RADHESHYAM BHAGWANDAS SHAH @ LALA VAKIL vs. THE STATE OF GUJARAT

Case Type: Writ Petition Criminal

Date of Judgment: 13-05-2022

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NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION      WRIT PETITION(CRL.) NO(S). 135 OF 2022 RADHESHYAM BHAGWANDAS SHAH @ LALA VAKIL …PETITIONER(S) VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. 1. The present petition has been filed by the convict petitioner seeking direction in the nature of Mandamus to the State of Gujarat to consider his application for pre­mature release under the policy th dated   9   July,   1992   which   was   existing   at   the   time   of   his conviction. 2. The petitioner along with other co­accused persons faced trial for the offence under Section 302, 376(2)(e )(g) read with Section 149 IPC committed in the State of Gujarat in 2004. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Rachna Date: 2022.05.13 17:41:07 IST Reason: 3. Indisputedly, the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat but this Court in Transfer Petition(Crl.) No. 192 of 2004, in the 1 peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   considered   it appropriate   to  transfer   Sessions   Case   No.   161   of   2004   pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dahod/Ahmedabad to the competent Court in Mumbai for trial and disposal by an th Order dated 6  August 2004. 4. The learned trial Court, Mumbai in Sessions Case No. 634 of 2004, after holding trial, held the petitioner guilty and convicted him for the afore­stated offences and sentenced him to undergo st rigorous   imprisonment   for   life   by   judgment   dated   21   January 2008. 5. It may be relevant to note that one of the co­accused Ramesh Rupabhai, who had faced trial along with the petitioner and later st convicted by judgment dated 21   January 2008, approached the High Court of Bombay by filing Criminal Writ Petition no. 305 of 2013 seeking pre­mature release but his application came to be th dismissed by the High Court of Bombay by Order dated 5  August, 2013 on the premise that the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat   and   his   trial   came   to   be   transferred   in   the   peculiar th circumstances, under the directions of this Court by Order dated 6 2 August, 2004 and once the trial stands concluded and the prisoner has been convicted, the appropriate prison would be the State of Gujarat   and   accordingly   the   application   filed   by   the   co­accused Ramesh Rupabhai for pre­mature release was left to be examined as per the policy applicable in the State of Gujarat. 6. The present petitioner filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(hereinafter being referred to as the “CrPC”) stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody but his petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat came to be dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC and placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in   Union of India   Vs.   V. Sriharan alias Murugan and 1 Others  on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra, the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated th 17  July 2019. 1 2016(7) SCC 1 3 7. As   per   the   custody   certificate   which   has   been   placed   on st record,   the   petitioner,   as   on   1   April   2022,   has   undergone   the sentence of more than 15 years 4 months without remission. 8. The   policy   with   which   the   petitioner   has   to   be   governed, applicable in the State of Gujarat on the date of conviction, indeed th is Resolution No. JLK/3390/CM/16/Part/2/J dated 9  July 1992. 9. It has been settled by this Court in   State of Haryana   Vs. 2   that the application for grant of pre­mature release will Jagdish have to be considered on the basis of the policy which stood on the date of conviction.  The relevant para is as under:­
54.The State authority is under an obligation to at least exercise
its discretion in relation to an honest expectation perceived by the
convict, at the time of his conviction that his case for premature
release would be considered after serving the sentence, prescribed
in the short­sentencing policy existing on that date. The State has
to exercise its power of remission also keeping in view any such
benefit to be construed liberally in favour of a convict which may
depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our opinion, it
should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour
of the respondent. In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of
consideration of the case of a “lifer” for premature release, he
should be given benefit thereof.”
10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in   Union of India   Vs.   V. Sriharan 2 2010(4) SCC 216 4 alias Murugan and Others   (supra) and submits that since the trial   has   been   concluded   in   the   State   of   Maharashtra,   taking assistance   of   Section   432(7)   CrPC,   the   expression   ‘appropriate Government’ as referred to under Section 433 CrPC in the instant case, would be the State of Maharashtra and accordingly no error has been committed by the High Court in the order impugned. 11. In   our   considered   view,   the   submission   made   by   learned counsel for the respondents is not sustainable for the reason that the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat and ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State   and   in   terms   of   Section   432(7)   CrPC,   the   appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat but the instant case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by   this   Court   for   limited   purpose   for   trial   and   disposal   to   the th neighbouring State (State of Maharashtra) by an order dated 06 August, 2004 but after the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC.  5 12. Indisputedly, in the instant case, the crime was committed in the   State   of   Gujarat   which   is   the   appropriate   Government competent to examine the application filed for pre­mature release and that is the reason for which the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No. 305 of 2013 filed at the instance of co­ th accused Ramesh Rupabhai under its Order dated 5  August, 2013 declined   his   request   to   consider   the   application   for   pre­mature release and left the application to be examined according to the policy   applicable   in   the   State   of   Gujarat   by   the   concerned authorities. 13. The   judgment   on   which   the   learned   counsel   for   the respondents has placed reliance may not be of any assistance for the   reason   that   under   Section   432(7)   CrPC,   the   appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments under Section 432(7) CrPC.   14. In the instant case, once the crime was committed in the State of   Gujarat,   after   the   trial   been   concluded   and   judgment   of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court. 15. Consequently,   the   petition   is   allowed.     The   judgment th impugned dated 17  July, 2019 is set aside. 16. The respondents are directed to consider the application of the th petitioner for pre­mature release in terms of its policy dated 9 July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be decided within a period of two months.   If any adverse order is passed, the petitioner is at liberty to seek remedy available to him under the law. 17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. ……………………………..J. (AJAY RASTOGI) ……………………………..J. (VIKRAM NATH) NEW DELHI MAY 13, 2022. 7