Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 950 OF 2009
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006)
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation … Appellant
Versus
Assistant Comnr. of Police (Traffic) Delhi …
Respondent
With
Civil Appeal No. 951 OF 2009
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.2408 of 2006)
J U D G M E N T
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. Leave granted in both the SLPs. Both the appeals are being disposed
of through this common judgment.
2
2. Interpretation of a judgment of this Court, vis-à-vis the action taken
by the first respondent pursuant to or in furtherance thereof is in question in
these appeals. In the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006, the
challenge is against a judgment and order dated 9.9.2005 passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.1958
of 2005 whereby and whereunder a judgment and order dated 10.8.2004
passed by a learned Single Judge of the said Court in Civil Writ Petition
No.8339 of 2002 was upheld. The appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.2408
of 2006 is against the order and judgment dated 9.9.2005 passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in LPA No.1956 of 2005
confirming an order dated 17.8.2004 passed by a learned Single Judge in
WP (C) No.13688 of 2004.
3. Since the facts in both the appeals are identical and since the same
legal questions arise in both the appeals, reference is being made to the facts
in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006. Appellant is a
Corporation constituted and registered under the Road Transport
Corporation Act, 1951, indisputably, for the purpose of plying of buses on
various routes falling within the State of Uttar Pradesh and National Capital
Territory of Delhi. Several agreements as envisaged under sub-section (5)
3
of Section 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called and
referred to for the sake of brevity as ‘the Act’) were executed.
4. A Public Interest Litigation in regard to observance of the norms of
safety on the roads came up for consideration before this Court in a writ
petition filed by one Shri M.C. Mehta which was registered as Writ Petition
(Civil) No.13029 of 1985. This Court in exercise of its power under Article
32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India issued the following
directions by an order dated 20.11.1997 :
“(a) No heavy and medium transport vehicles,
and light goods vehicles being four
wheelers would be permitted to operate on
the roads of the NCR and NCTT, Delhi,
unless they are fitted with suitable speed
control devices to ensure that they do not
exceed the speed limit of 40 KMPH. This
will not apply to transport vehicles
operating on Inter-State permits and
national goods permits. Such exempted
vehicles would, however, be confined to
such routes and such timings during day and
night as the police/transport authorities may
publish. It is made clear that no vehicle
would be permitted on roads other than the
aforementioned exempted roads or during
the times other than aforesaid time without a
speed control device.
(b) In our view the scheme of the Act
necessarily implies an obligation to use the
vehicle in a manner which does not imperil
public safety. The authorities aforesaid
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should, therefore, ensure that the transport
vehicles are not permitted to overtake any
other four-wheel motorized vehicle.
XXX XXX XXX
(e) Any breach of the aforesaid directions by
any person would, apart form entailing other legal
consequences, be dealt with as contravention of
the conditions of the permit which could entail
suspension /cancellation of the permit and
impounding of the vehicle.
XXX XXX XXX
The Government is directed to notify under
section 86(4) the officers of the rank of Assistant
Commissioners of Police or above so that these
officers are also utilized for constituting the flying
squads.
XXX XXX XXX
B. We direct the Union of India to ensure that
the contents of this Order are suitably
publicized in the print as well as the
electronic media not later than November
22, 1997 so that every body is made aware
of the directions contained in the Order.
Such publication would be sufficient public
notice to all concerned for due compliance.
C. We, direct that this Order will be carried out
notwithstanding any other order or
directions by any authority, Court or
Tribunal, and that no authority shall
interfere with the functioning of the police
and transport department in so far as
implementation and execution of these
directions is concerned.”
5
5. In the first appeal, a bus of the appellant Corporation bearing
Registration No.UP 14 Q 8755, driven by one Shri Shiv Lal was found
overtaking another four wheel vehicle bearing Registration No. DL 1 LD
6452 and, thus, purported to have violated the conditions as enshrined in the
directions of this Court. A proceeding under Sections 3/181, 66(i)/92A of
the Act was initiated.
In the said proceeding, fine of Rs.300/- was imposed.
6. Respondent, as a purported consequence of the penalty imposed upon
the driver of the said vehicle, initiated a proceeding under Section 86 of the
Act, directing :
“NOW THEREFORE, I.K.S. Bedi, Assistant
Commissioner of Police/Traffic/East district,
Delhi in exercise of powers delegated to me u/s
read with 86(4) of M.V.Act, 1988 by STA Delhi
vide its Board Resolution No.1/98, dated
25.5.1998 hereby require General Manager s/o
Shri Nil R/o UPSRTC, Lucknow, U.P. the permit
holder top show cause as to why the said permit
should not be suspended for a period of one month
for the above mentioned violations. Your reply, if
any, should reach the undersigned within a period
of 7 days from the date of the show cause notice,
failing which, it will be presumed that you have
nothing to say and the case will be decided ex
parte on merits.
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You are also at liberty to appear before the
undersigned within the stipulated period to make
personal submissions, if any, in this regard.”
7. By reason of an order dated 20.12.2002, the permit was suspended,
stating :
“AND WHEREAS, it is evident from the record
brought up before the undersigned and submission
that the permit holder has violated the permit
conditions as enshrined in the directions of
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case of
M.C.Mehta vs. UOI. It is also evident that the
permit holder has ignored the safety of the public
on road and failed to exercise such supervision as
was necessary on his employees as a result of
which the vehicle violated the permit conditions,
provisions of MV Act framed there under to the
extent that the vehicle was being driven in such a
way which has dangerous for the public safety.
NOW THEREFORE, keeping in view all
the facts of the case, reply of the show cause
notice submitted by the permit holder on one hand
and on the other hand going through the STA
Board Resolution, permit conditions mentioned in
the brochure and directions of Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in case of M.C.Mehta vs. UOI, I,
K.S.Bedi, Assistant Commissioner of Police,
Traffic, East Distt. Delhi in exercise of powers
under section 86 of M.V.Act, 1988 and delegated
to me vide STA Board Resolution No.1/98 dated
25.5.1998 do hereby suspend the permit No. of
UP-14R-7231 of the said vehicle for a period of
[7] seven days from the date of depositing the
vehicle at Burari Pit (STA),Delhi within 3 days
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positively and receipt be submitted in this office
alongwith the original permit of the vehicle which
will be kept on the file till the expiry of suspension
period.”
8. A writ petition was filed thereagainst by the appellant. A learned
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, by an order dated 10.8.2004, having
regard to the directions issued by this Court on 20.11.1997, refused to
interfere with the said order dated 20.12.2002, stating:
“Learned counsel for the respondent states that in
fact the petitioner has not surrendered the bus in
pursuance to the order for suspension of the
licence. It is seen from the order-sheet that there
is no interim relief granted in favour of the
petitioner. If the Petitioner has failed to comply
with the directions for suspension of the
permit/licence, it is open to the respondent to take
appropriate measures not only to enforce the said
order but to take further action against the
petitioner for not having complied with directions
passed by the respondents.”
9. Without preferring a Letters Patent Appeal thereagainst, a Special
Leave Petition was filed. The same was dismissed as withdrawn.
Thereafter a Letters Patent Appeal was filed against the said order dated
10.8.2004. It is, however, stated that another special leave petition filed in
identical matter was dismissed.
8
10. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said appeal has been
dismissed by the High Court.
11. Mr. Ashok Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant urged that having regard to the provisions of Section 86 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, the respondent, not being the appropriate State
Transport Authority, could not have directed impounding of the bus and/or
suspension of the permit.
It was urged that as the State of U.P. has entered into a mutual
agreement with the National Capital Territory of Delhi in regard to the
plying of buses in the National Capital region, the terms and conditions laid
down therein being binding on both the parties in the event of any violation
of any provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the rules framed thereunder or
the conditions of permit, the rules applicable to the State of U.P. shall be
attracted. Even otherwise, the learned counsel would contend in relation to
a inter-State permit, the State which had merely countersigned could only
withdraw the same but would have no jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the
permit as such.
12. Mr. Qadri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on
the other hand would contend :
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1) The order dated 20.12.2000 having been passed in compliance of this
Court’s order, the impugned judgment of the High Court should not
be interfered with.
2) This Court, having dismissed the special leave petition whereafter
only a letters patent appeal was filed, the present appeal is not
maintainable.
13. The National Capital Territory of Delhi, in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 86(4) of the Act, having delegated its power to various police
authorities, the respondent had the requisite jurisdiction to pass an order
suspending the permit in terms thereof. Our attention in this behalf has
been drawn to Rule 61-A as inserted by Notification dated 19.5.1998, which
reads as under:
“`DELEGATION OF POWERS FOR
SUSPENSION OF PERMIT : The State Transport
Authority may by general or special resolution
recorded in its proceedings and subject to the
restrictions, limitation and conditions that it may
impose, delegate to Group `A’ and Group `B’
Gazetted Officers, its powers under section 86 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to suspend a permit
or to recover from the holder thereof a sum of
money agreed upon in accordance with sub-
section (5) of section 86 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988.
10
Provided that the State Transport Authority
may delegate its powers as mentioned hereinabove
by specifying the designation of the officer(s) and
the name of the Government department/branch in
which the said officer (s) may be serving if it is
necessary to do so.”
14. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance therof, the State Transport
Authority had delegated its power in favour of the respondent in terms of a
circular letter dated 23.9.1998 containing the resolution passed by the
Authority. Respondent, even otherwise, having regard to the provisions of
Section 207 of the Act had the requisite jurisdiction to detain the bus.
Respondent having the requisite power to suspend the operation of permit
granted by the U.P. State Transport Authority even if a wrong provision had
been maintained, it need not be held that the impugned order is wholly
without jurisdiction.
15. The Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to
motor vehicles. Chapter V of the Act deals with control of transport
vehicles. Section 66 of the Act provides for the necessity of permits stating
that no owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as
a transport vehicle actually carrying any passengers or goods save in
accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a
Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority
11
authorizing him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which
the vehicle is used. The power to control Road Transport Corporation is
vested in the State under Section 67 of the Act. Section 68 provides for
constitution of Transport Authorities. Section 71 provides for the procedure
of Regional Transport Authority in the matter of considering application for
stage carriage permit. Section 72, inter alia, provides for any or more of the
conditions as stated in sub-section (2) of Section 72 to be attached to the
permit. Section 80 provides for the procedure of filing of application for
and grant of permits. Section 84 provides for general conditions attaching
to all permits. Section 86 deals with cancellation and suspension of permits,
sub-section (1) whereof reads as under :
“ Section 86 - Cancellation and suspension of
permits.— (1) The transport authority which
granted a permit may cancel the permit or may
suspend it for such period as it thinks fit-
(a) on the breach of any condition specified in
section 84 or of any condition contained in
the permit, or
(b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or
allows a vehicle to be used in any manner
not authorised by the permit, or
(c) if the holder of the permit ceases to own the
vehicle covered by the permit, or
(d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the
permit by fraud or misrepresentation, or
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(e) if the holder of the goods carriage permit,
fails without reasonable cause, to use the
vehicle for the purposes for which the
permit was granted, or
(f) if the holder of the permit acquires the
citizenship of any foreign country:
Provided that no permit shall be suspended or
cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to
the holder of the permit to furnish his
explanation.”
Section 88 of the Act provides for validation of permits for use
outside the region for which it is granted. Sub-Section (4) thereof reads as
under :
“(4) The provisions of this Chapter relating to
the grant, revocation and suspension of permits
shall apply to the grant, revocation and suspension
of countersignatures of permits:
Provided that it shall not be necessary to
follow the procedure laid down in Section 80 for
the grant of countersignatures of permits, where
the permits granted in any one State are required
to be countersigned by the State Transport
Authority of another State or by the Regional
Transport Authority concerned as a result of any
agreement arrived at between the States after
complying with the requirements of sub-section
(5).”
13
Sub-sections (5), (6), (7) and (8) of Section 88 lay down the
procedure or provide for entering into the agreements between the States to
fix the number of permits.
Section 89 of the Act provides for an appeal from such an order
wherefor the State Government is required to constitute Transport Appellate
Tribunals in such numbers as it thinks fit.
Section 207 of the Act authorises any police officer to seize and
detain any motor vehicle in the event he has reason to believe that it has
been or was being used in contravention of the provisions of section 3 or
section 4 or section 39 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of
section 66 or in contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the
route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle
may be used in the prescribed manner and for the said purpose to take or
cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe
custody of the vehicle.
16. The directions issued by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India must be
held to be in addition to the conditions contained in the permit and/or the
provisions of the Act.
14
17. Regulation of motor vehicles is vested in the State and/or statutory
authorities. Ordinarily, they should exercise their power within the four
corners thereof.
Right to ply a vehicle in terms of the provisions of the Act or the
Rules framed thereunder is a statutory right. Where a person, including a
juristic person, is conferred a right to carry on business, regulation thereof
should ordinarily be governed by the statute under which the permit has
been granted. Although in view of several decisions of this Court and, in
particular, Vishaka & Ors. V. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [(1997) 6 SCC
241], even if additional regulatory measures are laid down, the same, in our
opinion, should be construed strictly.
18. Keeping in mind the aforementioned legal principles, we may now
consider the effect of the directions issued by this Court.
19. Paragraph ‘A’ of the directions has been issued upon the Police and
all other authorities entrusted with the administration and enforcement of
the Act and generally with the control of the traffic. The direction upon the
authorities to ensure that the transport vehicles are not permitted to overtake
any four wheels motorized vehicle was issued as in the view of this Court,
the scheme of the Act necessarily implied an obligation to use the vehicle in
15
a manner which does not imperil public safety. Clause (e) of the order must
be construed in the light of the purpose and object for which the Act was
enacted.
20. The direction that any breach will be considered to be in
contravention of the conditions of the permit which could entail
suspension/cancellation of the permit and impounding of the vehicle must
be read in the light of the provisions of the Act and not de hors the same.
This Court could not and, in fact, did not while issuing the said direction
confer a statutory authority upon a person who did not have any such
authority under the statute. An order passed by an authority without
jurisdiction, it is trite, would be a nullity. It would, therefore, be
preposterous to presume that this Court would confer jurisdiction upon an
authority whose order would be a nullity and, thus, non est in the eye of law.
21. The aforementioned directions must be construed having regard to the
reasons assigned in support thereof. This Court analysed each of the
relevant chapters and the provision of the Act. It considered a proposal
made by the Transport Commissioner whereby maximum punishment was
proposed to be raised. It, in the aforementioned backdrop, took into
consideration the realities and chaotic state of road traffic in National
Capital Region and National Capital Territory of Delhi. Referring to
16
Section 207 of the Act which empowers any police officer or other person
authorised in this behalf, to detain vehicles used without certificate of
registration permit etc., it was opined:
“In our opinion, the existing provisions in the Act
alone are sufficient to clothe the members of the
police force and the transport authorities with
ample powers to control and regulate the traffic in
an appropriate manner so that no vehicle being
used in a public place poses any danger to the
public in any form. The requirement of
maintaining the motor vehicles in the manner
prescribed and its use if roadworthy in a manner
which does not endanger the public, has to be
ensured by the authorities and this is the aim of
these provisions enacted in the Act. As earlier
stated, we reach this conclusion even without
reference to the general powers available to the
police officers under the Police Act and the Code
of Criminal Procedure.”
{See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. [(1997) 8 SCC 770]}.
22. What was emphasized is that empowerment of the authority. Such
empowerment must be within the broad framework of the Act. The judge
made law in an area covered by the Parliamentary Act should not be applied
in an expansive manner. Nothing should be deduced therefrom.
23. A decision is an authority, it is trite, for which it decides and not what
can logically be deduced therefrom. This wholesome principle is equally
17
applicable in the matter of construction of a judgment. A judgment is not to
be construed as a statute. It must be construed upon reading the same as a
whole. For the said purpose, the attending circumstances may also be taken
into consideration. {See Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai [(2005) 4
SCC 772]}.
24. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of
the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question(s). It
misread the provisions of Section 86 to hold that respondent was clothed
with the jurisdiction of suspension and/or cancellation of the permit and
impounding of the vehicle in terms of the order of the Court. This Court
had merely spelt out the consequences emanating from contravention of the
directions. Such directions, if read with the provisions of the Act, would
mean that the procedure for suspension/cancellation of the permit and
impounding of the vehicle must be followed as contained in the Act.
Jurisdiction for the said purpose must be exercised by the authority under
the statute. No statutory authority, whether empowered by this Court or
otherwise, can act de hors the statute.
25. The width and breadth of Article 142 of the Constitution although is
wide, any direction issued thereunder by reason of an interpretation should
not be expanded. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court did
18
precisely this. The Division Bench unfortunately did not consider this
aspect of the matter. It is true that in one case the Special Leave Petition
was dismissed. But it was an unreasoned order. It did not create any
precedent. Thus, when a Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable, the
Division Bench could have and, in our opinion, should have determined the
question in accordance with law. We, therefore, are of the opinion that
violation of the directions of this Court would merely entail the
consequences which would mean that the respondent could proceed to take
action only in accordance with law including the provisions contained in
Section 88 of the Act.
26. Indisputably, the Lieutenant Governor of National Capital Territory
of Delhi inserted Rule 61-A in the Rules by reason whereof the State
Transport Authority had been vested with the power to delegate its powers
in favour of any other authority. A purported resolution was passed by the
State Transport Authority which is to the following effect:
“Now that the necessary rule has been gazetted it
is proposed that the power to suspend permits
under section 86 may now be delegated in
accordance with Rule 61-A of the Delhi Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1993 to officers of the category
that were empowered vide Resolution no.28/1997
dated 21-11-1997 subject to the condition that the
delegation shall be liable to be reviewed from time
to time and also subject to the limitation that the
19
power to charge compounding fees in lieu of
suspension in case of fatal accidents by stage
carriage buses shall be exerciseable by officers of
the level of Deputy Director and above of the
Transport Department only in accordance with the
procedure laid down vide resolution no.3/1997
dated 2-4-1997.”
27. Vires of the said delegation not being under challenge, we would
assume the same to be valid. The question, however, is as to whether even
in terms of the said delegated power, the respondent could direct suspension
of permit of a bus belonging to appellant and in respect whereof inter-State
permit had been granted by the U.P. State Transport Authority.
28. Section 86 of the Act, on a plain reading, clearly confers power to
suspend a permit only on the authority which had granted it. Even the
conditions therefor have been laid down.
29. It is not in dispute that inter-State permits have been granted pursuant
to the agreements entered into by and between the State of U.P. and
National Capital Territory of Delhi. Mr. Srivastava has placed before us a
sample copy of the Agreement. Paragraph 4 of the said Agreement refers to
stage carriage (substantive permits). Paragraph 14 of the said Agreement
provides for the general powers. We may refer to some of the clauses
thereof:
20
“(ii) Permits issued within the terms of reciprocal
agreement shall be countersigned
immediately on presentation before the
Regional Transport Authority or the State
Transport Authority subject to payment of
countersignature fee and other taxes due to
that State.
(iv) Except as provided otherwise in the
agreement, the vehicles of the one
reciprocating State plying in the other State
shall be governed by the rules, other than
the provisions relating to payment of taxes
and fees, and fare of the State which granted
the permit.
(v) Before any action is taken for breach of the provisions of
the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and the Rules framed
thereunder against the State Transport Undertakings of
the reciprocating State a prior reference to the Head of
the State Transport Undertaking concerned shall be made
in order to decide if departmental action would not be
adequate instead of prosecuting them in the Court of
Law.”
30. In terms of the aforementioned Agreement also, thus, in case of any
violation by any driver of any vehicle for which such carriage permit had
been granted, it is the authorities of the State of U.P. who could take action.
The rules framed by the State of U.P. alone would be applicable in relation
thereto. Thus, Rule 64A of the Delhi Rules pursuant whereto or in
furtherance whereof the delegation of power in favour of the respondents
had been made, would not apply. Even otherwise, the countersigning State
21
would not be entitled to suspend or cancel the permit of a vehicle wherefor
a stage carriage permit has been granted by the State of U.P.
31. The question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of
the Madras High Court in Gajalakshmi Ammal Manonmaniammal Bus
Service vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras & Anr. [AIR
1962 MADRAS 173] wherein interpreting the provisions of Section 63 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which is in pari materia with Section 86 of
the Act, it was held:
“(3) There can be no doubt that overloading of
passengers in a stage carriage is a breach of the
conditions of the permit. Section 63 relates to the
issue of permits over inter-district routes. Sub-
section (1) of that section provides that a permit
granted by the Regional Transport Authority of
one region could be valid for another region, if the
Regional Transport Authority of the latter region
counter-signs the permit. It follows from the
provisions of the section that the original or
primary permit is granted under S.60 and that S.63
(1) only provides for its validation by a counter-
signature. Section 63 (3) only means that the
power of suspension would apply even in regard
to breach of a condition with respect to inter
district permits, i.e., it confers a power on the
authority granting the primary permit to take
cognizance of offences in the course of the route,
even though such route is outside his jurisdiction
and to cancel or suspend the permit, if there is a
breach of any condition relating to the same. We
are therefore of opinion that the Regional
Transport Authority of North Arcot, who issued
22
the original permit, had jurisdiction to impose
punishment in respect of the breach of the
conditions of the permit, even if any such breach
took place in the South Arcot Dt.”
32. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in A. Annamalai vs. State Transport Authority Andhra Pradesh
& ors. [AIR 1962 AP 148] wherein Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as His Lordship
then was) held :
“From a reading of this section it is seen that
where the vehicle is to be used in two or more
regions in the same State, that authority is given
jurisdiction in which the majority of the route is to
be operated, or if the route is equally divided
between two regions in the same state, that
authority has jurisdiction where the vehicle is
kept. When it comes to the jurisdiction of the
authority where the vehicle is plying between two
States, the Legislature has vested jurisdiction in
that authority where the applicant resides or has
his principal place of business. There is a clear
indication in this section to vest the jurisdiction in
that authority which has control over the applicant
by reason of his being domiciled within that state.
The counter signature by the countersigning
authority under S.42 is dependent upon the grant
of the primary permit. If the permit is cancelled
by the primary authority, the vehicle cannot
possibly be plied in the region of the
countersigning authority; but if the
countersignature is cancelled for any breach of the
conditions imposed by the countersigning
authority, the vehicle can be plied up that region.
23
In such circumstances, therefore, the anomaly to
which the learned advocate for the petitioner has
adverted does not in fact exist because, for the
breach of any independent conditions imposed by
the countersigning authority which conditions are
not the conditions imposed by the primary
authority, it is only the countersigning authority
that can cancel the counter signature. But if the
conditions of the permit issued by the primary
authority are merely counter signed, then the
jurisdiction to cancel the permit for any breach of
the conditions in the region of the counter signing
authority would vest in the primary authority also
because such suspension or cancellation would be
the only effective method of control over such
stage carriage permit holder. The cancellation of
the countersignature, as we have already indicated,
would be ineffective.”
33. Submission of Mr. Qadri that action could have been taken by the
respondent in exercise of its power under other provisions of the Act, in
particular Section 207 thereof, cannot be accepted. The respondent has not
exercised its jurisdiction under Section 207. Even the conditions precedents
for exercise of the said jurisdiction did not exist in the case. If the
respondent for the reasons stated hereinbefore was not entitled to pass an
order suspending the permit, the entire proceeding was vitiated in law. It
could not have even issued a notice therefor. It is, therefore, not a case
where the respondent had even otherwise jurisdiction to suspend a permit
24
but merely a wrong provision was quoted in the notice and by reason
whereof no prejudice was caused to appellant.
34. For the self same reasons, submission of Mr. Qadri that if the
impugned order is set aside, the same shall give rise to another illegal order
is also without any force. Respondent has exercised its jurisdiction on a
wrong premise. It will be a repetition to state that it was not a case where
jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 207 or any other provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act could be exercised. In a case of this nature where
exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the statutory authority is found to be
wholly illegal, we are not in a position to agree with the submission of Mr.
Qadri that this Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is really a matter of some
surprise to us that such a contention has been raised by a State against a
State. By reason of the order impugned, permit of the vehicle was
suspended for a period of seven days. However, the said period is over.
While exercising jurisdiction under Section 207 of the Act, the respondent
could not have directed production of the bus for the period during which
the permit was directed to be suspended. Power of detention of a vehicle, as
noticed hereinbefore, could be exercised only for a limited purpose. Such a
25
power could not include a power directing the owner of a bus to produce the
offending vehicle for the purposes mentioned in the notice.
35. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained. They are set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed and
consequently the orders impugned in the writ petitions will stand quashed.
There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
……………………………….J.
[S.B. Sinha]
..…………………………..…J.
[Cyriac Joseph]
New Delhi;
February 12, 2009