Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Miscellaneous Application No.1630 of 2020
in
Writ Petition (C) No.880 of 2016
SURAZ INDIA TRUST … Petitioner
Versus
UNION OF INDIA …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The raison d’etre of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain the dignity of
the institution of judicial forums. It is not a vindictive exercise nor are
inappropriate statements by themselves capable of lowering the dignity of a
Judge. These are often ignored but where despite all latitude a perennial
litigant seeks to justify his existence by throwing mud at all and sundry, the
Court has to step in.
2. In order to understand the contours of the present dispute, nothing
Signature Not Verified
more is required than to turn to the judgment of this Court in WP(C)
Digitally signed by
RASHI GUPTA
Date: 2021.09.29
17:00:26 IST
Reason:
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No.880/2016 dated 01.05.2017. This judgment is not an origination but in
some sense a culmination. Mr. Rajiv Daiya, claims to be the spirit behind
Suraz India Trust (for short ‘Trust’), which has been filing a large number of
cases both in Rajasthan and in Delhi. A perusal of the judgment dated
01.05.2017 would show that Mr. Daiya as Chairman of the Trust has been
canvassing matters in person. These petitions are stated to be public interest
litigations. A list of cases filed by him was prepared in the proceedings in
WP(C) No.880/2016, numbering 12 before this Court alone. Further, as per
the summary prepared by the Registry, there were 64 different proceedings
in these 12 cases as mentioned in para 3 of the aforementioned judgment.
The Court formed a prima facie view that the litigation initiated by the Trust
was thoughtless and frivolous. Liberty was granted to Mr. Daiya to make a
voluntary statement, if he considered it appropriate that Suraz India Trust
will henceforth not file any petition urging a cause in public interest.
Thereby, the Court made it clear to him that if he did so the matter would be
closed and no further consequences would follow. In the alternative, he was
asked to file a response to establish the bona fides of the Trust. Mr. Daiya
wanted to prosecute the matter without filing a written response despite the
opportunity. He claimed to have been dissatisfied by the Court, both on the
administrative and judicial side, with their manner of dealing with his
representations. Thereafter, he forwarded a disparaging communication to
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the residential offices of Hon’ble Judges. The endeavour, if one may say,
was to browbeat the Registry at that time. He sought to make
representations to the President of India and the Prime Minister too. In the
text of grievances made by the Trust, disparaging remarks were contained
therein not only with reference to the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court but
also with reference to the Judges of this Court. The vilification extended to
all levels of judicial officers in the State of Rajasthan as also the Chief
Justice and other Judges of that Court. The Bench opined that extremely
important matters are taken up for consideration on a daily basis and judicial
time gets wasted because individuals not competent to assist the Court insist
without due cause to be granted a prolonged hearing. A misconceived
petition in that case was not only dismissed, but a direction was issued that
the Trust shall henceforth refrain from filing any cause in public interest
before any Court in this country and that it will equally apply to Mr. Rajiv
Daiya. Exemplary costs of Rs. 25 lakhs were imposed on Mr. Rajiv Daiya,
to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Welfare Trust
within three months from the date of the order, failing which the costs would
be recovered from Mr. Rajiv Daiya through his personal proceeds, if
necessary. The matter was directed to be listed in case costs were not
deposited.
3. The costs were not deposited and Mr. Daiya filed an application on
3
21.08.2017 seeking to submit unconditional apology with a prayer that the
costs imposed on him of Rs. 25 lakhs be waived and that he be pardoned
against charges of contempt. In MA No. 507 of 2017, Mr. Daiya requested
the court to not enforce the judgment dated 01.05.2017 passed in WP(C) No.
880 of 2016 as he had moved for sanction of prosecution to the President of
India. The Court, on 21.08.2017 ordered that the letter requesting sanction of
prosecution written by Mr. Daiya to the President of India qua the Judges
who presided over the Bench be placed on record. Thereafter on 05.12.2017,
the application of Mr. Daiya was dismissed observing that the Bench was not
inclined to modify the order and the Registry was directed to proceed as per
law.
4. MA No. 1158 of 2017 was placed before this Court by the Registry as
Mr. Daiya had failed to withdraw all pending cases filed by the Trust in
accordance with paragraph 27 of the judgment dated 01.05.2017. Since costs
were not deposited all applications and writ petitions filed by the Trust and
Mr. Daiya were directed to be dismissed with the direction to the Registry
not to accept any application or petition filed by either by the Trust or Mr.
Daiya vide order dated 08.02.2018.
5. MA No.1630 of 2020 by way of an Office Report was placed before
the Court on 29.09.2020 informing that the costs had not been deposited by
the Trust. This aspect was also confirmed by the Secretary of the Supreme
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Court AOR Welfare Trust since the costs had to be deposited with the said
entity. That being the position on the said date an order was passed issuing
notice to the Trust. Instead of responding to the same, Mr. Daiya sought
from the Registry the note sheets on the basis of which the directions had
been sought by the Registry vide e-mail dated 16.10.2020. This was
followed by an e-mail dated 09.02.2021. In view of the peremptory nature
of the order dated 08.02.2018 the said letter was sought to be circulated for
directions to accept the applications at the filing counter. On 12.02.2021 the
Court noted that there was no basis for demanding the note sheets. In view of
the obdurate stand of Mr. Daiya and non-appearance in pursuance of the
notices served, bailable warrants were directed to be issued for his
production in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount.
6. At that stage Mr. Daiya did a volte face and moved IA No.36444/2021
on 22.02.2021 seeking to submit an unconditional apology with an audit
report showing his assets in compliance with the order dated 29.09.2020.
The factum of this IA was placed on record by the Registry. The Court was
informed that the same was not accepted on 22.02.2021, once again, because
of the peremptory nature of the order.
7. Now there was another U-turn by Mr. Daiya, who addressed a letter
dated 11.03.2021 to the Attorney General of India. In this letter, consent was
sought to initiate proceedings for criminal contempt against the Assistant
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Registrar of the PIL Section, Section X and Section XVI-A and other
officials for obstructing and interfering with administration of justice by not
letting the matter of Mr. Daiya be decided on merits of the case.
Simultaneously consent was also sought for filing contempt proceedings
against the then Chief Justice of India Shri J.S. Khehar (since retired),
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) as they
were the three Judges party to the judgment passed on 01.05.2017 on the
ground that the Judges were obstructing the meritorious decision making of
various petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. On
14.03.2021, Mr. Daiya sent a letter to the Registrar stating that he had filed
an application for unconditional apology and producing details of assets in
compliance with the order dated 29.09.2020, however, that the same be
considered by a Bench comprising the Chief Justice of India. On
15.03.2021, the Bench directed Mr. Daiya to place on record his current
sources of income, more so, as he had claimed that he was in a Government
job. He was directed to give a complete list of his movable and immovable
assets, if any. Further, since he was claiming to be in a Government job he
should give his last salary slip which would show emoluments being
received by him along with deductions being made.
8. On 23.03.2021 the Attorney General sent two letters to Mr. Daiya
denying him initiation of contempt proceedings in respect of both the letters
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dated 11.03.2021. Mr. Daiya, however, addressed two letters dated
26.03.2021 and 27.03.2021 to the Attorney General with identical content,
stating that he should be granted an opportunity to place the entire record
before him. On 26.03.2021, an e-mail was addressed to the Assistant
Registrar (PIL Section) stating that one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) should
recuse himself as he had moved for sanction of prosecution before the
President of India against him. The letter addressed to the President was also
attached. This was in the context of the action he wanted to take against the
Coram which passed the order dated 01.05.2017 as according to him it
fulfilled the requirements of an offence under Section 219 of the Indian
Penal Code (Public servant in judicial proceedings corruptly making reports,
etc. contrary to law). On 27.03.2021, an e-mail was sent reminding the
Attorney General of the letter sent earlier on 26.03.2021.
9. On 02.04.2021, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of
India requesting information to take suo motu cognizance of the criminal
complaint against the Assistant Registrar and officers/officials of the PIL
(Writ) Section.
10. In the aforesaid context when the matter was listed on 05.04.2021,
Mr. Daiya sought to excuse himself from appearing before the Court on
account of Covishield vaccination. He had not complied with the orders and
was seeking to wriggle out of the proceedings by raising all kinds of
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objections, i.e., that the matter should not be heard by the Bench but by a
bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. It was, thus, observed that this
was not the prerogative of Mr. Daiya, and the Chief Justice had despite his
letter continued to permit the same Bench to deal with the matter. Since
Mr. Daiya was found to be bent upon violating the directions of the Court,
the Court deemed it appropriate to issue notice of contempt to Mr. Daiya
returnable on 12.04.2021. Incidentally, Mr. Daiya, despite the aforesaid
request, was present in Court and accepted notice. On the issue of
Government job, he stated that what he was referring to was the fact that he
was a Stenographer in a legal office, but deployed with the State of
Rajasthan. Notice was thus issued to State of Rajasthan to verify the factum
in view of non-cooperative attitude of Mr. Daiya.
11. On 08.04.2021, Mr. Daiya filed a report with details of his movable
and immovable assets. He claimed to have regularly taken loans for meeting
various requirements, which were being deducted from his emoluments. In
the liabilities he sought to put forth the expenses towards his daughter’s
study apart from the liability of marriage of his daughter. He submitted that
he had no sufficient funds to make payment of the costs.
12. In the next proceedings held on 12.04.2021, the State of Rajasthan
was asked to give information about the employment of Mr. Daiya and
whether the activities he was carrying on were permissible while being so
8
engaged and drawing salary from the State. The request made for
appointment of an Amicus for Mr. Daiya was declined as he had been
appearing in person practically in all cases.
13. On 03.05.2021, an affidavit was filed by the State of Rajasthan
informing that Mr. Daiya was working in the office of the Government
Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General at Jodhpur, which was an office
separate from the office of the Advocate General of the State. He had been
issued show cause notice under relevant service rules applicable and had
been suspended and transferred since his conduct before various courts as
the Chairman of the Trust was in violation of the relevant service rules.
Against this, Mr. Daiya had filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High
Court, being S.B. Civil Writ No.6864/2021. Thus, on 06.05.2021 in the
proceedings it was noted that the State had moved for vacation of interim
order and the State would take steps to commence the process for recovery
of costs as ‘arrears of land revenue’.
14. On 10.05.2021, Mr. Daiya filed an application for recalling/review of
the order dated 06.05.2021. It was claimed that he was not given a chance to
be heard and that the proceedings for recovery were a nullity. It was his case
that the dismissal of the recovery proceedings in MA No.507/2017 by a
Bench of three Judges on 21.08.2017 was binding on the present Bench. He
conveniently ignored that the said proceedings recorded only his submission
9
with the direction to place an application that he had moved for sanction of
prosecution before the President of India. The order passed in M.A.
No.507/2017 on 05.12.2017 was to the effect that Mr. Daiya’s prayer to
modify the order was actually declined and the Registry was directed to
proceed as per law (for recovery of costs).
15. Once again on 08.07.2017, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to the
Registrar stating that he had filed a complaint with the President of India
against one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.), for conducting an inquiry under
In-House procedure vide letter dated 07.06.2021. A reminder was sent on
08.07.2021 and once again, requesting that the matter be listed before a
Bench of which one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) was not a member. He
had also sought some RTI query.
16. On 09.07.2021 the attention of the Court was invited to the letter of
Mr. Daiya. It was found that all kinds of pleadings were being made in an
issue of what was simply of recovery of costs from the Trust/Mr. Daiya
Letters were also written to scandalise the Court and prevent the Court from
taking action to ensure recovery of costs. It was, thus, clearly an endeavour
to browbeat the Court which the Court would not countenance. Contempt
notice was issued to Mr. Daiya as to why he should not be proceeded against
and sentenced for his endeavour to scandalise the Court returnable on the
next date, i.e., 04.08.2021. Thereafter, Mr. Daiya sought adjournment as he
10
had undergone some surgery and the State counsel was asked to verify when
Mr. Daiya would be able to attend the Court proceedings as per medical
advice. On 18.08.2021 it was noticed that as per the affidavit filed on behalf
of the State of Rajasthan, affirmed on 16.08.2021, in pursuance of the
medical advice, the contemnor had resumed his duties on 11.08.2021. His
endeavour to seek adjournment by four months was found not acceptable. It
was further noted that the contumacious conduct continued and that Mr.
Daiya was under a misconception that by endeavouring to scandalise the
Court he could get away with it. Bailable warrants in the sum of Rs.10,000/-
with one surety of the like amount were issued directing his presence.
17. The petitioner filed a response to the contempt proceedings and on
06.09.2021 filed an application for impleading the Secretary, Law and Legal
Affairs Department, Government of Rajasthan, Registrar, Supreme Court of
India, one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) and B. Sunita Rao, Secretary of the
Supreme Court AOR Welfare Trust. He also sought the placement of the
complaint before the Chief Justice of India and, on 07.09.2021, he further
sought adjournment by 4-5 months so as to enable response by the Chief
Justice of India to his earlier letter as reasoned orders were not being passed
by the Bench. On 08.09.2021, in pursuance of the bailable warrants
Mr. Daiya appeared and we heard him at some length along with learned
Additional Solicitor General and learned counsel for the State. As had
11
transpired earlier, in the end the petitioner stated that he wanted to tender an
unqualified apology and sought to withdraw all what he had said. We told
him that he was at liberty to file what he pleased within three days and we
would take that into consideration while passing our orders and the judgment
was reserved. Thereafter, an application was filed, being IA No.114626/2021
seeking to place what he calls an “unconditional apology” and further
seeking review by IA No.114629/2021. It does not mention as to what
review was being sought.
18. The so-called unconditional apology is again a recital of his alleged
grievances in the earlier proceedings. It seeks to canvas that the proceedings
for recovery of costs had actually come to an end, which was factually not so
as it was his endeavour to seek modification of the order of costs. The same
was declined while permitting the Registry to take action for recovery. Since
the recovery did not take place, the Registry had placed the matter before the
Court. Thereafter, he had made a grievance about the chargesheet served on
him by the State Government in terms of his employment, an aspect with
which we are not directly concerned with. He has mentioned that he seeks
redressal of various grievances in various proceedings he has filed, claiming
the applicability of the doctrine of impossibility in relation with payment of
costs. He has referred to various petitions filed before the Rajasthan High
Court.
12
19. On a careful reading of the aforesaid we can hardly categorise the
same as an unconditional apology.
20. We have penned down all these details not only to record the conduct
of Mr. Daiya as Chairman of the Trust prior to the order being passed in
WP(C) No.880/2016, but continuously thereafter. In the submissions he
sought to suggest that he was compelled to take this course of action to
ensure that the proceedings he files in different courts are not interceded or
terminated on account of his inability to pay costs. This can hardly be a
course of action which is permissible. We would like to emphasise on the
kind of actions Mr. Daiya has embarked upon in a simple issue of recovery
of costs. In fact, the State counsel referred to communications addressed by
him to the State Government, once again, seeking to threaten the officers
who had initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. But for the fact that
Mr. Daiya appears in person and seeks to canvas his case with such clear
understanding, it could possibly have given rise to the apprehension that he
was not all there. It also appears that he is under constant legal advice
beyond his abilities to address the Court by the very nature of pleadings he
files.
21. Insofar as Miscellaneous Application No.1630/2020 is concerned, in
our view, nothing more has to be directed than what was already been stated
on 06.05.2021, i.e., the State Government should take steps to commence
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process of recovery of costs as ‘arrears of land revenue’ and the recovery
amount be remitted to the beneficiary as per the order already passed in
WP(C) No.880/2016 on 01.05.2017. Other than that, no further directions
are required as the recovery would naturally depend on the available
resources of both the Trust and Mr. Daiya. In the direction passed by this
Court on 01.05.2017 it was observed “failing deposit, the above costs shall
be recoverable from Mr. Rajiv Daiya, its Chairman, through his personal
proceeds, if necessary.”
22. In fact, if Mr. Daiya had just merely expressed his inability to pay the
amount as per his affidavit, the matter could have been left at that, with, of
course, the natural consequences as contained in the order dated 01.05.2017
which disabled him from filing public interest litigations. After all, there
cannot be a birthright to file public interest litigations and the level of
assistance and the nature of causes as canvassed has already been adversely
commented upon in the order dated 01.05.2017.
23. M.A. No.1630/2020 is thus closed with the aforesaid order.
24. However, that unfortunately cannot be the end of the matter.
25. Let us say at the inception that the easier path is to recuse or give up
the matter instead of inviting so much trouble. But then that is not the course
for which the Judges have taken oath. Sometimes the task is unenviable and
difficult but it must be performed for the larger good of the institution. Such
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litigants cannot be permitted to have their way only because they can plead
and write anything they feel like and keep on approbating by sometimes
apologising and then again bringing forth those allegations. We have thus
chosen the more difficult path.
26. Now turning to the conduct of Mr. Daiya, which is apparent from the
judgment as aforesaid.
27. We are enlightened in respect of the course of action we follow by
judicial precedents. We would first like to turn to the judgment in Roshan
1
Lal Ahuja, In Re: . Disparaging remarks and aspersions deliberately and
repeatedly made against the Supreme Court and its Judges in memorandum
of writ petition and in representation made before the President of India in
connection with order of reduction in rank and subsequent dismissal from
service of the contemnor was held to bring down the image of judiciary in
the estimation of public and to bring administration of justice into disrepute.
The contemnor was directed to suffer four months simple imprisonment and
pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-.
28. Suffice to note that even in the said proceedings, after tendering
apology, ostensibly on the ground that it was desired by the Judges, once
again, the contemnor showed no redemption for his behaviour. The
observations by Justice A.S. Anand (as he then was) in paras 11, 12 & 13 are
1
1993 Supp (4) SCC 446.
15
as under:
“11. The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers
by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they
desire is on the increase and it is high time that serious note is
taken of the same. No latitude can be given to a litigant to
browbeat the court. Merely because a party chooses to appear in
person, it does not give him a licence to indulge in making such
aspersions as have the tendency to scandalise the court in relation
to judicial matters.
12. Ordinarily, courts of law do not initiate proceedings to commit
a person for contempt of court where there is mere technical
contempt or where the contemnor satisfies the court that he was
truly repentant for his action. Judgments of the court are open to
criticism. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to
fair and reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments,
even if, put-spoken, but made without any malice or attempting to
impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in
proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt of
court. Lord Denning in Reg v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn, 1968 (2) WLR 1204 made some
pertinent observations in this regard. In the words of the Master of
Rolls:
Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done
in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and
our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal
or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will
remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot
reply to their criticism. We cannot enter into public
controversy. Still less into political controversy.
However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and
calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of judiciary
in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of
justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute the
courts must bester themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty
of law. No litigant can be permitted to over step the limits of fair, bona
fide and reasonable criticism of a judgment and bring the courts
generally in disrepute or attribute motives to the Judges rendering the
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judgment. Perversity, calculated to undermine the judicial system and
the prestige of the court, cannot be permitted for otherwise the very
foundation of the judicial system is bound to be undermined and
weakened and that would be bad not only for the preservation of Rule
of Law but also for the independence of judiciary. Liberty of free
expression is not to be confused with a licence to make unfounded,
unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the Judges or the
courts in relation to judicial matters. No system of justice can tolerate
such an unbridled licence. Of course "Justice is not a cloistered virtue;
she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though
outspoken, comments of ordinary men", but the members of the public
have to abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in
the administration of justice and exercise their right of free criticism
without malice or in any way attempting to impair the administration
of justice and refrain from making any comment which tends to
scandalise the court in relation to judicial matters.
13. The contemnor in the present case let alone showing any remorse
or regret has adopted an arrogant and contemptuous attitude. His
conduct in circulating the 'note for directions' adds insult to injury. Of
course, the dignity of the court is not so brittle as to be shattered by a
stone thrown by a mad man, but, when the court finds that the
contemnor has been reckless, persistent and guilty of undermining the
dignity of the court and his action is, motivated, deliberate and
designed, the law of contempt of court must be activised.”
29. The aforesaid shows that there is no absolute licence when appearing
in person to indulge in making aspersions as a tendency to scandalise the
Court in relation to judicial matters. Motivated and calculated attempts to
bring down the image of the judiciary in estimation of public and impair the
administration of justice must bester themselves to uphold their dignity and
the majesty of law. In the current context if seen, the grievance arises on
account of the inability of the contemnor to file public interest petitions on
account of costs being imposed, which he claims to be unable to pay and the
17
consequences thereof of not being able to prosecute his petitions, which are
large in number. The contemnor has apparently made a profession of filing
public interest petitions of subjects of which he may not know much and
then seeking to scandalise the Court to grant him relief failing which he will
continue to scandalise the Court.
2
30. In Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors. which arose in suo motu contempt petition
after the conviction of Mr. Mathews Nedumpara, an advocate. In those
proceedings, the Court while not finally sentencing him to imprisonment
instead gave him a suspended sentence and barred him from practice for a
3
specified period of time before this Court . This resulted in another round on
account of complaints against the Indian Bar Association and by some
person claiming to be the National Secretary of Human Rights Security
Council wherein they had sought to send contemptuous complaints to the
President of India and the Chief Justice of India (a somewhat similar
situation in the case at hand). Shri Nedumpara sought discharge on the
ground that he did not really know those people. A Bench of this Court
debated the powers of the Supreme Court in relation to dealing with the
contempt in the light of Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution of India
read with in conjunction with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The
provisions read as under:
2
2020 SCC Online SC 407.
3
Mathews Nedumpara, In Re, (2019) 19 SCC 454.
18
“9. Article 129 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
“129. Supreme Court to be a court of record. The Supreme
Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers
of such a court including the power to punish for contempt
of itself.”
A bare reading of Article 129 clearly shows that this Court being a
Court of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Record
including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a
constitutional power which cannot be taken away or in any manner
abridged by statute.
10. Article 142 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court
and orders as to discovery, etc. (1) The Supreme
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree
or make such order as is necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any
decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable
throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be
prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and,
19
until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as
the President may by order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf
by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects
the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power
to make any order for the purpose of securing the
attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any
documents, or the investigation or punishment of any
contempt of itself.”
31. In the context of the aforesaid it was opined that the comparison of the
two provisions show that whereas the founding fathers felt that the powers
under clause (2) of Article 142 could be subject to any law made by the
Parliament, there is no such restriction as far as Article 129 is concerned.
The power to punish for contempt is a constitutional power vested in this
Court which cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative
enactment. We have little doubt that what the contemnor has been
endeavouring is to have his way or, alternatively, I will throw mud at all and
sundry, whether it be the Court, its administrative staff or the State
Government so that people, apprehensive of this mud thrown, may back off.
20
We refuse to back off and are clear in our view that we must take it to its
logical conclusion.
32. We may note that the notice issued on 09.07.2021 was a composite
notice issued to proceed against him as well as to sentence him for his
endeavour to scandalise the Court.
33. We are of the view that the contemnor is clearly guilty of contempt of
this Court. His actions to scandalise the Court cannot be countenanced. He
continues with his contumacious behaviour. The apologies submitted by him
are only endeavours to get out of the consequences again followed by
another set of allegations, thus, a charade. The last apology can hardly be
called an apology seeing the contents. This Court has held that an apology
cannot be a defence, a justification can be accepted if it can be ignored
without compromising the dignity of the Court ( Vishram Singh
4
Raghubanshi v. State of U.P. ). There is, as already stated, no remorse on
the part of the contemnor which we find in the present case.
34. The only next question is whether he has a right to be heard on
sentence in the background of the facts that the notice sent to him by our
order is both to be proceeded against him on merits and on sentence for his
endeavour to scandalise the Court. It is a contempt on the face of the Court
by the reason of the pleadings filed by him. We are not mandated in view of
4
(2011) 7 SCC 776.
21
the aforesaid to give him a hearing on the issue of sentence but would still
give him one more chance and, thus, consider it appropriate to list the
petition to hear the contemnor on the question of final sentence.
...……………………………J.
[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]
...……………………………J.
[M.M. Sundresh]
New Delhi.
September 29, 2021.
22