Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 12
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. of 2026
(@ S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 15478 of 2025)
Arvind Dham … Appellant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement … Respondent
JUDGMENT
ALOK ARADHE, J.
1. Leave granted
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 19.08.2025, passed by learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Delhi, by which the application preferred by
the appellant under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) read with Section 45 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘PMLA’) seeking
grant of regular bail, came to be rejected.
3. The appellant is a former promoter and non-executive
Signature Not Verified
Chairman of Amtek Auto Ltd. (AAL), and is also non-
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2026.01.06
15:01:47 IST
Reason:
executive Director of M/s. ACIL Ltd., a company registered
1
under the Companies Act. The group of companies including
subsidiaries and associate concerns is collectively referred
to as the “Amtek Group”. During the period 2017-2018,
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated
against entities belonging to Amtek Group.
4. FIRs were registered on 21.12.2022 at the instance of IDBI
Bank and Bank of Maharashtra alleging commission of
offences under Sections 120B, 420, 406, 468 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein the appellant was arrayed
as an accused along with twenty seven other individuals. In
the aforementioned FIRs there is an allegation of fraud to
the extent of INR 385.35 crores and INR 289 crores
respectively. On the basis of the said FIRs on 21.03.2023,
the Directorate of Enforcement registered two ECIRs alleging
laundering of proceeds of crime.
5. A Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,
being W.P. Criminal No(s). 246 of 2022 ( Jaskaran Singh
Chawla vs. Union of India and Ors. ) was filed before this
Court alleging failure of CBI and the Serious Fraud
Investigation Office (SFIO) to investigate frauds allegedly
2
committed by Amtek Group involving diversion and
siphoning of bank loans amounting to Rs.33,400 crores. A
two-Judge Bench of this Court, by an interim order dated
27.02.2024, directed the CBI and SFIO to conduct an
exhaustive investigation and to cooperate with and
complement the Enforcement Directorate in the collection of
evidence.
6. The gravamen of the allegation against the appellant is that
he is the ultimate beneficiary of the fraud which was a well-
orchestrated scheme, executed at his behest, involving
diversion and siphoning of public funds through layered
entities, resulting in substantial wrongful loss to Public
Sector Banks.
7. The appellant, in response to the summons issued to him
under Section 50 of the PMLA, appeared on 19.06.2024 and
his statement was recorded. The respondent carried out
search and seizure operations on 20.06.2024, at the
residence of the appellant and his statement was again
recorded. The appellant was arrested on 09.07.2024. A
prosecution complaint dated 06.09.2024 was filed against
16 accused persons i.e., six individuals and ten companies,
3
wherein, appellant was arrayed as an accused. Thereafter a
supplementary prosecution complaint was filed on
02.08.2025 against 40 accused persons i.e., 22 individuals
and 18 companies. Out of 28 individuals, only the appellant
has been arrested and is in custody. A total number of 208
prosecution witnesses have been cited. The cognizance of
prosecution complaint is yet to be taken.
8. On 16.12.2024, the appellant moved an application under
Section 45 of the PMLA for seeking bail before the Special
Judge. The Special Judge by an order dated 21.01.2025
dismissed the application on the ground that the appellant
is not covered by proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA.
Thereafter, on 04.02.2025, the appellant approached the
High Court by filing an application under Section 483 of the
BNNS and Section 45 of PMLA, along with an application for
interim bail. The appellant was granted interim bail on
medical grounds on 11.03.2025 till 01.04.2025. By the
impugned order dated 19.08.2025, the High Court rejected
application for regular bail.
9. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that
appellant is aged about 64 years and suffers from multiple
4
ailments. It is further submitted that appellant is in custody
for past about 16 months and 20 days and his long
incarceration, is violative of the Right to Liberty and speedy
trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. In support of the
aforesaid submission, reliance is placed on decisions of this
1
Court . It is pointed out that out of 28 individuals only the
appellant has been arrested and investigation qua the
appellant stands concluded. In this connection, reference
has been made to order dated 20.08.2025 passed by the
Special Court which records the submission of the ED. It is,
therefore, contended that the custody of the appellant is no
longer required. It is urged that no cognizance of the
prosecution complaint has been taken and the matter is at
the stage of scrutiny of documents.
10. It is submitted that there is no likelihood of trial
commencing in foreseeable future. It is pointed out that
delay in trial of approximately eight months is attributable
to the respondent, as it had filed Crl. MC No.7860 of 2024
1
Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660, Padam Chand Jain v. Enforcement
Directorate, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1291, Udhaw Singh v. Directorate Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 357, Prem Prakash v. Union of India, SLP (Crl.) No.691 of 2023 – Order dated 04.10.2024,
Dineshchand Surana v. Asst. Director, ED, SLP (Crl.) No.15274 of 2024 – Order dated 06.08.2025,
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, Kapil Wadhawan v. CBI, SLP (Crl.) No.16953 of 2025 –
Judgment/Order dated 11.12.2025.
5
before the High Court challenging the order dated
07.09.2024 issuing notice to the proposed accused person.
It is pointed out that in the said proceeding, the High Court
had granted an interim order of deferment of proceeding
before the Special Judge and after eight months,
respondent, on 23.05.2025, withdrew the said proceeding.
11. It is urged that the appellant has cooperated with the
investigation and the allegation with regard to influencing
the witness, Ms. Anuradha Kapur, is incredulous as the
appellant has been in custody since 09.07.2024 and
aforesaid Ms. Anuradha Kapur has been arrayed as a
witness in supplementary prosecution complaint dated
02.08.2025. Therefore, the question of instructing the said
witness not to join the investigation prior to issue of
summons to her does not arise. It is pointed out that all
close family members of the appellant have fully participated
in the investigation. It is contended that the appellant is in
custody since 09.07.2024 and has no knowledge of
dissipation of properties at Panipat and Alwar. It is
submitted that the appellant is not the Director of M/s.
Marichika Properties and, therefore, has no knowledge
6
about dissipation of properties mentioned in the chart at
page 125 of the counter affidavit.
12. It is submitted that the allegations in the predicate offence
allege a total bank fraud to the tune of INR 673.35 crores,
therefore, the figure of INR 38,000 crores is deliberately
exaggerated to project the instant case as India’s largest
bank fraud to justify the prolonged custody of the appellant.
It is urged that it is settled law that economic offences
cannot be classified as separate class on its own for
2
determination of grant of bail . It is also stated that the
appellant is neither a flight risk nor can he tamper with the
evidence. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to be enlarged
on bail.
13. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General
submitted that the gravity of the offence disentitles the
appellant from seeking any exemption from the mandatory
twin conditions of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA. It is
further submitted that the appellant is an influential person
and had instructed his cousin, Ms. Anuradha Kapur, who is
a dummy director in his group of companies, not to join the
2
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791.
7
investigation. It is also submitted that the appellant has
dissipated the proceeds of crime i.e., immovable properties
at Alwar and Panipat after attachment. It is contended that
mere incarceration for a long period cannot be a sole ground
for bail, ignoring the gravity of an offence especially when
there are allegations of tampering with evidence and
3
influencing witnesses . It is contended that delay in trial, if
any, is attributable to the appellant, which is evident from
the order sheet of the Trial Court. It is further contended
that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA has no
application to the facts of the case.
14. It is submitted that out of 210 witnesses to be examined
during the trial, 25 witnesses are common in both the
prosecution complaints. It is pointed out that out of 63,691
pages of relied upon documents, only few pages are relevant
to prove the loss. It is further pointed out that ED has filed
an application on 27.09.2025 for day-to-day hearing. It is
submitted that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
Alternatively, it is also pointed out that in many serious
cases, this Court has directed the parties to re-apply for bail
3
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 and B. Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007)
1 SCC 70 .
8
4
after sometime and the appellant, depending upon the
progress of the trial, be directed to renew the prayer for bail
after six months.
15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions and have carefully perused the record. The
court while dealing with the prayer for grant of bail has to
consider gravity of offence, which has to be ascertained in
the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the
circumstances to consider the gravity of offences is also the
term of sentence i.e., prescribed for the offence, the accused
5
is alleged to have committed . The court has also to take
into account the object of the special Act, the gravity of
offence and the attending circumstances along with period
of sentence. All economic offences cannot be classified into
one group as it may involve various activities and may differ
from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on
the part of the Court to categorize all the offences into one
6
group and deny bail on that basis . It is well settled that if
the State or any prosecuting agency including, the court,
4
Bimal Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl.) No. 7942/2021 .
5
P. Chidambaram (supra)
6
Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51
9
concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused, to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the
plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of
7
the nature of the crime . The aforesaid proposition was
quoted with approval by another two-Judge Bench of this
Court and it was held that long period of incarceration for
around 17 months and the trial not even having
commenced, the appellant in that case has been deprived of
8
his right to speedy trial .
9
16. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Senthil Balaji’s case
has held that under the statutes such as PMLA, where
maximum sentence is seven years, prolonged incarceration
pending trial may warrant grant of bail by Constitutional
Courts, if there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within
a reasonable time. Statutory restrictions cannot be
permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention in
violation of Article 21.
7
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2024) 9 SCC 813.
8
Manish Sisodia (supra)
9
V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director , Enforcement Directorate , 2024 SCC OnLine SC2626
10
17. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Chand Jain
(supra), reiterated that prolonged incarceration cannot be
allowed to convert pretrial detention into punishment and
that documentary evidence already seized by the
prosecution eliminates the possibility of tampering with the
same.
18. The right to speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without
commencement or reasonable progress of trial, cannot be
countenanced, as it has the effect of converting pretrial
detention into form of punishment. Economic offences, by
their very nature, may differ in degree and fact, and
therefore cannot be treated as homogeneous class
warranting a blanket denial of bail.
19. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled parameters with
regard to exercise of jurisdiction for grant of bail in
economic offences, we now advert to the facts of the case in
hand. The appellant has joined the investigation even prior
to his arrest i.e., 19.06.2024 and 02.07.2024 as well as on
09.07.2024. Thus, he has cooperated with the investigation.
11
Out of 28 individuals, only the appellant has been arrested.
The order dated 20.08.2025 of the Special Court records the
submission of ED that investigation qua the appellant has
concluded. The maximum sentence which can be imposed
on the appellant is seven years. The appellant is in custody
for past around 16 months and 20 days. It is pertinent to
note that various Benches of this Court, while taking into
account the period of incarceration which ranges from 3
months to 17 months in several cases have granted bail to
10
the appellants therein . In the instant case, no cognizance
has been taken on the prosecution complaint and the
proceeding is at the stage of scrutiny of documents. No
material has been placed on record to show the fate of the
application filed by the ED on 27.09.2025 seeking day-to-
day hearing even after period of approximately three months
has expired. There are 210 witnesses to be examined in the
proceeding. There is no likelihood of trial commencing in the
near future. The continued incarceration in such
10
P. Chidambaram (supra) (three months), Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 2269 (five months), Sanjay Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 1748 (ten months), Sanjay Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1748
(eleven months), Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2276
(thirteen months), Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl) No.3148 of 2025 (Order dated
15.04.2025), V. Senthil Balaji (supra) (fifteen months), Neeraj Singal v. Directorate of Enforcement,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3598 (sixteen months), Abdul Razak Peediyakkal v. UOI, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
2326 (seventeen months) and Manish Sisodia (supra) (seventeen months)
12
circumstances, particularly where the evidence which is
primarily documentary in nature, is already in custody of
the prosecution, violates the right of the appellant to speedy
trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. As regards the allegation that the appellant instructed Ms.
Anuradha Kapur not to join the investigation, the same does
not inspire confidence, particularly, in view of the fact that
appellant has been in custody prior to concerned witness
being formally arrayed as a witness. It is noteworthy that
the appellant is in custody since 09.07.2024 and Ms. Kapur
was arrayed as a witness only on 02.08.2025. The
allegation, therefore, is wholly incredulous.
21. The record reveals that the prosecution complaint was filed
on 06.09.2024. The Special Judge issued notice on
07.09.2024 to all proposed accused persons under the
proviso to Section 223 of BNSS. The respondent challenged
the said order before the High Court, resulting in eight
months stay of proceedings, before the Special Judge, which
was lifted on 23.05.2025 only upon withdrawal of the
petition. The delay in the trial is thus attributable only to
the respondent, not the appellant.
13
22. The appellant has been in custody since 09.07.2024. The
disposal of immovable properties occurred on 24.12.2024
and 17.02.2025 and pertains to M/s Marichika Properties,
with which no material link to the appellant has been
established. There is no evidence that the appellant was
signatory to any sale document. The allegation of dissipation
of proceeds of crime by him is, therefore, untenable at this
stage.
23. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and
order dated 19.08.2025 is quashed and set aside.
The appellant-Arvind Dham shall be released on bail during
the pendency of the trial arising out of prosecution
complaint-ECIR Case Nos. ECIR/GNZO/13/2024 and
ECIR/GNZO/14/2024, pending before the Special Judge
(PC Act) (CBI)-02(Duty Judge), Rouse Avenue District Court,
under provisions of the PMLA. The terms and conditions for
grant of bail shall be fixed by the Trial Court.
24. In addition, the appellant will provide one telephone/mobile
No. on which he can be contacted by the Officers of
Directorate of Enforcement to ascertain his whereabouts
while he is on bail. The appellant shall surrender his
14
passport to the Trial Court and will not leave India without
permission of the Trial Court.
25. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
……………………J.
[SANJAY KUMAR]
..………………….J.
[ALOK ARADHE]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 6, 2026.
15
2026 INSC 12
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. of 2026
(@ S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 15478 of 2025)
Arvind Dham … Appellant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement … Respondent
JUDGMENT
ALOK ARADHE, J.
1. Leave granted
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 19.08.2025, passed by learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Delhi, by which the application preferred by
the appellant under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) read with Section 45 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘PMLA’) seeking
grant of regular bail, came to be rejected.
3. The appellant is a former promoter and non-executive
Signature Not Verified
Chairman of Amtek Auto Ltd. (AAL), and is also non-
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2026.01.06
15:01:47 IST
Reason:
executive Director of M/s. ACIL Ltd., a company registered
1
under the Companies Act. The group of companies including
subsidiaries and associate concerns is collectively referred
to as the “Amtek Group”. During the period 2017-2018,
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated
against entities belonging to Amtek Group.
4. FIRs were registered on 21.12.2022 at the instance of IDBI
Bank and Bank of Maharashtra alleging commission of
offences under Sections 120B, 420, 406, 468 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein the appellant was arrayed
as an accused along with twenty seven other individuals. In
the aforementioned FIRs there is an allegation of fraud to
the extent of INR 385.35 crores and INR 289 crores
respectively. On the basis of the said FIRs on 21.03.2023,
the Directorate of Enforcement registered two ECIRs alleging
laundering of proceeds of crime.
5. A Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,
being W.P. Criminal No(s). 246 of 2022 ( Jaskaran Singh
Chawla vs. Union of India and Ors. ) was filed before this
Court alleging failure of CBI and the Serious Fraud
Investigation Office (SFIO) to investigate frauds allegedly
2
committed by Amtek Group involving diversion and
siphoning of bank loans amounting to Rs.33,400 crores. A
two-Judge Bench of this Court, by an interim order dated
27.02.2024, directed the CBI and SFIO to conduct an
exhaustive investigation and to cooperate with and
complement the Enforcement Directorate in the collection of
evidence.
6. The gravamen of the allegation against the appellant is that
he is the ultimate beneficiary of the fraud which was a well-
orchestrated scheme, executed at his behest, involving
diversion and siphoning of public funds through layered
entities, resulting in substantial wrongful loss to Public
Sector Banks.
7. The appellant, in response to the summons issued to him
under Section 50 of the PMLA, appeared on 19.06.2024 and
his statement was recorded. The respondent carried out
search and seizure operations on 20.06.2024, at the
residence of the appellant and his statement was again
recorded. The appellant was arrested on 09.07.2024. A
prosecution complaint dated 06.09.2024 was filed against
16 accused persons i.e., six individuals and ten companies,
3
wherein, appellant was arrayed as an accused. Thereafter a
supplementary prosecution complaint was filed on
02.08.2025 against 40 accused persons i.e., 22 individuals
and 18 companies. Out of 28 individuals, only the appellant
has been arrested and is in custody. A total number of 208
prosecution witnesses have been cited. The cognizance of
prosecution complaint is yet to be taken.
8. On 16.12.2024, the appellant moved an application under
Section 45 of the PMLA for seeking bail before the Special
Judge. The Special Judge by an order dated 21.01.2025
dismissed the application on the ground that the appellant
is not covered by proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA.
Thereafter, on 04.02.2025, the appellant approached the
High Court by filing an application under Section 483 of the
BNNS and Section 45 of PMLA, along with an application for
interim bail. The appellant was granted interim bail on
medical grounds on 11.03.2025 till 01.04.2025. By the
impugned order dated 19.08.2025, the High Court rejected
application for regular bail.
9. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that
appellant is aged about 64 years and suffers from multiple
4
ailments. It is further submitted that appellant is in custody
for past about 16 months and 20 days and his long
incarceration, is violative of the Right to Liberty and speedy
trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. In support of the
aforesaid submission, reliance is placed on decisions of this
1
Court . It is pointed out that out of 28 individuals only the
appellant has been arrested and investigation qua the
appellant stands concluded. In this connection, reference
has been made to order dated 20.08.2025 passed by the
Special Court which records the submission of the ED. It is,
therefore, contended that the custody of the appellant is no
longer required. It is urged that no cognizance of the
prosecution complaint has been taken and the matter is at
the stage of scrutiny of documents.
10. It is submitted that there is no likelihood of trial
commencing in foreseeable future. It is pointed out that
delay in trial of approximately eight months is attributable
to the respondent, as it had filed Crl. MC No.7860 of 2024
1
Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660, Padam Chand Jain v. Enforcement
Directorate, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1291, Udhaw Singh v. Directorate Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 357, Prem Prakash v. Union of India, SLP (Crl.) No.691 of 2023 – Order dated 04.10.2024,
Dineshchand Surana v. Asst. Director, ED, SLP (Crl.) No.15274 of 2024 – Order dated 06.08.2025,
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, Kapil Wadhawan v. CBI, SLP (Crl.) No.16953 of 2025 –
Judgment/Order dated 11.12.2025.
5
before the High Court challenging the order dated
07.09.2024 issuing notice to the proposed accused person.
It is pointed out that in the said proceeding, the High Court
had granted an interim order of deferment of proceeding
before the Special Judge and after eight months,
respondent, on 23.05.2025, withdrew the said proceeding.
11. It is urged that the appellant has cooperated with the
investigation and the allegation with regard to influencing
the witness, Ms. Anuradha Kapur, is incredulous as the
appellant has been in custody since 09.07.2024 and
aforesaid Ms. Anuradha Kapur has been arrayed as a
witness in supplementary prosecution complaint dated
02.08.2025. Therefore, the question of instructing the said
witness not to join the investigation prior to issue of
summons to her does not arise. It is pointed out that all
close family members of the appellant have fully participated
in the investigation. It is contended that the appellant is in
custody since 09.07.2024 and has no knowledge of
dissipation of properties at Panipat and Alwar. It is
submitted that the appellant is not the Director of M/s.
Marichika Properties and, therefore, has no knowledge
6
about dissipation of properties mentioned in the chart at
page 125 of the counter affidavit.
12. It is submitted that the allegations in the predicate offence
allege a total bank fraud to the tune of INR 673.35 crores,
therefore, the figure of INR 38,000 crores is deliberately
exaggerated to project the instant case as India’s largest
bank fraud to justify the prolonged custody of the appellant.
It is urged that it is settled law that economic offences
cannot be classified as separate class on its own for
2
determination of grant of bail . It is also stated that the
appellant is neither a flight risk nor can he tamper with the
evidence. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to be enlarged
on bail.
13. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General
submitted that the gravity of the offence disentitles the
appellant from seeking any exemption from the mandatory
twin conditions of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA. It is
further submitted that the appellant is an influential person
and had instructed his cousin, Ms. Anuradha Kapur, who is
a dummy director in his group of companies, not to join the
2
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791.
7
investigation. It is also submitted that the appellant has
dissipated the proceeds of crime i.e., immovable properties
at Alwar and Panipat after attachment. It is contended that
mere incarceration for a long period cannot be a sole ground
for bail, ignoring the gravity of an offence especially when
there are allegations of tampering with evidence and
3
influencing witnesses . It is contended that delay in trial, if
any, is attributable to the appellant, which is evident from
the order sheet of the Trial Court. It is further contended
that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA has no
application to the facts of the case.
14. It is submitted that out of 210 witnesses to be examined
during the trial, 25 witnesses are common in both the
prosecution complaints. It is pointed out that out of 63,691
pages of relied upon documents, only few pages are relevant
to prove the loss. It is further pointed out that ED has filed
an application on 27.09.2025 for day-to-day hearing. It is
submitted that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
Alternatively, it is also pointed out that in many serious
cases, this Court has directed the parties to re-apply for bail
3
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 and B. Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007)
1 SCC 70 .
8
4
after sometime and the appellant, depending upon the
progress of the trial, be directed to renew the prayer for bail
after six months.
15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions and have carefully perused the record. The
court while dealing with the prayer for grant of bail has to
consider gravity of offence, which has to be ascertained in
the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the
circumstances to consider the gravity of offences is also the
term of sentence i.e., prescribed for the offence, the accused
5
is alleged to have committed . The court has also to take
into account the object of the special Act, the gravity of
offence and the attending circumstances along with period
of sentence. All economic offences cannot be classified into
one group as it may involve various activities and may differ
from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on
the part of the Court to categorize all the offences into one
6
group and deny bail on that basis . It is well settled that if
the State or any prosecuting agency including, the court,
4
Bimal Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl.) No. 7942/2021 .
5
P. Chidambaram (supra)
6
Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51
9
concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused, to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the
plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of
7
the nature of the crime . The aforesaid proposition was
quoted with approval by another two-Judge Bench of this
Court and it was held that long period of incarceration for
around 17 months and the trial not even having
commenced, the appellant in that case has been deprived of
8
his right to speedy trial .
9
16. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Senthil Balaji’s case
has held that under the statutes such as PMLA, where
maximum sentence is seven years, prolonged incarceration
pending trial may warrant grant of bail by Constitutional
Courts, if there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within
a reasonable time. Statutory restrictions cannot be
permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention in
violation of Article 21.
7
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2024) 9 SCC 813.
8
Manish Sisodia (supra)
9
V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director , Enforcement Directorate , 2024 SCC OnLine SC2626
10
17. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Chand Jain
(supra), reiterated that prolonged incarceration cannot be
allowed to convert pretrial detention into punishment and
that documentary evidence already seized by the
prosecution eliminates the possibility of tampering with the
same.
18. The right to speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without
commencement or reasonable progress of trial, cannot be
countenanced, as it has the effect of converting pretrial
detention into form of punishment. Economic offences, by
their very nature, may differ in degree and fact, and
therefore cannot be treated as homogeneous class
warranting a blanket denial of bail.
19. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled parameters with
regard to exercise of jurisdiction for grant of bail in
economic offences, we now advert to the facts of the case in
hand. The appellant has joined the investigation even prior
to his arrest i.e., 19.06.2024 and 02.07.2024 as well as on
09.07.2024. Thus, he has cooperated with the investigation.
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Out of 28 individuals, only the appellant has been arrested.
The order dated 20.08.2025 of the Special Court records the
submission of ED that investigation qua the appellant has
concluded. The maximum sentence which can be imposed
on the appellant is seven years. The appellant is in custody
for past around 16 months and 20 days. It is pertinent to
note that various Benches of this Court, while taking into
account the period of incarceration which ranges from 3
months to 17 months in several cases have granted bail to
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the appellants therein . In the instant case, no cognizance
has been taken on the prosecution complaint and the
proceeding is at the stage of scrutiny of documents. No
material has been placed on record to show the fate of the
application filed by the ED on 27.09.2025 seeking day-to-
day hearing even after period of approximately three months
has expired. There are 210 witnesses to be examined in the
proceeding. There is no likelihood of trial commencing in the
near future. The continued incarceration in such
10
P. Chidambaram (supra) (three months), Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 2269 (five months), Sanjay Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 1748 (ten months), Sanjay Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1748
(eleven months), Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2276
(thirteen months), Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl) No.3148 of 2025 (Order dated
15.04.2025), V. Senthil Balaji (supra) (fifteen months), Neeraj Singal v. Directorate of Enforcement,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3598 (sixteen months), Abdul Razak Peediyakkal v. UOI, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
2326 (seventeen months) and Manish Sisodia (supra) (seventeen months)
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circumstances, particularly where the evidence which is
primarily documentary in nature, is already in custody of
the prosecution, violates the right of the appellant to speedy
trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. As regards the allegation that the appellant instructed Ms.
Anuradha Kapur not to join the investigation, the same does
not inspire confidence, particularly, in view of the fact that
appellant has been in custody prior to concerned witness
being formally arrayed as a witness. It is noteworthy that
the appellant is in custody since 09.07.2024 and Ms. Kapur
was arrayed as a witness only on 02.08.2025. The
allegation, therefore, is wholly incredulous.
21. The record reveals that the prosecution complaint was filed
on 06.09.2024. The Special Judge issued notice on
07.09.2024 to all proposed accused persons under the
proviso to Section 223 of BNSS. The respondent challenged
the said order before the High Court, resulting in eight
months stay of proceedings, before the Special Judge, which
was lifted on 23.05.2025 only upon withdrawal of the
petition. The delay in the trial is thus attributable only to
the respondent, not the appellant.
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22. The appellant has been in custody since 09.07.2024. The
disposal of immovable properties occurred on 24.12.2024
and 17.02.2025 and pertains to M/s Marichika Properties,
with which no material link to the appellant has been
established. There is no evidence that the appellant was
signatory to any sale document. The allegation of dissipation
of proceeds of crime by him is, therefore, untenable at this
stage.
23. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and
order dated 19.08.2025 is quashed and set aside.
The appellant-Arvind Dham shall be released on bail during
the pendency of the trial arising out of prosecution
complaint-ECIR Case Nos. ECIR/GNZO/13/2024 and
ECIR/GNZO/14/2024, pending before the Special Judge
(PC Act) (CBI)-02(Duty Judge), Rouse Avenue District Court,
under provisions of the PMLA. The terms and conditions for
grant of bail shall be fixed by the Trial Court.
24. In addition, the appellant will provide one telephone/mobile
No. on which he can be contacted by the Officers of
Directorate of Enforcement to ascertain his whereabouts
while he is on bail. The appellant shall surrender his
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passport to the Trial Court and will not leave India without
permission of the Trial Court.
25. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
……………………J.
[SANJAY KUMAR]
..………………….J.
[ALOK ARADHE]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 6, 2026.
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