M/S. S.E. GRAPHITES PRIVATE LIMITED vs. STATE OF TELANGANA

1 (REPORTABLE) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7574 OF 2014 M/S. S.E. Graphites Private Limited    ..…Appellant(s)  Versus State of Telangana & Ors.   ….Respondent(s) WITH  Civil Appeal Nos.10433/2014, 2084/2015, 4098/2016, 4099/2016,   8452/2016,  10670/2016,  3349/2018  and S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19961/2015, 6880/2019 J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. Civil Appeal Nos.7574/2014, 10433/2014, 2084/2015 and Civil Appeal No.5345 of 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.6880 of 2019) 1. Leave granted in SLP (C) No.6880 of 2019. These Civil Appeals emanate from the orders passed by the 2. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by CHARANJEET KAUR Date: 2019.07.10 18:06:18 IST Reason: Appellate   Authority   rejecting   the   appeal   preferred   by   the concerned appellant(s) under the provisions of APGST Act, 1957 2 or AP VAT Act, 2005 or Telangana State VAT Act, 2005, as the case  may   be,   on   the   ground   that   the   appellant­assessee   had failed   to   comply   with   the   pre­condition   of   producing   proof   of payment of tax admitted to be due or of such installments as may have been granted and/or the proof of payment of twelve and a half percent (12.5%) of the difference of the tax assessed by the assessing authority and the tax admitted by the appellant for the relevant assessment year in respect of which the appeal has been preferred   by   the   concerned   appellant­assessee,   warranting rejection of the appeal in terms of the second proviso of Section 19 and  proviso  of   Section   21   (2)  of   the   APGST  Act,   1957  or second proviso of Section 31 and proviso of Section 33 (2) of the AP   VAT   Act,   2005.   Similar   position   obtains   regarding   the provisions of Telangana State enactments.  3. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the concerned   appellant   following   the   decision   of   the   coordinate bench of the High Court in   Ankamma Trading Company Vs. 1 Appellate   Deputy   Commissioner   (CT),   Guntur   &   Anr.   and other   decisions   taking   the   same   view,   despite   the   appellant 1  (2011) 44 VST 189 (AP) 3 pointing out to the High Court that the decision in   Ankamma Trading Company   (supra) has been impliedly overruled by the Supreme   Court   in   M/s.   Innovatives   Systems,   Rep.   by   its Managing   Partner   Vs.   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh,   Rep.   by 2 Principal Secretary to Government . In that case, this Court after   clearly   noting   that   the   High   Court   had   relied   upon   the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the same High Court [in  Ankamma Trading Company  (supra)] to dismiss the   writ  petition   preferred   by   the   appellant,   yet   proceeded   to allow the appeal filed by the appellant therein by setting aside the decision of the High Court. The appellant in that case had filed appeal within limitation period but deposited the twelve and a half percent (12.5%) of the difference of the tax assessed by the assessing authority in respect of which the appeal was preferred after   the   expiry   of   the   limitation   period   specified   in   the   first proviso of the concerned provision. This Court, nevertheless, held that   the   appellant   having   deposited   the   stipulated   amount   of twelve and a half percent (12.5%) as directed by the Appellate Deputy   Commissioner   (CT),   the   High   Court   ought   to   have condoned the delay in complying with the direction given by the 2  Civil Appeal No.2230/2015 (arising out of SLP (C) No.1832/2015 decided  on February 23, 2015).  4 Appellate Authority in that regard and thus restored the appeal with a direction to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal on merits. Relying on the subsequent decisions of this Court in  M/s. IOT   Infrastructure   &   Energy   Services   Ltd.,   Rep.   by   its Deputy   Manager   (Accounts)   Vs.   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh 3 Rep.   by   its   Principal   Secretary   to   Government   and   M/s. Ranisati   Trading   Co.   Rep.   by   its   Managing   Partner   Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Gajuwaka Circle, Visakhapatnam 4 ,   it is urged by the appellant­assessee that the High and Ors. Court   ought   not   to   have   disregarded   those   decisions   on   the specious ground that the same cannot be treated as a binding precedent   and   purportedly   having   been   passed   in   exercise   of plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Inasmuch   as,   looking   at   the   decision   in   M/s.   Innovatives Systems  (supra) of this Court, there is hardly any doubt that the effect   of   the   said   order   is   to   impliedly   overrule   the   principle enunciated   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in Ankamma   Trading   Company   (supra)   or   other   decisions following   the   same.   For,   this   Court   had   unmistakably   shown 3  (Civil Appeal No.12077/2016 decided on 14.12.2016) 4  (Civil Appeal No.5339/2017 decided on 17.04.2017) 5 inclination to apply its mind to the merits of the said order before it having granted leave to appeal against the same albeit it had disposed of the matter by a brief judgment. Thus, additionally, the   doctrine   of   merger   would   come   into   play   as   exposited   in 5 Kunhayammed   and   Ors.   Vs.   State   of   Kerala   and   Anr. , wherein a three­Judge Bench of this Court opined that once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors of the appellate jurisdiction   of   this   Court   have   been   let   open   and   any   order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. Further, it would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal, or of affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or a non­speaking one.  In addition, the appellant(s)­assessee(s) have relied on the 4. decisions of this Court in   Ranjit Impex Vs. Appellate Deputy 6 , which has had an occasion to deal Commissioner and Anr.   with more  or  less  similar  provision,  if  not  identically worded, being Section 51 of the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006. Even there 5  (2000) 6 SCC 359  6  (2013) 10 SCC 655 6 the provision contained stipulation such as the proviso of the provisions   under   consideration   pertaining   to   State   of   Andhra Pradesh and State of Telangana. It is then urged that even the Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Ankamma (supra), in paragraph 25 has taken note of Trading Company   the   fact   that   the   proviso   of   the   concerned   section   does   not specifically mention the time within which such proof of payment is to be produced but then went on to rely on the first proviso dealing with the period of limitation within which the appeal is required to be filed and the maximum period of delay which could be condoned by the Appellate Authority, to hold that the deposit specified in the second proviso should also be paid within such time only. Else, it went on to hold that the Appellate Authority is obliged to reject the appeal or in other words, not admit the same.  5. The   appellants   would   urge   that   there   is   well   recognized distinction   between   the   factum   of   filing,   institution   and presentation of the appeal and the factum of “entertaining” the appeal or consideration thereof for admitting the same on merits. If the provision had expressly stated that the “appeal when filed” 7 should be “accompanied with” the receipt or proof of payment of amount   referred   to   in   the   second   proviso,   the   interpretation commended to the High Court could be sustained. However, the High   Court   itself   having   recognized   the   fact   that   no   specific mention   is   made   about   the   time   within   which   such   proof   of payment is to be produced, the corollary thereof is that the proof of payment is required to be produced by the assessee on the “first   date   of   hearing”   of   the   appeal   for   admission   or consideration thereof on merits. The appellant has also relied on couple of reported decisions to contend that the right of appeal, though, it does not inhere in the party, but once such remedy is provided   then   it   cannot   be   whittled   down   by   giving   strict interpretation to the second proviso. However, the just approach would be to read the expression “not to be admitted” as “not to be entertained” ­ if the dealer failed to produce proof of payment of tax dues as per the second proviso of the concerned provision. The thrust of the argument is that in cases where the appellant­ assessee has already paid the requisite amount referred to in the second proviso of the concerned provision, before the appeal is taken by  the  Appellate  Authority/Court for  the  “first time  for consideration”   after   its   filing   in   the   office   of   the   Appellate 8 Authority,   that   will   be   substantial   compliance   of   the   second proviso. In such a case, the Appellate Authority would be obliged to admit the appeal if it deserves consideration on merits and the appellant­assessee cannot be non­suited on the ground that the amount so paid is after the limitation period specified for filing of an appeal.  6. The respondent­State, on the other hand, has supported the exposition in the case of  (supra), Ankamma Trading Company  and would urge that the view taken in the said decision is the only possible interpretation of the second proviso. In that, if the amount specified in the second proviso is not deposited within the   period   provided   for   filing   an   appeal   and   including   for condonation   of   delay,   such   appeal   would   be   inflicted   with institutional defect and will have to be rejected on that count in light of the mandate contained in the proviso of the concerned provision. It is urged that the appellants have been ill­ advised to invoke doctrine of merger. According to the respondent­State, on a bare perusal of the decision of this Court in  M/s. Innovatives (supra), and the other decisions passed following the Systems   same would clearly indicate that it has been passed in the fact 9 situation   of   the   concerned   case.   Notably,   this   Court   has   not interpreted the provisions under consideration or for that matter explicitly   overturned   the   principle   expounded   by   the   Division Bench in  Ankamma Trading Company  (supra). Whereas, a bare reading   of   the   provision   makes   it   amply   clear   that   it   is   a mandatory provision. Failure to comply with the stipulation in the   second   proviso   would   inevitably   denude   the   Appellate Authority from entertaining the same or so to speak, admitting the   same   on   merits.   Heavy   reliance   has   been   placed   on   the decision   in   the   case   of   M/s.   Lakshmi   Rattan   Engineering 7 , Works Ltd. Vs. Asst. Commr. Sales Tax, Kanpur & Anr. wherein this Court was called upon to interpret Section 9 of the relevant enactment. As per that provision, no appeal against an assessment   shall   be   entertained   unless   it   is   accompanied   by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax amount admitted by the appellant to be due. The exposition in this decision, according to the respondent­State, would admit of no other interpretation of the second proviso as is held by the Division Bench of the High Court   in   Ankamma   Trading   Company   (supra).   In   that,   the Appellate Authority cannot exercise power to admit the appeal 7  (1968) 1 SCR 505  10 beyond   the   statutory   period   and   since   the   pre­deposit   is quintessence,   the   requirement   of   pre­deposit   within   the maximum period of limitation for filing the appeal including, for condoning the delay in filing the same, would have bearing on the second proviso of the concerned provision. Reliance is also placed on the decision in  Narayan Chandra Ghosh Vs. UCO Bank and 8 Ors. , which has had an occasion to interpret the purport of Section 18 of the  Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 wherein the Court noted that there is an absolute power to entertain an appeal   under   Section   18   of   the   Act   unless   the   condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. The respondent­State would, thus, contend   that  the   deposit  even  if  made   by   the   assessee before the rejection of the appeal (for non­compliance of the pre­ condition in terms of the proviso of the concerned provision), will be of no avail to the assessee.  7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. At the outset, we deem it apposite to reproduce the relevant provisions of the APGST Act, 1957 and AP VAT Act, 2005. Almost identical provisions obtain in the Telangana State Acts. Section 19 and 21 8  (2011) 4 SCC 548 11 of the APGST Act, 1957 and Section 31 and 33 of the AP VAT Act, 2005, read thus: 

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(emphasis supplied) These   provisions   have   been   interpreted   by   the   Division 8. Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Ankamma   Trading (supra). We are essentially concerned with the second Company  proviso of Section 19 and Section 31 of the respective enactment; and   first   proviso   of   Section   21(2)   and   Section   33(2)   of   the respective   enactment.   Upon   reading   the   Section   under consideration as a whole, it is evident that the first proviso in the concerned Section (Section 19 and Section 31, as the case may be) pertains to limitation period “for filing” of an appeal; and discretion of the Appellate Authority to condone the delay in filing of   such   appeal,   up   to   a   maximum   period   specified   therein. Indeed, the second proviso is part of the same Section. However, it   is   an   independent   condition   and   in   one   sense,   mutually exclusive   condition   mandating   or   enjoining   the   appellant   to 14 produce proof of payment of tax dues in respect of which the appeal   is   preferred.   That   obligation,   in   our   opinion,   can   be discharged until the appeal is considered for admission and/or condonation of delay in filing of the appeal, as the case may be, by the Appellate Authority for the first time. We are inclined to take this view as even the High Court in   Ankamma Trading Company  (supra) had justly noted that the said proviso does not provide for any specific period within which the tax dues should be paid. Moreover, there is no express stipulation to deposit the tax dues in respect of which the appeal is preferred, at the time of its filing, institution or presentation as such. In the absence of such a clear stipulation, it must necessarily follow that it is open to the assessee to file the appeal within the statutory period of limitation provided therefor and later on, deposit the specified tax dues but before the appeal is taken up for consideration by the Appellate Authority for the first time – be it for condonation of delay   in   filing   the   appeal   and/or   to   admit   it   on   merits   or otherwise. The proof of such payment having been made could be produced thereat. Failing which, the Appellate Authority will have no   other   option   but   to   reject   the   appeal   on   that   count.   The 15 Appellate Authority has no power to extend the time to deposit the specified tax dues.  9. Suffice it to observe that,   stricto sensu ,   the said proviso is not a provision of pre­deposit at the stage of filing, institution or presentation of the appeal as such; but is a provision stipulating payment   of   tax   dues   as   a   pre­requisite   or   sine   qua   non   for consideration   of   appeal   on   merits   or   otherwise   and/or   for condonation of delay in filing the same, as the case may be, for the first time. If we may say so, it is also to impose fetter on the Appellate Authority from admitting the appeal for consideration on   merits.   It   is   well   recognized   that   filing,   institution   or presentation of appeal in the office of the Appellate Authority is an   independent   event   than   the   appeal   being   taken   up   for consideration “for the first time” for being admitted on merits or otherwise and/or for condonation of delay in filing it, as the case may be. There is no reason to interpret the stated proviso in any other manner lest, inevitably, it would result in re­writing the same   and   entail   in   doing   violence   to   the   legislative   intent. Presumably, this  Court in   (supra), M/s. Innovatives Systems   and other decisions rendered following the same, therefore, was 16 persuaded to allow the appeal preferred by the assessee and to relegate   the   parties   before   the   Appellate   Authority   for consideration of the appeal for admission on merits.  Concededly,   this  Court  was   conscious   of   the   decision  in 10. Ankamma   Trading   Company   (supra).   In  that,   the   judgment under challenge before it in the concerned appeal was founded on the view already taken by the coordinate bench of the same High Court [including in   Ankamma Trading  Company   (supra)]. It has  been  so  recorded   by   this  Court.   In  that   sense,   the   legal position  expounded   in   (supra), Ankamma  Trading  Company   stood   impliedly   overruled,   even   though   that   decision   has   not been adverted to or expressly overruled by this Court.  11. The argument of the respondent proceeds that the decision in   M/s.   Innovatives   Systems   (supra),   neither   refers   to   any specific provision nor has it expressly over turned the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in   Ankamma Trading Company   (supra). Thus, it cannot be considered as a binding precedent. We are not impressed by this submission. Indeed, the decision of this Court in  (supra), is a M/s. Innovatives Systems  17 brief judgment. That, however, would make no difference. For, it is well established that once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. Resultantly, the order impugned before the Supreme Court became an order appealed against and any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and attract the doctrine of merger despite the fact that the order is of reversal or of modification or of affirming the order appealed against and including is a speaking or non­speaking one. This legal position has been restated in   Kunhayammed   (supra).   Having said this, we must reject the argument of the respondent­State that the decision of this Court in  (supra), and M/s. Innovatives Systems  other   decisions   following   the   same,   cannot   be   considered   as binding precedent. In   addition,   the   appellant­assessee   has   rightly   placed 12. reliance on the decision of this Court in  Ranjit Impex  (supra). In that   case,   the   Court   considered   almost   similar   stipulation   in Section 51 of the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006. Indeed, the second proviso   therein   uses   the   expression   no   appeal   shall   be “entertained”, unlike the expression used in the provisions under 18 consideration   that   the   appeal   so   preferred   “shall   not   be admitted”. We are conscious of the fact that the first proviso pertaining to maximum period of delay to be condoned by the Appellate Authority, also uses the expression “admit the appeal”. That expression “admit”, however, must be read to mean filing, institution   or   presentation   of   the   appeal   in   the   office   of   the Appellate Authority. Whereas, the expression “admitted” used in the second proviso will have to be construed as analogous to expression “entertained”. We are inclined to take this view as the setting in which the provisions under consideration appear leaves no manner of doubt that it is ascribable to the event of taking up the appeal for consideration, for the first time, to admit it on merits or otherwise and/or for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, as the case may be. Before that event occurs, it is open to the appellant to deposit the tax dues in respect of which the appeal is preferred and produce proof of such deposit before the Appellate Authority. This view is reinforced from the exposition of this Court in 13. Ranjit Impex   (supra), wherein the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras that the proof of deposit of tax 19 has to be produced at the time when the appeal is taken up for consideration, but not at the time of filing or presentation of the appeal, has been upheld.  14. Even the decision of this Court in   M/s. Lakshmi Rattan (supra),   heavily   relied   upon   by   the Engineering   Works   Ltd.   respondent­State, does not militate against the view taken by us ­ that the true purport of the said proviso is that the Appellate Authority   shall   proceed   with   the   consideration   of   appeal   for admission   for   hearing   on   merits   or   otherwise   and/or   for condonation of delay in filing appeal, as the case may be, if the proof of payment of the specified tax dues referred to in the said proviso is produced by the appellant on the first date of such consideration   of   the   appeal.   Similarly,   the   case   of   Narayan (supra), will be of no avail to the respondent, Chandra Ghosh   wherein   the   Court   opined   that   there   is   an   absolute   bar   to “entertain” an appeal under Section 18 of the Securitisation  and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest   Act,   2002,   unless   the   conditions   and   stipulation   are fulfilled. Inasmuch as, the second proviso under consideration does not require payment of tax dues referred to therein, at the 20 time of filing, institution or presentation of the appeal but the proof of such payment has been made, is required to be produced before the Appellate Authority at the first hearing of the appeal; failing which the Appellate Authority would be well within its jurisdiction to reject it rather duty bound not to proceed with the appeal on merits and to reject the same at the threshold on the ground of an institutional defect.  15. For the view that we have taken, it is wholly unnecessary to deal with the other reported decisions relied upon by the parties or to deal with other arguments which have no bearing on the conclusion reached by us.  Reverting   to   the   factual   position   in   the   appeals   under 16. consideration, admittedly, the appellant­assessee had deposited the specified tax dues before the date on which appeal preferred by them was taken up for consideration for the first time for admission   on   merits.   In   such   a   situation,   the   stated   proviso becomes   unavailable   to   reject   the   appeal   on   the   ground   of institutional defect. In this view of the matter, all these appeals must succeed.  21 While parting, we may observe that taking advantage of the 17. interpretation given by us, it is possible that some unscrupulous litigant (assessee) may file an appeal within the limitation period but keep it under defect so that the same does not proceed for consideration before the Appellate Authority. To obviate such a mischief, we hold and direct that the Appellate Authority shall be obliged to take up every singular appeal for consideration for admission on merits and/or for condonation of delay in filing the appeal for the first time, no later than thirty days from the date of its filing, institution or presentation in the office of the Appellate Authority. This direction shall be complied with by all concerned meticulously,   without   any   exception.   That   is   the   only   way   to secure the interests of the Revenue and at the same time to effectuate   the   purpose   underlying   the   proviso   regarding   the deposit of specified amount of tax dues.   18. Resultantly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and instead the writ petition(s) are allowed by setting aside the   order   passed   by   the   Appellate   Authority,   rejecting   the concerned appeals on the ground of non­compliance of the stated proviso   of   the   provisions   under   consideration.   The   concerned 22 appeals shall stand restored to the file of the Appellate Authority. The same shall proceed for consideration in accordance with law. All pending  applications   are  also  disposed  of.   No  order   as  to costs.                                           Civil Appeal Nos.4098/2016 & 4099/2016 19. These   appeals   were   heard   analogously   with   Civil   Appeal No.7574/2014. In this set of appeals, admittedly, the appellant­ assessee deposited the amount after the appeal filed by them came to be rejected by the Appellate Authority. In that sense, the appellant­assessee failed to produce proof of payment of tax dues in respect of which the appeal was preferred before the Appellate Authority when their appeal was taken up for consideration for admission. In Civil Appeal No.7574/2014, we have held that it is open to the assessee to deposit the amount before the event of first   date   of   hearing   of   the   appeal   for   admission   and/or   for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Resultantly, the deposit made   after   rejection   of   the   appeal   will   be   of   no   avail   to   the appellant­assessee, in light of the mandate of the stated proviso under consideration.  23 In view of the above, these appeals must fail and the same 20. are   therefore,   dismissed.   All   pending   applications   are   also disposed of. No order as to costs.  Civil Appeal No.8452/2016 21. This appeal was analogously heard along with Civil Appeal No.7574/2014. In the present appeal, the State has challenged the judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.22337 of 2015 and, in particular, the liberty granted to the respondent   (writ   petitioner)   to   pay   the   requisite   amount   after expiry of the limitation period prescribed under Section 33 of AP VAT Act, 2005 and on such deposit being made, the Appellate Authority is directed to consider the appeal on merits.  22. The background in which such direction came to be issued, can be discerned from the appeal filed by the State. To wit, the respondent,   who   was   dealing   in   works   contracts   and   was registered   under   APGST   Act,   1957,   was   assessed   by   the appropriate authority but that assessment was revised by the th Commercial Tax Officer by passing a revision order dated 25 March,   2013.   Against   that   decision,   respondent­assessee 24 preferred appeal before the State Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. During the pendency of the said appeal, respondent filed a writ petition to challenge the orders passed by the Commercial Tax th th Officer dated 27   February, 2013 and 25   March, 2013. That writ   petition   has   been   disposed   of   by   the   High   Court   vide impugned judgment, with liberty to comply with the condition of paying   the   tax   dues   in   terms   of   the   second   proviso   of   the concerned provision within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt   of   the   copy   of   order   and   upon   such   compliance,   the Appellate Authority would decide the pending appeal on merits.  23. Having regard to the exposition in Civil Appeal No.7574 of 2014, decided today, it must follow that if the appeal filed by the respondent   is   still   pending   and   has   not   been   taken   up   for consideration   so   far   by   the   Appellate   Authority,   only   then   it would be open to the respondent to deposit the requisite amount and   produce   the   proof   of   such   deposit   before   the   Appellate Authority. If, however, the appeal has already been taken up for consideration for being admitted on merits or otherwise and by that date the respondent had not deposited the requisite amount as prescribed in terms of stated proviso, the Appellate Authority 25 would be well within its jurisdiction and rather duty bound to reject the appeal on the ground of an institutional defect. That is a matter to be considered by the Appellate Authority. Besides this observation, nothing more is required to be stated in this appeal filed by the State.  24. We dispose of the appeal in the aforementioned terms with no order as to costs. All pending applications are also disposed of.  Civil Appeal No.5343 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.19961/2015) 25. Leave granted.  26. This   appeal   takes   exception   to   the   judgment   and   order st dated 31  October, 2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh   in   Writ   Petition   No.837   of   2014,   whereby   the   writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the order passed by the st second   respondent­Appellate   Authority   dated   31   December, 2013 came to be rejected. The appeal was dismissed on the sole ground that the appellant had failed to pay the required twelve 26 and a half percent (12.5%) disputed tax in terms of Section 31 of AP VAT Act, 2005. Initially, the Commercial Tax Officer passed th an assessment order on 11   June,  2012. The  appellant filed th appeal against the said assessment order on 11  July, 2012. The appellant   was   called   upon   by   the   Appellate   Authority   vide th communication dated 12   July, 2012 to make good the short payment of pre­deposit in the sum of Rs.1,35,00,512/­ as also the   institution   fee.   The   appellant   filed   response   to   the   said communication contending that there was input tax credit to the account of the appellant in the sum of Rs.1080,01,63,420/­ and that   amount   would   arise   only   in   respect   of   the   tax   paid   on taxable purchases effected within the State. Despite that factual aspect brought to the notice of the first Appellate Authority, it rejected the appeal for non­payment of pre­deposit amount vide th order dated 24  July, 2012. This was an  ex­parte  order.  The   appellant   then   filed   representation   to   the   assessing 27. authority for issuing tax credit certificate for giving necessary adjustments against the taxes payable for 04/2010 to 06/2011 th and pointing out the order of the Tribunal dated 18   October, 2011 which was communicated long back but not implemented thus far. The appellant, therefore, submitted new representation 27 th to   the   assessing   authority   on   15   September,   2012.   The th Commercial Tax Officer eventually, issued a certificate on 12 October, 2012 certifying that the appellant has input tax credit of Rs.   92,01,606/­,  eligible   to   be   refunded   either   in   cash   or th adjusted.  On  13   October, 2012, the  Commercial  Tax Officer issued proceedings holding that the appellant has an excess tax credit of Rs.66,46,284/­ for adjustment or refund.  28. The appellant being aggrieved by the orders passed by the th Appellate Deputy Commissioner rejecting appeal on 24   July, 2012 on the ground of non­payment of requisite disputed tax amount,   filed   second   appeal   before   the   Sales   Tax   Appellate Tribunal. That came to be allowed by setting aside the order rejecting the first appeal and instead directing the first Appellate Authority to restore the appeal and hear the appellant, as the th order dated 24  July, 2012 was an  ex parte  order passed without hearing the appellant.  In remanded proceedings, appellant filed evidence before 29. st the first Appellate Authority on 21  July, 2013 and requested to consider the evidence and give adjustment of the excess payment due   to   the   appellant   as   certified   by   the   assessing   authority. 28 Thus, the appellant requested the Appellate Authority to accept the tax credit certificates and take the appeal on   file for disposal on   merits.   Despite   production   of   the   said   certificates,   the Appellate   Deputy   Commissioner   once   again   called   upon   the appellant to pay the balance amount towards pre­deposit, vide th communication dated 15   May, 2013. In response thereto, the appellant   filed   representation   reiterating   its   earlier   stand. Nevertheless,   the   Appellate   Deputy   Commissioner   once   again st rejected the appeal on 31  December, 2013, for non­payment of pre­deposit   amount   primarily   relying   upon   the   judgment   of Ankamma Trading Company  (supra). Eventually, the appellant challenged   the   aforementioned   decision   by   filing   writ   petition No.847 of 2013. That writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court on the basis of the exposition in  Ankamma Trading Company  (supra). 30. The   principal   grievance   of   the   appellant   is   that   after remand,   the   first   Appellate   Authority   failed   to   consider   the specific   stand   taken   by   the   appellant   that   it   was   entitled   to adjustment of the amount mentioned in the tax credit certificate and if so done the appellant had complied with the pre­condition 29 of deposit of twelve and a half percent (12.5%) of the amount in respect of which the appeal was filed by the appellant before the first   Appellate   Authority.   Although,   this   plea   was   specifically taken   before   the   Appellate   Authority,   the   judgment   of   the Appellate Authority has not analysed the same at all. Instead, it proceeded   to   dismiss   the   appeal   merely   by   relying   on   the exposition in   (supra). Similarly, Ankamma Trading Company   even the High Court after recording this argument of the learned counsel   for   the   appellant,   has   not   analysed   the   same   and mechanically   rejected   the   writ   petition   on   the   ground   that appellant had failed to comply with the pre­condition of deposit. This approach of the High Court as well as of the first Appellate Authority is the subject matter of assail in the present appeal.  31. We have heard the counsel for the parties. As regards the legal   position   expounded   in   Ankamma   Trading   Company (supra),   we   have   already   answered   the   same   in   Civil   Appeal No.7574/2014 decided today. That appeal was heard along with all   connected   matters.   In   the   present   case,   however,   the additional   point   which   arises   is   whether   the   appellant   was entitled for adjustment of the amount mentioned in the tax credit 30 certificate   issued   in   favour   of   the   appellant.   Admittedly,   the appellant   had   specifically   taken   that   plea   before   the   first Appellate Authority. However, as already mentioned hitherto the first Appellate Authority failed to analyse that aspect ­ which it was expected to do, in terms of the earlier order passed by the second   Appellate   Authority   and   even   otherwise.   Further,   this grievance was specifically made before the High Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant as is noticed from the impugned judgment,  the relevant portion  of the  judgment recording the argument of the appellant, reads thus:  “……… Aggrieved thereby, the present Writ Petition is filed. Sri Tejprakash   Toshniwal,   Learned   Counsel   for   the petitioner, would submit that in M/s. Ideal Detonators Pvt.   Ltd.   v.   Commercial   Tax   Officer,   the   Supreme Court   had   directed   the   Appellate   Deputy Commissioner to revive the earlier order and dispose of the same on merits, after due notice to the parties; in Fytochem   Formulations   Ltd.   v.   Commercial   Tax Officer, a Division Bench of this Court had held that it is incumbent on the Commercial Tax Officer to decide the representation submitted by the petitioner; and, in case the petitioner is entitled to the excess amount, then   a   certificate/endorsement   should   be   issued   to him, so that the amount can be adjusted towards pre­ deposit   of   12.5%   at   the   time   of   admission   of   the appeal;  the  Commercial Tax  Officer  was  directed  to decide the representation; and, in case the petitioner’s representation was accepted by the Commercial Tax nd Officer, the 2   respondent was directed to admit the appeal. Learned Counsel would also rely on Chander Prakash   Goyal   v.   State   of   Haryana,   in   this regard……………..”  31 32. However,   even   the   High   Court   has   not   answered   this specific plea urged by the appellant, in the impugned judgment. If   the   appellant   is   right   in   contending   that   the   appellant   is entitled for an adjustment of amount and if so done, there would be no need for the appellant to deposit twelve and a half percent (12.5%) amount as required by the second proviso of Section 31 of the Act. The appellant had relied on the decisions of this Court to buttress that argument. However, the same has remained to be analysed and considered even by the High Court.  33. In that view of the matter, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned judgment and relegate the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of the Writ Petition No.837/2014 afresh on its own merits in accordance with law and including in light   of   decision   of   this   Court   in   Civil   Appeal   No.7574/2014 decided   today.   All   contentions   available   to   both   sides   in   the remanded writ petition are left open to be considered on its own merits and in accordance with law.  34. Accordingly,   this   appeal   is   allowed.   The   impugned st judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   dated   31 32 October, 2014 in Writ Petition No.837/2014 is set aside and instead the writ petition is restored to the file of the High Court for fresh consideration in light of the observations made hitherto. All contentions available to the parties are left open. All pending applications are also disposed of. No order as to costs.   Civil Appeal No.10670/16 35. This   appeal   was   heard   analogously   with   Civil   Appeal No.7574/2014.   It   has   been   preferred   by   the   assessee.   The th respondent   No.2   passed   an   order   dated   24   February,   2015, levying a penalty under Section 53(3) of the AP VAT Act, 2005 amounting to Rs.67,57,696/­, being equivalent to 100% of the th tax due. The appellant relies on a certificate dated 4  April, 2015 issued by respondent No.1 and stated on oath that a tax credit carry forward of Rs.10,63,683/­ by end of May, 2014 is available to the appellant. In the appeal preferred by the appellant against th the order imposing additional tax and penalty filed on 7  April, 2015, the appellant specifically took a plea that the input tax credit   and   alleged   variations   between   purchase   and   sales transactions   recorded   in   the   books   of   account   vis­à­vis   the returns filed under the AP VAT have been wrongly disallowed. 33 Notably, the appellant filed an affidavit stating that a tax credit of Rs.10,63,683/­   is   available   to   the   appellant   after   filing   the monthly return for May, 2014 and that such credit has not been adjusted to any other tax liability and thus prayed that the said credit may be adjusted towards the twelve and a half percent (12.5%)   of   Rs.67,57,696/­,   which   comes   to   Rs.8,44,712/­. Despite this specific stand taken by the appellant on affidavit, the respondent No.3 issued notice claiming that the appeals filed by the appellant were not compliant with Section 31 for want of proof of payment of twelve and a half percent (12.5%) of the disputed tax and penalty. Later on, respondent No.3 rejected the th appeal on 5  June, 2015 on the ground that the appellant had failed   to   produce   the   proof   of   payment   of   twelve   and   a   half percent (12.5%) of the disputed tax and penalty.  36. It is noticed from the narration of facts in the appeal that the appellant was then advised to deposit the twelve and a half th percent (12.5%) disputed tax which it did on 30  January, 2016 th and 30   March, 2016, in installments. The appellant had also filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition No.393 of 2015 and assailed the order passed by the Appellate Authority, rejecting its appeal on the ground of 34 institutional defect due to non­production of proof of payment of disputed   tax.   The   High  Court  relying  on   Ankamma   Trading Company  (supra), rejected the writ petition filed by the appellant.   37. Being aggrieved, the appellant has  preferred  this  appeal. Upon perusal of order passed by the Appellate Authority, it is noticed   that   even   the   Appellate   Authority   rejected   the   appeal without taking notice of the prayer made by the appellant on oath that a tax credit of Rs.10,67,683/­ is available to the appellant and that such credit has not been adjusted towards any other tax liability   and   can   be   adjusted   towards   the   twelve   and   a   half percent (12.5%) of disputed tax amount of Rs.67,57,696/­, which comes   to   Rs.4,44,712/­   only.   The   order   of   the   Appellate Authority, as communicated to the appellant, reads thus:  “The   appeal   petition   along   with   stay   petition   (main appeal & penalty appeal) are returned as the same are not   in   accordance   in   terms   of   second   provision   to sec.31(1) of read with Rule 38 of the AP VAT, 2005 for the reason.  “Provided further that an appeal so preferred shall not be   admitted   by   the   appellate   authority   concerned unless the dealer produces proof of payment of tax admitted to be due or of such instalments as have been granted and the proof of payment of 12.5% of the difference of the tax assessed and the tax admitted by the appellant, for the relevant tax period, in respect of which the appeal is preferred.” 35 Further they have not filled the challan for appeal fee in   original   and   also   medical   certificate   for   delay   in submission of the appeal.  Hence, in view of the above, the admission of the two appeals stand rejected.”   38. Even the High Court has failed to consider this aspect of the matter.   Whereas,   if   the   representation/request   made   by   the appellant   is   just   and   deserved   to   be   accepted,   the   appellant would   be   right   in   contending   that   no   payment   towards   the amount specified in the stated proviso under consideration was required to be made by the appellant and for that reason, the appeal   preferred   by   the   appellant   ought   to   proceed   for consideration for admission on merits. In that, upon accepting the representation to adjust the tax credit of Rs.10,63,683/­, a certificate/endorsement could be issued to the appellant by the department so that the said amount is adjusted towards payment of   specified   amount   of   tax   dues   including   twelve   and   a   half percent   (12.5%).   There   is   force   in   this   submission.   However, instead of examining this plea raised by the appellant in this appeal, we deem it proper to relegate the parties before the High Court to consider the same on its own merits, in accordance with law. We do not wish to dilate on any other contention in this 36 judgment. We leave all questions and contentions, available to both sides, open to be decided by the High Court on its own merits.   39. In view of the above, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and relegate the parties before the High Court by restoring   the   Writ   Petition   No.31393   of   2015,   for   fresh consideration thereof by the High Court on its own merits in accordance with law. All pending applications are also disposed of. No order as to costs.   Civil Appeal No.3349/2018 40. This   appeal   was   tagged   along   with   the   Civil   Appeal No.7574/2014 and other connected matters. However, in those cases, the High Court had rejected the writ petition on the sole ground that the concerned writ petitioner had failed to comply with the condition of deposit prescribed in terms of stated proviso of the provision(s) under consideration. In none of these cases, the High Court considered the matter on merits regarding the challenge to the original assessment order. In the present appeal, the appellant cannot be heard to agitate the question already 37 decided   in   Civil   Appeal   No.7574/2014   as   nothing   has   been brought to our notice to show that the appellant had deposited the specified tax dues, in respect of which the appeal was filed, before   the   first   date   of   consideration   of   the   appeal   by   the Appellate Authority.  41. However, as the High Court has dealt with merits of the challenge to the original order, in exercise of writ jurisdiction and as no argument was advanced by either party in that regard, we deem it appropriate to delink this appeal and direct that it be heard separately on the challenge to the original order passed by the first Appellate Authority. Appeal to proceed accordingly.       ……………………………..J       (A.M. Khanwilkar)       ……………………………..J       (Ajay Rastogi) New Delhi; July 10, 2019.   38