddy and T. V.R. Tatachari, for the
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respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidyalingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, granted
by this Court, is directed against the order dated October,
13, 1966, passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court,
dismissing Writ Petition No 853 of 1966, filed by the
appellant, under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The appellant filed the said writ petition under the
following circumstances. The appellant was the Vice-
Chancellor of the Osmania University, having been appointed,
as such, by order dated April 30. 1964, passed by the
Governor of Andhra Pradesh, in
216
his capacity as Chancellor of the said University. The
appointment of the appellant, under the said order, as Vice-
Chancellor, there is no controversy, was for a term of five
years from the date of taking charge; and the appointment
itself was made under sub-s. (1) of s. 12 of the Osmania
University Act, 1959 (Andhra Pradesh Act No. IX of 1959).
There is, again, no controversy that the appellant took
charge as Vice-Chancellor, in terms of the said order, on
April 30, 1964 and, as such, he became entitled to hold
office for the full period of five years, which will expire
at the ,end of April 1969.
The Osmania University was established in 1918 and the ad-
ministration of the University was then governed by a
Charter of His Exalted Highness, the Nizam of Hyderabad,
promulgated in 1947. With effect from November 1, 1956, the
State of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and the Telengana region
of that State became part of Andhra Pradesh. In 1959, the
Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University
Act, 1959, earlier referred to. That Act itself was one to
amend and consolidate the law relating to the Osmania
University. It is only necessary to note at this stage,
that under s. 12(1) of the said Act, it was provided that
the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor
from a panel of not less than three persons selected by a
Committee, as constituted under sub-s. (2); but, if the
Chancellor does not approve any of the persons so selected,
he may call for a fresh panel from the Committee. Section
13, again, provided for the term of office, salary and
allowances etc., of the Vice-Chancellor. Under sub-s. (1),
the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor was fixed for a
term of five years and there was also a further provision
to the effect that he shall be eligible for reappointment.
By s. 51 of the said Act, the Osmania University Revised
Charter,- of 1947 was repealed; but, nevertheless, it was
provided that the person holding office immediately before
the commencement of the Act as Vice-Chancellor, was to be
the Vice-Chancellor on such ,commencement of the Act, and
was to continue to hold the said office, in circumstances
mentioned therein.
There is, again, no controversy that the appellant, who was
already the Vice-Chancellor of the Osmania University from
1957, was again appointed in 1959, as Vice-Chancellor for a
period of five years under this Act; and he was similarly
appointed for a further term of five years, on April 30,
1964, as Vice-Chancellor, as mentioned earlier. During the
middle of 1965, certain amendments were sought to be
introduced in the Act by providing for removal of the Vice-
Chancellor, by the Chancellor, from office under certain
circumstances. There was also a proposal to reduce the term
of office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 years to 3 years,
from the date of his appointment, and for provisions being
made
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217
enabling the Government to give directions to the University
relating to matters of policy to be followed by it.
The amendments sought to be introduced in the Act, appear to
have come in for considerable criticism from several
quarters, and these have been elaborately dealt with in the
order, under attack. According to the appellant, he was one
of those who very strenuously opposed the proposed
amendments on the ground that the autonomy of the University
was sought to be interfered with by the Government.
According to the appellant, again, the various criticisms
made by him and others, were taken note of by the Inter-
University Board, by the Education Minister of the Union and
others. It is the further case of the appellant that it was
felt by the Government of Andhra Pradesh that he was
responsible for the agitation that was being made, against
the proposed amendments. But, ultimately, the Andhra
Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University
(Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act 11 of 1966), amending the Osmania
University Act of 1959 in certain particulars. The said
amendments are to the effect that the Vice-Chancellor shall
not be removed from office, except as provided for in s.
12(2) of the amended Act. The term of office was also fixed
at 3 years under the amended s. 13. Another provision
relating to the power of Government to give instructions to
the University, was also introduced, as s. 7A; but the
appellant continued as Vice-Chancellor.
The Osmania University Act, was again amended by the Osmania
University (Second Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act XI of 1966).
Under this amendment, s. 13A was enacted. In brief, that
section was to the effect that the person holding the office
of the ViceChancellor, immediately before the commencement
of the amending Act of 1966, was to hold office only until a
new Vice-Chancellor was appointed under sub-s. (1) of s. 12,
and it also provided that such appointment shall be made
within 90 days after such commencement. There was a further
provision that on the appointment of such new-Vice-
Chancellor, and on his entering upon his office, the person
holding the office of Vice-Chancellor immediately before
such appointment, shall cease to hold that office. Section
7-A, which had been introduced by Act II of 1966, was
deleted. Section 33-A was enacted, making special provision
as to the re-constitution of the Senate, Syndicate, Academic
Council and Finance Committee of the University.
The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 853 of 1966, in the
High Court, praying for the issue of a writ or order
declaring s. 5 of the Osmania University (Second Amendment)
Act. 1966, which introduced s. 13A in the original Act, as
unconstitutional and void. In that writ petition, he
challenged the validity of the new Section, s. 13A on
several grounds. In brief, his plea was that by virtue
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of his appointment as Vice-Chancellor for 5 years on April
30, 1964, he had acquired a vested right to hold that office
for the full term and that such a vested right could not be
taken away, during the currency of the period, by any
legislative enactment. The legislature had no competence to
enact the said provision inasmuch, as s. 13A could not be
treated as legislation in respect of University education.
The appellant had also pleaded that the provision virtually
amounted to removal of the appellant from his office without
giving him any opportunity to show cause against such
removal. According to the appellant, even assuming the
Legislature was competent to enact the provision in
question, nevertheless, s. 13A is unconstitutional and void,
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inasmuch as it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.
We do not think it necessary to advert, elaborately, to the
various other grounds of attack levelled against the
constitutional validity of the provision in question, which
have, no doubt, been dealt with by the High Court, because,
for the purpose of disposing of this appeal, in our opinion,
it is enough to refer to the grounds of attack, taken by the
appellant regarding the constitutionality of s. 13A, based
upon Art. 14 of the Constitution.
So far as this aspect is concerned, according to the
appellant, s. 9 of Act 11, of 1966 amended the Act of 1959
by incorporating new sub-ss. (1) and (2) in s. 12. Under
sub-s. (1) of s. 12, the ViceChancellor is to be appointed
by the Chancellor. Under sub-s. (2), the Vice-Chancellor
shall not be removed from his office except
by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of mis-
behaviour or incapacity; and it also provided for such an
order being passed only after due enquiry by a person who Is
or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court, as
may be appointed by the Chancellor, and the Vice-Chancellor
being given an opportunity of making his representation
against the removal. Therefore, in view of these
provisions, the Vice-Chancellor could not be removed by the
Chancellor without any cause, without reason, without
enquiry and without an opportunity being given to him to
show cause against removal. This provision applied to the
appellant, who was in office, on the date of the passing of
Act 11 of 1966, as well as Act XI of 1966. Nevertheless, s.
5 of Act XI of 1966 incorporated s.13A in the principal Act.
Under that section, not only has power been, conferred on
the Chancellor, but also a duty imposed, so to say, on him,
to remove the appellant, who was the Vice-Chancellor,
without any reason or justification or even giving an
opportunity to him to show cause against such removal. No
enquiry, before ordering such removal, is contemplated under
this section. Further, while a Vice-Chancellor, who is
appointed after the passing of Act XI of 1966, cannot be
removed from office, except in accordance with the
provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 12, the appellant, who was
already in office, could be arbitrarily and
219
illegally removed under s. 13A of the Act. There is no provi
sion, again, similar to s. 13A, applicable to a Vice-
Chancellor, appointed after the coming into force of the
amending Act. Therefore, according to the appellant, the
provisions contained in s. 13A are clearly directed only
against him,-as he was the person holding office, prior to
the amending Act, and therefore it is a clear case of
hostile discrimination.
Further, according to the appellant, persons appointed as
Vice-Chancellors, constitute a group and must be considered
as persons similarly situated and they must be treated
alike; whereas, by virtue of s. 13A, a differentiation is
made between the appellant, who was a Vice-Chancellor on the
date of the commencement of the Amending Act and other
persons who are to be appointed as Vice-Chancellors
thereafter. This differentiation, according to the
appellant, is again without any basis; nor has such a
classification, any reasonable relation to the main object
of the legislation.
The appellant also relied on s. 33A, introduced by s. 6 of
Act XI of 1966 relating to the reconstitution of the Senate,
Syndicate, Academic Council and the Finance Committee and
pleaded that whereas those academic bodies or authorities
were allowed to continue without any time-limit and to
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function until they were reconstituted, regarding the Vice-
Chancellor alone, a period of 90 days had been fixed, under
the Amending Act, within which the Chancellor was bound to
appoint another Vice-Chancellor. This, again, is a clear
proof of discrimination against the appellant.
The respondents controverted the stand taken on behalf of
the appellant. Apart from supporting the competency of the
Legislature to enact the measure, in question, they urge
that Art. 14 of the Constitution has no application at all.
According to the respondents, inasmuch as the term of office
of the Vice- Chancellor had been reduced to three years, as
per Act 11 of 1966, it was thought fit by the Legislature to
provide for the termination of the office of the Vice-
Chancellor, who was holding that post, at the commencement
of Act XI of 1966, as also for the appointment of a new
Vice-Chancellor. It was, under those circumstances, that s.
13A was incorporated in the Act of 1959, by s. 5 of Act, XI
of 1966. They also referred to similar provisions, which
were incorporated in the two enactments relating to the two
other Universities in the State, viz., the Andhra University
and Sri Venkateswara University.
The respondents further pleaded that Act 11 of 1966 placed
the Vice-Chancellor, who was already appointed and who was
functioning prior to that Act, in the first category, as a
class apart, from the Vice-Chancellors who were to be
subsequently appointed and who were to function, after the
passing of the said Amending Act, in the second category,
both in the matter of the mode of appointment, as well as
the term of appointment. The Vice-Chancellor
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viz., the appellant, who was in office, on the date of the
passing of Act XI of 1966, according to the respondents,
therefore fell into a class all by himself and, as such,
came under a third category; and the legislature thought fit
to take into account the special features relating to him
and, therefore, made separate provisions regarding the
termination of his office. Therefore, a suitable provision
was made, by enacting s. 13A, in respect of the existing
Vice-Chancellor, who was treated as a class, by himself.
The respondents also claimed that the Legislature was
entitled to treat the Vice-Chancellor, who was then in
office, as a class by himself and make suitable provisions
with regard to the termination of his office, and therefore
a legislation made for that purpose, and on that basis, was
constitutionally valid. The charge of hostility towards the
appellant, or any attempt to effect discrimination, was
stoutly denied by the respondents. The respondents, there-
fore, urged that the classification of the appellant, as a
separate class, was proper and such a classification had a
reasonable nexus, with the object of the amending
legislation.
The respondents further pleaded that the curtailment of the
term of office of an existing Vice-Chancellor, by a statute,
enacted by a competent Legislature, does not amount to
’removal’ of the Vice-Chancellor for sufficient and proved
cause. The respondents also ‘ urged that academic bodies or
authorities like the Senate, Syndicate and the Academic
Council are not similarly situated like the Vice-Chancellor,
either in the matter of appointment or constitution, or in
exercising functions under the statute; and therefore, the
appellant, according to them, was not ’entitled to place any
reliance. on s. 33A, introduced by s. 7 of Act XI of 1966.
For all these reasons, they urged that Art. 14 of the
Constitution was not violated by the Legislature in enacting
s. 13A.
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Before we refer to the findings recorded by the learned
Judges of ’the High Court, this will be a convenient stage
to refer to the material provisions of the statutes,
concerned. We have already mentioned that the appellant was
functioning as the Vice-Chancellor of the Osmania
University, even from 1957, i.e., even before the Osmania
University Act, 1959, was passed. We have also indicated
that the administration of the University was then governed
by a Charter promulgated in 1947. The Osmania University
Act, 1959 (Act IX of 1959), (hereinafter called the Act),
was passed in 1959 and published in the State Gazette on
February 2, 1959. Section 3 of the Act provided that the
University, established by the Revised Charter promulgated
by H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad, on December 8, 1947, and
functioning at Hyderabad immediately before the commencement
of the Act, be reconstituted and declared to be a University
by the name of ’Osmania University’. The said section also
provided that the University would be a
221
residential, teaching and affiliating University consisting
of a Chancellor, a Pro-Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor, a
Senate, a Syndicate and an Academic Council.
Section 12(1) provided for the appointment of the Vice-
Chancellor, by the Chancellor, from a panel of not less than
three persons selected by a committee, as constituted under
sub-s. (2) thereof But, if the Chancellor did not approve
any of the persons so selected, he could call for a fresh
panel from the committee. Sub-section (2) provided for
the constitution of the committee.
Section 13 provided for the term of office salary,
allowances etc., of the Vice-Chancellor. Under sub-s. (1),
the Vice-Chancellor was to hold office for a term of 5 years
and he was eligible for reappointment. There was a proviso
to the effect that the ViceChancellor shall continue to hold
office after the expiry of his term of appointment, for a
period not exceeding six months, or until Ms successor is
appointed and enters upon his office, whichever is earlier.
Sub-s. (6) provided for the filling up of the vacancy, in
the post of the Vice-Chancellor, when it fell permanently
vacant; and a Vice-Chancellor so appointed as per sub-ss.
(1) and (2) of s. 12, was to hold office for a full term of
5 years.
Section 51 (I) repealed the Osmania University Revised
Charter, 1947; but sub-s. (2) provided that notwithstanding
such repeal, the person holding office immediately before
the commencement of the Act, as Vice-Chancellor, shall, on
such commencement, be the Vice-Chancellor of the University,
and he was entitled to hold office until a Vice-Chancellor
is appointed in accordance with the Act.
It will be noticed, by the above reference to the material
provisions of the Act, that there was no provision for
removal of a ViceChancellor; and that the appointment of a
Vice-Chancellor was to be by the Chancellor, as provided for
in s. 12. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor was 5
years and he was eligible for reappointment. The appellant,
who was already a Vice-Chancellor, functioning under the
Charter of 1947, was entitled to continue, and did continue,
as the Vice-Chancellor, by virtue of s. 51 of the Act. He
was also, as already mentioned, originally appointed as
ViceChancellor for a period of 5 years under the Act, in
1959.
The Act was amended in certain particulars by the Osmania
University (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act II of 1966)
(hereinafter called the First Amendment Act). The First
Amendment Act received the assent of the Governor on January
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29, 1966. Section 6 of the First Amendment Act, introduced
s. 7A, which we set out
222
"7A. Instructions by the Government.-The
Government may, after consultation with the
University, give to the University,
instructions relating to matters of major
educational policy such as pattern of
University education, medium of instruction
and establishment of post-graduate centres, to
be followed by it.
(2) In the exercise of its powers and
performance of its functions under this Act,
the University shall comply with the
instructions issued under sub-section (1)."
Similarly, s. 9 incorporated new sub-ss. (1)
and (2) in s. 12 of the Act, as follows
12. (1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be
appointed by the Chancellor.
(2) The Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed
from his office except by an order of the
Chancellor passed on the ground of
misbehaviour or incapacity and after due
inquiry by such person who is or has been a
Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court as
may be appointed by the Chancellor, in which
the Vice-Chancellor shall have an opportunity
of making his representation against such
removal."
Section 10, while effecting certain other amendments to s.
13. the Act, incorporated a new sub-s. (1), as follows :
"13. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-
section (2) of section 12, the Vice-Chancellor
shall hold office for a term of three years
from the date of his appointment and shall be
eligible for re-appointment to that office for
another term of three years only;
Provided that the Vice-Chancellor shall
continue to hold office after the expiry of
his term of appointment for a period not
exceeding six months or until his successor is
appointed and enters upon his office,
whichever is earlier."
It was this Amendment Act, when it was in the Bill stage,
that appears to have been severely criticised by various
authorities on the ground that the autonomy of the
University was sought to be interfered with by the
Government. In that connection, the appellant also appears
to have made several statements criticising the provisions
sought to be incorporated in the Act. It is also on record
that counter-statements were made on behalf of the
Government meeting these criticisms regarding the proposed
amendments. They have been dealt with by the High Court
rather elaborately; but, we do not propose to go into those
matters, for the purpose of this appeal.
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By virtue of the amendments effected and referred to above,
it will be seen that the term of office of the Vice-
Chancellor has been reduced from 5 years to 3 years. The
manner of appointment of the Vice-Chancellor has also been
changed and a provision is contained for removal of the
Vice-Chancellor from his office, but that can be done only
in accordance with the provisions contained in s. 12(2) of
the Act. Section 7A gives power to the Government to give
instructions to the University relating to matters of major
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educational policy; and it is made obligatory on the
University to comply with such instructions issued by the
Government.
As we have already stated, the appellant was again appointed
as Vice-Chancellor for a period of 5 years on April 30,
1964; and he was continuing in office when the First
Amendment Act was passed. One of the claims that is made by
the appellant, in these proceedings, is that he is entitled
to the protection conferred by s. 12(2) of the Act referred
to above. There does not appear to be any controversy that
any appointment of a Vice-Chancellor was made, after the
passing of the First Amendment Act .
The Act was further amended by the Osmania University
(Second Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act XI of 1966) (to be
referred to as the Second Amendment Act). It received the
assent of the Governor on May 16, 1966. Section 2 of the
Second Amendment Act, omitted s. 7A of the Act. Section 5
of the Second Amendment Act, which introduced new s. 13A in
the Act, and which provision is the subject of attack in
these proceedings, is as follows :
"13A. Special provision as to the
appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor.-
Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the
person holding the office of the Vice-
Chancellor immediately before the commencement
of the Osmania University (Second Amendment)
Act, 1966, shall continue to hold that office
only until a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed
by the Chancellor under sub-section (1) of
section 12 and enters upon his office; and
such appointment shall be made within ninety
days after such commencement. On the
appointment of such new Vice-Chancellor, and
on his entering upon his office, the person
holding the office of the Vice-Chancellor
immediately before such appointment shall
cease to hold that office."
Again, s. 6 of the Second Amendment Act., incorporated s.
33A in the Act, which is as follows :
"33A. Special provision as to the
reconstitution of the Senate,
Syndicate, .Academic Council and Finance Com-
mittee. Notwithstanding anything in this Act,
the members of the Senate, the Syndicate, the
Academic Council and the Finance Committee
constituted and functioning
224
before the commencement of the Osmania
University (Amendment) Act, 1966, shall
continue to be such members and function only
until a new Senate, Syndicate, Academic
Council or Finance Committee, as the case may
be, is reconstituted under this Act. On the
reconstitution of such new Senate, Syndicate,
Academic Council or Finance Committee, the
members of the Senate other than the life
members thereof, the members of the Syndicate,
Academic Council or Finance Committee, as the
case may be, holding office immediately before
such reconstitution, shall cease to hold that
office."
Even according to the respondents, s. 13A was incorporated
for the purpose of terminating the services of the appellant
as Vice-Chancellor, so as to enable the Chancellor to make a
fresh appointment of a Vice-Chancellor. We have referred to
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s. 33A of the Act, because the appellant’s case was also to
the effect that with regard to the Senate, Syndicate,
Academic Council etc., there is no provision similar to s.
13A of the Act, though they are also similarly situated like
him.
The findings of the learned Judges of the. High Court may
now be briefly summarised :-
1. The Andhra Pradesh Legislature was
competent to enact s. 5 of the Second
Amendment Act. The said section does not
contravene art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
2. The appellant was holding the office of
the ViceChancellor when the Act came into
force and continued under S. 51(2) thereof as
Vice-Chancellor until the Chancellor passed an
order, in 1959 appointing him once again
under the Act.
3. Section 13(1), as introduced by the
First Amendment Act, is not retrospective and
the right of the appellant to continue as
Vice-Chancellor for the full term of 5 years
stood unaffected and the new S. 13(1) does not
apply to him.
4. The new S. 12(2), as introduced by the
First Amendment Act, is not applicable to the
appellant.
5. Sections 12(2) and 13A of the Act, do
not cover the same field. Section 12(2)
provides for removal by way of punishment and
its operation is on a different field from
that of s. 13A where the cessation of office
is due to a curtailment of the term. Section
12(2) applies only to the future Vice-
Chancellors and S. 13A is solely applicable to
the existing Vice-Chancellor, the appellant.
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.lm0
Regarding the attack on s. 13A, on the basis of Art. 14 of
the Constitution that there is an unreasonable
discrimination, the learned Judges were of the view that the
said section did not suffer from any such infirmity. The
learned Judges held that the impugned legislation had
resulted in classifying Vice-Chancellors under two
categories, (a) the appellant, as the existing Vice-
Chancellor, falling under the first category; and (b) future
Vice-Chancellor, to be appointed under the Act, who falls
under the second category. According to the High Court, the
object sought to be achieved by such classification, as
could be seen from the objects and reasons of the Second
Amendment Act, 1966, was to give effect to the reduced term
of 3 years fixed under s. 13(1) of the Act
after the First Amendment. The Hi
gh Court
further held that the classification adopted
by s. 13A, of putting the appellant, as the
existing ViceChancellor, in a class by
himself, is founded on an intelligible
differentia, which distinguishes the appellant
from future ViceChancellors, and that this
differentia has a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the Second
Amendment Act. In this connection, the
learned Judges also advert to the similar
provisions enacted, at about the same time, in
the Andhra University Act, 1925, and the Sri
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Venkateswara University Act, 1954.
The High Court is also of the view that the Legislature must
have taken into account the fact that the appellant has
already put in more than 6 years of service as Vice-
Chancellor, for treating him as a class by himself, as
distinct from future Vice-Chancellors, who are to be
appointed and, as such, have not put in any service at all.
The learned Judges have, no doubt, adverted to the fact that
the appellant has got an eventful record of efficient
service, full of recognition and appreciation, but the
appellant cannot plead those circumstances when a competent
legislature has passed a valid legislative measure, under
which he has to lose his office.
Ultimately, on these findings, the High Court came to the
conclusion that s. 5 of the Second Amendment Act,
introducing s. 13A in the Act, is not vitiated by any
infirmity, as alleged by the appellant, and, finally,
dismissed the appellant’s writ petition.
The appellant has again raised, no doubt, most of the
contentions that were taken before the High Court. But the
main ground of attack that has been pressed before us, by
learned counsel for the appellant, is the one based upon
Art. 14 of the Constitution. The findings recorded, and the
views expressed, by the High Court are sought to be
sustained by the learned Additional Solicitor-General,
appearing for the respondents. But, we do not think it
necessary to go into the larger controversy that has been
raised by the appellant, before the High Court, in the view
that we take, that the appellant must succeed in respect of
the attack levelled against the impugned
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provision, based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution. As to
whether the criticism, made by the appellant, about the
proposals to amend the Act, was or-was not responsible for
the passing of the legislation in question, does not assume
much of an importance; because, the simple question is
whether the provision, s. 13A, as it now stands n the Act,
is violative, in any manner, of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
If the answer is ’yes’, it is needless to state that the
provision will have to be struck down. Therefore, we are
confining our attention only to the provisions of the Act
and we will refer to any other circumstance that is brought
to our notice only for the limited purpose of considering
the grounds of attack based upon Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
According to Mr. Setalvad, the appellant is entitled to take
advantage of the provisions of s. 12(2) of the Act. On the
date of the passing of the First Amendment Act, the
appellant was, admittedly, a Vice-Chancellor and he had been
continuing as such. He cannot be removed from his office,
except in accordance with the provisions of s. 12(2) of the
Act. But, in view of s. 13A of the Act, introduced by the
Second Amendment Act, the appellant is forced out of his
office, within 90 days of the passing of the Second Amend-
ment Act. The creation of two classes of Vice-Chancellors,
viz., Of Vice-Chancellors appointed under the Act and the
Vice-Chancellor who was in office at the commencement of the
Second Amendment Act, is not on any rational basis. Person
is appointed as ViceChancellors, constitute a
group, and the impugned provision
makes a differentiation between the person who is a Vice-
Chancellor then and other persons who are to be appointed
Vice-Chancellors thereafter, for which differentiation,
there is absolutely no basis. Further, even if it can be
stated that there is any basis for the said classification,
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nevertheless there should be a nexus or connection between
the basis of the classification and the object of the
legislation, which again, is lacking in this case.
Mr. Setalvad further urged that while the services of a
ViceChancellor, appointed under the Act, could be terminated
only in accordance with the provisions contained in s. 12(2)
of the Act, the appellant’s services could be terminated
under s. 13A, without adopting the procedure laid down in s.
12(2) of the Act. There was also no provision in the Act,
Mr. Setalvad pointed out, making s. 13(2) applicable to
Vice-Chancellors to be appointed in future. Though the term
of office for a Vice-Chancellor has been fixed under the
Act, even after the amendments, as three years, and that may
apply to all the Vice-Chancellors, so far as the appellant
is concerned, his term has been reduced or restricted to 90
days under s. 13A of the Act.
Mr. Setalvad again urges that even assuming that it is open
to the Legislature, in an appropriate case, to make
provisions applicable
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to only one individual or a group of individuals,
nevertheless, it is well-established, by this Court, that
the classification that is effected ,by the statute must be
a classification founded on an intelligible differentia and
that differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute. Applying these two
tests, learned counsel urges, that the impugned legislation
must be. considered to be violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
The learned Additional Solicitor-General has urged that the,
term of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been reduced to
three; years by the First Amendment Act. The Legislature,
in order to give effect to this provision and to enable
fresh appointments to be made under the Act, has enacted s.
13A. That section has, necessarily, to apply only to
persons like the appellant who are holding. office at the
time when these provisions came into force. Such a
provision, in the nature of things, cannot apply to Vice-
Chancellors who are to be appointed in future under the Act.
Therefore it is wrong to state that all Vice-Chancellors,.
irrespective of the manner’ or mode under which they are
appointed, in present or in future, fall under the same
category. Further, the appellant has been a Vice-Chancellor
for nearly 7 years. The legislature, the learned Solicitor
points out, having regard to these circumstances, has chosen
to treat the appellant, the Vice-Chancellor holding office
on the date of the Second Amendment Act, as a class by
himself and has differentiated him from persons to be
appointed ViceChancellor for the first time. Such a
classification, is reasonable and it has got a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second
Amendment Act, viz., bringing about uniformity in the tenure
of three years of office for all Vice-Chancellors. The
learned Solicitor points out further that the appellant is
not entitled to the benefit of s. 12(2) of the Act. The
Legislature was competent to enact the Measure in question
and the object of the Legislature was to give effect to the
amendment provisions as early as. possible. He pointed out
that similar provisions were also made in two other
enactments at about the same time, viz., in the Andhra
University Act, 1925, and the Sri Venkateswara University
Act, 1954. It may be that the Legislature could have
adopted another method for replacing the present Vice-
Chancellor, but that is a matter of policy, which cannot be
reviewed by the Courts, so long as the Legislature had the
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competence to enact the measure and the provisions, so
enacted, do not suffer from any other legal infirmities.
We have given due consideration to the various contentions
placed before us by Mr. Setalvad, learned counsel,for the
appellant, and the learned Additional Solicitor-General, on
behalf of the respondents; but we are not inclined to agree
with the contentions of the learned Additional Solicitor-
General.
228
The principles to be borne in mind, when a question arise
under Art. 14 of the Constitution, have been laid down in
several ,decisions, by this Court,on a number of occasions.
In Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar(1), Das J.,
speaking for the Court said :
"It is now well-established that while
article 14 forbids class ’legislation, it does
not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. In order, however,
to pass the test of permissible classification
two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i)
that the, classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together
from others left out of the group and (ii)
that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the statute in question."
Therefore, it will be seen that in order to accept a
classification as permissible and not hit by Art. 14, the
measure in question will have to pass the two tests laid
down in the above decision. The observations, extracted
above, have been quoted by Das C. J., in .Ram Krishna Dalmia
v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar(2). It is no doubt true, as
pointed out by the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral, that
a statute may direct its provisions against one individual
person or thing, or against several individual persons or
things. But, before such a provision can be accepted as
valid, the Court must be satisfied that there is a
reasonable basis of classification which appears on the face
of the statute itself, or is deducible from the surrounding
circumstances or matters of common knowledge. If no such
reasonable basis of classification appears on the face of
the statute, or is deducible from the surrounding
circumstances, the law will have to be struck down as an
instance of naked discrimination.
It should also be borne in mind that there is always a
presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an
enactment and the burden is upon the party who attacks the
same as unconstitutional, to ,Show that there is a clear
transgression of the constitutional principles; but, as
observed by Das C.J., in Ram Krishna Dalmia’s case(2), at p.
297,
"while good faith and knowledge of the
existing conditions on the part of a
legislature are to be presumed, if there is
nothing on the face of the law or the
surrounding circumstances brought to the
notice of the court on which the
classification may reasonably be regarded as
based, the presumption of constitutionality
cannot be carried
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045,1049.
(2) [1959] S.C.R 279, 296.
229
to the extent of always holding that there
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must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons
for subjecting certain individuals or
corporations to hostile or discriminating
legislation."
Having due regard to the principles referred to above, we
now proceed to consider as to whether the appellant has been
able to establish that s. 5 of the Second Amendment Act,
introducing s.13A in the Act, is discriminatory and, as
such, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
We have already stated that the appellant was appointed,
under the Act, for a further term of 5 years, as Vice-
Chancellor, on April 30, 1964, and he was continuing in
office, as such, at the time when the two Amending Acts were
passed; and, normally,. he, would be entitled to continue in
that post for the full term, which will expire only at the
end of April 1969. The First Amendment Act provided, in s.
12 of the Act, that the Vice-Chancellor is to be appointed
by the Chancellor; but s. 12(2) specifically provided that
the Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed from his office-excep
t by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground
of misbehaviour or incapacity and, after due inquiry by such
person who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court or the
Supreme Court, as may be appointed by the Chancellor. It
was also provided that the ViceChancellor was to have an
opportunity of making his representation against such
removal. Prima facie; the provisions contained in sub-s.
(2) of s. 12, must also apply to the appellant, who did
continue in office even after the passing of the First
Amendment Act. No doubt the term of office of the Vice-
Chancellor was fixed at 3 years under S. 13(1) of the Act.
But no provisions, were made in the First Amendment Act
regarding the termination of the tenure of office of the
Vice-Chancellor who was then holding that post.
There can be no controversy that s. 13A, introduced by s. 5
of the Second Amendment Act, deals only with the appellant.
In fact, the stand taken on behalf of the respondents in the
counteraffidavit filed before the High Court, was to the
effect that the Legislature had chosen to treat the Vice-
Chancellor holding office at the time of the commencement of
the Second Amendment Act, as a class by himself and with a
view to enable the Chancellor to make fresh appointments, s.
13A of the Act was enacted.
Therefore, it is clear that s. 13A applies only to the
appellant. Though, no doubt, it has been stated, on behalf
of the respondents,,,, that similar provisions were
incorporated, at about the same time, in two other Acts,
relating to two other Universities, viz., the Andhra
University and the Sri Venkateswara University, and though
this circumstance has also been taken into account by the
learned Judges of the High Court, in our opinion, those
provisions
230
have no bearing in considering the attack levelled by the
appellant on s. 13A of the Act.
This is a clear case where the statute itself directs its
provisions by enacting s. 13A, against one individual, viz.,
the appellant; and before it can be sustained as valid, this
Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for
grouping the appellant as a class by himself and that such
reasonable basis must appear either in the statute itself or
must be deducible from other surrounding circumstances
According to learned counsel for the appellant, all Vice-
Chancellors of the Osmania University come under one group
and can be classified only as one unit and there is
absolutely no justification for grouping the appellant under
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one class and the Vice-Chancellors to be appointed in future
under a separate class. In any event, it is also urged that
the said classification has no relation or nexus to the
object of the enactment.
Our attention has been drawn to the Statement of Objects
and Reasons to the Second Amendment Bill, the material part
of which is as follows
"The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor
has been reduced to three years under section
13(1) of the Osmania University Act as amended
by section 10 of the Osmania University
(Amendment) Act, 1966.
Section 13-A, proposed to be inserted by
clause 5 of the Bill, enjoins that
notwithstanding anything in the Act, the
person holding the office of the Vice-
Chancellor immediately before the commencement
of the Osmania University (Second Amendment)
Act, 1966 shall continue to hold that office
only until a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed
by the Chancellor under section 12(1) as
amended and enters upon his office, and such
appointment shall be made within ninety days
after such commencement."
We are inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Setalvad,
that there is no justification for the impugned legislation
resulting in a classification of the Vice-Chancellors into
two categories, viz., the appellant as the then existing
Vice-Chancellor and the future Vice. Chancellors to be
appointed under the Act.
In our view, the Vice-Chancellor, who is appointed under the
Act, or the Vice-Chancellor who was holding that post on the
date ,of the commencement of the Second Amendment Act, form
one single group or class. Even assuming that the
classification of these two types of persons as coming under
two different groups can be made nevertheless, it is
essential that such a classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes the appel-
231
lant from the Vice-Chancellor appointed under the Act. . We
are not able to find any such intelligible differentia on
the basis of which the classification can be justified.
It is also essential that the classification or differentia
effected by the statute must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute. We have gone
through the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Second
Amendment Bill, which became law later, as well as the
entire Act itself, as it now stands. In the Statement of
Objects and Reasons for the Second Amendment Bill, extracted
above, it is seen that except stating a fact that the term
of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been reduced to 3 years
under s. 13(1) and that s.13A was intended to be enacted, no
other policy his indicated which will justify the
differentiation. The term of office fixing the period of
three years for the Vice-Chancellor, has been already
effected by the First Amendment Act and, therefore, the
differential principle adopted for terminating the services
of the appellant by enacting s. 13A of the Act, cannot be
considered to be justified. In other words, the differentia
adopted in s. 13A and directed as against the appellant-and
the appellant alone not be considered to have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second
Amendment Act.
While a Vice-Chancellor appointed under s. 12 of the Act can
be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under
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s. 12(2), the services of the appellant, who was also a
Vice. Chancellor and similarly situated, is sought to be
terminated by enacting s. 13A of the Act. We do not see any
policy underlying the Act justifying this differential
treatment accorded to the appellant. The term of office of
the Vice-Chancellors has been no doubt reduced under the
First Amendment Act and fixed for 3 years for all the Vice-
Chancellors. But, so far as the appellant is concerned, by
virtue of s. 13A of the Act, he can continue to hold that
office only until a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed by the
Chancellor, and that appointment is to be made within 90
days. While all other Vice-Chancellors, appointed under the
Act, can continue to be in office for a period of three
years, the appellant is literally forced out of his office
on the expiry of 90 days from the date of commencement of
the Second Amendment Act. There is also no provision in the
statute providing for the termination of the services of the
ViceChancellors, who are appointed under the Act, in the
manner provided under s. 13A of the Act. By s. 13A, the
appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available
under the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act, which
benefit is available to all other ViceChancellors.
The appointment of the appellant in 1959 and, again in 1964,
under s. 12(1) of the Act, as it stood prior to the two
amendments, by the Chancellor, must have been, no doubt,
from a panel of
232
names submitted by a committee constituted under s. 12(2).
The appointment of a Vice-Chancellor after the passing of
the First Amendment Act, is to be made exclusively by the
Chancellor under s. 12(1), as the section now stands. That
is a circumstance, relied on by the respondent, for
differentiating the appellant as an existing Vice-Chancellor
from a Vice-Chancellor to be appointed under the Act, as
amended. Another circumstance relied on is that the
appellant has been a Vice-Chancellor for 7 years. In our
opinion, these are not such vital or crucial factors which
will justify treating the appellant as a class by himself,
because the powers and duties of a Vice-
Chancellor, either under ’the Act, prior to the amendment,
or under the Act, after amendment, continue to be the same.
To conclude, the classification of the appellant, as a class
by himself, is not founded on any intelligible differentia,
which distinguishes him from other Vice-Chancellors and it
has no rational relation to the object of the statute, and
so s. 13A is hit by Art. 14.
The appellant has attacked s. 13A, as discriminatory,
relying upon a different provision, made under s. 33A, in
respect of the Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council and the
Finance Committee. We have, however, not considered the
question as to whether the appellant can be treated as
falling under the same class, as the other authorities
mentioned in s. 33A, as we have accepted the appellant’s
contention, based upon Art. 14, on other grounds.
For the above reasons, we accept the contentions of the
learned counsel for the appellant, and hold that s. 5 of the
Second Amendment Act (Act XI of 1966), introducing s. 13A in
the Act, is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution and, as such, has to be struck down as
unconstitutional. The result is that the appeal is allowed,
and the appellant will be entitled to his costs in the
appeal, payable by the respondents, here and in the High
Court.
R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed.
M19Sup. C.I./66-2,500-18-7-67-GIPF.
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