Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12
PETITIONER:
CHANDRAKANT KHAIRE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DR. SHANTARAM KALE & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT29/07/1988
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 1665 1988 SCR Supl. (1) 725
1988 SCC (4) 577 JT 1988 (3) 175
1988 SCALE (2)103
CITATOR INFO :
D 1989 SC1289 (14,18)
ACT:
Municipalities: Bombay Provincial Corporation Act
1949/Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Rules.
Section 453/Chapter II Rule 1(h)-Powers of Chairman-
’Adjourned for the day’, adjourned sine die, ’ ’proceedings
suspended’-Distinction between.
Section 6(2)-First meeting of the Municipal
Corporation-Properly convened-Cannot be adjourned for
another day or sine die.
Words and phrases: ’Adjourned for the day’ ’adjourned
sine die’-Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
After the election of Members, the first meeting of the
Aurangabad Municipal Corporation was held on May 6, 1983 at
2 P.M. and the Municipal Commissioner announced that the
polling for the offices of Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Members
of the standing Committee would commence from 2.30 p.m.
onwards. But at 2.30 P.M. some of the Councillors belonging
to the Opposition Party sat on the ballot boxes and some
others surrounded the Municipal Commissioner and demanded
that the meeting be adjourned to a subsequent date. The
Councillors belonging to the ruling party demanded that the
meeting and election be held later on that day. Total
confusion and bedlam prevailed and the rival groups started
throwing Chairs at each other, leading to a pandemonium. It
was a free for all, and even outsiders were present. When
the situation was brought under control, the Municipal
Commissioner announced that the meeting would continue and
the elections would be held at 4.30 p.m.
The petitioner filed a protest at 4.15 p.m. stating
that the meeting had been adjourned by the Municipal
Commissioner for the day and, therefore, the holding of the
meeting later on the same day would be improper and illegal.
Thereafter, the opposition group abstained from
participating in the meeting held at 4.30 p.m., in which
Respondents 1 and 2 were declared elected as Mayor and
Deputy Mayor respectively
726
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 12
and Respondents 3-8 as Members of the Standing Committee.
In a Writ Petition filed before the High Court, the
appellant questioned the election, on the basis that the
meeting in which the election was held, was invalid. The
High Court held that the meeting was not adjourned for the
day or sine die, but was only postponed, to be held as soon
as peace was restored on the very day and upheld the
election of Respondents 1 to 8. Against the judgment of the
High Court, the petitioner has filed the present special
leave petition.
On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that the
meeting was not adjourned to a definite point of time and
must therefore be regarded as adjourned for the day or
adjourned sine die.
The contention of the Respondents was that the meeting
had not been adjourned sine die but the proceedings had
merely been suspended at 2.45 p.m. and the adjourned meeting
held at 4.30 p.m. was a continuation of the original meeting
and no new notice of an adjourned meeting had to be given.
It was also contended that there was no warrant for
interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution since a
finding of fact had been reached by the High Court on
consideration of the material on record.
Dismissing the petition,
^
HELD: 1. A properly convened meeting cannot be
postponed. The proper course to adopt is to hold the meeting
as originally intended, and then and there adjourn it to a
more suitable date. If this course be not adopted, members
will be entitled to ignore the notice of postponement, and,
if sufficient to form a quorum, hold the meeting as
originally convened and validly transact the business
thereat. Even if the relevant rules do not give the chairman
power to adjourn the meeting, he may do so in the event of
disorder. Such an adjournment must be for no longer than the
chairman considers necessary and the chairman must, so far
as possible, communicate his decision to those present.
[739F-G]
2.1 In the instant case, the High Court was right in
holding that the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation
fixed by the Municipal Commissioner for May 6, 1988 was not
’adjourned for the day’ or ’adjourned sine die’ but had only
been put off to a later hour i.e. the proceedings had only
been suspended, to re-commence when peace and order were
restored. [740D-E]
727
2.2 There is nothing on record to sustantiate the
petitioner’s submission that the first meeting scheduled to
be held on May 6, 1988 at 2 P.M. was ’adjourned for the day’
or ’adjourned sine-die’ without transacting any business
i.e. without consideration of the agenda for the day. On the
contrary, it is not in dispute that the business for the day
was partly transacted when the Councillors met at 2 p.m. as
scheduled and the Municipal Commissioner declared that the
polling would commence from 2.30 p.m. onwards. The trouble
started at 2.30 p.m. when the Councillors belonging to the
petitioner’s party prevented the casting of votes by
snatching away the ballot boxes from the polling booths and
sat upon them. There was a pre-determined plan on their part
not to allow the first meeting to be held on that day. But
the Municipal Commissioner did not give way to the commotion
and pandemonium and he did not put off the meeting to
another day. In the prevailing situation, the Municipal
Commissioner had no other alternative but to adjourn the
meeting. Under the scheme of the Act, when the term of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 12
elected Councillors is a period of five years which in terms
of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Act is deemed to
commence on the date of the first meeting, the Municipal
Commissioner obviously could not adjourn the meeting for
another day or adjourn it sine die. If the contention that
the meeting having been adjourned without specifying a
definite point of time were to prevail, it would give rise
to a serious anomaly. The effect of adjourning the first
meeting to another day would imply the coming into existence
of another deemed date under s. 6(2) of the Act for
commencement of the term of the Councillors. The fact that
the Municipal Commissioner did not leave the House or vacate
the seat lends support to the version that he had merely
suspended the proceedings till order was restored. [737A-E]
Smt. Menaka Bala Dasi v. Hiralal Gobindalal & Anr., 37
CWN 583 and Sheokumar Shashtri v. Municipal Committee,
Rajnandgaon, AIR 1964 MP 195 Distinguished.
Shackelton on the Law & Practice of Meeting, 7th Edn.
p. 44, Horsley’s Meetings Procedure, Law and Practice, 2nd
Edition, p. 84, para 1002 referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 7508 of 1988.
From the Judgment and order dated 28.6.1988 of the
Bombay High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 800 of 1988.
728
S.N. Kacker, U.R. Lalit, V.D. Joshi, B.D. Joshi, S.C.
Bora and Kailash Vasdev for the Petitioner.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, V.A. Bobde, V.J. Francis, N.M. Popli
and Miss Almjit Chauhan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN, J. This special leave petition is directed against
the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated
June 28, 1988 upholding the election of respondents nos. 1
and 2 Dr. Shantaram Kale and Takiqui Hassan as Mayor and
Deputy Mayor respectively, and respondents nos. 3-8 as
Members of the Standing Committee at the first meeting of
the Aurangabad Municipal Corporation at the Alankar Hall,
held on May 6, 1988 at 2 p.m. The issue involved is whether
the first meeting of the Corporation called for that day at
2.45 p.m. by the Municipal Commissioner, respondent no. 9,
who presided over the meeting, was adjourned for the day or
adjourned sine die and therefore had to be called on some
subsequent date to be fixed by him and thus necessitated the
giving of seven days’ clear notice as required by r. 1(h),
Chapter II of the Rules framed under s. 453 of the Bombay
Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949.
Since the question involved was a matter of moment and
the affidavits filed by the petitioner Chandrakant Khaire,
the leader of the Shiv Sena Party which is the largest
single group in the Corporation consisting of 18 Concillors,
and by some of the Councillors as well as their supporters,
and the affidavits-in-opposition filed by the Party-in power
Congress-I which has formed a coalition with the splinter
groups commanding a majority of 32 Councillors in a House of
60, raise controverted facts as to whether the proceedings
of the meeting had been adjourned sine die or merely
suspended, we thought it better to have the minutes of the
proceedings before us. Shri Vinod Bobde, learned counsel
appearing for the Municipal Commissioner has placed the
minute books written in Marathi along with a translation
thereof in English. At the last occasion we were left with
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 12
the impression that the word used by the Municipal
Commissioner was ’tahkub’ while adjourning the meeting at
2.45 p.m. amidst unprecedented scenes of complete disorder,
commotion and pendemonium. We now find the word used in the
minutes is ’sthagit’ but in the translation furnished the
word used is ’adjourned’.
The facts revealed in the counter-affidavits filed by
the Munici-
729
pal Commissioner, Collector and the Superintendent of Police
show that a serious law and order situation had arisen due
to which both the Collector and the Superintendent of Police
had to rush to the venue of the meeting. They both have
sworn to the fact that not only the Councillors but many
outsiders were present in the hall where the meeting was
being held. There were also a large number of supporters of
the rival parties, spectators and journalists. The Municipal
Commissioner was surrounded by some 20-25 persons apart from
the Councillors, one group insisting upon the meeting being
adjourned for the day i.e. the Councillors belonging to the
majority Shiv Sena Party while the other group consisting of
the Congress-I Party and the splinter groups forming the
coalition demanding that the meeting be continued. The
Collector has sworn to the fact that there was ’total
confusion and bedlam inside the hall apart from the fact
that the entire atmosphere was surcharged with commotion’
and no business could be transacted. He has further sworn to
the fact that respondent no. 9, the Municipal Commissioner,
the presiding officer, appeared to be ’in a very agitated
state of mind’ and told him that he could not hold the
meeting in the unruly and disorderly situation prevailing
and complained that despite his repeated requests to the
Councillors to maintain peace, it had no effect and they
kept on shouting, raising slogans and fighting amongst
themselves and thereby making it impossible for him to
transact any business. The meeting was scheduled to be held
at 2 p.m. and respondent no. 9 announced that the polling
for the offices of Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Members of the
Standing Committee would commence from 2.30 p.m. onwards.
What happened thereafter reveals a very disturbing
feature which unfortunately has become too common these days
and shows the strain through which our democratic system is
passing. At about 2.30 p.m. some of the Councillors
belonging to the Shiv Sena Party sat on the ballot boxes and
others belonging to that Party and its supporters surrounded
the Municipal Commissioner demanding that the meeting be
adjourned to a subsequent date. Thereupon, the Councillors
belonging to the Party-in-power i.e. Congress-I, started
shouting at him that the meeting be held later on that day,
being apprehensive that if the meeting were to be adjourned,
they might lose the contest. There followed shouting of
slogans, hurling of abuses and thumping of the tables. The
Councillors belonging to the rival groups then started
throwing chairs at each other leading to a pandemonium. That
the fact that not only Councillors but also many outsiders
were present in the hall where the meeting was being held
who really had no business to be there, is clearly brought
out in the affidavits sworn by the Municipal
730
Commissioner, Collector and the Superintendent of Police.
They also show a large number of persons freely entering and
leaving the hall. It is apparent from the affidavit of the
Superintendent of Police that during the time when all this
happened, Viswasrao Deshmukh, Revenue Minister, Government
of Maharashtra came into his office and left the premises
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 12
while he was actually busy in supervising the bandobust. We
have been shown photographs showing the presence of a large
number of policemen wielding lathis inside the hall. The
Collector’s affidavit reveals that the Superintendent of
Police personally requested Chagan Bhujbal, a sitting Member
of the State Legislative Assembly belonging to the Shiv Sena
Party, to keep himself away from the premises of the meeting
hall. Be that as it may, it appears that both the officers
asked the outsiders to clear out of the hall, requested the
Councillors to take their places so as to permit the
Municipal Commissioner to transact the business for the day
and brought the situation under control. They have sworn to
the fact that after the Councillors had calmed down and
order was restored, both of them left the hall. Thereafter,
the Municipal Commissioner apparently announced on the mike
that the meeting would continue and the elections would be
held at 4.30 p.m. The petitioner Chandrakant Khaire being
the leader of the Shiv Sena Party, filed a written protest
at 4.15 p.m. that the meeting had been adjourned by the
Municipal Commissioner for the day and therefore the holding
of the meeting later on that day would be improper and
illegal. After this, the Councillors belonging to the
opposition group abstained from participating in the meeting
held at 4.30 p.m. at which respondents nos. 1 and 2 Dr.
Shantaram Kale and Takiqui Hassan were declared elected as
Mayor and Deputy Mayor respectively and respondents nos. 3-8
as Members of the Standing Committee, each of them having
polled 32 votes.
We had benefit of hearing Shri S.N. Kacker, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, learned
counsel appearing for respondents nos. 1-8 and Shri Vinod
Bobde, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 9, the
Municipal Commissioner. After a protracted hearing we at the
end of the day reserved orders. Having given the matter our
anxious consideration, we find it difficult to interfere
with the judgment of the High Court.
In view of the conflicting affidavits, the petitioner
and his supporters asserting that the Municipal Commissioner
had adjourned the meeting for the day and respondent no. 2
reiterating the version of the Municipal Commissioner that
he had only suspended the proceedings so that the meeting
could be held later in the day and the business for
731
the day, namely, election of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor and
Members of the Standing Committee, could be transacted, the
High Court relying on the ’preponderance of probabilities’
has come to the conclusion that in the facts and
circumstances the affidavit of the Municipal Commissioner,
respondent no. 9, appeared to be ’more impressive, probable
and convincing’ and therefore they were inclined to accept
it as ’one inspiring confidence’. Acting upon the affidavit
sworn by respondent no. 9, the Municipal Commissioner, the
High Court has found as a fact that the meeting was not
adjourned for the day or sine die but it was to be held as
soon as peace was restored on the very day i.e. the meeting
had only been postponed. That is an inference drawn from
affidavits and we find no just and compelling reasons to
upset the same.
Shri S.N. Kacker, learned counsel for the petitioner
contends that the High Court erred in proceeding on
probabilities in deciding the present matter which has far-
reaching ramifications affecting the democratic principles.
It is said that the High Court having found that because of
unruly and provocative atmosphere prevailing in the meeting
hall, the Municipal Commissioner was required to adjourn the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 12
meeting in order to restore peace and to re-arrange the
furniture which was helter-skelter as the Councillors, it is
stated, threw chairs at each other, erred in taking the view
that the meeting was not adjourned for the day or sine die
but had merely been suspended when in fact, the business for
the day, namely, elections to the offices of Mayor, Deputy
Mayor and Members of the Standing Committee, could not
obviously be transacted. He further contended that when the
Municipal Commissioner on his own showing had to adjourn the
proceedings in view of the prevailing atmosphere and since
he felt it was impossible to continue the election process
in that situation, it was wrongly held by the High Court
that the meeting was not adjourned sine die when the
Municipal Commissioner unequivocally admits that such
adjournment was necessary to enable him to decide and
announce the time for the resumption of the further
proceedings. In substance, the contention is that the
meeting was not adjourned to a definite point of time and
must therefore be regarded as adjourned for the day or
adjourned sine die. The learned counsel referred to several
law dictionaries to bring out the meaning of the expression
’adjourned sine die’ and relied upon the decision of the
Calcutta High Court in Smt. Menaka Bala Dasi v. Hiralal
Gobindalal & Anr., 37 CWN 583 and that of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Sheokumar Shashtri v. Municipal Committee,
Rajnandgaon, AIR (1964) MP 195, and also to a passage from
Shackleton on the Law & Practice of Meetings, 7th edn. at p.
44 for the
732
submission that in the case of adjournment sine die, the
meeting stands adjourned to an unspecified date and as such
a fresh notice calling for the meeting is necessary.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale appearing for respondents nos. 1-8 and
Shri Vinod Bobde for respondent no. 9, on the other hand,
contended that the meeting had not been adjourned sine die
but the proceedings had merely been suspended at 2.45 p.m.
and the adjourned meeting at 4.30 p.m. was a continuation of
the original meeting and no new notice of an adjourned
meeting had to be given. It was contended further that there
was no warrant for interference under Art. 136 of the
Constitution since a finding of fact has been reached by the
High Court on a consideration of the Material on record. It
was also contended that the petitioner having failed to make
good the averment in the writ petition that the meeting had
been ’adjourned for the day’, the High Court was justified
in declining to interfere.
In order to appreciate the point in controversy, it is
necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions
bearing on the question. It is needless to stress that a
Municipal Corporation cannot function without the Mayor,
Deputy Mayor and Members of the Standing Committee who are
entrusted with certain functions and duties under the Act.
Sub-s. (1) of s. 19 of the Act provides that ’the
Corporation shall at its first meeting after the general
elections ........... elect from amongst the Councillors one
of its members to be the Mayor and another to be the Deputy
Mayor’, their term of office being one year. Sub-s. (2) of
s. 20 enacts that ’the Corporation shall at its first
meeting after the general elections appoint 12 persons out
of its own body to be Members of the Standing Committee’.
The term of office of the elected Councillors, as provided
by s. 6(1), is a period of five years which in terms of sub-
s. (2) is deemed to commence on the date of the first
meeting called by the Municipal Commissioner. The relevant
Rules framed under s. 453 of the Act relating to the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 12
proceedings of the Corporation are as follows:
"1(b). The first meeting of the Corporation after
general elections shall be held as early as
conveniently may be on a day and at a time and
place to be fixed by the Commissioner, and if not
held on that day shall be held on some subsequent
date to be fixed by the Commissioner."
"1(h). At least seven clear days’ notice shall
ordinarily be given of every meeting, other than
any adjourned meeting....
733
1(m). Any meeting may, with the consent of a
majority of the councillors present be adjourned
from time to time to a later hour on the same day
or to any other, but no business shall be
transacted and, except as is hereinafter provided,
no proposition shall be discussed at any adjourned
meeting other than the business or proposition
remaining undisposed of at the meeting from which
the adjournment took place."
"2(3). The Presiding Officer may in case of grave
disorder suspend the meeting for a period not
exceeding three days."
It is therefore quite obvious that the first meeting of the
Corporation is of prime importance. Learned counsel for the
parties have agreed that cl.(m) may not govern the first
meeting of the Corporation but relates to subsequent
meetings. The question before us is whether the first
meeting ’could not be held on that day’ within the meaning
of cl.(b) of r. 1 and therefore had to be held ’on some
subsequent date to be fixed by the Municipal Commissioner’.
The affidavits on record clearly show that the Municipal
Commissioner who presided over the meeting, was constrained
to adjourn the meeting at 2.45 p.m. when some of the
Councillors belonging to the Shiv Sena Party, of which the
petitioner is the leader, went inside the booth and forcibly
removed the ballot boxes and sat upon them to prevent
casting of any votes, giving rise to commotion and
pandemonium. What actually happened is best stated by the
Municipal Commissioner in his affidavit:
"As a result there was tremendous confusion, chaos
and uproar in the house and there was tremendous
noise and nothing could be heard clearly.
I say that there was tremendous tension and
the situation was going out of control and it was
not possible to conduct the election at the moment
of time and therefore I announced that the meeting
is adjourned and that the Councillors should
restore peace. I also said that I shall soon
announce the time of meeting.
I say that I did not leave the house and
remained in the chair of the Presiding Authority
hoping that the peace would be restored and I
would be able to announce the time of the meeting.
Thereafter Shri Man Mohan Singh
734
Oberoi raised the point of order that the
meeting should not be adjourned and that he along
with another Councillor Dr. Sancheti insisted that
meeting should continue. At this stage the
situation in the house worsened and in fact there
was hot exchange of words and shouting between
different groups of Councillors. An attempt was
made to throw chairs at each other and in fact the
furniture in the house was scattered and several
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 12
Councillors surrounded me and some spoke in favour
of adjournment and some spoke in favour of
continuation. My efforts to restore peace and
order were futile, and there was serious law and
order situation.
In the circumstances aforesaid there was no
alternative and I felt that it was my duty to seek
the Police help and I called the Police to restore
order. Thereupon some of the Councillors objected
and actually resisted the entry of the Police.
Thereafter on my directives the Police soon left.
Some of the Shiv Sena Councillors were in
aggressive mood and they came to my table and
violently thumped the table and shouted that they
would not allow this meeting to take place. During
this period I even suggested that the Councillors
should go out. This was necessary as I felt that
without that the furniture cannot be re-arranged
and further steps for resuming the meeting will
not be possible. In the meantime the District
Magistrate Shri R.R. Sinha and Supdt. of Police
Shri T.C. Wankhede entered the Hall. S.P. Shri
Wankhede appealed the Councillors on the mike to
restore peace. I say that discussions took place
between myself and the Dist. Magistrate with a
view to restore the peace. The Dist. Magistrate
Shri Sinha also appealed to restore peace.
Thereafter the Councillors were calmed down and
the order was restored. On the peace being
restored both the District Magistrate and the S.P.
left the house at 3.45 p.m. I announced on the
mike that meeting would continue and election
would be held at 4.30 p.m."
".... in effect the adjournment declared by me as
aforesaid amounts to suspension of the meeting
because of the grave disorder ...."
735
"I also said that I shall soon make an
announcement about the time for resuming the
meeting."
"I had to adjourn the proceedings in view of the
prevailing circumstances set out hereinabove and
since I felt that it was impossible to continue
the election process in that situation. It was
also necessary to enable myself to decide and
announce the time for the resumption of the
further proceedings of the meeting."
While setting out the facts we have already adverted to
the facts sworn by the Collector and the Superintendent of
Police. There is no reason not to act on these affidavits.
The Collector says that ’there was total confusion and
bedlam inside the hall’ apart from the fact that ’the entire
atmosphere was surcharged with commotion’, and ’the
Municipal Commissioner was in a very agitated state of mind
and said that he could not hold the meeting in the unruly
and disorderly situation prevailing’. There can be no doubt
that such unruly scenes witnessed on that day gave rise to a
serious law and order situation but both the Collector and
the Superintendent of Police were able to restore order in
the House and prevailed upon the outsiders to vacate the
meeting hall in order that the proceedings could be resumed.
The fact that the Municipal Commissioner did not leave the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 12
House or vacate the seat does lend support to the version
that he had merely suspended the proceedings till order was
restored. There is no reason to doubt the affidavit sworn by
the Municipal Commissioner that he announced on the mike at
3.45 p.m. that the proceedings would be resumed at 4.30 p.m.
for transacting the business for the day.
It is quite obvious that the meeting was not ’adjourned
for the day’ or ’adjourned sine die’. Shri Kacker, learned
counsel for the petitioner contended that when the
affidavits of the three officers showed that utter confusion
prevailed and there was pandemonium all around with
strangers moving about in the meeting hall, it must
necessarily follow that no business could be transacted on
that day. The contention is that the meeting was not
adjourned to a definite point of time and must therefore be
regarded as ’adjourned for the day’ or ’adjourned sine die’.
He referred to the decisions in Menaka Bala Dasi and
Sheokumar Shashtri, as also to various law dictionaries,
besides a passage from Shackleton on the Law and Practice of
Meetings, 7th edn. at p. 44. On the strength of these
authorities, it was submitted that
736
the meeting was adjourned not to a definite point of time
and must therefore be regarded as ’adjourned for the day’ or
’adjourned sine die’. He accordingly submitted that the
Municipal Commissioner should have fixed another date for
the meeting and issued fresh notice therefor. We are afraid,
we cannot accept this line of reasoning.
According to the ordinary meaning, the expression ’sine
die’ as given in Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd edn., vol.
II at p. 2000 means:
"Without any day being specified (for
reassembling, resumption of business etc.);
indefinitely."
Similarly, in Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary,
International edn., the meaning given is more or less the
same:
"Without a day; indefinitely: an adjournment sine
die (that is, without setting a day for
ressembling)."
The same is the legal meaning. In Black’s Law Dictionary,
Deluxe 4th edn. at p. 1556, the meaning of the expression
sine die is:
"Without day; without assigning a day for a
further meeting or hearing."
The legal meaning given in Jowitt’s Dictionary of English
Law, 2nd edn., vol. II at p. 1663 reads:
"Without a day being fixed. The consideration of a
matter is said to be adjourned sine die when it is
adjourned without a day being fixed for its
resumption."
The passage in Shackleton at p. 44 on which the learned
counsel relies reads:
"Adjourned meetings: Notice. An adjournment, if
bona fide, is only a continuation of the meeting
and the notice that was given for the first
meeting holds good for and includes all the other
meetings following up it. If however the meeting
is adjourned sine die, a fresh notice must be
given.
No new business can be introduced unless
notice of such new business is given."
737
There can be no dispute with the proposition but the
difficulty is about the applicability of that principle to
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 12
the facts of the case. Literally, there is nothing on record
to substantiate the petitioner’s submission that the first
meeting scheduled to be held on May 6, 1988 at 2 p.m. was
’adjourned for the day’ or ’adjourned sine die’ without
transacting any business i.e. without consideration of the
agenda for the day. On the contrary, it is not in dispute
that the business for the day was partly transacted when the
Councillors met at 2 p.m. as scheduled and the Municipal
Commissioner declared that the polling would commence from
2.30 p.m. onwards. The trouble started at 2.30 p.m. when the
Councillors belonging to the petitioner’s Shiv Sena Party
prevented the casting of votes by snatching away the ballot
boxes from the polling booths and sat upon them. There was a
pre-determined plan on their part not to allow the first
meeting to be held on that day. But the Municipal
Commissioner did not give way to the commotion and
pandemonium and he did not put off the meeting to another
day. In the prevailing situation, the Municipal Commissioner
had no other alternative but to adjourn the meeting. Under
the scheme of the Act, when the term of the elected
Councillors is a period of five years which in terms of sub-
s. (2) of s. 6 of the Act is deemed to commence on the date
of the first meeting, the Municipal Commissioner obviously
could not adjourn the meeting for another day or adjourn it
sine die. If the contention that the meeting having been
adjourned without specifying a definite point of time were
to prevail, it would give rise to a serious anomaly. The
effect of adjourning the first meeting to another day would
imply the coming into existence of another deemed date under
s. 6(2) of the Act for commencement of the term of the
Councillors. The Municipal Commissioner has unequivocally
asserted that he only suspended the proceedings in order
that they could be resumed for transaction of the business
for the day, and the business for the day had to be
transacted on May 6, 1988, the date of the first meeting, as
fixed by him. Admittedly, the Municipal Commissioner did not
leave the meeting hall nor vacate his seat. He showed
exemplary courage in not yielding to the threats of violence
wielded by the party in opposition, because he knew that in
law the first meeting had to be held on that day and could
not be adjourned to another day. There is no reason to
disbelieve the Municipal Commissioner that when he adjourned
the meeting he simultaneously made an announcement that he
would later announce the time when the meeting was to be
resumed. He is candid enough to say that he had to adjourn
the proceedings in view of the prevailing situation when he
felt that it was impossible to continue the election process
hoping that peace would soon be restored and he would be
able to announce the time of the
738
meeting. One of the reasons given for the adjournment was
that he adjourned the meeting to enable him to decide and
announce the time for the resumption of the further
proceedings of the meeting.
Rankin, CJ in Menaka Bala Dasi’s case in repelling the
contention that adjournment sine die of an application for
making a decree in a mortgage suit final, was a
discontinuance of it, observed:
"(W)hatever may be the old authorities on that
point, I have no doubt myself that with us to-day
’adjournment sine die’ differs altogether from
discontinuance. It is after all an adjournment-an
adjournment to a date that is not at the moment
fixed."
The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 12
Sheokumar Shasthri’s case relied upon by learned counsel for
the petitioner is clearly distinguishable. In that case, it
was admitted that the meeting of the Municipal Committee
summoned for January 17, 1962 at which the motion of no
confidence was to have been moved was adjourned sine die for
want of quorum and the High Court held relying upon the
proviso to s. 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act,
1961, that a meeting convened for consideration of a no
confidence motion could not be adjourned sine die, but had
to be adjourned to ’some other day’ for which a fresh notice
was necessary, P.V. Dixit, CJ speaking for himself and K.L.
Pandey, J. observed:
"It is settled law that where there is a power of
adjournment and a meeting is adjourned, then the
adjourned meeting is a continuation of the
original meeting and no new notice of an adjourned
meeting need be given unless the relevant
statutory provisions or rules so require. But in
the case of an adjournment sine die a fresh notice
is necessary, (See: Scadding v. Lorant, [1851] 3
HLC 418; and Wills v. Murray, [1850] 4 Ex 843. The
proviso to section 32 of the C.P. and Berar
Municipalities Act, 1922, laid down that:
"If at any ordinary or special meeting of the
committee a quorum is not present, the
Chairman shall adjourn the meeting to such
other day as he may think fit ........"
Under this proviso, a meeting could be adjouned to
some fixed date and not sine die."
739
The decision in Sheokumar Shashtri is therefore of no avail.
Shackleton on the Law & Practice of Meetings, 7th edn.
apart from the passage at p. 44 already quoted, gives the
different shades of meaning of adjournment as understood in
legal parlance, in the following words:
"Adjournment is the act is postponing a meeting of
any private or public body or any business until
another time, or indefinitely, in which case it is
an adjournment sine die. The word applies also to
the period during which the meeting or business
stands adjourned. An Adjournment may be:
1. For an interval expiring on the day of
the adjournment.
2. For an interval expiring on some later
date.
3. For an indefinite time (i.e. sine die).
4. Until a fixed time and date.
5. To another place."
The learned author then sets out the different causes giving
rise to an adjournment which may be by (1) Resolution of the
meeting. (2) Action of the chairman, and (3) Failure to
achieve or maintain a quorum.
A properly convened meeting cannot be postponed. The
proper course to adopt is to hold the meeting as originally
intended, and then and there adjourn it to a more suitable
date. If this course be not adopted, members will be
entitled to ignore the notice of postponement, and, if
sufficient to form a quorum, hold the meeting as originally
convened and validly transact the business thereat. Even if
the relevant rules do not give the chairman power to adjourn
the meeting, he may do so in the event of disorder. Such an
adjournment must be for no longer than the chairman
considers necessary and the chairman must, so far as
possible, communicate his decision to those present.
The law relating to adjournment has been put succinctly
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 12
in Horsley’s Meetings Procedure, Law and Practice, 2nd edn.,
edt. by W. John Taggart at p. 84, para 1002:
740
"The word ’adjournment’ tends to be used loosely
in connection with meetings. Indeed, as a result,
the word is possibly in process of acquiring a
further, derived meaning of ’close, conclude or
finish’, whereas a meeting or a debate is
adjourned when its further proceedings are
postponed to some subsequent time or to enable it
to reassemble at some other place; to a later hour
in the same day, to some future date, or
indefinitely, i.e. sine die (without a day being
named). The business (of the whole meeting or the
debate respectively) is indeed suspended, but with
an intention of deferring it until resumption at a
later time."
The learned author goes on to say that the word ’adjourn’
has been in use for almost five centuries in connection with
meetings, with an early meaning of ’to put off or defer
proceedings to another day’, and adds:
"This in due course gave rise to the added meaning
’to break off for later resumption’."
On an overall view of the facts and circumstances, we
have no hesitation in upholding the finding that the first
meeting of the Municipal Corporation fixed by the Municipal
Commissioner for May 6, 1988 was not ’adjourned for the day’
or ’adjourned sine die’ but had only been put off to a later
hour i.e. the proceedings had only been suspended, to re-
commence when peace and order were restored.
In the result, the special leave petition must fail and
is dismissed. No costs.
G.N. Petition dismissed.
741