V. SENTHUR vs. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS, SECRETARY TAMIL NADU PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANR

Case Type: Contempt Petition Civil

Date of Judgment: 01-10-2021

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Full Judgment Text

CORRECTED  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA INHERENT/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 638 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4954 OF 2016 V. SENTHUR AND ANOTHER      ...PETITIONER(S) VERSUS M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS, SECRETARY, TAMIL NADU  PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANOTHER         ...RESPONDENT(S) WITH CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.        OF 2021 [DIARY NO.16048 OF 2020] IN SLP (C) NOS. 2890­2894 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.      OF 2021 [DIARY NO. 6415 OF 2021] IN SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2021.10.21 16:46:14 IST Reason: 1 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1848 OF 2018 IN  SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2188 OF 2018 IN  SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 SLP (C) NOS. 12114­12117 OF 2021 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1247 OF 2019 IN  SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 687 OF 2021 IN   SLP (C) NOS. 2890­2894 OF 2016 O R D E R B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. The   present   contempt   petitions   have   been   filed   by   the petitioners   praying   for   initiation   of   contempt   proceedings against   the   alleged   contemnors­respondents   for   willfully nd disobeying the order passed by this Court dated 22  January 2 2016 in SLP(C) Nos. 2890­2894 of 2016 and SLP(C) No. 2886 of 2016. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the filing of the present petitions are as under:­ The contempt petitioners had filed writ petitions before the Single Judge of the Madras High Court being aggrieved by the th fixation of inter se seniority list published on 29   April 2004. The   petitioners   along   with   the   contesting   respondents   were selected in pursuance of the selection process held on the basis th of the notification dated 10   September 1999, issued by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as “TNPSC”).   Upon selection, the selectees were appointed in the Public Works Department of the State of Tamil Nadu and the Highways Department in the year 2000. 3. After a period of 4 years from the date of joining of the th selectees, the seniority list came to be notified on 29   April 2004.  One R. Balakrishnan made a representation contending therein   that   though   he   was   a   more   meritorious   candidate 3 belonging to the Backward Class category, he was allotted to the General Turn (open category) and kept at Serial No. 172 of the roster point.  It was however his contention that the other persons   belonging   to   the   Backward   Classes,   who   were   less meritorious, were placed higher in the list and given seniority over and above him since they were placed against reserved vacancies. The representation of R. Balakrishnan was rejected th by TNPSC vide order dated 20  December 2004, on the ground that the roster point itself determined the seniority, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of  P.S. Ghalaut v. State 1 of Haryana and Others .   Being aggrieved by the said order th dated 20   December  2004, R. Balakrishnan and  few others filed various writ petitions before the Madras High Court.  The said writ petitions came to be dismissed vide judgment and th order dated 18   October 2012, passed by the Single Judge of the Madras High Court, on the ground of delay and laches.  4. Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the   original   writ   petitioners preferred appeals before the Division Bench of the Madras High 1 (1995) 5 SCC 625 4 st Court. The Division Bench vide judgment and order dated 31 March 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the first judgment”), allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment and order dated th 18  October 2012, passed by the Single Judge and directed the official respondents to take the rank assigned by TNPSC to the selectees, as the basis for fixation of seniority.   The Division Bench also directed TNPSC to issue appropriate orders within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order. The same came to be challenged before this Court by TNPSC vide SLP(C) Nos. 2890­2894 of 2016.  This Court vide its nd judgment and order dated 22   January 2016, by a speaking order, dismissed the same.  The present contempt petitions are filed contending non­compliance of the order passed by this nd Court dated 22  January 2016. 5. Certain developments which took place in the meanwhile also need to be noted. To overcome the first judgment of the Madras High Court as affirmed by this Court, the State of Tamil Nadu enacted Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of 5 Service) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”). Section   40   of   the   said   Act   provided   that   the   seniority   of   a person in service will be determined in accordance with the rule of reservation and the order of rotation.  The same came to be challenged in a batch of writ petitions before the Madras High Court.     The   Division  Bench  of   the   Madras  High  Court  vide th judgment   and   order   dated   15   November   2019   (hereinafter referred to as “the second judgment”), allowed the said writ petitions.  It declared Sections 1(2), 40 and 70 of the said Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional. It further directed to redo the exercise of fixation of seniority within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of said order.  The said order of th the   High   Court   dated   15   November   2019,   was   challenged before this Court by filing SLP(C) Nos. 2861­2876 of 2020.  This th Court passed the following order on 6  July 2020:­ “Permission   to   file   Special   Leave   Petition(s)   is granted. Application for impleadment is allowed to the extent of intervention. There is absolutely no merit in these petitions.  The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. 6 Pending application(s) is/are disposed of.” 6. After dismissal of the said SLPs, the official respondents had filed review petitions before the Division Bench of the High Court. So  also, certain contempt petitions  were  filed  by the selectees, who were aggrieved by non­revision of the seniority list.     The   Division   Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court   vide th judgment   and   order   dated   26   March   2021   dismissed   the review petitions, so also, the contempt petitions.  The same is challenged   before   this   Court   by   the   selectees,   who   were aggrieved by non­revision of the seniority list, by filing SLP(C) Nos. 12114­12117 of 2021. 7. The contempt petitions have been listed before this Court th on various dates. Vide order dated 11   February 2021, this Court passed the following order:­ “In the meanwhile, the judgment dated 22.01.2016 shall be implemented. In case the judgment is not implemented   by   that   date,   the   following   alleged contemnors/respondents   shall   be   present   in   this court on the next date of hearing:  C.P.(C)No.638 of 2017 in C.A.No.4954 of 2016 7 1) M. Vijayakumar  2) S. Thinakaran  Dy No.16048 of 2020 in SLP(C) Nos.2890­2894 of 2016:  1) Dr. S. Swarna  2) K. Ramamoorthy  3) K. Nanthakumar  C.P.(C) No.1247 of 2019 in SLP (C) No.2886 of 2016: 1) K. Shanmugam  2) K. Nanthakumar  3) Dr. K.Manivasan  4) K. Ramamurthy  C.P.(C)No.1848 of 2018 and C.P.(C)No.2188 of 2018 in SLP (C)No.2886 of 2016:  1) K. Nanthakumar  2) S. K. Prabhakar  3) S. Bakthavathchalam” The contempt petitions have also been listed thereafter on 8. various dates.  Today, we have heard Shri Prashant Bhushan, 8 learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of TNPSC, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Shri V. Giri and Shri P. Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­ alleged contemnors, at length. 9. Shri Prashant Bhushan submitted that the first judgment nd has been merged into the order passed by this Court dated 22 January 2016.  He submitted that in the said order, this Court has categorically held that in view of the judgment in the case 2 of   , the Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and Others seniority list has to be prepared on the basis of merit list of selection and that the list drawn on roster point would not be valid in law.   He submitted that the respondent authorities have not implemented the said order, on the contrary, a revised th seniority list is published on 13  March 2021, contending that the said seniority list has been published on the basis of the orders passed by this Court. He submitted that a perusal of the said   seniority   list   would   further   show   that   the   said   list   is 2 (2003) 5 SCC 604 9 prepared   totally   in   breach   of   the   judgment   in   the   case   of Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra).     It   is   thus   submitted   that   by publishing the said list, the respondent authorities have not only committed the aggravated contempt of court but have also committed perjury.  10. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Shri V. Giri and Shri P. Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of   the   respondents,   on   the   contrary,   submitted   that   the contempt petitions are without any merit. 11. In a nutshell, the contentions as raised on behalf of the said respondents are thus:­ (i) In the first judgment, the Division Bench of the Madras High   Court   had   granted   relief   to   the   individual petitioners.   Understanding the same, the respondent authorities   had   issued   a   fresh  seniority   list,   thereby granting   the   requisite   seniority   to   the   individual petitioners. 10 (ii) Perusal  of   the   second   judgment  of  the   Madras   High th Court dated 15  November 2019, would further fortify that the relief granted in earlier round was restricted to individual petitioners.  Relying on certain observations in the said judgment, it is submitted that the Division Bench   has   clearly   held   that   the   delay,   laches, acquiescence and accrued right would be the relevant factors   and   as   such,   the   individuals   who   were   not petitioners in the first round, are not entitled to get the seniority as per the first judgment of the Madras High Court. (iii) That the rights of the parties have been crystallized for more than almost two decades and upsetting those at this stage, would cause great heart­burn amongst the employees in the cadre. (iv) That some of the employees have accepted the seniority list and now the entire exercise cannot be redone to thrust the revised seniority on such employees. 11 (v) That in any case, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was capable of being interpreted as applying only to the individuals and therefore, even if the official respondents have incorrectly understood the judgment, the non­compliance of the directions cannot be considered to be willful or deliberate and as such, the action for contempt would not lie. 12. In addition, Shri Rohatgi submitted that the contempt, if any, is of the order passed by the High Court. He submitted nd that since by the order dated 22  January 2016, this Court has dismissed   the   SLPs   albeit   giving   certain   reasons,   the   same would not amount to merger, and as such, it cannot be held that the respondents have committed contempt of this Court. He further submitted that if tomorrow, merely upon dismissal of SLPs against the judgments of the High Court, the contempt petitions are entertained contending contempt of this Court, it will open a floodgate of contempt petitions. He submitted that 12 such   a   practice   would   not   be   conducive   to   the   interest   of justice. 13. Shri Vaidyanathan relied on the following judgments of this  Court  in  support  of   his  submissions  that,   in  contempt proceedings,   the   Court   cannot   travel   beyond   the   original judgment and order. Jhareswar   Prasad   Paul   and   Another   v.   Tarak   Nath 3 ,   Ganguly   and   Others Midnapore   Peoples’   Coop.   Bank 4 Limited and Others v. Chunilal Nanda and Others ,   V.M. 5   and Manohar   Prasad   v.   N.   Ratnam   Raju   and   Another Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and   Natural   Gas   Corporation   Limited  and   Others   v.   M. 6 George Ravishekaran and Others . 14. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that in a contempt   jurisdiction,   the   court   will   not   travel   beyond   the original judgment and direction; neither would it be permissible 3 (2002) 5 SCC 352 4 (2006) 5 SCC 399 5 (2004) 13 SCC 610 6 (2014) 3 SCC 373 13 for   the   court   to   issue   any   supplementary   or   incidental directions, which are not to be found in the original judgment and   order.   The   court   is   only   concerned   with   the   wilful   or deliberate   non­compliance   of   the   directions   issued   in   the original judgment and order. 15. At   the   outset,   we   may   clarify   that   in   the   present proceedings, we are only concerned with the contempt of the nd order passed by this Court dated 22  January 2016.   Insofar as the contention of the respondents that the issue 16. before the High Court in the first round was individualistic in nature is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment:­   “37. ….. (ii)   The   cases   on   hand   are   not   individualistic   in nature, depending upon individual dates, facts and sequence of events. The cases on hand arise out of a most fundamental question as to the principle of law   to   be   applied   in   the   matter   of   fixation   of seniority. The grievance of the writ petitioners was not individualistic, depending for their adjudication, upon distinct facts. These cases question the very foundation   on   which   seniority   was   sought   to   be 14 determined   on   principle.   To   such   cases,   the enabling   provision   under   Rule   35(f)   entitling   the department   to   summarily   reject   the   claim   of   the individuals, cannot be invoked.” 17. It   can   thus   be   seen   that   the   High   Court   has   clearly observed   that   the   case   before   the   High   Court   was   not individualistic   in   nature,   depending   upon   individual   dates, facts and sequence of events.   It has further observed that it arose out of the most fundamental question as to the principle of law to be applied in the matter of fixation of seniority. 18. Having observed this, in the operative part, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment held thus:­   “85.   In   view   of   the   above,   the   writ   appeals   are allowed, the order of the learned judge is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the appellants are allowed.   There   will   be   a   direction   to   the   official respondents   to   take   the   rank   assigned   by   the Service Commission to the selectees, as the basis for fixation of seniority and issue appropriate orders within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs.” 15 19. It could thus clearly be seen that the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment issued a direction to the official respondents to take the rank assigned by TNPSC to the   selectees   as   the   basis   for   fixation   of   seniority   and appropriate orders were directed to be issued by TNPSC within a period of 4 weeks from the receipt of the copy of the said order. 20. The basis for allowing the writ petitions by the High Court was the judgment of this Court in the case of  Bimlesh Tanwar (supra), which held that the seniority has to be determined, not on the basis of roster point but on the basis of the seniority assigned at the time of selection of the selectees.  This Court, nd while dismissing the SLPs vide order dated 22  January 2016, observed thus:­  “The fundamental principle which has been applied by the Division Bench in the cases on hand relates to the question as to what should be the basis for drawing a seniority list. In that context, the Division Bench has noted that at the time when the Service Commission drew the list in 2000 the same was in tune   with   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   P.S. Ghalaut v. State of Haryana & Others, reported in 16 (1995) 5 SCC 625. The Court also found that the said   list   which   was   approved   by   the   State Government did not achieve the finality and that ultimately when the seniority list came to be issued on 29.2.2004, by which time the judgment of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 604 had came into effect   which   reversed   the   judgment   in   Ghalaut (supra).   The   Division   Bench,   therefore,   held   that there was no delay in the challenge made to the seniority   list.   After   the   emergence   of   the judgment   in   Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra),   the fundamental   principle   relating   to   drawl   of seniority   list   was   that   it   should   be   based   on merit list of selection and that the list drawn based on roster point can have no application for the purpose of seniority list.   As   the   said   fundamental   principle   was applied   by   the   High   Court   in   passing   the impugned judgment, we do not find any merit in these special leave petitions. The special leave petitions are dismissed.  The   learned   Attorney   General   for   India, appearing   for   the   Tamil   Nadu   Public   Service Commission, raised an issue that with reference to a   contra   view   taken   by   another   Judgment   of Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, at the instance of one of the employees an SLP is pending in this Court. Since the issue is now covered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar (supra), the   pendency   of   the   said   SLP   will   be   of   no consequence as the said SLP should also be covered by the said judgment of this Court, namely, Bimlesh Tanwar (supra).”  [emphasis supplied] 17 It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of 21. this Court in the case of  Kunhayammed and Others v. State 7 :­   of Kerala and Another
27.A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may
be dismissed by a non­speaking order or by a
speaking order. Whatever be the phraseology
employed in the order of dismissal, if it is a non­
speaking order, i.e., it does not assign reasons for
dismissing the special leave petition, it would
neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand
substituted in place of the order put in issue before
it nor would it be a declaration of law by the
Supreme Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution for there is no law which has been
declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by
reasons then also the doctrine of merger would not
be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was
not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a
discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to
appeal. We have already dealt with this aspect
earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court would
attract applicability of Article 141 of the
Constitution if there is a law declared by the
Supreme Court which obviously would be binding
on all the courts and tribunals in India and
certainly the parties thereto. The statement
contained in the order other than on points of law
would be binding on the parties and the court or
tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the
principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the
Apex Court of the country. No court or tribunal or
7 (2000) 6 SCC 359 18
parties would have the liberty of taking or
canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed
by this Court. The order of Supreme Court would
mean that it has declared the law and in that light
the case was considered not fit for grant of leave.
The declaration of law will be governed by Article
141 but still, the case not being one where leave
was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply.
The Court sometimes leaves the question of law
open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the
principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by
the High Court and yet would dismiss the special
leave petition. The reasons given are intended for
purposes of Article 141. This is so done because in
the event of merely dismissing the special leave
petition, it is likely that an argument could be
advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court
has to be understood as not to have differed in law
with the High Court.”
It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms has 22. held   that  if  the   order  of   dismissal of   SLPs  is   supported by reasons,   then   also   the   doctrine   of   merger   would   not   be attracted.   Still the reasons stated by the court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, if there is   a   law   declared   by   this   Court   which   obviously   would   be binding   on   all   the   courts   and   the   tribunals   in   India   and certainly, the parties thereto.  It has been held that no court, 19 tribunal or party would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed by this Court.  Such an order would mean that it has declared the law and in that light, the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs against the first 23. judgment,   has   clearly   held   that   after   the   emergence   of   the judgment   in   Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra),   the   fundamental principle governing the determination of seniority was that, it should be based on merit list of selection and that the list made on the basis of roster point, would not be permissible in law.  It could   thus   be   seen   that   while   dismissing   the   SLPs,   this Court has reiterated the legal position as laid down in the case of  (supra) to the effect that while determining Bimlesh Tanwar  seniority, what is relevant is the inter se merit in the selection list and not the roster point. 24. It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   though,   the   then   learned Attorney General had raised an issue with regard to a contrary view taken by the Madurai Bench of the same High Court, this 20 Court clearly held that since the issue was now covered by the decision   of   this   Court   in   Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra),   the pendency   of   the   SLPs   challenging   the   judgment   of   Madurai Bench, would be of no consequence inasmuch as the said SLPs would be governed by the judgment of this Court in   Bimlesh (supra). Tanwar  25. It is thus clear that though it cannot be said that the second judgment of the Madras High Court has merged into the nd order   of   this   Court   dated   22   January   2016,   still   the declaration of law as made in the said order, would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in the country and in any case, between the parties. 26. In that view of the matter, the respondents were bound to follow the law laid down by this Court and determine the inter se seniority on the basis of selection by TNPSC and not on the basis of roster point. 27. At   the   cost   of   repetition,   we   may   clarify   that   though various arguments were advanced with regard to the merits of 21 the matter by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities, we cannot go into those aspects inasmuch as we are exercising limited jurisdiction of contempt. Insofar   as   the   lis   between   the   parties   is   concerned,   it   has nd achieved finality by the order of this Court dated 22  January 2016.   We   find   that   the   seniority   list,   which   is   purportedly published in accordance with the order of this Court, is totally in breach of the directions of this Court.  A first glance at the list   would   reveal   that   various   selectees,   who   have   received much  less   marks,   are   placed   above   the   selectees   who   have received higher marks.   We, therefore, have no hesitation to th hold that the following persons named in our order dated 11 February   2021,   are   guilty   of   having   committed   contempt   of order of this Court:­  “C.P.(C)No.638 of 2017 in C.A.No.4954 of 2016 1) M. Vijayakumar  2) S. Thinakaran  Dy No.16048 of 2020 in SLP(C) Nos.2890­2894 of 2016:  22 1) Dr. S. Swarna  2) K. Ramamoorthy  3) K. Nanthakumar  C.P.(C) No.1247 of 2019 in SLP (C) No.2886 of 2016: 1) K. Shanmugam  2) K. Nanthakumar  3) Dr. K.Manivasan  4) K. Ramamurthy C.P.(C)No.1848 of 2018 and C.P.(C)No.2188 of 2018 in SLP (C)No.2886 of 2016:  1) K. Nanthakumar  2) S. K. Prabhakar  3) S. Bakthavathchalam” 28. We therefore direct the respondents to revise and publish the   seniority   list   of   the   selectees,   who   were   selected   in  the selection process conducted in pursuance of the notification th issued by TNPSC dated 10   September 1999, strictly on the basis of the merit determined by it in the selection process and 23 not on the basis of the roster point. The same shall be done within a period of 12 weeks from the date of this order. 29. Insofar   as   the   issue   with   regard   to   quantum   of punishment to be imposed upon the aforesaid contemnors is th concerned, the matter be kept on 10  January 2022.  We clarify that on the said date, the persons named in paragraph (27) who have been held guilty of contempt of this Court by us, shall remain present before this Court and would be heard on the quantum of punishment. Insofar   as   SLP(C)   Nos.   12114­12117   of   2021   are 30. concerned, in view of the order passed by us in the contempt petitions, no order is necessary.  Accordingly, the said SLPs are disposed of. …..…..….......................J.    [L. NAGESWARA RAO]      …….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 01,2021. 24 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA INHERENT/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 638 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4954 OF 2016 V. SENTHUR AND ANOTHER      ...PETITIONER(S) VERSUS M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS, SECRETARY, TAMIL NADU  PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANOTHER         ...RESPONDENT(S) WITH CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.        OF 2021 [DIARY NO.16048 OF 2020] IN SLP (C) NOS. 2890­2894 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.      OF 2021 [DIARY NO. 6415 OF 2021] IN SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1848 OF 2018 IN  25 SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2188 OF 2018 IN  SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 SLP (C) NOS. 12114­12117 OF 2021 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1247 OF 2019 IN  SLP (C) NO. 2886 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 687 OF 2021 IN   SLP (C) NOS. 2890­2894 OF 2016 O R D E R B.R. GAVAI, J. 31. The   present   contempt   petitions   have   been   filed   by   the petitioners   praying   for   initiation   of   contempt   proceedings against   the   alleged   contemnors­respondents   for   willfully nd disobeying the order passed by this Court dated 22  January 2016 in SLP(C) Nos. 2890­2894 of 2016 and SLP(C) No. 2886 of 2016. 26 32. Brief facts giving rise to the filing of the present petitions are as under:­ The contempt petitioners had filed writ petitions before the Single Judge of the Madras High Court being aggrieved by the th fixation of inter se seniority list published on 29   April 2004. The   petitioners   along   with   the   contesting   respondents   were selected in pursuance of the selection process held on the basis th of the notification dated 10   September 1999, issued by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as “TNPSC”).   Upon selection, the selectees were appointed in the Public Works Department of the State of Tamil Nadu and the Highways Department in the year 2000. 33. After a period of 4 years from the date of joining of the th selectees, the seniority list came to be notified on 29   April 2004.  One R. Balakrishnan made a representation contending therein   that   though   he   was   a   more   meritorious   candidate belonging to the Backward Class category, he was allotted to the General Turn (open category) and kept at Serial No. 172 of 27 the roster point.  It was however his contention that the other persons   belonging   to   the   Backward   Classes,   who   were   less meritorious, were placed higher in the list and given seniority over and above him since they were placed against reserved vacancies. The representation of R. Balakrishnan was rejected th by TNPSC vide order dated 20  December 2004, on the ground that the roster point itself determined the seniority, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of  P.S. Ghalaut v. State 8 .   Being aggrieved by the said order of Haryana and Others th dated 20   December  2004, R. Balakrishnan and  few others filed various writ petitions before the Madras High Court.  The said writ petitions came to be dismissed vide judgment and th order dated 18   October 2012, passed by the Single Judge of the Madras High Court, on the ground of delay and laches.  34. Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the   original   writ   petitioners preferred appeals before the Division Bench of the Madras High st Court. The Division Bench vide judgment and order dated 31 March 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the first judgment”), 8 (1995) 5 SCC 625 28 allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment and order dated th 18  October 2012, passed by the Single Judge and directed the official respondents to take the rank assigned by TNPSC to the selectees, as the basis for fixation of seniority.   The Division Bench also directed TNPSC to issue appropriate orders within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order. The same came to be challenged before this Court by TNPSC vide SLP(C) Nos. 2890­2894 of 2016.  This Court vide its nd judgment and order dated 22   January 2016, by a speaking order, dismissed the same.  The present contempt petitions are filed contending non­compliance of the order passed by this nd Court dated 22  January 2016. 35. Certain developments which took place in the meanwhile also need to be noted. To overcome the first judgment of the Madras High Court as affirmed by this Court, the State of Tamil Nadu enacted Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”). Section   40   of   the   said   Act   provided   that   the   seniority   of   a 29 person in service will be determined in accordance with the rule of reservation and the order of rotation.  The same came to be challenged in a batch of writ petitions before the Madras High Court.     The   Division  Bench  of   the   Madras  High  Court  vide th judgment   and   order   dated   15   November   2019   (hereinafter referred to as “the second judgment”), allowed the said writ petitions.  It declared Sections 1(2), 40 and 70 of the said Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional. It further directed to redo the exercise of fixation of seniority within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of said order.  The said order of th the   High   Court   dated   15   November   2019,   was   challenged before this Court by filing SLP(C) Nos. 2861­2876 of 2020.  This th Court passed the following order on 6  July 2020:­ “Permission   to   file   Special   Leave   Petition(s)   is granted. Application for impleadment is allowed to the extent of intervention. There is absolutely no merit in these petitions.  The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s) is/are disposed of.” 30 36. After dismissal of the said SLPs, the official respondents had filed review petitions before the Division Bench of the High Court. So  also, certain contempt petitions  were  filed  by the selectees, who were aggrieved by non­revision of the seniority list.     The   Division   Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court   vide th judgment   and   order   dated   26   March   2021   dismissed   the review petitions, so also, the contempt petitions.  The same is challenged   before   this   Court   by   the   selectees,   who   were aggrieved by non­revision of the seniority list, by filing SLP(C) Nos. 12114­12117 of 2021. 37. The contempt petitions have been listed before this Court th on various dates. Vide order dated 11   February 2021, this Court passed the following order:­ “In the meanwhile, the judgment dated 22.01.2016 shall be implemented. In case the judgment is not implemented   by   that   date,   the   following   alleged contemnors/respondents   shall   be   present   in   this court on the next date of hearing:  C.P.(C)No.638 of 2017 in C.A.No.4954 of 2016 1) M. Vijayakumar  31 2) S. Thinakaran  Dy No.16048 of 2020 in SLP(C) Nos.2890­2894 of 2016:  1) Dr. S. Swarna  2) K. Ramamoorthy  3) K. Nanthakumar  C.P.(C) No.1247 of 2019 in SLP (C) No.2886 of 2016: 1) K. Shanmugam  2) K. Nanthakumar  3) Dr. K.Manivasan  4) K. Ramamurthy  C.P.(C)No.1848 of 2018 and C.P.(C)No.2188 of 2018 in SLP (C)No.2886 of 2016:  1) K. Nanthakumar  2) S. K. Prabhakar  3) S. Bakthavathchalam” The contempt petitions have also been listed thereafter on 38. various dates.  Today, we have heard Shri Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Shri 32 C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of TNPSC, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Shri V. Giri and Shri P. Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­ alleged contemnors, at length. Shri Prashant Bhushan submitted that the first judgment 39. nd has been merged into the order passed by this Court dated 22 January 2016.  He submitted that in the said order, this Court has categorically held that in view of the judgment in the case 9 of   , the Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and Others seniority list has to be prepared on the basis of merit list of selection and that the list drawn on roster point would not be valid in law.   He submitted that the respondent authorities have not implemented the said order, on the contrary, a revised th seniority list is published on 13  March 2021, contending that the said seniority list has been published on the basis of the orders passed by this Court. He submitted that a perusal of the said   seniority   list   would   further   show   that   the   said   list   is prepared   totally   in   breach   of   the   judgment   in   the   case   of 9 (2003) 5 SCC 604 33 Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra).     It   is   thus   submitted   that   by publishing the said list, the respondent authorities have not only committed the aggravated contempt of court but have also committed perjury.  40. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Shri V. Giri and Shri P. Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of   the   respondents,   on   the   contrary,   submitted   that   the contempt petitions are without any merit. In a nutshell, the contentions as raised on behalf of the 41. said respondents are thus:­ (vi) In the first judgment, the Division Bench of the Madras High   Court   had   granted   relief   to   the   individual petitioners.   Understanding the same, the respondent authorities   had   issued   a   fresh  seniority   list,   thereby granting   the   requisite   seniority   to   the   individual petitioners. (vii) Perusal  of   the   second   judgment  of  the   Madras   High th Court dated 15  November 2019, would further fortify 34 that the relief granted in earlier round was restricted to individual petitioners.  Relying on certain observations in the said judgment, it is submitted that the Division Bench   has   clearly   held   that   the   delay,   laches, acquiescence and accrued right would be the relevant factors   and   as   such,   the   individuals   who   were   not petitioners in the first round, are not entitled to get the seniority as per the first judgment of the Madras High Court. (viii) That the rights of the parties have been crystallized for more than almost two decades and upsetting those at this stage, would cause great heart­burn amongst the employees in the cadre. (ix) That some of the employees have accepted the seniority list and now the entire exercise cannot be redone to thrust the revised seniority on such employees. (x) That in any case, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was capable of being interpreted 35 as applying only to the individuals and therefore, even if the official respondents have incorrectly understood the judgment, the non­compliance of the directions cannot be considered to be willful or deliberate and as such, the action for contempt would not lie. 42. In addition, Shri Rohatgi submitted that the contempt, if any, is of the order passed by the High Court. He submitted nd that since by the order dated 22  January 2016, this Court has dismissed   the   SLPs   albeit   giving   certain   reasons,   the   same would not amount to merger, and as such, it cannot be held that the respondents have committed contempt of this Court. He further submitted that if tomorrow, merely upon dismissal of SLPs against the judgments of the High Court, the contempt petitions are entertained contending contempt of this Court, it will open a floodgate of contempt petitions. He submitted that such   a   practice   would   not   be   conducive   to   the   interest   of justice. 36 43. Shri Vaidyanathan relied on the following judgments of this  Court  in  support  of   his  submissions  that,   in  contempt proceedings,   the   Court   cannot   travel   beyond   the   original judgment and order. Jhareswar   Prasad   Paul   and   Another   v.   Tarak   Nath 10 Ganguly   and   Others ,   Midnapore   Peoples’   Coop.   Bank 11 ,   Limited and Others v. Chunilal Nanda and Others V.M. 12 Manohar   Prasad   v.   N.   Ratnam   Raju   and   Another   and Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and   Natural   Gas   Corporation   Limited  and   Others   v.   M. 13 . George Ravishekaran and Others 44. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that in a contempt   jurisdiction,   the   court   will   not   travel   beyond   the original judgment and direction; neither would it be permissible for   the   court   to   issue   any   supplementary   or   incidental directions, which are not to be found in the original judgment 10 (2002) 5 SCC 352 11 (2006) 5 SCC 399 12 (2004) 13 SCC 610 13 (2014) 3 SCC 373 37 and   order.   The   court   is   only   concerned   with   the   wilful   or deliberate   non­compliance   of   the   directions   issued   in   the original judgment and order. At   the   outset,   we   may   clarify   that   in   the   present 45. proceedings, we are only concerned with the contempt of the nd order passed by this Court dated 22  January 2016.   46. Insofar as the contention of the respondents that the issue before the High Court in the first round was individualistic in nature is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment:­   “37. ….. (ii)   The   cases   on   hand   are   not   individualistic   in nature, depending upon individual dates, facts and sequence of events. The cases on hand arise out of a most fundamental question as to the principle of law   to   be   applied   in   the   matter   of   fixation   of seniority. The grievance of the writ petitioners was not individualistic, depending for their adjudication, upon distinct facts. These cases question the very foundation   on   which   seniority   was   sought   to   be determined   on   principle.   To   such   cases,   the enabling   provision   under   Rule   35(f)   entitling   the department   to   summarily   reject   the   claim   of   the individuals, cannot be invoked.” 38 47. It   can   thus   be   seen   that   the   High   Court   has   clearly observed   that   the   case   before   the   High   Court   was   not individualistic   in   nature,   depending   upon   individual   dates, facts and sequence of events.   It has further observed that it arose out of the most fundamental question as to the principle of law to be applied in the matter of fixation of seniority. 48. Having observed this, in the operative part, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment held thus:­   “85.   In   view   of   the   above,   the   writ   appeals   are allowed, the order of the learned judge is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the appellants are allowed.   There   will   be   a   direction   to   the   official respondents   to   take   the   rank   assigned   by   the Service Commission to the selectees, as the basis for fixation of seniority and issue appropriate orders within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs.” 49. It could thus clearly be seen that the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment issued a direction to 39 the official respondents to take the rank assigned by TNPSC to the   selectees   as   the   basis   for   fixation   of   seniority   and appropriate orders were directed to be issued by TNPSC within a period of 4 weeks from the receipt of the copy of the said order. 50. The basis for allowing the writ petitions by the High Court was the judgment of this Court in the case of  Bimlesh Tanwar (supra), which held that the seniority has to be determined, not on the basis of roster point but on the basis of the seniority assigned at the time of selection of the selectees.  This Court, nd while dismissing the SLPs vide order dated 22  January 2016, observed thus:­  “The fundamental principle which has been applied by the Division Bench in the cases on hand relates to the question as to what should be the basis for drawing a seniority list. In that context, the Division Bench has noted that at the time when the Service Commission drew the list in 2000 the same was in tune   with   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   P.S. Ghalaut v. State of Haryana & Others, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 625. The Court also found that the said   list   which   was   approved   by   the   State Government did not achieve the finality and that ultimately when the seniority list came to be issued 40 on 29.2.2004, by which time the judgment of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 604 had came into effect   which   reversed   the   judgment   in   Ghalaut (supra).   The   Division   Bench,   therefore,   held   that there was no delay in the challenge made to the seniority   list.   After   the   emergence   of   the judgment   in   Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra),   the fundamental   principle   relating   to   drawl   of seniority   list   was   that   it   should   be   based   on merit list of selection and that the list drawn based on roster point can have no application for   the purpose of seniority list. As   the   said   fundamental   principle   was applied   by   the   High   Court   in   passing   the impugned judgment, we do not find any merit in these special leave petitions. The special leave petitions are dismissed.  The   learned   Attorney   General   for   India, appearing   for   the   Tamil   Nadu   Public   Service Commission, raised an issue that with reference to a   contra   view   taken   by   another   Judgment   of Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, at the instance of one of the employees an SLP is pending in this Court. Since the issue is now covered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar (supra), the   pendency   of   the   said   SLP   will   be   of   no consequence as the said SLP should also be covered by the said judgment of this Court, namely, Bimlesh Tanwar (supra).”  [emphasis supplied] 41 51. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of  Kunhayammed and Others v. State 14 of Kerala and Another :­  
27.A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may
be dismissed by a non­speaking order or by a
speaking order. Whatever be the phraseology
employed in the order of dismissal, if it is a non­
speaking order, i.e., it does not assign reasons for
dismissing the special leave petition, it would
neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand
substituted in place of the order put in issue before
it nor would it be a declaration of law by the
Supreme Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution for there is no law which has been
declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by
reasons then also the doctrine of merger would not
be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was
not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a
discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to
appeal. We have already dealt with this aspect
earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court would
attract applicability of Article 141 of the
Constitution if there is a law declared by the
Supreme Court which obviously would be binding
on all the courts and tribunals in India and
certainly the parties thereto. The statement
contained in the order other than on points of law
would be binding on the parties and the court or
tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the
principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the
Apex Court of the country. No court or tribunal or
parties would have the liberty of taking or
14 (2000) 6 SCC 359 42
canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed
by this Court. The order of Supreme Court would
mean that it has declared the law and in that light
the case was considered not fit for grant of leave.
The declaration of law will be governed by Article
141 but still, the case not being one where leave
was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply.
The Court sometimes leaves the question of law
open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the
principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by
the High Court and yet would dismiss the special
leave petition. The reasons given are intended for
purposes of Article 141. This is so done because in
the event of merely dismissing the special leave
petition, it is likely that an argument could be
advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court
has to be understood as not to have differed in law
with the High Court.”
52. It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms has held   that  if  the   order  of   dismissal of   SLPs  is   supported by reasons,   then   also   the   doctrine   of   merger   would   not   be attracted.   Still the reasons stated by the court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, if there is   a   law   declared   by   this   Court   which   obviously   would   be binding   on   all   the   courts   and   the   tribunals   in   India   and certainly, the parties thereto.  It has been held that no court, tribunal or party would have the liberty of taking or canvassing 43 any view contrary to the one expressed by this Court.  Such an order would mean that it has declared the law and in that light, the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs against the first 53. judgment,   has   clearly   held   that   after   the   emergence   of   the judgment   in   Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra),   the   fundamental principle governing the determination of seniority was that, it should be based on merit list of selection and that the list made on the basis of roster point, would not be permissible in law.  It could   thus   be   seen   that   while   dismissing   the   SLPs,   this Court has reiterated the legal position as laid down in the case of  (supra) to the effect that while determining Bimlesh Tanwar  seniority, what is relevant is the inter se merit in the selection list and not the roster point. 54. It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   though,   the   then   learned Attorney General had raised an issue with regard to a contrary view taken by the Madurai Bench of the same High Court, this Court clearly held that since the issue was now covered by the 44 decision   of   this   Court   in   Bimlesh   Tanwar   (supra),   the pendency   of   the   SLPs   challenging   the   judgment   of   Madurai Bench, would be of no consequence inasmuch as the said SLPs would be governed by the judgment of this Court in   Bimlesh Tanwar  (supra). 55. It is thus clear that though it cannot be said that the second judgment of the Madras High Court has merged into the nd order   of   this   Court   dated   22   January   2016,   still   the declaration of law as made in the said order, would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in the country and in any case, between the parties. 56. In that view of the matter, the respondents were bound to follow the law laid down by this Court and determine the inter se seniority on the basis of selection by TNPSC and not on the basis of roster point. 57. At   the   cost   of   repetition,   we   may   clarify   that   though various arguments were advanced with regard to the merits of the matter by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf 45 of the respondent authorities, we cannot go into those aspects inasmuch as we are exercising limited jurisdiction of contempt. Insofar   as   the   lis   between   the   parties   is   concerned,   it   has nd achieved finality by the order of this Court dated 22  January 2016.   We   find   that   the   seniority   list,   which   is   purportedly published in accordance with the order of this Court, is totally in breach of the directions of this Court.  A first glance at the list   would   reveal   that   various   selectees,   who   have   received much  less   marks,   are   placed   above   the   selectees   who   have received higher marks.   We, therefore, have no hesitation to th hold that the following persons named in our order dated 11 February   2021,   are   guilty   of   having   committed   contempt   of order of this Court:­  “C.P.(C)No.638 of 2017 in C.A.No.4954 of 2016 1) M. Vijayakumar  2) S. Thinakaran  Dy No.16048 of 2020 in SLP(C) Nos.2890­2894 of 2016:  46 1) Dr. S. Swarna  2) K. Ramamoorthy  3) K. Nanthakumar  C.P.(C) No.1247 of 2019 in SLP (C) No.2886 of 2016: 1) K. Shanmugam  2) K. Nanthakumar  3) Dr. K.Manivasan  4) K. Ramamurthy C.P.(C)No.1848 of 2018 and C.P.(C)No.2188 of 2018 in SLP (C)No.2886 of 2016:  1) K. Nanthakumar  2) S. K. Prabhakar  3) S. Bakthavathchalam” 58. We therefore direct the respondents to revise and publish the   seniority   list   of   the   selectees,   who   were   selected   in  the selection process conducted in pursuance of the notification th issued by TNPSC dated 10   September 1999, strictly on the basis of the merit determined by it in the selection process and not on the basis of the roster point. The same shall be done within a period of 12 weeks from the date of this order. 47 59. Insofar   as   the   issue   with   regard   to   quantum   of punishment to be imposed upon the aforesaid contemnors is th concerned, the matter be kept on 10  January 2022.  We clarify that on the said date, the persons named in paragraph (25) who have been held guilty of contempt of this Court by us, shall remain present before this Court and would be heard on the quantum of punishment. 60. Insofar   as   SLP(C)   Nos.   12114­12117   of   2021   are concerned, in view of the order passed by us in the contempt petitions, no order is necessary.  Accordingly, the said SLPs are disposed of. …..…..….......................J.    [L. NAGESWARA RAO] …….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 01, 2021. 48