SIRAJ AHMAD vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 13-12-2019

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1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL No.9412    OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30061 of 2017) SIRAJ AHMAD    ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.     .... RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T   Leave granted. 2. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties.  3. The appeal challenges the Judgment and Order dated 11.09.2017,   passed   by   the   division   bench   of   Allahabad High   Court   in   W.P.(Service   Bench)   No.   1020   of   2015, thereby dismissing the Writ Petition filed by appellant.  4. The  facts  giving  rise  to  the  present appeal are as Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Date: 2019.12.13 16:47:53 IST Reason: under: The appellant was appointed on ad­hoc basis on the post of Junior Engineer in the pay scale of Rs. 485­860/­ 2 by order dated 30.03.1987, issued by Respondent No. 1 . It is not in dispute  that the said Order was issued with prior approval of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. It is also not in dispute, that the said appointment was made after the post was   advertised   and   after   the   appellant   underwent   the selection   process   conducted   by   the   State   under   the provisions   of   U.P.   Development   Authorities   Centralized Services   Rules,   1985   (hereinafter   referred   as   “the   said Rules”).  Pursuant  to the  selection  and  appointment,  the appellant joined with the Agra Development Authority on 08.04.1987.   While   in   service   the   appellant   obtained   the degree   in   B.Sc.­Engineering   from   Aligarh   Muslim University, Aligarh on 08.06.1987. The appellant thereafter through proper channel communicated the respondents the fact regarding obtaining of requisite qualification and being eligible   for   consideration   for   promotion,   to   the   post   of Assistant Engineer (Civil), in the  Centralised Services  under Sub Rule (3) of Rule 24 of the said Rules. It is the case of the   appellant,   that   the   State   Government   had   sought information   from   all   the   Development   Authorities   vide communication   dated   25.09.1987   with   regard   to   the 3 number   of   Junior   Engineers   possessing   the   degree   of Bachelor of Engineering / A.M.I.E. In compliance to the said   communication   the   Vice­Chairman   of   Agra Development Authority informed the State Government that in   Agra   Development   Authority   appellant   was   the   only Junior   Engineer,   who   was   possessing   the   degree   of Bachelor of Engineering. 5. Since   the   appellant   was   not   promoted,   he   made various representations to the State seeking promotion. The appellant had claimed the promotion from 18.01.1995, i.e. the   date   on   which   the   juniors   to   the   appellant   were promoted. The appellant’s claim for promotion came to be rejected on 16.04.2015. Hence the appellant approached the   division   bench   of   the   High   Court   by   way   of   Writ Petition.   The   petition   came   to   be   rejected.   Hence,   the present appeal. 6. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of appellant submits, that the appellant’s services already stood regularised  from 23.11.2002 and  as such in view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this 4 Court in the case of  Direct Recruit Class – II Engineering Officers   Association   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra   and 1 others ,   the   appellant   was   entitled   for   promotion   by treating   his   continuous   service   from   the   date   of   initial appointment. 7. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that, as a matter of fact the Allahabad High Court itself, in the case of   Rajendra   Prasad   Dwivedi   vs.   State   of   U.P.   and 2 , vide judgment and order dated 19.08.2011, had others directed the State Government to consider the case of said Shri   Dwivedi   for   promotion   to   the   post   of   Assistant Engineer after completion of 10 years of service as Junior Engineer, provided they had a B.E./A.M.I.E. degree.  8. It is further submitted, that vide subsequent Order dated 09.11.2011, the Allahabad High Court had modified its Order in view of the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of   this   Court   in   Direct   Recruitment   of   Class   –   II Engineering Officers Association   (supra), wherein it is observed, that the petitioner therein, i.e. Rajendra Prasad 11990 (2) SCC 715 2Writ Petition No. 3421 of 1996 5 Dwivedi,   became   eligible   for   promotion   to   the   post   of Assistant Engineer as soon as he obtained qualification of A.M.I.E. in 1993. He submits, that vide said Order, it was held that if the promotion was given to any other Junior Engineer,   junior   to   the   petitioner   therein,   the   petitioner therein was also eligible for promotion from the said date along   with   consequential   benefits.   The   learned   Senior Counsel submits that the learned Single Judge who passed the Order in the case of Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi was the same   learned   Judge   heading   the   bench   in   the   case   of present appellant and, as such, there was no reason as to why the appellant ought not to have been given the same benefit. 9. Per contra, Mr. V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the State submits that, under the rules it was necessary that the appointment was made with concurrence   of   U.P.   Public   Service   Commission.   He submits,  undisputedly  the appellant’s appointment was not made   with   the   concurrence   of   U.P.   Public   Service Commission. It is therefore   submitted, that as such the appellant’s appointment will have to be termed as illegal. 6 He   therefore   submits,   that   the   High   Court   has   rightly refused   to   take   into   consideration   the   services   of   the appellant, prior to the date on which his services came to be regularised.  10. The   facts   in   the   present   case   are   not   in   dispute. Undisputedly the appellant’s initial appointment in the year 1987 was after the advertisement was issued for the posts in Centralised Services constituted under the said Rules. It is also not in dispute, that the appellant was selected after he  underwent   the   entire   selection   process   by   competing with other persons, who had also applied for the said post. The   only   issue   that   the   learned   Judges   of   the   division bench   have   found   against   the   appellant   is   that   the appellant’s selection was not made in due consultation with the U.P. Public Service Commission. 11. This court in the case of  State of M.P. and ors. vs. 3 ,   after considering the Judgment of Lalit Kumar Verma Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Secy., 4 ,  observed thus : State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi(3) 3(2007)1 SCC 575 4 (2006) 4 SCC 1 7 “  The   question   which,   thus,   arises   for 12. consideration,   would   be:   Is   there   any   distinction between   “irregular   appointment”   and   “illegal appointment”? The distinction between the two terms is apparent. In the event the appointment is made in total disregard of the constitutional scheme as also the recruitment rules framed by the employer, which is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the recruitment would be an illegal   one;   whereas   there   may   be   cases   where, although,   substantial   compliance   with   the constitutional scheme as also the rules have been made, the appointment may be irregular in the sense that some provisions of some rules might not have been strictly adhered to. ” 12. It can thus be seen that this court has held that the distinction   between   irregular   appointment   and   illegal appointment is clear. It has been held that in the event appointment is made in total disregard to the constitutional scheme and the recruitment rules framed by the employer, where   the   employer   is   a   “State”   within   the   meaning   of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the recruitment will be   illegal   one.   It   has   however   been   held,   that   where although,   substantial   compliance   with   the   constitutional scheme, as also the rules have been made, the appointment would become irregular in as much as the  some provisions of some rules have been adhered to.  8 13. Subsequently another bench of this Court in the case of  State of Karnataka and Others vs. M. L. Kesari and 5   also had an occasion to consider the issue. The Others Court observed thus :  
“7. It is evident from the above that there is an<br>exception to the general principles against<br>“regularisation” enunciated in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4<br>SCC 1] , if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The employee concerned should have worked<br>for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned post without<br>the benefit or protection of the interim order of any<br>court or tribunal. In other words, the State<br>Government or its instrumentality should have<br>employed the employee and continued him in service<br>voluntarily and continuously for more than ten<br>years.
(ii) The appointment of such employee should not<br>be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments<br>are not made or continued against sanctioned posts<br>or where the persons appointed do not possess the<br>prescribed minimum qualifications, the<br>appointments will be considered to be illegal. But<br>where the person employed possessed the prescribed<br>qualifications and was working against sanctioned<br>posts, but had been selected without undergoing the<br>process of open competitive selection, such<br>appointments are considered to be irregular.”
14. This court held, that where the appointment are not made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the 5(2010) 9 SCC 247 9 persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications,   the   appointment   will   be   considered   to   be illegal. However, when the person employed possessed the prescribed   qualifications   and   is   working   against   the sanctioned   posts,   but   had   been   selected   without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such appointments are considered to be irregular.  15. As already discussed herein above, the appellant had applied in pursuance to the advertisement issued by State for   the   post   in   the   Centralised   Services   under   the provisions of the said rules. The appellant had participated in the selection process along with the other competitors. The   appellant   was   possessing   the   requisite   qualification and   was   selected   after   competing   with   others   and   was appointed against the sanctioned posts for a period of One year.   Undisputedly   the   appellant   thereafter   has continuously   rendered   his   services,   till   the   date   of regularisation of his services i.e. on 23.11.2002 and even thereafter till date. As such appellant’s case would be on a much   better   pedestal   that   the   one   which   fall   for consideration in the case of  M.L. Kesari  (Supra). 10 16. It   can   thus   be   seen  that   the   only   issue   which   is found against the appellant is that prior to appointment there   was   no   concurrence   of   the   U.P.   Public   Service Commission. It can thus be seen that the appointment of the appellant at the most can be termed as irregular and not illegal. 17. It   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following observations   of   the   constitution   bench   judgment   of   this Court in the case of  Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association   (supra), the constitution bench has observed thus 
13.When the cases were taken up for hearing
before us, it was faintly suggested that the principle
laid down inPatwardhan case[(1977) 3 SCC 399:
1977 SCC (L&S) 391: (1977) 3 SCR 775] was
unsound and fit to be overruled, but no attempt was
made to substantiate the plea. We were taken
through the judgment by the learned counsel for the
parties more than once and we are in complete
agreement with the ratio decidendi, that the period of
continuous officiation by a government servant, after
his appointment by following the rules applicable for
substantive appointments, has to be taken into
account for determining his seniority; and seniority
cannot be determined on the sole test of
confirmation, for, as was pointed out, confirmation is
one of the inglorious uncertainties of government
service depending neither on efficiency of the
incumbent nor on the availability of substantive
vacancies. The principle for deciding inter se
11
seniority has to conform to the principles of equality
spelt out by Articles 14 and 16. InBaleshwar
Dassv.State of U.P.[(1980) 4 SCC 226: 1980 SCC
(L&S) 531: (1981) 1 SCR 449] andDelhi Water
Supply and Sewage Disposal Committeev.R.K.
Kashyap[1989 Supp (1) SCC 194: 1989 SCC (L&S)
253: (1989) 9 ATC 784] , with which we are in
agreement. InNarender Chadhav.Union of
India[(1986) 2 SCC 157: 1986 SCC (L&S) 226:
(1986) 1 SCR 211] the officers were promoted
although without following the procedure prescribed
under the rules, but they continuously worked for
long periods of nearly 15­20 years on the posts
without being reverted. The period of their
continuous officiation was directed to be counted for
seniority as it was held that any other view would be
arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16. There is
considerable force in this view also. We, therefore,
confirm the principle of counting towards seniority
the period of continuous officiation following an
appointment made in accordance with the rules
prescribed for regular substantive appointments in
the service.
18. The constitution bench in unequivocal terms holds that,   if   an   appointment   is   made   by   way   of   stopgap arrangement   without   considering   the   claims   of   all   the eligible   persons   and   without   following   the   rules   of appointment, the experience of such appointment cannot be   equated   with   the   experience   of   a   regular   appointee, because   of   qualitative   difference   in   the   appointment.   It however   holds,   that   if   the   appointment   is   made   after considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the 12 appointee   continues   in   the   post   uninterruptedly   till   the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules made   for   regular   substantive   appointments,   there   is   no reason   to   exclude   the   officiating   service   for   purpose   of seniority. 19. The constitution bench concludes thus : “ 47 . To sum up, we hold that: A)  Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from   the   date   of   his   appointment   and   not according to the date of his confirmation.  The   corollary   of   the   above   rule   is   that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop­gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be   taken   into   account   for   considering   the seniority. B)   If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but   the   appointee   continues   in   the   post uninterruptedly   till   the   regularisation   of   his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. …….” 20. It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen,   that   the   Constitution Bench   in   unequivocal   terms   holds   that,   if   the   initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules, but the appointee continues in the post 13 uninterruptedly   till   the   regularisation   of   his   service   in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.   21. It is not in dispute, that except the concurrence of the U.P. Public Service Commission the appointment of the appellant   has   been   made   after   following   the   procedure prescribed   under   the   said   Rules.   The   appellant   has uninterruptedly served till the regularisation of his service which was made in accordance with the rules. It can thus be   seen   that   the   case   of   present   appellant   is   squarely covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case   of   Direct   Recruit   Class   II   Engineering   Officers Association  (supra). 22. It is further to be noted that the Respondent had issued an office memorandum dated 11.03.1994 thereby, providing for relaxation of the condition which prescribed minimum 10 years service in the post of Junior Engineer. Schedule­3   to   the   said   Rules   provided,   that   for   being eligible to the promotion of Assistant Engineer along with the educational qualification a candidate must possess 10 14 st years service, in the post of Junior Engineer on 01  July of the   selection   year.   By   the   said  office   memorandum,  the Government   provided   that   5%   of   the   posts   out   of   50% promotional   quota   are   to   be   reserved   by   extending relaxation   to   such   of   the   Junior   Engineers,   who   have passed B.E. or A.M.I.E. examination. It further provided, that   in   case   candidates   possessing   B.E.   /   A.M.I.E. examination were not available, the post should be filled in from non Graduate Junior Engineers. As discussed herein above,   it   is   to   be   noted   that   the   Government   had   also sought information from the Development Authorities with regard to the number of persons possessing the requisite B.E.   /   A.M.I.E.   degree.   In   response   to   the   said communication   the   Agra   Development   Authority   had intimated the respondent state the name of the appellant being the only person possessing the said qualification. 23. We further fail to appreciate as to how the same High Court  could   have   considered  the   case   of   two  employees differently when they were similarly circumstanced. It is not in dispute that the present appellant as well as Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi were selected through the same selection 15 process though their orders of appointment differs. It will be   appropriate   to   refer   to   the   observation   made   by   the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 3421 of 1996 in the case of   Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi vs. State of U.P. which reads thus: “Upon perusal of the Government Orders dated 26th of August, 1992 as well as 11th of March, 1994, I find   force   in   the   submission   of   the   petitioner, therefore,  I   am   of   the   view   that   as   soon   as   the petitioner obtained the qualification of AMIE in 1993, he   became   eligible   for   promotion   to   the   post   of Assistant   Engineer.   Though   only   gaining   the qualification does not create right of promotion, but I am of the view that if thereafter any promotion has been   given   to   others   particularly   junior   to   the petitioner, the petitioner is liable to be considered for promotion   from   the   said   date   alongwith consequential benefits. In   light   of   the   law   laid   down   by   the   Hon'ble Supreme   Court,   in   the   case   referred   to   here­in­ above,  I hereby also observe that the fact that the petitioner was not confirmed in the service, shall not come in the way of the petitioner's promotion as an impediment and the petitioners services even on ad hoc basis on the post of Junior Engineer shall be taken   into   consideration   for   the   purpose   of promotion to the higher post. Accordingly a direction is   issued   to   the   respondents   to   consider   the petitioner's   case   for   promotion   to   the   higher   post from the date of promotion of his junior within two months, after receipt of a certified copy of this order” (emphasis supplied) 24. The   above   judgment   of   the   learned   Single   Judge dated 09.11.2011 was carried in appeal before the division 16 bench   of   the   said   court.   The   division   bench   of   the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 75 of 2012 in   in   its   Order   dated State   of   U.P.   Vs.   R.   P.   Dwivedi 13.02.2014 observed thus: “ On due consideration of rival submissions, we find considerable force in the arguments of respondent. The   condition   of   length   of   ten   years'   service   was relaxed. The respondent, though appointed on ad­ hoc basis as Junior Engineer on 24.02.1987, had obtained the degree of AMIE on 10.10.1993 before Sri   Sunil   Dutt   Sharma   and   Sri   Sajid   Hasan   who passed the examination in 1994. As the vacancies were   available   and   the   private   respondent   was qualified to be considered for promotion in 1993, he should   have   been   considered   even   prior   to   the aforesaid persons. ....” (emphasis supplied)   25. The State had also carried the said matter by way of Special   Leave   Petition   Civil   (CC)   No.   13830­31   of   2014 before this court. The SLP also came to be dismissed on 12.01.2015.   The   state   thereafter   preferred   a   Review Petition, seeking review of the Judgment of division bench in the case of  State of U.P. vs. Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi by way of Review Petition No. 188 of 2015. The said Review Petition is also dismissed. 26. The   only   ground   on   which   the   High   Court   has refused to consider the case of the appellant is that in the 17 case   of   Rajendra   Prasad   Dwivedi,   the   court   had   not considered the issue with regard to non­concurrence of the U.P. Public Service Commission. At the cost of repetition as discussed herein above the appointment of the appellant at the most can be considered as irregular and not illegal. 27. It is to be noted that the appellant has obtained the Bachelor of Science (Engineering) degree in the year 1987 and though Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi had obtained the A.M.I.E. in 1993, taking into consideration that Sunil Dutt Sharma and Sajid Hasan had obtained the degree of A.M.I.E. in 1994, the said Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi was held to be entitled for promotion on 18.01.1995 i.e. the date on which the said Sajid Hasan and Sunil Dutt Sharma were promoted as Assistant Engineer from  Junior Engineer. We fail to appreciate the approach of the  High Court in denying the promotion to the appellant when all the other three i.e. namely Rajendra Prasad Dwivedi, Sajid Hasan and Sunil Dutt Sharma were appointed in the year 1987 through the same   selection   process   and   though   Rajendra   Prasad Dwivedi had obtained the degree in 1993 and Sajid Hasan 18 and Sunil Dutt Sharma had obtained the same in 1994 whereas   the   appellant   had   obtained   the   said   degree   in 1987.  28. It could thus be seen that, in view of the office memorandum dated 11.03.1994, the appellant was entitled to be promoted immediately after the issuance of the said office memorandum as he possessed the requisite degree when the said office memorandum was issued. In any case the appellant is entitled to be promoted with effect from 18.01.1995 i.e. the date on which the juniors to him were promoted.  29. As already discussed, the non­concurrence with the U.P. Public Service Commission, at the most would make the appointment of the appellant irregular and not illegal. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court erred in dismissing the petition of the appellant. The appeal deserves to succeed on more than one ground. 30. Hence, the following order:  (i) The appeal is allowed; 19 (ii) The Judgment and Order passed by the High Court   dated   11.09.2017   is   quashed   and   set aside; (iii) The   Order   passed   by   the   Respondent   No.   1, dated 16.04.2015 is quashed and set aside.  (iv) It   is   held   and   declared   that   the   petitioner   is entitled to promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer   (Civil)   from   the   date   on   which   his junior possessing the Bachelor of Engineering / A.M.I.E.   has   been   promoted   with   all consequential benefit. (v) In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. …....................CJI.                              [S.A. BOBDE] ......................J.                                                   [B.R. GAVAI] ......................J.                                                   [SURYA KANT] NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 13, 2019.