V K John vs. S. Mukanchand Bothra And Huf (Died) Represented By Lrs.

2026 INSC 393
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No......................... OF 2026
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16162/2023)

V.K. JOHN … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

S. MUKANCHAND BOTHRA AND HUF
(DIED) REPRESENTED BY
LRS. & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL,J.

Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SOURAV PAL
Date: 2026.04.20
17:59:51 IST
Reason:
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2. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment
and order dated 03.02.2023, passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Madras in CRP No. 676/2013, whereby Civil Revision Petition
preferred by the appellant against arbitral award dated 21.02.2011
1
in Arbitration Case No. 1/2011 came to be dismissed.

Brief Facts
3. The genesis of the present lis is from a ‘ Deed of Agreement
for Sale ’ entered into between one Mr. Appu John [alleged paternal
uncle of the appellant] and Respondent No. 1 herein, S.
Mukanchand Bothra, for the sale of the subject property on
2
20.04.2007 . Thereafter, Mr. Appu John, passed away on
28.07.2007. Respondent No. 1 initiated arbitration against
Respondent No. 2, A. Philip, in 2011, alleging violation of the above
Agreement. The case of the appellant is that Mr. Philip has been
falsely shown as the legal representative of Mr. Appu John.

4. An Award dated 21.02.2011 came to be passed by the learned
Sole Arbitrator Vedavalli Kumar, in favor of Respondent No. 1 and
thereby directed Respondent No. 2, A. Philip, to execute the sale

1
Hereinafter ‘the Arbitral Award’.
2
Hereinafter ‘the Agreement’.
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deed. Consequently, an execution petition bearing number E.P. No.
17 of 2012 also came to be filed on 10.08.2011.

5. The case of the appellant is that he was only informed of the
above arbitration proceedings on 28.08.2012. Thereafter, the
appellant sought and has been impleaded in the execution petition
mentioned above, vide order dated 14.09.2021 of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in A. Nos. 3800 – 3802 of 2012.


6. Prior thereto, in 1994, the appellant had initiated a suit against
his uncle seeking partition of properties belonging to his paternal
grandmother, which came to be numbered as CS No. 423 of 1995
before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. In the said suit, on
02.01.2018, a preliminary decree was passed in favor of the
rd
appellant, decreeing 1/3 share in the subject property.


7. For the present lis , the appellant had assailed the arbitral
award vide Civil Revision Petition No. 676 of 2013 before the High
Court of Judicature at Madras. The High Court vide the impugned
order dismissed the civil revision preferred by the appellant, while
observing that as the appellant claims to be a legal representative of
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Mr. Appu John, the appropriate relief would lie under the
Arbitration Act, and in view of such statutory remedy – the
challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be permitted.

Our View
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant. We have also heard Mr. Gagan Bothra, respondent no. 3
– in person. As the other respondents have chosen not to enter
appearance, this Court appointed Mr. Chakradhari Sharan Singh and
Ms. Gauri Rajput, as amici curiae to assist the Court in this matter
vide order dated 03.09.2025.


9. The issue which arises before us is whether the appropriate
remedy for legal heirs aggrieved by an arbitral award would be a
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act,
3
1996 or a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution/Section 115
4
of the Code of Civil Procedure ?



3
Hereinafter ‘the Arbitration Act’.
4
Hereinafter ‘CPC’.
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10. The case of the appellant, in a nutshell, is that his uncle was
unmarried and had no issues. The arbitral award stands vitiated as
the appellant, who has a substantial claim over the subject property,
has not been heard. Moreover, the arbitrator made no enquiry as to
whether respondent no. 2 is actually the legal heir of Mr. Appu John.
He further submits that the only recourse available to him was to file
a petition for revision under Article 227 of the Constitution. As he
was never made a party in the arbitration proceedings, he cannot
challenge the said award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.


11. Respondent No. 3 has placed reliance on the judgments of this
Court in Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar
5
Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and Anr . and Ravi Prakash
6
Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel to submit that since the specific
case of the appellant is that he is the sole surviving legal heir of Mr.
Appu John, the appropriate remedy lies under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act.



5
(2022) 1 SCC 75.
6
(2008) 13 SCC 667.
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12. The amici curiae have taken a different view, whereby they
state that there is no binding arbitration agreement inter se the
parties. The award is not executable against successors-in-interest.
However, considering the submissions raised at the bar, we seek to
examine the issue of law raised before us without going into the
merits of the arbitration agreement.


13. In the considered view of this Court, the appropriate relief for
a legal representative to challenge an arbitral award is under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act and not under Article 227 of the
Constitution/Section 115 of the CPC.


14. The Arbitration Act is a complete Code in itself. The object
of the Act is to consolidate the laws pertaining to domestic
arbitration, international arbitration and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards. Section 34 thereof enumerates the grounds on which
a Court may set aside an arbitral award, upon an application made
by a party. The relevant portion reads:

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15. Judicial interference beyond the scope and procedure
enumerated under Section 34, must be exercised in ‘ exceptional
rarity ’, as was observed by this Court in Bhaven Construction
(supra) , where the Court had the occasion to consider the scope of
the above Section. It was observed:
“17. Thereafter, Respondent 1 chose to impugn the order
passed by the arbitrator under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration
Act through a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Indian
Constitution. In the usual course, the Arbitration Act provides
for a mechanism of challenge under Section 34. The opening
phase of Section 34 reads as

“ 34. Application for setting aside arbitral
award .—(1) Recourse to a Court against an
arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such award in
accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section
(3) ”.
(emphasis supplied)

The use of term “only” as occurring under the provision serves
two purposes of making the enactment a complete code and lay
down the procedure.
18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework, mandates
that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a constitutional right.
In Nivedita Sharma v. COAI [ Nivedita Sharma v. COAI ,
(2011) 14 SCC 337 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947] , this Court
referred to several judgments and held : (SCC p. 343, para 11)
… … …
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It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to
allow judicial interference beyond the procedure established
under the enactment. This power needs to be exercised in
exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under
the statute or a clear “bad faith” shown by one of the parties.
This high standard set by this Court is in terms of the legislative
intention to make the arbitration fair and efficient.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. At this stage, we must consider whether the term ‘ party ’ in
Section 34, would include ‘ legal representatives ’ claiming
thereunder. A ‘ legal representative ’ has been defined under Section
2(1)(g) of the Act as:

“(g) “legal representative” means a person who in law
represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any
person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased, and,
where a party acts in a representative character, the person on
whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so acting;”


17. For this purpose, it is pertinent to note that the scheme of the
Arbitration Act, does not envision arbitration proceedings to cease
with the death of a party. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act, extends
the finality of an arbitral award not only to parties to the award, but
also to ‘ parties claiming under them ’. We also make reference to
Section 40 which reads:
“40. Arbitration agreement not to be discharged by death
of party thereto .—(1) An arbitration agreement shall not be
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discharged by the death of any party thereto either as respects
the deceased or as respects any other party, but shall in such
event be enforceable by or against the legal representative of
the deceased.
(2) The mandate of an arbitrator shall not be terminated by the
death of any party by whom he was appointed.
(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the operation of any law
by virtue of which any right of action is extinguished by the
death of a person.”

18. In our view, when the scheme of the Act is towards continuity
of arbitral proceedings, in the event of death of a party, the natural
corollary, evident from the definition clause itself, is that upon the
death of a party, legal representatives’ step into the shoes of a party
for the purposes of the Act. Similarly, this Court in Rahul Verma
7
and Ors. v. Rampat Lal Verma and Ors. , while permitting legal
heirs of a deceased partner to invoke arbitration under the agreement
therein, had noted that upon the death of the deceased, the legal heirs
had ‘ stepped into the shoes of the deceased ’ and therefore, the
arbitration clause continues to bind all concerned parties.

19. Moreover, in the considered view of this Court, when an
award has been made enforceable against the legal representatives
of a deceased party under the Act, the right to challenge such an
award, which is available under the Act to the parties, also has to

7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 578.
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naturally flow to the said legal representatives. This Court, while
permitting the legal representatives of a deceased partner of a
partnership firm to initiate arbitration, in Ravi Prakash Goel
( supra ), as rightly submitted by Respondent No. 3 had observed as
under:

(emphasis supplied)

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20. Taking into view the above observations, denying a legal
representative the right to challenge an award under Section 34,
would defeat the very object of the Arbitration Act, and its purpose
as a self-contained complete Code of dispute resolution.
Furthermore, as discussed above, such an interpretation is also in
furtherance of continuity of arbitral proceedings as envisioned under
the Arbitration Act. Moreover, in our view, legal representatives of
a deceased party cannot be made remediless under the statute on one
hand, and on the other hand being made liable to fulfill the award.


21. Lastly, we are also not inclined to accept the conflicting stand
of the appellant, where at one stage he submits that he is the sole
surviving legal heir of Mr. Appu John, and on the other states that
he does not represent the estate of Mr. Appu John.


22. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court vide the
impugned order is correct in law and consequently, upheld. As a
result thereof, the present appeal is dismissed. The impugned order
of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 03.02.2023 in CRP
No. 676/2013 is affirmed.

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23. Needless to add, the appellant is permitted to exercise his
remedies under the Arbitration Act. Any such petition, if so filed, is
to be decided on its own merits. Limitation for filing such petition
shall run from the date of this judgment.


24. Pending applications, if any, shall stand dismissed.



…………………………...…J.
(SANJAY KAROL)



………………………………J.
(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

New Delhi
April 20, 2026



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