Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DR. MOHAMMAD SAHEB MAHBOOB MEDICO
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE DEPUTY CUSTODIAN-GENERAL ANDANOTHER(And Connected Petiti
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
25/04/1961
BENCH:
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
BENCH:
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SARKAR, A.K.
WANCHOO, K.N.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1961 AIR 1657 1962 SCR (2) 371
CITATOR INFO :
R 1974 SC2349 (10)
ACT:
Evacuee Property-Two groups of Persons, transferring assets
to Pakistan during two different periods-Equal Protection of
laws -Declaration of evacuee Property, when to be made-
Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, s.
2(d)(iii)-Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, s.
22(b).
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was held to be an evacuee under S. 2(d)(iii)
of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949,
and his property was declared to be evacuee property under
S. 22 (b) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act,
950, on the ground that he had transferred a substantial
portion of his assets to Pakistan. The relevant portion of
s. 22(b) runs thus:-
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"If the Custodian is satisfied, after such enquiry as may be
prescribed, that the circumstances relating to any person,
in respect of whom a declaration has been made on the ground
that after the 14th day of August, 1947, and before the 18th
day of October, 1949, he has transferred to Pakistan his
assets or any part thereof situated in any part of the
territories to which this Act extends, are such as may be
prescribed as constituting a preparation for his migration
to Pakistan, the Custodian may declare any property situated
in the State in which such person has any right or interest
to be evacuee property.........."
The contentions, inter alia, of the appellant were that (1)
S. 22(b) contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution and (2)
that the circumstances as to the transfer of a substantial
portion of his assets should relate to an act done after he
was declared as an intending evacuee.
Held, that the two groups of persons who transferred their
assets between the 14th August, 1947, and the 18th October,
1949 and persons who transferred their assets after the 18th
October, 1949 were not similarly circumstanced and the
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denial of equal benefits to the two groups was not an
infringement of equal protection of laws under Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
The circumstance of transfer of a substantial portion of
assets was available for consideration for the purpose of an
order under S, 22(b) whether or not the transfer took place
before the person was declared as an intending evacuee or
afterwards.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 456 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
May 10, 1957, of the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) at
Jaipur in D. B. Civil Reference No. 17 of 1956.
WITH
PETITION No. 87 of 1961.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
enforcement of Fundamental rights.
Bishan Narain, and Govind Saran Singh, for the
appellant/petitioner.
N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
1961. April 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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DAS GUPTA, J.-On April 1, 1950, the Deputy Custodian,
Jaipur, made an order in proceedings instituted under s. 19
of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance
declaring the appellant Dr. Mohammad Saeed a medical
practitioner of Jaipur to be an intending evacuee. By the
same order a notice was directed to be issued to the
respondent to show cause why he should not be declared to be
an evacuee under s. 2(d)(i) and s. 2(d)(iii) of the
Ordinance. When thereafter the Administration of Evacuee
Property Act, 1950 (Act XXXI of 1950), came into force ano-
ther notice was issued on the appellant under s. 22(b) of
the Act to show cause why his property should not be
declared evacuee property on the ground that he had
transferred a substantial portion of his assets to Pakistan.
On November 16, 1951, the Deputy Custodian, Jaipur held Dr.
Mohammad Saeed to be an evacuee under s. 2(d)(iii) of the
Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949. He also
held Dr. Mohammad Saeed’s property to be evacuee property
under s. 7 of the Ordinance and also under s. 22(b) of
the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
On appeal the District Judge, Jaipur, set aside this
declaration of the appellant as an evacuee under s.
2(d)(iii) of the Ordinance and remanded the case for a fresh
decision in the light of the observations made by him. As
regards the order under s. 22(b) the learned District Judge
agreed with the Deputy Custodian that Dr. Mohammed Saeed had
transferred a substantial portion of his assets to Pakistan
between November 1947 and September 1948. Being of opinion
however that not only this act of transfer which took place
before the 18th day of October, 1949, but other
circumstances including the appellant’s conduct after
October 18, 1949, have to be, taken into consideration
before action under section 22(b) can be taken, he found
that it was difficult to say that the appellant had been
making preparations for his migration to Pakistan.
Accordingly he set aside the order made by the Deputy
Custodian under s. 22(b). The
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374
Custodian of Evacuee Property, Rajasthan, moved the
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Custodian-General of Evacuee Property for revision of this
order. The Deputy Custodian-General of Evacuee Property who
heard this petition in revision was unable to agree with the
District Judge’s findings on the question as regards the
order under s. 22(b) and accordingly made a reference under
s. 27(2) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act,
1950, to the High Court of Rajasthan. The High Court
rejected the contention raised on behalf of this appellant
that the circumstances as to the transfer of a substantial
portion of his assets should relate to an act done by any
person, after, he was declared as an intending evacuee. It
further held that the fact that Dr. Mohammad Saeed had
during the period from August 14, 1947 to October 18, 1949,
transferred a substantial portion of his assets in India to
Pakistan constituted under the law a preparation for his
migration to Pakistan and that this justified a declaration
by the Custodian of his property situated in Rajasthan in
which Dr. Mohammad Saeed has a right or interest, to be
evacuee property. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the
decision of the District Judge in respect of Deputy
Custodian-General’s orders under s. 22(b) and directed the
Custodian-General or the Deputy Custodian-General, if
authorised to deal with it, to dispose of the proceedings in
accordance with the decision of the High Court. In
accordance with this direction the Deputy Custodian-General
on August 10, 1957, held that the property of the petitioner
was rightly declared to be evacuee property under s. 22(b)
by the Deputy Custodian. The appeal has been filed against
this decision by special leave granted by this Court.
After the appeal was heard in part on January 23, 1961, the
hearing was adjourned to enable the appellant to make a writ
petition. A petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution was
then filed on February 14, 1961, praying for a writ of
certiorari and/or mandamus or direction to quash the order
made under s. 22(b). The appeal and the petition have come
up for hearing together.
375
As the writ petition challenges the validity of the law as
enacted in s. 22(b) it will be proper and convenient to take
up that petition for decision first. Of the several grounds
urged in the petition against the validity of S. 22(b) only
one, viz., that s. 22(b) contravenes Art. 14 of the
Constitution has been pressed before us. While however in
the grounds as stated in the petition the attack was that
discrimination had been made between persons declared as
intending evacuee in respect of whose property proceedings
had been started before the commencement of the Act and
those in respect of whose property no such proceedings had
yet been started and further that Art. 14 was contravened
because a person declared to be an intending evacuee who had
done one of the acts prescribed as constituting a
preparation for migration to Pakistan, was denied the right
to show that he had, in fact, no intention so to migrate and
had made no preparation for the purpose and by imposing upon
him a very grave penalty, neither of those contentions were
urged at the hearing.
The only argument on the question of contravention of Art.
14 which Mr. Bishan Narain urged on behalf of the petitioner
was that in two matters there was discrimination between an
intending evacuee whose property was declared evacuee
property under s. 22(b) and an evacuee whose property might
be declared to be an evacuee property, where the evacuee had
done practically the same thing for which another person has
been declared as an intending evacuee. Learned Counsel has
pointed out that under s. 2(d)(iv) of the Administration of
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Evacuee Property Act, 1950, as it stood after its amendment
by Act 11 of 1953, a person who has after the 18th day of
October, 1949, transferred to Pakistan without the previous
approval of the Custodian his assets or any part of his
assets situated in any part of the territories to which the
Act extends is an evacuee; so that any property of such a
person is evacuee property within the meaning of the Act.
When in respect of property of such a person an order has
been made under s. 7 of the Act declaring it to be evacuee
property the evacuee or his heir will be entitled to make
376
an application for restoration of the property under s. 16
of the Act, and after due inquiry the Central Government
may, subject to the conditions specified in the section make
an order restoring the property to the applicant. Another
benefit which a person who is an evacuee within the
meaning of s. 2(d)(iv) is entitled to, along with other
evacuees, is that of s. 13 of the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XLIV of 1954), under
which when any property of an evacuee has been acquired
under s. 12 there shall be paid to an evacuee compensation
in respect of his property........................ in
accordance with such principles and in such manner as may be
agreed upon between the Governments of India and Pakistan.
Take however the case of a person, like the present
petitioner who after the 14th day of August, 1947, and
before the 18th day of October, 1949, transferred his assets
or any portion thereof to Pakistan. He would be an
"intending evacuee" within the meaning of s. 2(e)(i) of the
Act and once a declaration had been made under s. 19 that he
was an intending evacuee his property would be liable to be
declared evacuee property under s. 22(b). Even so however
he would not get the benefit of s. 16 of Act XXXI of 1950 or
of s. 13 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.
The result of the several provisions of law of the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, after it was
amended in 1953 therefore is that if a person transferred
his assets or any part of his assets to Pakistan without the
previous approval of the Custodian after the 18th day of
October, 1949, he would be an evacuee in law and his
property will be liable to be declared an evacuee property,
but he will still be entitled to restoration of the property
under s. 16 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act
1950, and also to the benefit of s. 13 of the Displaced
Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XLIV of
1954); but if a person transferred his assets or part of his
assets to Pakistan between the 14th day of August, 1947, and
the 18th day of October, 1949, he was liable
377
to be declared an intending evacuee at any date before the
Amended Act of 1953 came into force and if that has
happened, any property belonging to him was liable to be
declared evacuee property under s. 22 of the Act at any time
before Chapter IV of that Act was repealed by the 1953 Act
and even after that date if any proceeding under s. 22 was
pending on the’ date of the commencement of the 1953 Act.
But such a person would not be entitled to the benefit of
either s. 16 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act,
1950, or compensation under s. 13 of the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XLIV of 1954). This
denial of benefits under section 16 of the 1950 Act and s.
13 of the 1954 Act to one who has been declared an intending
evacuee on the ground of transfer of assets to Pakistan
amounts, it is urged by the learned counsel, to be a denial
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of equal protection of laws and it is contended that s.
22(b) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act as it
stood before the section war, repealed along with other sec-
tions of Chapter IV should be held to be void.
In our judgment, this contention is not well founded. In the
first place it is to be pointed out that a person who
transferred assets between the 14th August, 1947, and the
18th October, 1949, and a person who transferred such assets
after the 18th October, 1949, cannot properly be considered
to be similarly circumstanced. It has to be borne in mind
that political relations between India and Pakistan were in
a fluid and disturbed state immediately after the 14th
August, 1947, but the position improved to a considerable
extent by the 18th October, 1949, which it may be noticed
was the date when the Administration of Evacuee Property
Ordinance, 1949, was made. Persons who had transferred
assets between the 14th August, 1947, and the 18th October,
1949, may therefore reasonably have been considered by the
legislature to form a class distinct in respect of the
application of the law to their property from those who
transferred assets after the 18th October, 1949. We are not
however concerned with the reasons or the wisdom of the
policy which underlay the denial of the
378
benefits of s. 16 of the Administration of Evacuee Property
Act and s. 13 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act (XLIV of 1954) to those persons who had
been declared intending evacuees because of having
transferred assets between the 14th August, 1947, and the
18th October, 1949, while granting these benefits to those
who were evacuees under the law as amended in 1953, because
of transfer of assets to Pakistan after the 18th October,
1949. What is clear is that the two groups of persons are
not similarly circumstanced and so the denial of equal
benefits to the two groups is not an infringement of the
guarantee of equal protection of laws.
Next it is important to note that this differenceviz., that
one group of persons is entitled to the benefits of the
sections mentioned above while another group is not-does not
flow directly or necessarily from s. 22(b). What is
characterised as discrimination between an evacuee and an
intending evacuee is the consequence of the legislature’s
omission to extend to the intending evacuees the benefits of
s. 16 of the 1950 Act and s. 13 of the 1954 Act as mentioned
above and not of the provisions under s. 22(b) that under
certain circumstances as specified therein the Custodian may
declare the property of an intending evacuee to be evacuee
property.
We do not think that it is possible to say therefore that s.
22(b) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act
contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution therefore
fails and is dismissed with costs.
The appeal raises the question of the effect of the
application of s. 22(b) of the Act to the facts of the
present case. Section 22(b), substituting therein for the
words "he had done any of the acts specified in sub-clauses
(i) and (iii) of clause (e) of s. 2" the words of only cluse
2(e)(i), reads thus:-
"If the Custodian is satisfied, after such
enquiry as may be prescribed, that the
circumstances relating to any person, in
respect of whom a declaration has been so made
on the ground that after the 14th
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day of August, 1947, and before the 18th day
of October, 1949, he has transferred to
Pakistan his assets or any part thereof
situated in any part of the territories to
which this Act extends are such as may be
prescribed as constituting a preparation for
his migration to Pakistan, the Custodian may
declare any property situated in the State in
which such person has any right or interest to
be evacuee property and on the issue of such
notification any property specified in the
notification shall be deemed to be evacuee
property which has vested in the Custodian
within the meaning of this Act."
It is important to notice the explanation to the section
which runs thus:-
"Explanation:-The following shall be deemed to
be some of the circumstances prescribed under
clause (b), namely-
(i) the transfer to Pakistan by any person
referred to in that clause of a substantial
portion of his assets situated in any part of
the territories to which this Act extends, or
(ii) the acquisition of, or the declaration
of an intention to acquire, Pakistan
nationality by any such person."
It need only be mentioned that a declaration
has been "so made" means that a declaration
has been made under section 19 of the Act that
he is an intending evacuee.
It is no longer in dispute that Dr. Mohammad Saeed had,
before the order appealed from was made, transferred to
Pakistan a substantial portion of his assets situated in
Jaipur which is part of the territories to which this Act
extends. It is further not in dispute that this transfer
was made before he was declared an intending evacuee.
The first contention raised on behalf of the appellant was
that this transfer having been made before the declaration
was made is not available for consideration for the purpose
of an order under s. 22(b). The contention is clearly
unwarranted. On a normal grammatical construction of the
words used by the legislature it is abundantly clear that
the transfer to
380
Pakistan of a substantial portion of the assets shall be
deemed to be one of the circumstances prescribed under
clause (b) irrespective of whether the transfer took place
before the declaration as intending evacuee was made or
after such declaration. What is necessary is that the
circumstance must relate to any person in respect of whom a
declaration that he is an intending evacuee has been made.
There is nothing to justify the conclusion that the
circumstances in order that they may be taken into
consideration must also come into existence after the
declaration was made. Indeed the scheme of the legislation
appears to be that the fact that any portion of a person’s
assets has been transferred to Pakistan is sufficient to
make him liable to a declaration that he is an intending
evacuee; but he becomes liable to the further declaration
that his property is evacuee property, where it appears that
what was transferred forms a substantial portion of his
assets. In some cases it may happen that what was
transferred before his declaration as an intending evacuee
formed a small part of his assets. In such a case if later
on other portions of his assets were transferred to Pakistan
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and the two transfers together amount to a transfer of a
substantial portion of his assets, his property will be
liable to be declared as evacuee property: It will be
difficult to find any logic in the argument that when what
was transferred before his declaration as intending evacuee
was itself a substantial portion of his assets, such
liability should not fasten. Quite apart however from the
question of logic or reasonableness it is quite clear from
the language used in the section that the legislature in.
tended such circumstance of transfer of a substantial
portion of assets to be available for consideration for the
purpose of an order under s. 22(b) whether or not the
transfer took place before the person was declared as an
intending evacuee or afterwards.
It was next urged that in any case it would be proper for
the Custodian to take other circumstances including the
later conduct of the intending evacuee to decide whether or
not he should declare his property to be evacuee property.
It is unnecessary for
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us to consider whether it is open to the Custodian to
consider such other circumstances. The section however
gives a Custodian the authority to declare the property of a
person who has been declared an intending evacuee to be
evacuee property whenever the existence of any of the
circumstances prescribed as constituting a preparation for
his migrating to Pakistan is established. Where, as in the
present case, a Custodian in exercise of such authority has
given such a declaration there is no reason for saying that
the declaration has been improperly made.
In our opinion, the High Court was right in setting aside
the order of the District Judge and in directing the
Custodian-General or the Deputy Custodian-General to dispose
of the matter in accordance with the views expressed by the
High Court that on the facts proved in the case the order
made by the Deputy Custodian declaring Dr. Mohammad Saeed’s
property as evacuee property was right. The order made by
the Deputy Custodian-General in compliance with the
directions given by the High Court cannot therefore be
assailed.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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