Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HARISH CHANDRA NIGAM
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF U.F.
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/01/1980
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
CITATION:
1980 AIR 647 1980 SCR (2) 809
1980 SCC (1) 662
ACT:
Defence of India Act, 1962, sections 29 and 35(1) scope
of-Requisition orders issued to the person actually in
possession, but while issuing requisition orders, possession
ordered to be given to the State and not to the individuals
from whom taken-Propriety of the order.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants in both the appeals were allotted a plot
each "provisionally subject to the final approval of
Government" and possession thereof was also given in 1956.
Six years later by letter dated 31-10-62 they were informed
that "the State Government has not approved the allotment in
your favour and the provisional allotment made in your
favour stands cancelled". Steps were to be taken for the
eviction as per the said letter of cancellation, but before
any action was taken, the District Magistrate requisitioned
the said plots for defence purposes under section 29 of the
Defence of India Act, 1922. The letters of requisition were
addressed to the appellants and possession taken. No steps
were taken by the Department for taking formal or symbolical
possession of the plots in question after they were
requisitioned by the Magistrate. Later on, while
derequisitioning the said plots under section 35(1) of the
Defence of India Act 1962, the Magistrate "specified the
Director of Industries, Kanpur as the person to whom the
possession of the said plots shall be given". Possession was
given accordingly and the Director of Industries in CA
560/70 in turn allotted the plot covered in it to one Mrs.
B. K. Anand respondent 5 therein.
The writ Petitions filed by the appellants in the High
Court challenging the said orders failed and hence the
appeal by special leave.
Allowing CA 559/70 and dismissing CA 560/70, the Court,
^
HELD: The inquiry envisaged under sub section (1) of
section 35 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, is
necessitated only if facts and events taking place after
requisition necessitate it. Otherwise not. As for example,
suppose, possession of a property is taken from X and after
requisition he dies and dispute starts between his heirs as
to who is entitled to get back the property. A summary and
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prima facie inquiry may be made under sub-s. (1) and
property may be released in favour of the person who may be
entitled to the possession of it in the opinion of the
Government. Of course such a decision would be subject to
the adjudication of the rights of the parties in accordance
with sub-s. (2). [814 C-E]
Facts anterior to the requisition are not necessary to
be investigated for release of the property because the
property has to be released in favour of the person from
whom possession was taken. If it were not so then it would
be enlarging the scope of the inquiry envisaged under sub-s.
(1) of s. 35 of
810
the Act and the power of the Government to adjudicate upon
anterior title of the various claimants to the property.
This is not the scope of the inquiry. [814 E-F]
Technically speaking on a correct interpretation of the
law the property on de-requisition ought to have been
released in favour of the two appellants in the two appeals
from whom possession was taken at the time of requisition.
The requisition was effected by an order in writing
addressed to the person in possession of the property in
accordance with sub-s. (2) of s. 29. He may not be the owner
of the property. But on requisition possession was taken
from him. [814 C-D, F-G]
[The Court, however, passed a qualified and conditional
order in terms].
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 559-560
of 1970.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and order
dated 24-1-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special
Appeal No. 511 of 1968 connected with Special Appeal No. 512
of 1968.
R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis for the Appellant.
Madan Bhatia for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, J.-These two appeals by special leave have
been heard together as common questions of law and fact are
involved in them. We shall state the facts of Civil Appeal
No. 559 of 1970 in which the appellant is Shri Harish
Chandra Nigam. The facts of the other appeal viz. Civil
Appeal No. 560 of 1970 in which the appellant is Shri Amar
Singh are almost identical except one which shall be stated
hereinafter. The plot concerned in Nigam’s appeal is plot
no. 60 and in the other appeal it is plot no. 6. Nigam made
an application to the Director of Industries, Uttar Pradesh
for allotment of the plot to him for industrial purposes. By
an order dated November 22, 1956 the application was
"provisionally accepted subject to the final approval of
Government." Finally he was informed by the Manager of
Industrial Estate, Kalpi Road, Kanpur in his letter dated
31-10-1962 "that the State Government has not approved the
allotment in your favour and the provisional allotment made
in your favour stands cancelled." But it appears after the
provisional allotment Nigam was put in possession of the
land. Steps were to be taken for his eviction after giving
information as to the cancellation of the allotment in the
letter aforesaid dated 31-10-1962. But before these steps
were taken and possession was recovered from him the
District Magistrate, Kanpur requisitioned the plot under
section
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811
29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962; hereinafter called the
Act. This order is dated 7-12-1963. The order reads as
follows:-
"Whereas in my opinion it is necessary and
expedient to requisition unit no. 60 in the Govt.
Industrial Estate, Kanpur specified below, of which you
are the person in possession for efficient conduct of
Military operations.
And whereas the powers of requisitioning under
Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (Central
Act. No. 51 of 1962) have been conferred on me by the
Government of Uttar Pradesh under Notification No.
5589/18-I-LA/63, dated January 14, 1963 issued by
Revenue (B) Department-/18 Bhardwaj, District
Magistrate, Kanpur hereby requisition the aforesaid
Unit and order that possession thereof be delivered by
11-12-63 to the General Manager, ordnance Factory,
Kalpi Road, Kanpur, after removing therefrom any
furniture or other articles.
I further order that the Tahsildar, Kanpur shall
arrange for the delivery of possession of the aforesaid
unit to the General Manager, ordnance Factory, Kalpi
Road, Kanpur at the expiry of the period indicated
above, if the possession is not delivered in compliance
of the above order."
Pursuant to the above order possession was taken from
appellant Nigam on January 2, 1964 and was handed over to
the General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Kanpur. No steps were
taken by the Industries department for taking formal or
symbolical possession of the plot in question after it was
requisitioned by the District Magistrate. Then came the
derequisitioned order passed by the District Magistrate
under s. 35 of the Act on 20-1-1967. In passing it may be
mentioned here that the appellant had kept his stores in two
of the rooms standing in the land. But this fact is not very
material for the purpose of deciding the matter in issue
before us.
The de-requisition order reads as follows:-
"Regarding requisition of Unit No. 6 and 60
Industrial Estate for starting Astisan Training School
by the Ordnance Factory, Kalpi Road, Kanpur.
ORDER
Whereas the property specified in the schedule
hereto appended was requisitioned by the order of the
District Magistrate, Kanpur dated 7-12-1963 until
further order.
812
And whereas it has now been decided that the said
property shall be released from requisition with
immediate effect.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Defence of India
Act, 1962 (Act No. 51 of 1962), I, S. S. Sidhu,
District Magistrate, Kanpur being the competent
authority do here by declare that the said property is
released from requisition, and hereby specify the
Director of Industries, Kanpur as the person to whom
the possession of the said property shall be given.
Thereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in the
Allahabad High Court to issue a writ in the nature of
mandamus against the respondent directing to deliver
possession of the property in dispute to the appellant and
not to deliver possession to any other person. It appears,
however, that possession of the property had been given to
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the Industries department. The petitioner unsuccessfully
prosecuted his writ petition before the learned single Judge
of the High Court. He failed in appeal also. Hence the
present appeal.
One extra fact which need be mentioned in regard to the
case of Amar Singh is that after de-requisition and after
possession of the plot was taken by the Industries
department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh the plot was
allotted to Mrs. B. K. Anand, respondent no. 5 in Civil
Appeal No. 560 of 1970. The other facts of his case are
identical.
Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted before us
that irrespective of the disputed question of fact whether
there was final allotment in favour of the appellant or not,
since requisition order had been served on him and
possession had been taken from him, the property and its
possession on de-requisition ought to have been released to
him. It could not be made in favour of the Industries
department. Learned counsel for the State, on the other
hand, submitted that since the appellant had not semblance
of right, title or interest left in the plot after
cancellation of the provisional allotment in his favour he
had no locus standi to ask for a writ of mandamus for
delivery of possession of the plot to him. Direction was
given for releasing the plot in favour of the Industries
department and if the appellant is so advised he may recover
possession of the plot on establishment of his right, title
or interest in the plot in a competent court in accordance
with sub-s.(2) of section 35 of the Act. It was
813
further submitted in case of Amar Singh that the plot had
been allotted to Mrs. B. K. Anand and she cannot be
dispossessed now.
We shall read the two provisions first and enunciate
the law engrafted in them and then proceed to pass the final
orders in the two appeals as their respective facts and
circumstances may warrant.
Sections 29 and 35 read as follows:-
"29. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, if in the
opinion of the Central Government or the State
Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for
securing the defence of India, civil defence, public
safety, maintenance of public order or efficient
conduct of military operations, or for maintaining
supplies and services essential to the life of the
community, that Government may by order in writing
requisition any immovable property and may make such
further orders as appear to that Government to be
necessary or expedient in connection with the
requisitioning:
Provided that no property or part thereof which is
exclusively used by the public for religious worship
shall be requisitioned.
(2) The requisition shall be effected by an order
in writing addressed to the person deemed by the
Central Government or the State Government, as the case
may be, to be the owner or person in possession of the
property, and such order shall be served in the
prescribed manner on the person to whom it is
addressed.
(3) Whenever any property is requisitioned under
sub-section (1), the period of such requisition shall
not extend beyond the period for which such property is
required for any of the purposes mentioned in that sub-
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section.
35. (1) Where any property requisitioned under
section 29 is to be released from such requisition, the
Government by which or under whose authority the
property was requisitioned or any person generally or
specially authorised by it in this behalf may, after
such inquiry, if any, as it or he may in any case,
consider necessary to make or cause to be made, specify
by order in writing the person to whom possession of
the property shall be given and such possession shall,
as far as practicable, be given to the person who
814
appears to the Government or, as the case may be, the
person authorised as aforesaid, to be entitled to the
possession of the property at the time such order is
made.
(2) The delivery of possession of the property to
the person specified in the order under sub-section (1)
shall be a full discharge of the Government from all
liabilities in respect of the property, but shall not
prejudice by any rights in respect of the property
which any other person may be entitled by due process
of law to enforce against the person to whom possession
of the property is delivered."
The requisition was effected by an order in writing
addressed to the person in possession of the property in
accordance with sub-s. (2) of s. 29. He may not be the owner
of the property. But on requisition possession was taken
from him. The inquiry envisaged under sub-s. (1) of s. 35 is
necessitated only if facts and events taking place after
requisition necessitate it. Otherwise not. As for example,
suppose, possession of a property is taken from X and after
requisition he dies and dispute starts between his heirs as
to who is entitled to get back the property. A summary and
prima facie inquiry may be made under sub-s. (1) and
property may be released in favour of the person who may be
entitled to the possession of it in the opinion of the
Government. Of course such a decision would be subject to
the adjudication of the rights of the parties in accordance
with sub-s. (2). Facts anterior to the requisition are not
necessary to be investigated for release of the property
because the property has to be released in favour of the
person from whom possession was taken. If it were not so
then it would be enlarging the scope of the inquiry
envisaged under sub-s. (1) of s. 35 of the Act and the power
of the Government to adjudicate upon anterior title of the
various claimants to the property. This is not the scope of
the inquiry. It is, therefore, clear to us that technically
speaking on a correct interpretation of the law the property
on de-requisition ought to have been released in favour of
the two appellants in the two appeals from whom possession
was taken at the time of requisition. But on the special
facts of these two appeals we do not feel persuaded to make
our unqualified or unconditional order in these appeals
filed on grant of special leave under Art. 136 of the
Constitution as justice requires only a qualified and
conditional order. It is plain on the facts placed before us
that there was no final allotment of the plots in favour of
the appellants. The allotment was only provisional subject
to the approval of the Government. Possession had been given
to them and before requisition the Industries
815
department had not recovered back possession of either of
the two plots. In such a situation we make the following
orders in the two appeals separately.
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Civil Appeal No. 559 of 1970.
The possession of plot no. 60 is directed to be
delivered to appellant Nigam within a period of six months
from today. If during the said period of six months the
Government takes adequate and legal steps for taking back
formal possession of the plot from him, then possession need
not be delivered back to Nigam. But on their failure to do
so our direction will hold good and possession of plot no.
60 will have to be given to Nigam subject to its recovery
back by the Government even later. It will be open to the
aggrieved party, if necessary, to initiate a proceeding in
accordance with sub-s. (2) of s. 35. We allow this appeal in
part to the extent and in the manner indicated above.
Civil Appeal No. 560 of 1970.
Since in this case allotment of the plot was made in
favour of Mrs. B. K. Anand, we do not consider it just and
expedient to direct the Government to take steps for
completing the formality of taking possession and to
dispossess Mrs. Anand. On the special facts of this case we
dismiss this appeal in toto.
There will be no order as to costs in either of the
appeals.
V.D.K. C.A. 559/70 allowed.
C.A. 560/70 dismissed.
816