ARSHNOOR SINGH vs. HARPAL KAUR

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5124  OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6788 of 2019) Arshnoor Singh                …Appellant versus Harpal Kaur & Ors.              …Respondents J U D G M E N T INDU MALHOTRA, J. Leave granted. 1. The present Civil Appeal has been filed to challenge the Order dated 13.11.2018 passed in RSA No. 1354 of 2014 by the Signature Not Verified Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh. Digitally signed by ASHOK RAJ SINGH Date: 2019.07.01 17:12:32 IST Reason: 1 2. The background facts in which the present Civil Appeal has been filed are briefly stated as under: 2.1. Lal Singh was the owner of large tracts of agricultural land in Village Khangarh, District Ferozepur, Punjab. The Appellant herein is the great­grandson of Lal Singh.      The genealogy table of Lal Singh’s family is set out hereinbelow for the sake of convenience: Lal Singh Inder Singh

     Arshnoor Singh (Appellant) 2.2. Lal Singh passed away in 1951, and his entire property was inherited by his only son Inder Singh. In 1964, Inder Singh during his lifetime, effected a partition of the entire property  vide  decree dated 04.11.1964 passed in Civil Suit No. 182 of 4.11.1962 between his three 2 sons  viz . Gurcharan Singh, Dharam Singh, and Swaran Singh in equal shares.       Thereafter,   the   three   sons   transferred   one­fourth share in the entire property back to their father Inder Singh   for   his   sustenance.   As   a   consequence,   Inder Singh and his three sons held one­fourth share each in the property.      Inder Singh expired on 15.04.1970, and his one­ fourth share was inherited by his heirs i.e. his widow, three sons, and his daughter. 2.3. The present matter pertains to the property which came to   the   share   of   one   of   his   sons   viz.   Dharam   Singh (hereinafter referred to as the  “suit property”), which was agricultural land comprised of about 119 kanals 2 marlas, situated in Village Khangarh, District Feozepur, Punjab. 3 2.4. Dharam Singh had only one son  viz . Arshnoor Singh – the   Appellant   herein.     The   Appellant   was   born   on st 22.08.1985 to Dharam Singh through his 1  wife. 2.5. Dharam Singh purportedly sold the entire suit property to   Respondent   No.   1   viz .   Harpal   Kaur   vide   two registered   Sale   Deeds   dated   01.09.1999   for   an ostensible sale consideration of Rs. 4,87,500/­.    The first Sale Deed bearing Wasika No. 1075 pertains to land admeasuring 59 kanals 11 marlas situated in Khasra No. 35; the second Sale Deed bearing Wasika No. 1079 pertains to land admeasuring 59 kanals 11 marlas in Khasra No. 36. 2.6. On 21.09.1999, the two Sale Deeds were sent by the Sub­Registrar   to   the   Collector,   Ferozepur   for   action u/S. 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1999 as the Sale Deeds were undervalued.     Dharam Singh and Respondent No. 1 – Harpal Kaur appeared before the Collector. Dharam Singh admitted 4 that no consideration was exchanged in lieu of the two Sale   Deeds,   and   the   amount   of   Rs.   4,87,500/­   was mentioned only for the purpose of registration.       Respondent   No.   1   –   Harpal   Kaur,   the   purported vendee, admitted that no money was paid by her to Dharam Singh in exchange for the suit property. 2.7. Subsequently,   on   29.09.1999,   Dharam   Singh   got married to Respondent No. 1.   The Collector, Ferozepur  vide  Order dated 24.01.2000, held that the two Sale Deeds executed by Dharam Singh in   favour   of   Respondent   No.   1   were   without   any monetary transaction. 2.8. The Appellant became a major on 22.08.2003.       On   23.11.2004,   the   Appellant   filed   a   Suit   for Declaration   against   his   father   Dharam   Singh   as Defendant No. 1, and Harpal Kaur as Defendant No. 2 (Respondent No. 1 herein) for a declaration that the suit property was coparcenary property, and hence the two 5 Sale   Deeds   dated   01.09.1999   executed   by   his   father Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1 herein were illegal, null and void. The Appellant further prayed for a permanent injunction restraining Respondent No. 1   from   further   alienating,   transferring,   or   creating   a charge on the suit property. 2.9. During   the   pendency   of   the   Suit,   Respondent   No.   1 entered into a transaction whereby she purportedly sold the suit property jointly to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3  viz . Kulwant   Singh   and   Jung   Bahadur   vide   a  Sale   Deed dated 30.10.2007.      Respondent No. 1 filed an Application to Implead Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 as co­defendants in the Suit. However,   the   said   Application   was   disposed   of   vide Order   dated   25.09.2010,   with   liberty   granted   to Respondent   No.   1/Defendant   No.   2   to   defend   their rights. 6 2.10. The Additional Civil Judge, Ferozepur  vide  Order dated 29.04.2011,   decreed   the   Suit   in   favour   of   the Appellant/Plaintiff.      Dharam Singh in his deposition had stated that he executed   the   Sale   Deeds   without   any   monetary consideration   since   Respondent   No.   1   insisted   on transfer   of   the   suit   property   in   her   name   as   a   pre­ condition for marriage.     The   Trial   Court   held   that   the   suit   property   was ancestral coparcenary property of Dharam Singh and the Appellant. Respondent No. 1 failed to prove that Dharam Singh had sold the suit property to Respondent No. 1 for either legal necessity of the family, or for the benefit of the estate. Consequently, the two Sale Deeds dated   01.09.1999   purportedly   executed   by   Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1/Defendant No. 2 were   illegal,   null   and   void.   The   Appellant   was   held 7 entitled to joint possession of the suit property with his father. 2.11. Respondent   No.   1   along   with   the   subsequent purchasers – Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 filed a common Civil Appeal RBT No. 130 of 3.6.2011/7.9.2013 before the Additional District Judge, Ferozepur.      The ADJ   vide   Judgment & Order dated 13.01.2014 dismissed the Appeal. The Appellate Court held that the two   Sale   Deeds   dated   01.09.1999   were   executed without   any   consideration   as   per   the   admission   of Dharam   Singh,   and   Respondent   No.   1   in   their statements recorded by the Collector, Ferozepur.    In the absence of any legal necessity, or benefit to the estate of the joint Hindu family, the Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 were illegal, null and void. 2.12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order, Respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3 filed RSA No. 1354 of 2014 before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. 8 2.13. During   the   pendency   of   the   Regular   Second   Appeal before   the   High   Court,   Dharam   Singh   expired   on 05.01.2017. 2.14. The High Court  vide   the impugned Judgment & Order dated   13.11.2018,   allowed   the   RSA   filed   by   the Respondents, and set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below.      The High Court held that (i) the Appellant had no locus   to   institute   the   Suit,   since   the   coparcenary property ceased to exist after Inder Singh partitioned the   property   between   his   3   sons   in   1964;   (ii)   the Appellant   had   no   right   to   challenge   the   Sale   Deeds executed on 01.09.1999 on the ground that the sale consideration   had   not   been   paid,   since   only   the executant   of   the   Sale   Deeds   viz .   Dharam   Singh (Defendant No. 1) could have made such a challenge; and (iii) Jamabandis for the years 1957 – 58 till 1970 – 71 were not produced by the Appellant. 9 2.15. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment & Order dated 13.11.2018  passed  by the   High Court,  the  Appellant has filed the present Civil Appeal. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties, and perused the pleadings and written submissions filed by the parties. 4. Mr. Manoj Swarup, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, submitted that the suit property was coparcenary property in which the Appellant had become a coparcener by birth.     It was further submitted that since the suit property was coparcenary   property,   Dharam   Singh   could   not   have alienated it without legal necessity of the family, or benefit to the estate.       It   was   further   submitted   that   the   Sale   Deed   dated 30.10.2007   purportedly   executed   by   Respondent   No.   1   in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3, during the pendency of the Suit, was hit by   lis pendens . Hence, it was illegal, null and void. 10 5. Mr. Ritin Rai, Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents submitted that the Civil Suit was filed by the Appellant in collusion with his father Dharam Singh (Defendant No. 1), as Dharam Singh’s marriage with Respondent No. 1 had fallen apart, and had subsequently been dissolved through a decree of divorce on 15.12.2010. It was contended that the Civil Suit was filed by the Appellant at the behest of his father Dharam Singh.      It was further submitted that the suit property was not coparcenary property when the two Sale Deeds were executed on   01.09.1999.   Inder   Singh’s   property   ceased   to   be coparcenary   property   after   it   was   divided   the   decree vide   dated 04.11.1964. Reliance was placed on the decision of this 1 Court in  Uttam  v.  Saubhag Singh ,   wherein it was held that: “18. Some other judgments were cited before us for   the   proposition   that   joint   family   property continues   as   such  even  with  a   sole   surviving coparcener,   and   if   a   son   is   born   to   such coparcener thereafter, the joint family property 1  (2016) 4 SCC 68. 11 continues as such, there being no hiatus merely by virtue of the fact there is a sole surviving coparcener.   Dharma   Shamrao   Agalawe   v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (1988) 2 SCC 126, Sheela Devi v. Lal Chand, (2006) 8 SCC 581, and Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh (2013) 9 SCC 419, were cited for this purpose. None of these judgments would take the appellant any further in view of the fact that in none of them is there any consideration of the effect of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act. The law,   therefore,   insofar   as   it   applies   to   joint family   property   governed   by   the   Mitakshara School, prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be summarized as follows: … (vi) On a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family property has been distributed   in   accordance   with   section   8   on principles of intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold  the  property as  tenants  in common and not as joint tenants.”    It was further submitted that the Appellant had no  locus  to file the Civil Suit on the ground that no sale consideration was   paid   by   Respondent   No.   1   to   Dharam   Singh.   The Appellant was not a party to the Sale Deeds, and only the executant of the Sale Deeds  viz . Dharam Singh, could have filed such a suit. 12 6. The issues that arise for consideration before us are two­fold: (i) whether the   suit  property  was  coparcenary property  or self­acquired property of Dharam Singh; (ii) the validity of the Sale   Deeds   executed   on   01.09.1999   by   Dharam   Singh   in favour of Respondent No. 1, and the subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3. 7. With respect to the first issue, it is the admitted position that Inder Singh had inherited the entire suit property from his father Lal Singh upon his death. As per the Mutation Entry dated 16.01.1956 produced by Respondent No. 1, Lal Singh’s death took place in 1951. Therefore, the succession in this case   opened   in   1951   prior   to   the   commencement   of   the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when Inder Singh succeeded to his father Lal’s Singh’s property in accordance with the old Hindu  Mitakshara  law. 13 nd 7.1. Mulla in his commentary on Hindu Law (22   Edition) has stated the position with respect to succession under Mitakshara  law as follows: Page 129 “A son, a grandson whose father is dead, and a great­grandson   whose   father   and   grandfather are both dead, succeed simultaneously as single heir to the separate or self­acquired property of the deceased with rights of survivorship.” Page 327 “All property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father, is  ancestral property.  The  essential  feature of ancestral property according to Mitakshara law is that the sons, grandsons and great­grandsons of the person who inherits it, acquire an interest, and the rights attached to such property at the moment of their birth. A   person   inheriting   property   from   his   three immediate paternal ancestors holds it, and must hold it, in coparcenary with his sons, son’s sons, and   son’s   son’s   sons,   but   as   regards   other relations, he holds it, and is entitled to hold it as his absolute property.” (emphasis supplied) 2 7.2. In  Shyam Narayan Prasad  v.  Krisha Prasad & Ors. ,   this Court has recently held that : “12. It is settled that the property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is an ancestral property. The   essential   feature   of   ancestral   property, 2  (2018) 7 SCC 646. 14 according to Mitakshara Law, is that the sons, grandsons, and great grandsons of the person who inherits it, acquire an interest and the rights attached to such property at the moment of their birth. The share which a coparcener obtains on partition   of   ancestral   property   is   ancestral property   as   regards   his   male   issue.   After partition, the property in the hands of the son will continue to be the ancestral property and the natural or adopted son of that son will take interest in it and is entitled to it by survivorship.” (emphasis supplied) 7.3. Under   Mitakshara   law,   whenever   a   male   ancestor inherits any property from any of his paternal ancestors upto three degrees above him, then his male legal heirs upto three degrees below him, would get an equal right as coparceners in that property. 3 7.4. In  Yudhishter  v.  Ashok Kumar ,  this Court held that : “11. This question has been considered by this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Ors. v. Chander Sen and Ors. [1986] 161 ITR   370   (SC)   where   one   of   us   (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J) observed that under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father's   property   and   become   part   of   the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but   with   the   very   fact   of   his   birth.   Normally, therefore  whenever the  father gets  a property from whatever source, from the grandfather or 3  (1987) 1 SCC 204. 15 from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. This Court observed that this position has been affected by Section 8 of   the   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1956   and, therefore, after the Act, when the son inherited the   property   in   the   situation   contemplated   by Section 8, he does not take it as Kar of his own undivided family but takes it in his individual capacity.” (emphasis supplied) 7.5. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, this position has undergone a change. Post – 1956, if a person   inherits   a   self­acquired   property   from   his paternal ancestors, the said property becomes his self­ acquired   property,   and   does   not   remain   coparcenary property. 7.6. If succession opened under the old Hindu law, i.e. prior to   the   commencement   of   the   Hindu   Succession   Act, 1956, the parties would be governed by  Mitakshara  law. The   property   inherited   by   a   male   Hindu   from   his paternal male ancestor shall be coparcenary property in 16 his   hands  vis­à­vis   his   male   descendants   upto  three degrees below him. The nature of property will remain as coparcenary property even after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 7.7. In the present case, the succession opened in 1951 on the   death   of   Lal   Singh.   The   nature   of   the   property inherited by his son Inder Singh was coparcenary in nature.   Even   though   Inder   Singh   had   effected   a partition of the coparcenary property amongst his sons in 1964, the nature of the property inherited by Inder Singh’s sons would remain as coparcenary property  qua their male descendants upto three degrees below them.  7.8. The judgment in  v.  relied Uttam  Saubhag Singh (supra)  upon by the Respondents is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In  Uttam , the appellant therein was claiming   a   share   in   the   coparcenary   property   of   his grandfather, who had died in 1973 before the appellant 17 was   born.   The   succession   opened   in   1973   after   the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force.       The   Court   was   concerned   with   the   share   of   the appellant’s grandfather in the ancestral property, and the impact of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In light of these facts, this Court held that after property is distributed in accordance with Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, such property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it. It was therefore held that the appellant was not a coparcener vis­à­vis the share of his grandfather. 7.9. In the present case, the entire property of Lal Singh was inherited   by   his   son   Inder   Singh   as   coparcenary property prior to 1956. This coparcenary property was partitioned between the three sons of Inder Singh by the court   vide   a decree of partition dated 04.11.1964. The shares   allotted   in   partition   to   the   coparceners, 18 continued   to   remain   coparcenary   property   in   their hands   qua   their male descendants. As a consequence, the   property   allotted   to   Dharam   Singh   in   partition continued   to   remain   coparcenary   property   qua   the Appellant. 7.10. With respect to the devolution of a share acquired on nd partition, Mulla on Hindu Law (22  Edition) states the following: “§   339.   Devolution   of   share   acquired   on partition. – The effect of a partition is to dissolve the   coparcenary,   with   the   result,   that   the separating   members   thenceforth   hold   their respective   shares   as   their   separate   property, and the share of each member will pass on his death to his heirs. However, if a member while separating from his other coparceners continues joint with his own male issue, the share allotted to him on partition, will in his hands, retain the character of a coparcenary property as regards the male issue [§ 221, sub­§ (4)].” (emphasis supplied) 7.11. This Court in  Valliammai Achi  v.  Nagappa Chettiar and 4 Ors. ,   held that: “10. … It is well settled that the share which a co­sharer   obtains   on   partition   of   ancestral 4  AIR 1967 SC 1153. 19 property   is   ancestral   property   as   regards   his male issues. They take an interest in it by birth whether   they   are   in   existence   at   the   time   of partition or are born subsequently: [see Hindu Law by Mulla, Thirteenth Edition p. 249, para 223 (2)(4)]. If that is so and the character of the ancestral   property  does   not   change  so  far  as sons are concerned even after partition, we fail to  see how that  character can change  merely because the father makes a will by which he gives   the   residue   of   the   joint   family   property (after making certain bequests) to the son.” (emphasis supplied) 7.12. The   suit   property   which   came   to   the   share   of   late Dharam Singh through partition, remained coparcenary property   qua   his   son   –   the   Appellant   herein,   who became a coparcener in the suit property on his birth i.e. on 22.08.1985.      Dharam Singh purportedly executed the two Sale Deeds on  01.09.1999 in favour of  Respondent  No. 1 after   the   Appellant   became   a   coparcener   in   the   suit property. 8. The   second   issue   which   has   arisen   for   consideration   is whether the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 executed by 20 Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1, were valid or not. 8.1. It   is   settled   law   that   the   power   of   a     to   sell Karta coparcenary property is subject to certain restrictions viz . the sale should be for  legal necessity or for  the 5 benefit   of   the   estate.   The   onus   for   establishing   the existence of legal necessity is on the alienee. 6      In   Rani & Anr.   v.   Santa Bala Debnath & Ors. ,   this Court held that : “10.  Legal necessity to support the sale must however be established by the alienees. Sarala owned the land in dispute as a limited owner. She   was   competent   to   dispose   of   the   whole estate   in   the   property   for   legal   necessity   or benefit to the estate. In adjusting whether the sale   conveys   the   whole   estate,   the   actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit to be conferred upon the estate in the particular instance must be considered. Legal   necessity   does   not   mean   actual compulsion: it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of providing legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquires about the existence of the   necessity   and   that   he   did   all   that   was 5   Vijay A. Mittal & Ors.  v.  Kulwant Rai (Dead) through LRs & Ors. , (2019) 3 SCC 520; Mulla nd on Hindu Law (22  Edition), Pg. 372. 6  (1970) 3 SCC 722. 21 reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity.” (emphasis supplied) 8.2. In the present case, the onus was on the alienee i.e. Respondent   No.   1   to   prove   that   there   was   a   legal necessity, or benefit to the estate, or that she had made bona fide  enquiries on the existence of the same. 8.3. Respondent No. 1 has completely failed to discharge the burden of proving that Dharam Singh had executed the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 in her favour out of legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. In fact, it has come on record that the Sale Deeds were without any consideration whatsoever.      Dharam Singh had deposed before the Trial Court that   he   sold   the   suit   property   to   Respondent   No.   1 without any consideration. Respondent No. 1 had also admitted before the Collector, Ferozepur that the Sale Deeds were without consideration. 22    Hence, the ground of legal necessity or benefit of the estate falls through. 8.4. As a consequence, the Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 are hereby cancelled as being illegal, null and void. Dharam Singh   could   not   have   sold   the   coparcenary   suit property, in which the Appellant was a coparcener, by the aforesaid alleged Sale Deeds. 9. Since Respondent No. 1 has not obtained a valid and legal title   to   the   suit   property   through   the   Sale   Deeds   dated 01.09.1999, she could not have passed on a better title to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 either.     The subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 is hit by the doctrine of  . The underlying principle of the lis pendens doctrine of   lis pendens   is that if a property is transferred pendente lite , and the transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any title to 23 7 the property.   The Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 being null and void, is hereby cancelled.  10. The Plaintiff/Appellant being a male coparcener in the suit property, was vitally affected by the purported sale of the suit property by his father Dharam Singh.    The Appellant therefore had the locus to file the Suit for a Declaration   that   the   suit   property   being   coparcenary property, could not have been sold by his father Dharam Singh without legal necessity, or for the benefit of the estate.     As a consequence, the Appellant was entitled to move the Court   for   a   Declaration   that   the   two   Sale   Deeds   dated 01.09.1999 executed by his father Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1 were illegal, null and void. 10.1. The   very   fact   that   the   Sale   Deeds   dated   01.09.1999 were executed without any consideration, would itself show that the suit property was sold without any legal necessity. Being coparcenary property, it could not have 7   T.G. Ashok Kumar  v.  Govindammal & Ors. , (2010) 14 SCC 370. 24 been sold without legal necessity, or for the benefit of the estate. 10.2. The non­production of the   would make no Jamabandis difference, as it did not affect the title/ownership of the suit property. 11. In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion   on   law,   the   judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court  vide  the Impugned Order dated 13.11.2018, being contrary to law, is set aside.      The Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 bearing Wasika Nos. 1075   and   1079   executed   by   Dharam   Singh   in   favour   of Respondent No. 1 are hereby cancelled and set aside.    Consequently, the subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 during the pendency of proceedings is illegal, and hereby cancelled and set aside.   The   name   of   the   Appellant   is   to   be   recorded   in   the Jamabandis  as the owner of the suit property. 25 The   Civil   Appeal   is   allowed   in   the   aforesaid   terms.   All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of. Ordered accordingly. .....................................J. (UDAY UMESH LALIT) .…...............………………J. (INDU MALHOTRA) New Delhi, July 1, 2019. 26