REGIONAL MANAGER, UCO BANK vs. KRISHNA KUMAR BHARDWAJ

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 18-02-2022

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                                              NON­REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION     CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).      1457    OF    2022 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 13953 of 2021) REGIONAL MANAGER,  UCO BANK AND ANOTHER …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS KRISHNA KUMAR BHARDWAJ ….RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order st dated 21  January, 2021 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad affirming the order of the learned Single Judge th dated 19  October, 2019 pursuant to which the inquiry proceedings Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by JAGDISH KUMAR Date: 2022.02.18 16:04:54 IST Reason: and   consequential   punishment   inflicted   upon   the   respondent delinquent were quashed and set aside. 1 3. The   respondent   delinquent   was   serving   as   an   Assistant th th Manager,   Sewla   Branch   on   10 /11   November,   1999   when   the incident of theft was reported. The respondent delinquent being one of the joint custodian of cash was responsible for safety of keys of cash/strong   room   and   failed   to   take   all   precautionary   steps   as being indicated in the guidelines of the Bank and because of the alleged   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   respondent   delinquent   in handling the keys in inappropriate manner resulted into theft/loss of cash from the cash safe.   For such delinquency committed by him   in   discharge   of   his   official   duties,   he   was   placed   under suspension in exercise of power conferred under Regulation 12 of the UCO Bank Officers Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations 1976(hereinafter being referred to as the “Regulations 1976”) by an th Order dated 29  November, 1999. th 4. Later, chargesheet dated 7   December, 1999 along with four th article  of   charges   was   served   and   by   a   corrigendum   dated   13 March, 2000, additional charge no.5 was served upon him. It may th be appropriate to quote the extract of articles of charges, dated 7 2 December,   1999   along   with   additional   charge   no.5   by   a th corrigendum dated 13  March, 2000 as under:­ 1. Being one of the joint custodians of cash, Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj was responsible for safety of keys of cash/strong room, he did not keep the eyes in his person as per guidelines of the Bank, instead left the keys in the branch premises over­night in an almirah in contravention to the guidelines for safety of keys of cash safe/strong room.  He was most negligent and his handling the keys in a perfunctionary manner resulted into theft/loss of cash of Rs. 12.00 lacs from the cash safe. 2. Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj, being one of the joint custodians of cash, did not arrange to remit the surplus cash on 10.11.1999 to Currency Chest, Belanganj Branch, Agra even though there was huge cash balance much more than the average, anticipated daily requirement.  Thus, he did not take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and did not  discharge his duties with utmost  devotion and diligence which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees(Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as amended. 3. Before leaving the branch on 10.11.1999 after close of cash, Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj did not check about the closure of one rear gate between the main hall and passage towards toilet of Sewla Branch, Agra which was left unlocked/opened on 10.11.99.  Thus, he did not take take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and failed   to   discharge   his   duties   with   utmost   devotion   and   diligence which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officers Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as amended. 4. Mr. Bhardwaj did not maintain the key register for noting the transfer of keys from one holder to another.   He himself along with Chief Cashier had not signed the key register on taking over charge of the keys of cash safe/strong room of the branch.   Thus, he failed to discharge his duties with devotion and diligence which is violative of Regulation   3(1)   of   UCO   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as amended. 5. That Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj was in hand and glove with some person with an ulterior motive in perpetration of theft of cash at Sewla Branch  for th th Rs.12.00   lacs   on   10 /11   November,   1999.     Thus   he   failed   to 3 discharge   his   duties   with   utmost   integrity   and   honesty,   which   is violative of Regulation­3 of UCO BANK Officers employees (Conduct) Regulation, 1976 as amended.”   5. The inquiry officer conducted departmental inquiry in terms of the procedure prescribed under the scheme of Regulations, 1976 and after affording opportunity of hearing and due compliance of principles of natural justice, held charge nos. 1,3 and 4 proved vide st report dated 31  July, 2001.   However, charge nos. 2 and 5 were not held proved. 6. It is an admitted fact that the date on which the theft was th th committed,   i.e.   10 /11   November,   1999,   Mr.   Vinod   Kumar Khanna   was   the   Manager   of   Sewla,   Agra   Branch.     During   that period, the present respondent was Assistant Manager and one Mr. K.L.   Khandelwal   was   the   Assistant   Manager(Cash).     Apart   from them, four other clerks were posted at Sewla Branch and Mr. Vinod Kumar Khanna was not on duty on the day when the incident had taken place.  The signatures of custodian ­ the present respondent delinquent and Mr. K.L. Khandewal(Assistant Manager(Cash) were confirmed and in support thereof, document ME­2/1 to ME­2/5 were placed on record.   4 7. The statement of fact was duly recorded by the Inquiry Officer in his report that the respondent delinquent was custodian of keys th th on   the   day,   i.e.,   10 /11   November,   1999   when   the   theft   was committed   and   he   was   one   of   the   joint   custodian   of   cash   and responsible   for   safety   of   keys/cash.     After   due   appreciation   of documentary evidence placed on record, the Inquiry Officer found charge nos. 1, 3 and 4 proved against the respondent delinquent. After due appreciation of the documentary evidence on record, the extract   of   the   findings   which   has   been   recorded,   after   detailed scrutiny of facts, by the Inquiry Officer in his report for arriving to a conclusion in holding charge nos. 1, 3 and 4 proved against the respondent delinquent are referred to hereunder:­ Charge No. 1 Findings of the Inquiry Officer :­  I have fully examined the contentions of P.O.& DR/C.S.0. and my findings in this regard are as under:­  Considering all the facts and material placed before me during the inquiry proceedings by the concerned parties, I concur with the arguments advanced and facts established by the Presenting Officer, who has established the facts relating to charge No. 1 on the basis of ME­2/ 1 to 5, ME­ 6/1 & 2, ME­10,, ME­10/1&2, ME­11, ME­3, ME­13, ME­ 12, ME­14, ME­15, ME­20, ME­27, DE­30, DE­31/1&2, DE­32, ME­1/5, ME­23, ME­ 24, DE­2/1to15.  5 I, therefore, hold that charge No. 1 stands proved against Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj, C.S.O.  Charge No. 3  Findings of the Inquiry Officer :­  I have fully examined the contentions of P.O. and DR/CSO and my findings in this regard are as under:­  Considering all the facts and material placed before me during the inquiry proceedings by the concerned parties, I concur with arguments advanced and facts   established   by   the   Presenting   Officer,   who   has   established   the   facts relating to charge No. 3 on the basis of documentary evidence, namely, ME­3, ME­12, ME­13, ME­14, ME­15, ME­16, ME­17 & ME­18. As per ME­14 the C.S.O. had left the branch at about 4.45 p.m. on 10.11.99, and as per ME­12 and ME­13 the Manager, Mr. V.K. Khanna had left the branch on 10.11.99 at about 2.00 p.m. by informing to the Asstt. Manager, Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj. It is the bounden duty of the Manager to ensure the security of the branch and in absence of the Manager it automatically passes on to the Asstt. Manager, who is second­in­command in the branch. As such, the asstt. Manager Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj while leaving the Sewla branch on 10.11.1999, in absence of the Manager, must have fully ensured about the safety and security of the branch in view of alarming/huge cash accumulation (Rs. 27,84,002.17) in the branch as at the close of business on 10.11.99. Laxity in security is also evident from ME­15. So, it is well substantiated by P.O. that the Asstt. Manager was lacking in his duty while leaving the branch on 10.11.99 in absence of the Manager, in the matter of security and safety of the branch.  I, therefore, hold that charge No. 3 stands proved against Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj, C.S.O.  Charge No. 4 Findings of the Inquiry Officer: I have fully examined the contentions of P.O. & DR/CSO and my findings in this regard are as under:­  Considering all the facts and material placed before me during the inquiry proceedings by the concerned parties, I concur with the arguments advanced 6 and facts established by the Presenting Officer, who has established from ME­ 6/1&2 that "A record of custody of all important keys should be carried in a key Register. All changes in the custody of keys should be promptly made thereinunder the signatures of the custodians."  ME­8 & ME­22/ 1&2 confirm the incomplete records of the postings in the Key Register's relating to Asstt. Manager and Asstt. Manager (Cash) since 1.8.1995 and 2.7.1994 respectively.  It is established from above records that the Asstt. Manager and the Asstt. Manager (Cash) who were the joint custodians at Sewla Agra branch, had not signed the respective key registers on taking over charge of the keys of Cash Safe/Strong   Room   of   the   branch   and   did   not   maintain   the   Key   Registers uptodate.  I, therefore, hold that Charge No. 4, stands proved against Mr. K.K. Bhardwaj, C.S.O.”  8. The   disciplinary   authority,   after   affording   opportunity   of hearing to the respondent delinquent, concurred with the findings of  the  Inquiry   Officer   and   after  due   compliance   of   principles of natural justice, inflicted the penalty of dismissal from service vide st Order dated 31   December, 2001 with disqualification for future employment. 9. The order of the disciplinary authority came to be challenged by the respondent in the departmental appeal before the appellate authority.   The appellate authority, after revisiting the record of inquiry,   found   justification   in   the   submissions   made   by   the respondent delinquent with regard to charge no. 3 but so far as the 7 finding   in   reference   to   charge   nos.   1   and   4   is   concerned,   the appellate   authority   concurred   with   the   finding   recorded   by   the inquiry   officer   and   confirmed   by   the   disciplinary   authority   in exercise of power under Regulation 17 of the Regulations, 1976 and rd modified the punishment by its Order dated 23  December, 2002, the extract of which is as under:­ “I, therefore, in exercise of powers vested in me as Appellate Authority, and in terms of Regulation 17 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, as amended, pass the following Order : 
Charge No.<br>1ProvedShri K.K. Bhardwaj (PFM No. 23213) shall be<br>compulsorily retired from Bank's service.
Charge No.<br>2Not<br>ProvedExonerated
Charge No.<br>3Not<br>ProvedExonerated
Charge No.<br>4ProvedThe Basic Pay of Shri Bhardwaj be reduced by<br>two stages in the time scale of pay for a period<br>of 4 (four) years. It is further directed that he<br>will earn increments of pay during the period of<br>reduction and that on expiry of this period the<br>reduction will have the effect of postponing his<br>future increments.
Charge No.<br>5Not<br>ProvedExonerated
8 The   above   punishments   shall   run   concurrently,   However,   since   no   moral turpitude   is   being   found   against   Shri   Bhardwaj,   he   will   be   paid   with   all terminal benefits payable to him.”  10. The   order   passed   by   the   appellate   authority   came   to   be challenged by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge, after taking note of the record of inquiry, arrived to the conclusion that Mr. Vinod Kumar Khanna was the Branch Manager on the date when the incident had occurred, i.e., th th 10 /11   November, 1999 and the joint responsibility was of the Branch   Manager   and   the   Assistant   Manager(Cash).     Since   the present respondent delinquent was the Assistant Manager, he could not be held to be responsible for lapses and set aside the order of punishment   inflicted   upon   the   respondent   delinquent   under   its th Order dated 19  October 2019. 11. On   Letters   Patent   Appeal   preferred   at   the   instance   of   the present   appellant,   the   Division   Bench   under   the   impugned judgment has not taken care to examine the report of inquiry and has just reproduced the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge under the order impugned and dismissed the appeal by an 9 st Order  dated   21   January,   2021   which   is   the   subject   matter  of challenge before us. 12. For completion of facts, it may be relevant to note that the factual error was committed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench in passing the impugned judgment that Mr. Vinod Kumar Khanna, who was the Manager of Sewla, Agra Branch at that time, was also served with the charge­sheet and he too faced departmental   inquiry   but   the   allegation   against   him   was   that despite being fully aware that the respondent delinquent was the custodian of cash(keeping the keys of the cash safe/strong room in an almirah in the stationery room overnight) and not keeping the same in his personal custody as per rules of the Bank, he did not take appropriate steps against the staff who was reportedly keeping overnight safety of the keys of the chest in the Branch itself which was a gross negligence which he had committed in discharge of his duties   as   a   Manager   of   the   Branch   and   for   his   supervisory th negligence, after charge­sheet dated 17   December, 1999 came to be served, he too was held guilty for his supervisory negligence 10 which   he   had   committed   in   discharge   of   his   duties   and   was th punished by an Order dated 28  February, 2002. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that for the gross misconduct which the respondent had committed in discharge of his   duties,   the   inquiry   was   conducted   in   accordance   with   the procedure prescribed under the Regulations 1976 and it was never the   case   of   the   respondent   either   before   the   departmental authorities or before the High Court that the inquiry has not been conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the scheme of Regulations, 1976 or the record which was relevant to the charge, and demanded by him, was not made available to him and what prejudice has been caused to him on account of non­ availability   of   record   or   the   orders   passed   by   the disciplinary/appellate   authority   are   in   violation   of   principles   of natural justice while upholding the findings of the inquiry officer in reference to charge nos. 1 and 4 and consequential punishment inflicted upon him. 14. At the same time, learned counsel further submits that the learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   has   proceeded   on   the 11 premise that it was the Manager and Assistant Manager(Cash) who were responsible officers and because of their negligence, theft has th th been committed on 10 /11  November, 1999 from the cash safe of the Branch which appears to be factually incorrect.   It was the respondent delinquent who was the custodian and in­charge of keys at the relevant point of time along with Assistant Manager(Cash) and the finding was recorded by the Inquiry Officer supported by the documentary evidence on record and this was never questioned by the respondent delinquent at any later stage even when he was served with the inquiry report or to the disciplinary or appellate authority while assailing the finding recorded by the inquiry officer in his report.  This is the manifest error which the Division Bench of the   High   Court   has   committed   in   interfering   with   the   domestic inquiry   conducted   against   the   respondent   delinquent   in   which charge nos. 1 and 4 were finally held proved against him.  In the given circumstances, the interference made by the High Court in the   impugned   judgment   is   not   sustainable   and   deserves   to   be interfered with by this Court. 12 15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that respondent was the Assistant Manager and the responsibility was of the Manager of the Branch and the Assistant Manager(Cash)   and   submits   that   the   finding   recorded   by   the inquiry officer in his report is perverse and not sustainable. 16. Learned counsel further submits that the plea was raised by him against the inquiry officer being biased but no one has paid heed   to   his   request   and   further   submits   that   the   documents demanded by him were not made available despite request and the orders passed by the disciplinary/appellate authority being non­ speaking and cryptic in nature are otherwise not sustainable in law. 17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with their assistance. 18. The   power   of   judicial   review   in   the   matters   of   disciplinary inquiries,   exercised   by   the   departmental/appellate   authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 136 of   the   Constitution   of   India   is   well   circumscribed   by   limits   of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not 13 akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has earlier been examined by this Court in  B.C. Chaturvedi 1 Vs. ;     Union   of   India   and   Others Himachal   Pradesh   State 2 Electricity Board Limited   Vs.  Mahesh Dahiya  and recently by a three­Judge Bench of this Court(of which one of us is a member) in Deputy General Manager(Appellate Authority) and Others   Vs. 3 Ajay Kumar Srivastava  wherein this Court has held as under:­
“24.It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision­making
process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure
fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The
court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the
delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the
mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached
or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from
patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a
writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or
reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25.  When   the   disciplinary   enquiry   is   conducted   for   the   alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine: ( i ) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; ( ii ) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; 1 1995(6) SCC 749 2 2017(1) SCC 768 3 2021(2) SCC 612 14 ( iii )   whether   the   findings   or   conclusions  are   based   on   some evidence   and   authority   has   power   and   jurisdiction   to   reach finding of fact or conclusion.
26.It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the
disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the
disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings
recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary
authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after
affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record
his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for
such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for
further enquiry.
27.It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to
departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement
of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be
established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable
person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a
finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent
employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot
sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry
proceedings.
28.The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of
judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution
would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the
departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or
perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or
where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with
objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there
is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the
departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.”
19. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the Division Bench has proceeded on the premise that the responsibility was of the Branch Manager along with the Assistant Manager(Cash).  Hence, the respondent could not have been held responsible for the lapses 15 of those officers and proceeding on the said foundation, set aside the penalty inflicted upon the respondent delinquent but the record of   enquiry   clearly   manifests   that   it   was   a   factual   error   being committed   by   the   High   Court   while   setting   aside   the   domestic inquiry   and   the   consequential   punishment   inflicted   upon   the respondent delinquent. 20. In the course of enquiry, a documentary evidence came on record that although Mr. Vinod Kumar Khanna was the Manager of th th the Branch but the date, i.e., 10 /11   November, 1999 on which the theft was committed, the custodian of cash were the respondent along  with   the   Assistant   Manager(Cash).     The   finding   has   been recorded   by   the   inquiry   officer   in   his   report   holding   that   the respondent delinquent was the custodian of cash in keeping the keys in cash safe/strong room in the almirah of the stationery room overnight and not keeping the same in his personal custody as per rules of the Bank along with Assistant Manager(Cash).  The finding of fact was confirmed by the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority   in upholding the guilt of the respondent as he had failed in discharge of his duties as a custodian when the theft had taken place on 16 th th 10 /11   November,   1999   but   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned judgment has not taken pains to examine the finding recorded by the   inquiry   officer   in   reference   to   the   responsibility   which   the respondent delinquent failed to discharge as a custodian of cash at the relevant point of time when the theft was committed. 21. That apart, what has been recorded by the inquiry officer has been revisited by the disciplinary/appellate authority and after re­ appreciation of record of inquiry and due application of mind, the appellate   authority   while   exonerating   the   respondent   delinquent from charge no. 3 held charge nos. 1 and 4 proved against him and rd punished him by an order dated 23  December, 2002.  Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court has taken pains to look into the finding which was recorded by the inquiry officer in reference to charge nos. 1 and 4 and appreciated thereafter by the disciplinary/appellate authority in passing of the order of penalty inflicted upon the respondent delinquent. 22. In our considered view, the finding which has been recorded by the High Court in the impugned order is unsustainable and not supported with the report of inquiry available on record. 17 23. The submission made by learned counsel for the respondent that the inquiry officer was biased and that caused prejudice to him, suffice it to say, that merely making allegation that he was biased is not sufficient unless supported by the material placed by him   either   during   the   course   of   inquiry   or   before   the disciplinary/appellate authority.   Even no submission was made before the High Court also and it deserves no consideration except rejection. 24. So far as the submission regarding non­supply of document is concerned, inquiry officer has observed that the record which was demanded by the respondent delinquent was made available to him except   the   one   which   was   confidential   in   nature   still   he   was permitted for inspection.  At the same time, the respondent failed to show as to what prejudice has been caused to him in reference to the alleged non­supply of the documents demanded by him. 25. The further submission of learned counsel for the respondent that the   decision  of  the   disciplinary/appellate  authority   being  a non­speaking and cryptic in nature is concerned, it is a sorry state of affairs to say so that both the orders of the disciplinary/appellate 18 authority are on record and cogent reasons have been assigned while concurring with the finding of the inquiry officer in order of the disciplinary authority.   The appellate authority also, after due appreciation   of   the   record   of   inquiry   and   confirmed   by   the disciplinary authority, arrived to the conclusion that the finding recorded in reference to charge no. 3 is not proved and held charge nos. 1 and 4 proved on the basis of which he was persuaded to rd modify   the   punishment   under   the   Order   dated   23   December, 2002. 26. In our considered view, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction   while   interfering   with   the   disciplinary   proceedings initiated   against   the   respondent   delinquent   and   being unsustainable deserves to be set aside. 27. Consequently,   the   appeal   succeeds   and   is   allowed.     The st judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   dated   21 January, 2021 is accordingly quashed and set aside.  No costs. 28. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.    ………………………J. (AJAY RASTOGI) 19        ……………………….J. (ABHAY S. OKA) NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 18, 2022 20