Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.813 OF 2022
M/s Bombay Chemical Industries ..Appellant (S)
VERSUS
Deputy Labour Commissioner & Anr. ..Respondent (S)
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 14.11.2018 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No.33482
of 2018, by which the High Court has dismissed the said
writ petition preferred by the appellant herein and has
confirmed the order passed by the Presiding Officer,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by R
Natarajan
Date: 2022.02.04
16:47:00 IST
Reason:
Labour Court IV, U.P., Kanpur Nagar, under Section 33(C)
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(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the original writ
petitioner has preferred the present appeal.
2. That respondent No.2 herein moved an application before
the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act in Misc. Case No.26 of 2012 demanding the
difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012. The
said application was contested by the appellant herein
denying any relationship of employeeemployer. It was the
categorical stand of the appellant that respondent No.2
herein was never engaged by it. Before the Labour Court
respondent No.2 herein relied upon the documents exhibit
W1 to W6 in support of his case that he had worked in
the establishment as a salesman. That by order dated
28.11.2017 the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court
allowed the said application and directed the appellant
herein to pay the difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to
31.03.2012 as claimed in the application.
2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order
passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court
under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the
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appellant herein preferred a writ petition before the High
Court. By the impugned judgment and order the High
Court has dismissed the said writ petition which has given
rise to the present appeal.
3. Shri Vishal Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant has vehemently submitted that in the facts
and circumstances of the case the High Court has erred in
dismissing the writ petition and confirming the order
passed by the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act.
3.1 It is submitted by Shri Yadav appearing on behalf of the
appellant that the High Court ought to have appreciated
that when there was a serious issue raised with respect to
the employeremployee relationship between the appellant
and respondent No.2 and that it was seriously disputed
that respondent No.2 was at any point of time in
employment as a salesman, the Labour Court ought not to
have entertained/allowed the application under Section
33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the same could
have been decided in the reference under Section 10 of the
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Industrial Disputes Act. It is therefore submitted that the
order passed by the Labour Court is completely without
jurisdiction. Therefore, the High Court ought to have set
aside the same. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this
Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs.
, (1995) 1 SCC 235 and
Ganesh Razak and Anr. Union of
India and another Vs. Kankuben (Dead) By Lrs. and
Others, (2006) 9 SCC 292, in support of his submissions
that in a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court cannot
adjudicate the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the
claim and it can only interpret the award or settlement on
which the claim is based.
3.2 Making the above submissions and relying on the above
decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.
4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Dr. Vinod
Kumar Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent(s).
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4.1 It is submitted that in the present case respondent No.2
placed on record voluminous record namely exhibit W1 to
W6 to show that respondent No.2 was working as a
salesman with the appellant. It is submitted that the
appellant came out with a false case to get out of the
obligation difference in salary to be paid as claimed in the
application. It is therefore submitted that when on
appreciation of evidence and considering the material
available on record the Labour Court held that respondent
No.2 was employed as a salesman and thereafter directed
the appellant to pay the difference of wages it cannot be
said that the Labour Court exceeded in its jurisdiction.
4.2 It is submitted that when on the face of the record
available it was found by the Labour Court that
respondent No.2 was in employment of the appellant as a
salesman, and in the claim before the Labour Court there
was found a difference in the salary/pay for the period
from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012, the Labour Court has not
committed any error. The High Court has rightly dismissed
the writ petition.
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5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length.
6. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent
No.2 herein filed an application before the Labour Court
under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
demanding difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to
31.03.2012. It was thus the case on behalf of respondent
No.2 that he was working with the appellant as a
salesman. However, the appellant had taken a categorical
stand that respondent No.2 was never engaged by the
appellant. It was specifically the case on behalf of the
appellant that respondent No.2 had never worked in the
establishment in the post of salesman. Therefore, once
there was a serious dispute that respondent No.2 had
worked as an employee of the appellant and there was a
very serious dispute raised by the appellant that
respondent No.2 was not in employment as a salesman as
claimed by respondent No.2, thereafter, it was not open for
the Labour Court to entertain disputed questions and
adjudicate upon the employeremployee relationship
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between the appellant and respondent No.2. As per the
settled proposition of law, in an application under Section
33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court
has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of
entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can
only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim
is based. As held by this Court in the case of Ganesh
Razak and Anr. (supra), the labour court’s jurisdiction
under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like
that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of
law without prior adjudication or recognition of the
disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for
computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of
wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable
under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See
Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and Anr.
(1995) 1 SCC 235).
In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and
held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from
his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of
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being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled
to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit
can approach Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the
ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be
enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily
a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting
right. The difference between a preexisting right or
benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is
considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The
former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising
powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act while the latter
does not.
7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when there was
no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent
No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed
by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute
raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a
salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent
No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was
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the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents
are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought
not to have proceeded further with the application under
Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour
Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate
appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his
right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. Therefore, the
order passed by the Labour Court was beyond the
jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court has not
appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the
same without adverting to the scope and ambit of the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above the
present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court as well as that of the order
passed by the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act in Misc. Case No.26 of 2012 are
hereby quashed and set aside. Respondent No.2 is
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relegated to avail any other remedy which may be available
under the Industrial Disputes Act, including that of
reference to adjudicate his right as an employee of the
appellant as claimed by him. As and when such
proceedings are initiated the same to be considered in
accordance with law and on its own merits and without in
anyway being influenced by the present order, as this
Court has not expressed anything in favour of either of the
parties on the aspect of employeremployee relationship
between the appellant and respondent No.2. The present
appeal is allowed with the above observations and to the
aforesaid extent. No costs.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
February, 04 2022.
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