Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SARDAR SOMA SINGH AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF PEPSU AND UNION OF INDIA.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
11/03/1954
BENCH:
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BENCH:
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN
HASAN, GHULAM
CITATION:
1954 AIR 311 1954 SCR 955
CITATOR INFO :
R 1962 SC 191 (16)
R 1968 SC 331 (14)
ACT:
Constitution of India, art. 286 (3)-The Patiala and East
Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (XXX
III of 2006)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
Held, that the Patiala and East ’Punjab States Union General
Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (No. XXXIII of 2006) promulgated
on 6th November, 1949, is not ultra vires art. 286 (3) of
the Constitution.
Clause (3) of art. 286 contemplates a post-Constitution law,
for it must be a law made by a "Legislature of a State"
which must refer to the Legislature of a State created by
the Constitution.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 325 of 1953.
Petition to the Supreme Court, under article,32 of the
Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights.
S. P. Sinha (Bakshi Man Singh, with him) for the
petitioners.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India and J. N.
Kaushal (P. G. Gokhale, with them) for respondent No. 1.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta
and P. G Gokhale, with him) for respondent No. 2.
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1954. March 11. ’the Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
DAS J.-The short point raised on this petition filed in this
court under article 32 of the Constitution is whether the
Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax
Ordinance, 2006 (No. XXXIII of 2006) which was promulgated
on the 6th November, 1949, has become void since the date of
the commencement of the Constitution.
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Article 286(3) of the Constitution of India runs as follows
:-
" 286. (3) No law made by the Legislature of a State
imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the
sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by
Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the
community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for
the consideration of the President and has received his
assent."
The Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of Tax on
Sale or Purchase) Act, 1952 (Central Act No. LII of 1952)
declared certain commodities as essential for the life of
the community. In the schedule appended to the Act item 8
relates to "all cloth, woven on handlooms, coarse and medium
cotton cloth made in mills or woven on power looms." Section
3 of the same Act provides as follows:-
"3. Regulation of tax on ’sale or purchase of essential
goods: No law made after the commencement of this Act by the
Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the
imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods
declared by this Act to be essential for the life’ of the
community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for
the consideration of the President and has received his
assent."
The petitioners are dealers in coarse cloth and medium cloth
and their contention is that these commodities having been
declared as essential, for the life of the community they
are not liable to pay sales tax on them. In the petition an
allegation has been’ made that section 3 of Act LII of 1952
is in direct contravention of article 286(3) of the
Constitution. There
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does not appear to be any substance in this contention.
Section 3 is in line with article 286(3) and there is no
inconsistency between that section and the relevant
provision of the Constitution. The petitioners are sought
to be taxed under the Ordinance XXXIII of 2006, which, as an
existing law, has been continued by article 372. The
question is whether that Ordinance contravenes the
provisions of article 286(3) or has since been altered,
repealed or amended by any competent legislative authority..
It is quite clear that section 3 of Act LII of 1952 does not
affect the Ordinance’, for the Ordinance was not made after
the commencement of that Act. The only question, therefore,
is whether the Ordinance runs counter to clause (8) of
article 286 of the Constitution. A perusal of that clause
will at once indicate that clause contemplates a post-
Constitution law, for it must be a law made by a "I
Legislature of a State " which must refer to the Legislature
of a State created by the Constitution. Further, and what
is more important, it contemplates a law which can be but
has not been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has not received his assent. This provision clearly
points to post-Constitution law, for there can be no
question of an existing law continued by article 372 being
reserved for the consideration of the President for
receiving his assent. As we are concerned in this
application with a pre-Constitution law, it is not necessary
for us to express any opinion as to the validity or
otherwise of a law made after the commencement of the
Constitution but before the coming into operation of Act LII
of 1952.
The result, therefore, is that there is no substance in this
petition and we dismiss it with costs.
Petition dimissed.
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Agent for the petitioners: Sardar Singh.
Agent for respondent No. 1: R. H. Dhebar.
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