Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 359 of 2004
PETITIONER:
IP,Vigilance & Anti-Corruption,Tiruchirapalli
RESPONDENT:
V. Jayapaul
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/03/2004
BENCH:
RUMA PAL & P. VENKATARAMA REDDI.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 426 of 2002)
P.VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.
Leave granted.
Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the
criminal proceedings on the ground that the police officer,
who laid/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected
commission of certain cognizable offences by the respondent
should not have investigated the case and submitted the
final report? That is the question which arises for
consideration in this appeal filed by the State.
On 9.9.1996, the Inspector of Police (Vigilance & Anti-
Corruption), Tirucharapalli on the basis of the information
received that the respondent-accused was indulging in
corrupt practices by extracting money from the drivers and
owners of the motor vehicles while conducting check of the
vehicles and making use of certain bogus notice forms in the
process, prepared the First Information Report, registered
the crime under Sections 420, 201 IPC and Section 13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act. A copy of the FIR was submitted to the Court of CJM-
cum-Special Judge, Tirucharapalli. He then proceeded to
take up investigation, gathered information, examined the
witnesses and filed the charge-sheet in the Court together
with a list of documents including the police notice books
and hand-writing experts’ reports. The respondent was
implicated for the offences under Sections 465, 468 IPC and
Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act. The
respondent-accused then moved the High Court of Madras to
quash the proceedings. The learned Judge of the High
Court, relying on the decision of this Court in Megha Singh
vs. State of Haryana [(1996) 11 SCC 709] and two other
decisions of the Madras High Court, allowed the application
and quashed the proceedings. This is what the learned
Judge observed:
"In view of the consistent rulings of the Supreme
Court and of this Court, I am obliged to hold that
the very same police officer who registered the
case by lodging a first information ought not to
have investigated the case and that itself had
caused prejudice to the accused. "
We have no hesitation in holding that the approach of
the High Court is erroneous and its conclusion legally
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unsustainable. There is nothing in the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code which precluded the appellant
(Inspector of Police, Vigilance) from taking up the
investigation. The fact that the said police officer prepared
the FIR on the basis of the information received by him and
registered the suspected crime does not, in our view,
disqualify him from taking up the investigation of the
cognizable offence. A suo motu move on the part of the
police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by
the information received from some sources is not outside
the purview of the provisions contained in Sections 154 to
157 of the Code or any other provisions of the Code. The
scheme of Sections 154,156 and 157 was clarified thus by
Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Court in State of U.P. vs.
Bhagwant Kishore [AIR 1964 SC 221].
"Section 154 of the Code prescribes the
mode of recording the information
received orally or in writing by an officer
in charge of a police station in respect
of the commission of a cognizable
offence. Section 156 thereof authorizes
such an officer to investigate any
cognizable offence prescribed therein.
Though ordinarily investigation is
undertaken on information received by a
police officer, the receipt of information
is not a condition precedent for
investigation. Section 157 prescribes
the procedure in the matter of such an
investigation which can be initiated
either on information or otherwise. It is
clear from the said provisions that an
officer in charge of a police station can
start investigation either on information
or otherwise."
In fact, neither the High Court found nor any argument
was addressed to the effect that there is a statutory bar
against the police officer who registered the FIR on the basis
of the information received taking up the investigation.
Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on
which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that the
investigation by the same officer who ’lodged’ the FIR would
prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer
cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no
principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the
competent police officer, on the basis of information
received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the
informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such
investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or
real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer.
The question of bias would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down
a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which
it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police
officer proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on
his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or
biased. In the present case, the police officer received
certain discreet information, which, according to his
assessment, warranted a probe and therefore made up his
mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the FIR in
which he records the factum of having received the
information about the suspected commission of the offence
and then taking up the investigation after registering the
crime, does not, by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the
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investigation on the ground of bias or the like factor. If the
reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground
to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation
conferred on the police officers would be unduly hampered
for no good reason. What is expected to be done by the
police officers in the normal course of discharge of their
official duties will then be vulnerable to attack.
There are two decisions of this Court from which
support was drawn in this case and in some other cases
referred to by the High Court. We would like to refer to
these two decisions in some detail. The first one is the case
of Bhagwan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1976 SC
985). There, the Head Constable to whom the offer of bribe
was allegedly made, seized the currency notes and gave the
first information report. Thereafter, he himself took up the
investigation. But, later on, when it came to his notice that
he was not authorized to do so, he forwarded the papers to
the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The DSP then
reinvestigated the case and filed the charge sheet against
the accused. The Head Constable and the accompanying
Constables were the only witnesses in that case. This Court
found several circumstances which cast a doubt on the
veracity of the version of the Head Constable and his
colleagues. This Court observed that "the entire story
sounds unnatural". While so holding, this Court referred to
"a rather disturbing feature of the case" and it was pointed
out that "Head Constable Ram Singh was the person to
whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by
the appellant and he was the informant or complainant who
lodged the first information report for taking action against
the appellant. It is difficult to understand how in these
circumstances, Head Constable Ram Singh could undertake
investigation?\005.. This is an infirmity which is bound to
reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case".
It is not clear as to why the Court was called upon to
make the comments against the propriety of the Head
Constable\027informant investigating the case when the
reinvestigation was done by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police. Be that as it may, it is possible to hold on the basis of
the facts noted above, that the so called investigation by the
Head Constable himself would be a mere ritual. The crime
itself was directed towards the Head Constable which made
him lodge the FIR. It is well nigh impossible to expect an
objective and undetached investigation from the Head
Constable who is called upon to check his own version on
which the prosecution case solely rests. It was under those
circumstances the Court observed that the said infirmity "is
bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case".
There can be no doubt that the facts of the present case are
entirely different and the dicta laid down therein does not fit
into the facts of this case.
Now, we may turn our attention to the case of Megha
Singh Vs. State of Haryana [(1996) 11 SCC 709] on
which reliance was placed by the High Court.
In Megha Singh’s case, PW3, the Head Constable,
found a country-made pistol and live cartridges on search of
the person of the accused. Then, he seized the articles,
prepared a recovery memo and a ’rukka’ on the basis of
which FIR was recorded by the S.I. of police. However,
P.W.3\027the Head Constable himself, for reasons
unexplained, proceeded to investigate and record the
statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The
substratum of the prosecution case was sought to be proved
by the Head Constable. In the appeal against conviction
under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section 6(1) of the
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TADA Act, this Court found that the evidence of PWs 2 & 3
was discrepant and unreliable and in the absence of
independent corroboration, the prosecution case cannot be
believed. Towards the end, the Court noted "another
disturbing feature in the case". The Court then observed:
"PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the
accused and on search being conducted by him a
pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the
accused. It was on his complaint a formal first
information report was lodged and the case was
initiated. He being complainant should not have
proceeded with the investigation of the case. But
it appears to us that he was not only the
complainant in the case but he carried on with the
investigation and examined witnesses under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such practice, to say the
least, should not be resorted to so that there may
not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial
investigation".
The conviction was set aside by this Court for the
above reasons.
At first blush, the observations quoted above might
convey the impression that the Court laid down a proposition
that a Police Officer who in the course of discharge of his
duties finds certain incriminating material to connect a
person to the crime, shall not undertake further
investigation if the FIR was recorded on the basis of the
information furnished by him. On closer analysis of the
decision, we do not think that any such broad proposition
was laid down in that case. While appreciating the evidence
of the main witness, i.e., the Head Constable (PW3), this
Court referred to this additional factor\027namely, the Head
Constable turning out to be the investigator. In fact, there
was no apparent reason why the Head Constable proceeded
to investigate the case bypassing the Sub-Inspector who
recorded the FIR. The fact situation in the present case is
entirely different. The appellant\027Inspector of Police, after
receiving information from some sources, proceeded to
investigate and unearth the crime. Before he did so, he did
not have personal knowledge of the suspected offences nor
did he participate in any operations connected with the
offences. His role was that of investigator\027pure and simple.
That is the obvious distinction in this case. That apart, the
question of testing the veracity of the evidence of any
witness, as was done in Megha Singh’s case, does not arise
in the instant case as the trial is yet to take place. The High
Court has quashed the proceedings even before the trial
commenced.
Viewed from any angle, we see no illegality in the
process of investigation set in motion by the Inspector of
Police (appellant) and his action in submitting the final
report to the Court of Special Judge.
In the written submissions filed after the conclusion of
hearing, it is contended that the Inspector of Police had no
jurisdiction to investigate the offence under the Prevention
of Corruption Act without the order of a Magistrate of 1st
Class and it was only the Deputy Superintendent of Police
who was competent to investigate. Section 17 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 has been adverted to in
this connection. That is not the ground which was urged
before the High Court or even in the SLP or in the
arguments advanced at the time of hearing. It is not even
the case of the Respondent-accused that the Inspector of
Police (Vigilance & Anti-Corruption) has not been authorized
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under the proviso to Section 17. We are therefore not
inclined to deal with that question in this appeal.
In the result the impugned order of the High Court is
set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs.