Full Judgment Text
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(CRL) 1205/2012
th
Date of Decision: 8 October, 2013
ISHTIYAK ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Joginder Tuli and Mr.
A.K. Sharma, Advocates.
versus
STATE(NCT OF DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Dayan Krishnan, ASC for
the State with ASI Om
Prakash, PS Hauz Khas.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SUNITA GUPTA
J U D G M E N T
: SUNITA GUPTA, J.
1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
r/w Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner seeks issuance of writ of
certiorari for quashing the impugned order of learned Additional
th
Sessions Judge dated 10 July, 2012, vide which the charge under
Section 3 of Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 1 of 22
(hereinafter referred as MCOCA) was framed against the petitioner in
FIR No. 269/2011, PS Hauz Khas.
2. The brief facts as they emerge from the record are that the
petitioner Mohd. Ishtiyaq was apprehended during vehicle checking
in the area of PS Hauz Khas, New Delhi in a car baring No. DL 6C Q
3398. During scrutiny of Registration Certificate, it was found that
the genuine number of vehicle was DL 3C Q 3398. A number of
stolen music systems, speakers, amplifiers, laptops and other
electronic items were found loaded in the vehicle. Accordingly, a
case was registered against the petitioner herein vide FIR No.
151/2009 u/s 411/482/34 IPC at PS Hauz Khas, New Delhi.
Investigation revealed that the petitioner has amassed a huge amount
of wealth by way of unlawful activities. He was found involved in 26
cases of theft from 2006 to 2010. In many cases his accomplices,
namely, Pradeep @ Bittu, S/o Madan Lal, R/o 51/A, Kewal Park,
Azadpur, Delhi, Sakil @ Satish, S/o Shokeen Ahmed, R/o A1/84,
Nehru Vihar, Karawal Nagar, Bhajanpura, Delhi and Satish Chand,
S/o Alkesh Ram, R/o B-1170, Sonia Vihar, New Delhi were also
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 2 of 22
found to be involved. The modus operandi of the petitioner herein
was to study the topography of a particular area and the other
surrounding circumstances and after meticulous planning, he
committed the crimes in an organised manner. The petitioner along
with his syndicate was successful in creating fear psychosis and terror
in the minds of people in the areas where they were active and gained
huge pecuniary benefit. To curb his criminal activity, a proposal was
prepared and approval to apply Section 3 MCOCA was obtained.
Accordingly, a case vide FIR No. 269/11 u/s 3 MCOCA was
registered. During investigation, the petitioner was arrested. He was
interrogated at length. As per his disclosure, investigation was
conducted at his house as well as at his native place and he was found
accumulating huge wealth. The confessional statement of the
petitioner herein was also recorded by Sh. A.K. Ojha, DCP, South
West District, Delhi under Section 18 MCOCA. During investigation
vehicle No. DL-4C AG 2734 was found registered in the name of
Mohd. Ishtiyaq. The complete files of the vehicle was obtained which
revealed that the petitioner used one LIC policy No.172756096 issued
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 3 of 22
at the address of one Wakil Ahmed as address proof with an affidavit
in this regard in the transport authority to get the car registered in his
name. On verification, the said LIC policy was found in the name of
Sunil Kumar (LA) S/o Jag Mohinder (P) B-1201, Jahangir Puri, New
Delhi-33. The notary Bhoop Singh was interrogated and it became
clear that the accused got the car transferred in his name on the basis
of forged/fake LIC documents. Hence Section 420/468/471 IPC was
also added. He was convicted in FIR No. 190/2010, PS DLF Phase I,
Gurgaon Haryana.
3. It was alleged that the petitioner along with the members of his
organized crime syndicate have been actively involved in criminal
activities both jointly and singly and, as such, proceedings of
MCOCA are made out against him.
th
4. Vide impugned order dated 10 July, 2012, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that prima facie case under
Section 3 of MCOCA Act and Section 420/468/471 IPC is made out
against the accused. As such, charge was framed against him.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 4 of 22
Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the present petition has been
filed.
5. I have heard Sh. Joginder Tuli, Advocate for the petitioner and
Sh. Dayan Krishnan, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the
State and have perused the record.
6. Before considering the submissions of the appellant and the
counter submissions made on behalf of the respondent/State, it is
deemed expedient to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the MCOCA, which have a direct bearing on the matter in issue and
read as under:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons.- Organized crime
has for quite some years now come up as a very serious
threat to our society. It knows no national boundaries and
is fueled by illegal wealth generated by contract killings,
extortion, smuggling in contrabands, illegal trade in
narcotics, kidnapping for ransom, collection of protection
money and money laundering, etc. The illegal wealth and
black money generated by the organized crime is very
huge and has serious adverse effect on our economy. It is
seen that the organized criminal syndicates make a
common cause with terrorist gangs and foster narco
terrorism which extend beyond the national boundaries.
There is reason to believe that organized criminal gangs
are operating in the State and thus, there is immediate
need to curb their activities.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 5 of 22
It is also noticed that the organized criminals make
extensive use of wire and oral communications in their
criminal activities. The interception of such
communications to obtain evidence of the commission of
crimes or to prevent their commission is an indispensable
aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.
2. The existing legal frame work i.e. the penal and
procedural laws and the adjudicatory system are found to
be rather inadequate to curb or control the menace of
organized crime. Government has, therefore, decided to
enact a special law with stringent and deterrent
provisions including in certain circumstances power to
intercept wire, electronic or oral communication to
control the menace of the organized crime.
3. .....”
7. Section 2 (d), (e) and (f) of the Act define the terms "continuing
unlawful activity", "organized crime" and "organized crime
syndicate" as under:
2. Definitions. - (1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
(a) .....
(b) .....
(c) .....
(d) "continuing unlawful activity" means an activity
prohibited by law for the time being in force, which is a
cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 6 of 22
three years or more, undertaken either singly or jointly,
as member of an organized crime syndicate or on behalf
of such syndicate in respect of which more than one
charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court
within the preceding period of ten years and that Court
has taken cognizance of such offence;
(e) "organized crime" means any continuing unlawful
activity by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a
member of an organized crime syndicate or on behalf of
such syndicate, by use of violence or threat of violence
or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means,
with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or
gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself
or any other person or promoting insurgency;
(f) "organized crime syndicate" means a group of two or
more persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as
a syndicate or gang indulge in activities of organized
crime;”
8. Section 3 of the MCOCA which deals with punishment for
organized crime reads as follows:
“3. Punishment for organized crime.-(1) Whoever
commits an offence of organized crime shall,-
(i) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person,
be punishable with death or imprisonment for life and
shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of
rupees one lac;
(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than five years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 7 of 22
be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees
five lacs.
(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or
advocates, abets or knowingly facilitates the commission
of an organized crime or any act preparatory to organized
crime, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall be not less than five years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to
a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(3) Whoever harbours or conceals or attempts to harbour
or conceal, any member of an organized crime syndicate
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine,
subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(4) Any person who is a member of an organized crime
syndicate shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which
may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be
liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five
lacs.
(5) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from
commission of an organized crime or which has been
acquired through the organized crime syndicate funds
shall be punishable with a term which shall not be less
than three years but which may extend to imprisonment
for life and shall also be liable to fine, subject to a
minimum fine of rupees two lacs.”
9. Shri Joginder Tuli, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner has
mounted an assault on the order framing charge principally on the
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 8 of 22
ground that the alleged offences were of theft only which were not
intended by the legislature to be covered within the ambit of the
MCOCA, 1999 as extended to Delhi. According to him the
ingredients of Section 3 of MCOCA are not made out, inasmuch as,
the petitioner is not a member of any “Organized crime syndicate”
within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Act nor has indulged in any
“continuing unlawful activity” as envisaged by Section 2(d) of the
Act.
10. It was further urged that it is the case of the prosecution that the
accused is involved in an apparently sof t crime and, as such, the
alleged offences did not involve the use of violence or threat of
violence or intimidation or coercion. The petitioner did not obtain
any pecuniary gain from the offences allegedly committed by him.
His father is the owner of a property at Meerut, UP worth more than
one crore and has sold the same and given it to the petitioner as per
record of the year 1987-89. As such, there was no pecuniary gain out
of the crime committed by him. Moreover all the stolen properties
have been recovered by the police.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 9 of 22
11. Learned Special Judge failed to appreciate that alleged
confessional statement of accused under Section 18(c) of the Act was
not voluntary. He was made to sign a blank paper. Moreover it was
not recorded by the competent authority himself but by the
stenographer, as such, the impugned order framing charge under
Section 3 of MCOCA is liable to be set aside.
12. Countering the submissions made by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, it was urged by Sh. Dayan Krishnan, learned standing
counsel for the respondent that the petitioner has amassed a huge
amount of wealth by way of unlawful activities. He was found
involved in 26 cases of theft from 2006 to 2010 as detailed in para 8
of the status report. In many cases, his accomplices were also
involved as detailed in further para 8 of the Status report. Same
reflects that the petitioner along with the members of his organized
crime syndicate have been involved in criminal activities both jointly
and singly. As such, provisions of MCOCA are clearly made out.
Confessional statement was recorded by Sh. A.K. Ojha, DCP, South
West under Section 18 of the Act which is admissible in evidence.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 10 of 22
Moreover, on a prima facie view of the matter, the charge has been
framed. The trial is still going on. Moreover, exercise of the power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, r/w Section 482
Cr.P.C. are to be exercised in exceptional circumstances and
circumstances of the present case do not warrant invocation of this
power, as such the petition is liable to be dismissed.
13. By virtue of the present petition, the petitioner is seeking
setting aside of the impugned order vide which charge under Section
3 of MCOCA has been framed meaning thereby that impliedly he is
seeking his discharge for this offence under Section 227 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
14. The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by the
Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh , (1977)
4 SCC 39 wherein it was observed as follows:
“4....Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter
remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place
of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at
the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads
the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that
the accused has committed an offence then it is not open
to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 11 of 22
guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial
stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of
criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed
to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only
for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the
Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence
which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the
guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is
challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the
defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient
ground for proceeding with the trial....”
This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion
may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it
may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Trial Judge in
order to frame a charge against the accused.
15. In a subsequent decision i.e. in Union of India v. Prafulla
Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, Supreme Court after adverting to the
conditions enumerated in Section 227 of the Code and other decisions,
enunciated the following principles:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 12 of 22
properly explained the Court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By
and large however if two views are equally possible and
the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before
him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave
suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his
right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227
of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post
Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the evidence and the documents produced
before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the
case and so on. This however does not mean that the
Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.”
16. The scope and ambit of Section 227 was again considered in
Niranjan Singh K.S. Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4
SCC 76 in para 6, where it was held that:
“6....Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of
the case and in the documents placed before him as he
would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution after the charge is framed? It is obvious
that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not
there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 13 of 22
enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the
facts emerging from the record and documents constitute
the offence with which the accused is charged. At that
stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose
but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view
to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is
called upon to consider is whether there is sufficient
ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose
he must weigh the material on record as well as the
documents relied on by the prosecution. In the State of
Bihar v. Ramesh Singh this Court observed that at the
initial stage of the framing of a charge if there is a strong
suspicion-evidence which leads the court to think that
there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence then it is not open to the court to
say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor
proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even
if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-
examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,
cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then
there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the
trial. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal this
Court after considering the scope of Section 227
observed that the words `no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the
Judge is not merely a post office to frame charge at the
behest of the prosecution but he has to exercise his
judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine
that a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution.
In assessing this fact it is not necessary for the court to
enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities but
he may evaluate the material to find out if the facts
emerging there from taken at their face value establish
the ingredients constituting the said offence.”
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 14 of 22
17. In a recent decision, in the case of Soma Chakravarty v. State
through CBI, (2007) 5 SCC 403 it was held as under:
“10. The settled legal position is that if on the basis of
material on record the Court could form an opinion that
the accused might have committed offence it can frame
the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused has committed the offence. At the time of
framing of the charges the probative value of the material
on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought
on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true.
Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial
mind on the material placed on record and must be
satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused
was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed
the offence, can only be decided in the trial.
19. Charge may although be directed to be framed
when there exists a strong suspicion but it is also trite
that the Court must come to a prima facie finding that
there exist some materials therefor. Suspicion cannot
alone, without anything more, form the basis therefor or
held to be sufficient for framing charge.”
18. In P Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Anr. , (2010) 2 SCC 398 it
was held that:-
“10. At the stage of Section 227 , the Judge has merely
to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would
take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 15 of 22
by the police or the documents produced before the
Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame a
charge against him.”
19. The aforesaid principles enunciated above are to be applied to
the present case in order to find out whether or not the Court below
was justified in framing charge under Section 3 of the MCOCA.
20. The basic submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that
as per the prosecution case also he was involved in theft cases only,
therefore, it cannot be said to be constituting any threat to the peace
and tranquillity in the locality. The alleged activities of the petitioner
is not causing any undue disturbance to the public at large.
21. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner is facing
trial or stands convicted in respect of more than 26 cases. This clearly
establishes that he has proclivity of committing offences. Therefore,
even though it may be accepted that some of the offences which are
registered against him are the offences of theft or burglary,
nevertheless, he is equally involved in serious offences bearing FIR
No. 191/2010 under Section 186/353/307 IPC and 25/27 Arms Act
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 16 of 22
and the present FIR where Sections 420/468/471 were added.
Therefore, it can be safely said that the petitioner is not confining his
period of operation to one particular definite kind of offence. He
seems to be doing all illegal things and merely because some of the
activities by him cannot apparently be disturbing the peace and
tranquillity of the locality but nevertheless the same are illegal and
have a tendency of creating a bang in the area where frequent
burglaries and theft etc. are taking place. The investigation further
revealed that there were pecuniary gains by continuously being
involved in such type of offences and it is alleged that properties and
vehicles were purchased, otherwise the petitioner and his associates
have no legal source of income. Statement of the petitioner was
recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA wherein he disclosed that he
belonged to a poor family and came in contact with bad elements of
the society and started committing petty offences of theft. Later on,
they started committing theft of stereo and other articles from car. He
formed a gang with his brother Ashfaq and Anwar, who resided with
him. Ashfaq and Anwar were having a Hyundai Accent and a Honda
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 17 of 22
City respectively, which were purchased by them from the money
obtained by selling stolen stereos, laptop etc. He also involved his
associates for selling these stolen articles. When his business of
stereo theft grew, he started selling stolen articles at Delhi, Meerut,
Pilibhit and other places of UP. He also purchased a piece of land
measuring 100 sq. mtr. in Vishnu Enclave, Govind Puram, Ghaziabad,
UP for a sum of Rs.13 lacs accumulated from the money through
various crimes. He also got a double storey building constructed on it
and spent Rs.21 lacs on its construction. His associates Ishrar and
Ishfaq were found to be history sheeter of PS- Khakheda and were
found to be involved in more than 20 criminal cases of theft,
Gangster Act, Gunda Act, Kidnapping and Rape etc. Ishtiaq was
found in possession of a plot of 300 sq.yds., a house of 2.5 storey was
found built in 100 sq yards at Ghaziabad, UP, the cost of which was
assessed to be Rs.45-50 lacs. He also disclosed that the electronic
shop in the name of his brother was opened from the funds made
through theses crimes. He had LIC policies. It was also revealed that
he got his car No. DL-4C-AG 2734 transferred in his name on the
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 18 of 22
strength of forged and fake LIC documents. He had forged LIC
policy.
22. The plea of learned counsel for the petitioner that the
confessional statement was not voluntary in nature and he was merely
made to sign the same and that it was not recorded by the concerned
DCP himself but by the stenographer, it is trite law that the same
cannot be entertained at the stage of framing of charge and must be
decided during the trial when the witnesses are examined.
23. As regards the submission that the properties were purchased
even prior to registration of FIR against him or that his father owned a
property worth more than one crore etc., at best can be the defence of
the petitioner which are required to be proved at the time of his
defence evidence but at the time of framing of charge, the material
available on record was only required to be scrutinized which made
out a case under Section 3 MCOCA Act and Section 420/468/471
IPC. As such, no infirmity can be found in the impugned order which
warrants interference.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 19 of 22
24. There is another aspect of the matter. The petition has been
filed under Section 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has
been discussed at length in various pronouncements. In the State of
Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335, the
Supreme Court defined the categories of cases wherein the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be
exercised by the High Court by illustrating as under :
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 20 of 22
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
25. In State of Bihar Vs. Rajendra Agrawalla , (1996) 8 SCC 164, the
Supreme Court has shed light on the power of this Court under Section 482
Cr. P.C and held as under:
“It has been held by this Court in several cases that
the inherent power of the court under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be very
sparingly and cautiously used only when the court
comes to the conclusion that there would be
manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the
process of the court, if such power is not exercised.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 21 of 22
26. So far as the order on framing of charge by learned Additional
Sessions Judge is concerned, inherent power can be exercised only if
the allegations in the First Information Report together with other
material collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not
constitute the offence alleged.
27. Having regard to the object of MCOCA and the material on
record as discussed above, I have no hesitation in recording that prima
facie , the material available on record made out a case for framing of
the charge and the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality
which calls for interference.
28. In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition being
without any merit, is dismissed. It is, however, clarified that nothing
stated in this order will tantamount to an expression of opinion on
merits of the case and it will be open to the learned Additional
Sessions Judge to decide the case on merits in view of the evidence
which will come on record.
SUNITA GUPTA
(JUDGE)
OCTOBER 08, 2013/ rs
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 22 of 22
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(CRL) 1205/2012
th
Date of Decision: 8 October, 2013
ISHTIYAK ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Joginder Tuli and Mr.
A.K. Sharma, Advocates.
versus
STATE(NCT OF DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Dayan Krishnan, ASC for
the State with ASI Om
Prakash, PS Hauz Khas.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SUNITA GUPTA
J U D G M E N T
: SUNITA GUPTA, J.
1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
r/w Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner seeks issuance of writ of
certiorari for quashing the impugned order of learned Additional
th
Sessions Judge dated 10 July, 2012, vide which the charge under
Section 3 of Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 1 of 22
(hereinafter referred as MCOCA) was framed against the petitioner in
FIR No. 269/2011, PS Hauz Khas.
2. The brief facts as they emerge from the record are that the
petitioner Mohd. Ishtiyaq was apprehended during vehicle checking
in the area of PS Hauz Khas, New Delhi in a car baring No. DL 6C Q
3398. During scrutiny of Registration Certificate, it was found that
the genuine number of vehicle was DL 3C Q 3398. A number of
stolen music systems, speakers, amplifiers, laptops and other
electronic items were found loaded in the vehicle. Accordingly, a
case was registered against the petitioner herein vide FIR No.
151/2009 u/s 411/482/34 IPC at PS Hauz Khas, New Delhi.
Investigation revealed that the petitioner has amassed a huge amount
of wealth by way of unlawful activities. He was found involved in 26
cases of theft from 2006 to 2010. In many cases his accomplices,
namely, Pradeep @ Bittu, S/o Madan Lal, R/o 51/A, Kewal Park,
Azadpur, Delhi, Sakil @ Satish, S/o Shokeen Ahmed, R/o A1/84,
Nehru Vihar, Karawal Nagar, Bhajanpura, Delhi and Satish Chand,
S/o Alkesh Ram, R/o B-1170, Sonia Vihar, New Delhi were also
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 2 of 22
found to be involved. The modus operandi of the petitioner herein
was to study the topography of a particular area and the other
surrounding circumstances and after meticulous planning, he
committed the crimes in an organised manner. The petitioner along
with his syndicate was successful in creating fear psychosis and terror
in the minds of people in the areas where they were active and gained
huge pecuniary benefit. To curb his criminal activity, a proposal was
prepared and approval to apply Section 3 MCOCA was obtained.
Accordingly, a case vide FIR No. 269/11 u/s 3 MCOCA was
registered. During investigation, the petitioner was arrested. He was
interrogated at length. As per his disclosure, investigation was
conducted at his house as well as at his native place and he was found
accumulating huge wealth. The confessional statement of the
petitioner herein was also recorded by Sh. A.K. Ojha, DCP, South
West District, Delhi under Section 18 MCOCA. During investigation
vehicle No. DL-4C AG 2734 was found registered in the name of
Mohd. Ishtiyaq. The complete files of the vehicle was obtained which
revealed that the petitioner used one LIC policy No.172756096 issued
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 3 of 22
at the address of one Wakil Ahmed as address proof with an affidavit
in this regard in the transport authority to get the car registered in his
name. On verification, the said LIC policy was found in the name of
Sunil Kumar (LA) S/o Jag Mohinder (P) B-1201, Jahangir Puri, New
Delhi-33. The notary Bhoop Singh was interrogated and it became
clear that the accused got the car transferred in his name on the basis
of forged/fake LIC documents. Hence Section 420/468/471 IPC was
also added. He was convicted in FIR No. 190/2010, PS DLF Phase I,
Gurgaon Haryana.
3. It was alleged that the petitioner along with the members of his
organized crime syndicate have been actively involved in criminal
activities both jointly and singly and, as such, proceedings of
MCOCA are made out against him.
th
4. Vide impugned order dated 10 July, 2012, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that prima facie case under
Section 3 of MCOCA Act and Section 420/468/471 IPC is made out
against the accused. As such, charge was framed against him.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 4 of 22
Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the present petition has been
filed.
5. I have heard Sh. Joginder Tuli, Advocate for the petitioner and
Sh. Dayan Krishnan, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the
State and have perused the record.
6. Before considering the submissions of the appellant and the
counter submissions made on behalf of the respondent/State, it is
deemed expedient to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the MCOCA, which have a direct bearing on the matter in issue and
read as under:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons.- Organized crime
has for quite some years now come up as a very serious
threat to our society. It knows no national boundaries and
is fueled by illegal wealth generated by contract killings,
extortion, smuggling in contrabands, illegal trade in
narcotics, kidnapping for ransom, collection of protection
money and money laundering, etc. The illegal wealth and
black money generated by the organized crime is very
huge and has serious adverse effect on our economy. It is
seen that the organized criminal syndicates make a
common cause with terrorist gangs and foster narco
terrorism which extend beyond the national boundaries.
There is reason to believe that organized criminal gangs
are operating in the State and thus, there is immediate
need to curb their activities.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 5 of 22
It is also noticed that the organized criminals make
extensive use of wire and oral communications in their
criminal activities. The interception of such
communications to obtain evidence of the commission of
crimes or to prevent their commission is an indispensable
aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.
2. The existing legal frame work i.e. the penal and
procedural laws and the adjudicatory system are found to
be rather inadequate to curb or control the menace of
organized crime. Government has, therefore, decided to
enact a special law with stringent and deterrent
provisions including in certain circumstances power to
intercept wire, electronic or oral communication to
control the menace of the organized crime.
3. .....”
7. Section 2 (d), (e) and (f) of the Act define the terms "continuing
unlawful activity", "organized crime" and "organized crime
syndicate" as under:
2. Definitions. - (1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
(a) .....
(b) .....
(c) .....
(d) "continuing unlawful activity" means an activity
prohibited by law for the time being in force, which is a
cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 6 of 22
three years or more, undertaken either singly or jointly,
as member of an organized crime syndicate or on behalf
of such syndicate in respect of which more than one
charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court
within the preceding period of ten years and that Court
has taken cognizance of such offence;
(e) "organized crime" means any continuing unlawful
activity by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a
member of an organized crime syndicate or on behalf of
such syndicate, by use of violence or threat of violence
or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means,
with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or
gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself
or any other person or promoting insurgency;
(f) "organized crime syndicate" means a group of two or
more persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as
a syndicate or gang indulge in activities of organized
crime;”
8. Section 3 of the MCOCA which deals with punishment for
organized crime reads as follows:
“3. Punishment for organized crime.-(1) Whoever
commits an offence of organized crime shall,-
(i) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person,
be punishable with death or imprisonment for life and
shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of
rupees one lac;
(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than five years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 7 of 22
be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees
five lacs.
(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or
advocates, abets or knowingly facilitates the commission
of an organized crime or any act preparatory to organized
crime, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall be not less than five years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to
a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(3) Whoever harbours or conceals or attempts to harbour
or conceal, any member of an organized crime syndicate
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine,
subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(4) Any person who is a member of an organized crime
syndicate shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which
may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be
liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five
lacs.
(5) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from
commission of an organized crime or which has been
acquired through the organized crime syndicate funds
shall be punishable with a term which shall not be less
than three years but which may extend to imprisonment
for life and shall also be liable to fine, subject to a
minimum fine of rupees two lacs.”
9. Shri Joginder Tuli, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner has
mounted an assault on the order framing charge principally on the
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 8 of 22
ground that the alleged offences were of theft only which were not
intended by the legislature to be covered within the ambit of the
MCOCA, 1999 as extended to Delhi. According to him the
ingredients of Section 3 of MCOCA are not made out, inasmuch as,
the petitioner is not a member of any “Organized crime syndicate”
within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Act nor has indulged in any
“continuing unlawful activity” as envisaged by Section 2(d) of the
Act.
10. It was further urged that it is the case of the prosecution that the
accused is involved in an apparently sof t crime and, as such, the
alleged offences did not involve the use of violence or threat of
violence or intimidation or coercion. The petitioner did not obtain
any pecuniary gain from the offences allegedly committed by him.
His father is the owner of a property at Meerut, UP worth more than
one crore and has sold the same and given it to the petitioner as per
record of the year 1987-89. As such, there was no pecuniary gain out
of the crime committed by him. Moreover all the stolen properties
have been recovered by the police.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 9 of 22
11. Learned Special Judge failed to appreciate that alleged
confessional statement of accused under Section 18(c) of the Act was
not voluntary. He was made to sign a blank paper. Moreover it was
not recorded by the competent authority himself but by the
stenographer, as such, the impugned order framing charge under
Section 3 of MCOCA is liable to be set aside.
12. Countering the submissions made by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, it was urged by Sh. Dayan Krishnan, learned standing
counsel for the respondent that the petitioner has amassed a huge
amount of wealth by way of unlawful activities. He was found
involved in 26 cases of theft from 2006 to 2010 as detailed in para 8
of the status report. In many cases, his accomplices were also
involved as detailed in further para 8 of the Status report. Same
reflects that the petitioner along with the members of his organized
crime syndicate have been involved in criminal activities both jointly
and singly. As such, provisions of MCOCA are clearly made out.
Confessional statement was recorded by Sh. A.K. Ojha, DCP, South
West under Section 18 of the Act which is admissible in evidence.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 10 of 22
Moreover, on a prima facie view of the matter, the charge has been
framed. The trial is still going on. Moreover, exercise of the power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, r/w Section 482
Cr.P.C. are to be exercised in exceptional circumstances and
circumstances of the present case do not warrant invocation of this
power, as such the petition is liable to be dismissed.
13. By virtue of the present petition, the petitioner is seeking
setting aside of the impugned order vide which charge under Section
3 of MCOCA has been framed meaning thereby that impliedly he is
seeking his discharge for this offence under Section 227 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
14. The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by the
Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh , (1977)
4 SCC 39 wherein it was observed as follows:
“4....Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter
remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place
of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at
the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads
the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that
the accused has committed an offence then it is not open
to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 11 of 22
guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial
stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of
criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed
to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only
for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the
Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence
which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the
guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is
challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the
defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient
ground for proceeding with the trial....”
This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion
may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it
may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Trial Judge in
order to frame a charge against the accused.
15. In a subsequent decision i.e. in Union of India v. Prafulla
Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, Supreme Court after adverting to the
conditions enumerated in Section 227 of the Code and other decisions,
enunciated the following principles:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 12 of 22
properly explained the Court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By
and large however if two views are equally possible and
the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before
him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave
suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his
right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227
of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post
Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the evidence and the documents produced
before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the
case and so on. This however does not mean that the
Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.”
16. The scope and ambit of Section 227 was again considered in
Niranjan Singh K.S. Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4
SCC 76 in para 6, where it was held that:
“6....Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of
the case and in the documents placed before him as he
would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution after the charge is framed? It is obvious
that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not
there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 13 of 22
enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the
facts emerging from the record and documents constitute
the offence with which the accused is charged. At that
stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose
but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view
to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is
called upon to consider is whether there is sufficient
ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose
he must weigh the material on record as well as the
documents relied on by the prosecution. In the State of
Bihar v. Ramesh Singh this Court observed that at the
initial stage of the framing of a charge if there is a strong
suspicion-evidence which leads the court to think that
there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence then it is not open to the court to
say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor
proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even
if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-
examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,
cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then
there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the
trial. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal this
Court after considering the scope of Section 227
observed that the words `no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the
Judge is not merely a post office to frame charge at the
behest of the prosecution but he has to exercise his
judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine
that a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution.
In assessing this fact it is not necessary for the court to
enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities but
he may evaluate the material to find out if the facts
emerging there from taken at their face value establish
the ingredients constituting the said offence.”
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 14 of 22
17. In a recent decision, in the case of Soma Chakravarty v. State
through CBI, (2007) 5 SCC 403 it was held as under:
“10. The settled legal position is that if on the basis of
material on record the Court could form an opinion that
the accused might have committed offence it can frame
the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused has committed the offence. At the time of
framing of the charges the probative value of the material
on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought
on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true.
Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial
mind on the material placed on record and must be
satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused
was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed
the offence, can only be decided in the trial.
19. Charge may although be directed to be framed
when there exists a strong suspicion but it is also trite
that the Court must come to a prima facie finding that
there exist some materials therefor. Suspicion cannot
alone, without anything more, form the basis therefor or
held to be sufficient for framing charge.”
18. In P Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Anr. , (2010) 2 SCC 398 it
was held that:-
“10. At the stage of Section 227 , the Judge has merely
to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would
take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 15 of 22
by the police or the documents produced before the
Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame a
charge against him.”
19. The aforesaid principles enunciated above are to be applied to
the present case in order to find out whether or not the Court below
was justified in framing charge under Section 3 of the MCOCA.
20. The basic submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that
as per the prosecution case also he was involved in theft cases only,
therefore, it cannot be said to be constituting any threat to the peace
and tranquillity in the locality. The alleged activities of the petitioner
is not causing any undue disturbance to the public at large.
21. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner is facing
trial or stands convicted in respect of more than 26 cases. This clearly
establishes that he has proclivity of committing offences. Therefore,
even though it may be accepted that some of the offences which are
registered against him are the offences of theft or burglary,
nevertheless, he is equally involved in serious offences bearing FIR
No. 191/2010 under Section 186/353/307 IPC and 25/27 Arms Act
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 16 of 22
and the present FIR where Sections 420/468/471 were added.
Therefore, it can be safely said that the petitioner is not confining his
period of operation to one particular definite kind of offence. He
seems to be doing all illegal things and merely because some of the
activities by him cannot apparently be disturbing the peace and
tranquillity of the locality but nevertheless the same are illegal and
have a tendency of creating a bang in the area where frequent
burglaries and theft etc. are taking place. The investigation further
revealed that there were pecuniary gains by continuously being
involved in such type of offences and it is alleged that properties and
vehicles were purchased, otherwise the petitioner and his associates
have no legal source of income. Statement of the petitioner was
recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA wherein he disclosed that he
belonged to a poor family and came in contact with bad elements of
the society and started committing petty offences of theft. Later on,
they started committing theft of stereo and other articles from car. He
formed a gang with his brother Ashfaq and Anwar, who resided with
him. Ashfaq and Anwar were having a Hyundai Accent and a Honda
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 17 of 22
City respectively, which were purchased by them from the money
obtained by selling stolen stereos, laptop etc. He also involved his
associates for selling these stolen articles. When his business of
stereo theft grew, he started selling stolen articles at Delhi, Meerut,
Pilibhit and other places of UP. He also purchased a piece of land
measuring 100 sq. mtr. in Vishnu Enclave, Govind Puram, Ghaziabad,
UP for a sum of Rs.13 lacs accumulated from the money through
various crimes. He also got a double storey building constructed on it
and spent Rs.21 lacs on its construction. His associates Ishrar and
Ishfaq were found to be history sheeter of PS- Khakheda and were
found to be involved in more than 20 criminal cases of theft,
Gangster Act, Gunda Act, Kidnapping and Rape etc. Ishtiaq was
found in possession of a plot of 300 sq.yds., a house of 2.5 storey was
found built in 100 sq yards at Ghaziabad, UP, the cost of which was
assessed to be Rs.45-50 lacs. He also disclosed that the electronic
shop in the name of his brother was opened from the funds made
through theses crimes. He had LIC policies. It was also revealed that
he got his car No. DL-4C-AG 2734 transferred in his name on the
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 18 of 22
strength of forged and fake LIC documents. He had forged LIC
policy.
22. The plea of learned counsel for the petitioner that the
confessional statement was not voluntary in nature and he was merely
made to sign the same and that it was not recorded by the concerned
DCP himself but by the stenographer, it is trite law that the same
cannot be entertained at the stage of framing of charge and must be
decided during the trial when the witnesses are examined.
23. As regards the submission that the properties were purchased
even prior to registration of FIR against him or that his father owned a
property worth more than one crore etc., at best can be the defence of
the petitioner which are required to be proved at the time of his
defence evidence but at the time of framing of charge, the material
available on record was only required to be scrutinized which made
out a case under Section 3 MCOCA Act and Section 420/468/471
IPC. As such, no infirmity can be found in the impugned order which
warrants interference.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 19 of 22
24. There is another aspect of the matter. The petition has been
filed under Section 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has
been discussed at length in various pronouncements. In the State of
Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335, the
Supreme Court defined the categories of cases wherein the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be
exercised by the High Court by illustrating as under :
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 20 of 22
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
25. In State of Bihar Vs. Rajendra Agrawalla , (1996) 8 SCC 164, the
Supreme Court has shed light on the power of this Court under Section 482
Cr. P.C and held as under:
“It has been held by this Court in several cases that
the inherent power of the court under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be very
sparingly and cautiously used only when the court
comes to the conclusion that there would be
manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the
process of the court, if such power is not exercised.
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 21 of 22
26. So far as the order on framing of charge by learned Additional
Sessions Judge is concerned, inherent power can be exercised only if
the allegations in the First Information Report together with other
material collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not
constitute the offence alleged.
27. Having regard to the object of MCOCA and the material on
record as discussed above, I have no hesitation in recording that prima
facie , the material available on record made out a case for framing of
the charge and the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality
which calls for interference.
28. In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition being
without any merit, is dismissed. It is, however, clarified that nothing
stated in this order will tantamount to an expression of opinion on
merits of the case and it will be open to the learned Additional
Sessions Judge to decide the case on merits in view of the evidence
which will come on record.
SUNITA GUPTA
(JUDGE)
OCTOBER 08, 2013/ rs
W.P(Crl.)1205/2012 Page 22 of 22