Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
A. SANJEEVI NAIDU ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MADRAS AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
05/02/1970
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
SHAH, J.C.
GROVER, A.N.
RAY, A.N.
DUA, I.D.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1102 1970 SCR (3) 505
1970 SCC (1) 404
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1971 SC1002 (5)
E 1973 SC 974 (2)
RF 1973 SC1461 (223)
R 1974 SC2192 (33,34,47,131)
R 1978 SC 68 (133,146,173,211)
RF 1982 SC 149 (709)
RF 1987 SC2106 (6)
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act 4 of 1939, s. 68(c)-Validity of scheme
framed upon formation of requisite opinion by Secretary and
not Minister. Rule 23-A authorising Secretary-Validity of-
Constitution of India, Art. 166(3)-Scope of.
HEADNOTE:
A draft scheme for the nationalisation of certain transport
routes was prepared and published by the respondent State
Government under Section 68(C) of the Motor Vehicles Act 4
of 1939. The validity of the scheme was challenged by the
appellants, who were private stage carriage operators, in a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but the peti-
tion was dismissed by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court the validity of the scheme was
mainly challenged on the ground that the opinion requisite
under Section 68(C) was not formed by the State Government
but by the Secretary to the Government acting pursuant to
powers conferred on him under Rule 23-A of the Madras
Government Business Rule. It was further contended that the
said rule was ultra vires, the provisions of the
Constitution; Parliament has conferred powers under Section,
68-C to a designated authority and that power can be
exercised only by the authority specified and no one else.
The authority concerned in the present case was the State
Government and it could not have delegated is statutory
’functions to any one else. By Government was meant the
Governor aided and advised by his Ministers. The requisite
opinion should therefore have been formed by the Minister to
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whom the business had been allocated under the Rules.
HELD : The functions under the Motor Vehicles Act had been
allocated by the Governor to the Transport Minister under
the Rules and the Secretary of that Ministry had been
validly authorised under Rule 23-A to take action under s.
68(C) of the Act.
In the very nature of things, neither the Council of
Ministers nor an individual Minister can attend to the
numerous matters that come up before the Government. Those
matters have to be attended to and decisions taken by
various officials at various levels. When those officials
discharge the functions allotted to them, they are doing so
as limbs of the Government and not as persons to whom the
power of the Government had been delegated. [513 G]
Under our Constitution, the Governor is essentially a
constitutional head; the administration of the State is run
by the Council of Ministers. in order to obviate the
difficulty that would arise if the Council of Ministers had
to deal with every matter, the Constitution has authorised
the Governor under sub-article (3) of the Article 166 to
make rules for the more convenient transaction of the
business of the Government of the State and for the
allocation amongst its Ministers of the business of
Government. All matters excepting those in which the
Governor is required to act in his discretion have to be
allocated to one or the other of the Ministers on
506
the advice of the Chief Minister. Apart from allocating
business among the Ministers, the Governor can also make
rules on the advice of his Council of Ministers for more
convenient transaction of business. He can not only
allocate the various subjects amongst the Ministers but may
go further and on the advice of his Ministers, designate a
particular official to discharge any particular function.
[511 F]
The cabinet is responsible to the Legislature for every
action taken in any of the Ministries. This is the essence
of joint responsibility. That does not mean that each and
every decision must be taken by the cabinet. The political
responsibility of the Council of Ministers does not and
cannot predicate the personal responsibility of the
Ministers to discharge all or any of -the functions of the
Government. Similarly an individual Minister is responsible
to, the Legislature, for every action taken or omitted to be
taken in his ministry. This again is a political
responsibility and not personal responsibility. In every
well-planned administration, most of the decisions are taken
by the civil servants who are likely to be experts and not
subject to political pressure. The Minister is not expected
to burden himself with the day-to-day administration. His
primary function is to lay down the policies and programmes
of his ministry while the Council of Ministers settle the
major policies and programmes of the, Government. [512 A]
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee & Ors. L.R. 72 I.A. p. 241;
Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P. [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 76;
Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi v. State of Gujarat and anr.,
[1968] 2 S.C.R. 266, Capital Multipurpose Cooperative
Society v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Civil Appeal
No. 2201/1966 decided on 30-3-1967; referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 397, 400 to
402, 404 to 417, 422 to 4.41, 451, 1158 to 1161, 1176, 1178
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to 1181, 1204, 1207 and 1407 of 1969.
Appeals from the judgments and orders dated January 6, 1969
of the Madras High Court in Writ petitions Nos. 846 of 1968
etc.
K. K. Venugopal, K. R. Nambiar and A. S. Nambiar, for the
appellants (in C.As. Nos, 397, 400 to 402, 422,, 423, 441
and 451 of 1969).
M. C. Chagla, V. Subramaniam, V. T. Gopalan, Radharani,
C. S. Prakasa Rao and K. Jayaram, for the appellant I s
(in. C.As. Nos. 404 to 417, 1179, 1180 of 1407 of 1969).
M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the
appellant (in C.A. No. 1176 of 1969).
R. V. S. Mani, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 424 to
428, 1158 to 1161 and 1207 of 1969).
A. K. Sen, C. A. Prakasa Rao and R. Gopalakrishnan, for
the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 429, 431 to 438, 440, 441,
1178 and 1181 of 1969).
C. S. Prakasa Rao, A. R. Ramanathan and R. Gopalakrishnan,
for the appellant (in C.A. No. 430 of 1969).
507
C. S. Prakasa Rao, R. Gopalakrishnan and Sudhir Khanna,
for the appellant (in C.A. No. 439 of 1969).
C. S. Prakasa Rao, K. K. Venugopal and R. Gopalakrishnan,
for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1204 of 1969).
Niren De, Attorney General for India and A. V. Rangam, for
the respondents (in C . A. No. 397 of 1969).
S. V. Gupte and A. V. Rangam, for the respondents (in C.A.
No. 400 of 1969).
A. V. Rangam, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 401, 402,
404 to 417, 422 to 441, 451, 1158 to 1161, 1176, 1178 to
1181, 1204, 1207 and 1407 of 1969).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J. These 52 appellants are private stage carriage
operators in the State of Tamil Nadu. They have been
operating in various routes in that State. Some of those
routes are proposed to be rationalised. A draft scheme of
nationalisation has been prepared and published under s. 68
(C) of the Motor Vehicles Act (Central Act IV of 1939) (to
be hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’). The validity of
the -draft scheme was challenged by the appellants before
the High Court of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Incidentally the validity of some of the provisions of the
amending Act XVIII of 1968 (Madras Act) also came to be
challenged in those petitions. A division bench of the
Madras High Court consisting of Anantanarayanan C.J. and
Natesan J. have dismissed those petitions. As against the
decision of the High Court these appeals have been brought
on the strength of the certificates issued-by the High
Court.
In these appeals we are primarily concerned with the
validity of the draft scheme under challenge. The ground on
which it is challenged is that the opinion requisite Under
s. 68 (C) of the Act was not formed by the State Government
but by the Secretary to the government in the Industries,
Labour and Housing Department, acting in pursuance of the
powers conferred on him under rule 23(A) of the Madras
Government Business Rules (to be, here inafter referred to
as ’the Rules’). The contention of the appellants is that
the said rule is ultra vires the provisions of the Consti-
tution. There is no dispute that if the rule in question is
valid, the challenge directed against the &aft scheme must
fail. The High Court has opined that that rule is a valid
rule. It is the correctness of that conclusion that is
primarily in issue in these, appeals.
508
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Section 68(C) prescribes :
"Where any State transport undertaking is of opinion that
for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate,
economical and properly coordinated road transport service,
it is necessary in the public interest that road transport
services in general or any particular class of such service
in relation to any area or route or portion .thereof should
be run and operated by the State transport undertaking,
whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other
persons or otherwise, the State transport undertaking may
prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the
services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed
to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto
as may be prescribed, and shall cause every such scheme to
be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other
manner as the State Government may direct."
This section requires that the State transport undertaking
must form the opinion contemplated therein. In the State of
Tamil Nadu, the State transport undertaking is a department
of the State government. Therefore the necessary opinion
should have been formed by the State government. It was
urged on behalf of the appellants that under our
constitutional set up, the requisite opinion could have been
formed either by the Council of Ministers or the Minister to
whom the business in question had been allocated under the
’Rules’. The same could not have been formed by the
’Secretary who is merely an official and that too by the
Secretary who is not the head of the department to which the
functions under the Act had been assigned. The contentions
advanced on behalf of the appellants proceed thus : The
executive power of the State vests in the Governor (Art.
154). In the exercise of that power he has to be aided and
advised by the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister
at the head (Art. 163(1)) but the Governor can make rules
for more convenient transaction of the business of the
government of the State and for the allocation among
Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not
business with respect to which the Governor is by or under
the Constitution required to act in his discretion, (Art.
166(3)). A Minister can only deal with the business that
has been allocated to him by the Governor under ’the Rules’.
He is not competent to deal with any other business. Motor
Vehicles Act has been allocated to the Home Department. Mr.
Karunanidhi, the Transport Minister was not in-charge of the
Home Department. Therefore his department could not have
dealt with functions arising under the Act. Further the
Governor could not have allocated any business to a
Secretary. Hence in making rule 23(A), the Governor
exceeded the powers -conferred on him under Art. 166(3).
509
On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the State of
Tamil Nadu that originally the functions under the Motor
Vehicles Act had been allocated to the Home Department but
when Mr. Annadurai formed the D.M.K. government in Tamil
Nadu in 1967, the Home Department as such was not allocated
to any Minister. The various subjects included in that
department were split up and distributed amongst the various
Ministers. Transport was allocated to Mr. Karunanidhi.
Motor Vehicles Act as such was not allocated to any
Minister. The department of Transport included functions
under the Motor Vehicles Act as well. Ever since the D.M.K.
ministry was formed, the functions under the Motor Vehicles
Act were dealt with by the Transport ministry. At the
instance of the Transport Minister, Mr. Karunanidhi,
Governor framed rule 23(A) for the more convenient discharge
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of the business. On behalf of the government, it was
further urged that Art. 166(3) has two, parts namely (1)
rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of
the government of the State and (2) rules relating to
allocation of business of the State among the Ministers. It
was said that after allocating the business of the
government among ’various Ministers, it was open to the
Governor on the advice of the ministry to make rules for the
convenient discharge of the business allocated. Rule 23(A)
is one such rule made under Art. 166(3). Hence its validity
is not open to question.
The impugned rule 23(A) was introduced for the first time by
G.O.Ms. No. 2715 Public dated 22-12-67. Under sub-cl. (1)
of that rule, it is provided that powers and functions which
State transport undertaking may exercise under s. 68(C) of
the Act shall be exercised and discharged on behalf of the
State government by the Secretary to the Government of
Madras in the Industries. Labour -and Housing Department.
The rule further provides that cases relating to such powers
and functions of the State transport undertaking under s.
68(C) need not be submitted to the Minister in-charge.
Under sub-cl. (2) of that rule, the powers and functions of
the State government under s. 68(D) of the Act and the rules
relating thereto are directed to be exercised and discharged
by the Secretary to the government in the Home Department.
Rule 4 of ’the Rules’ deals with allocation and disposal of
business. It provides. that the business of the Government
shall be transacted in the department specified in the 1st
Sch. and classified and distributed between those
departments as laid down therein. Rule 5 says that Governor
shall, on the advice of the Chief Minister allot the
business of the government among the Ministers, assigning
one or more departments to the charge of a Minister but the
proviso to that rule says that nothing in that rule shall
prevent the assigning of one department to the charge of
more than one Minister.
510
Rule 6 prescribes that each department of the secretariat
shall be under a Secretary who shall be the official head of
the department. Under rule 7, the Council of Ministers
constituted under Art 163(1) is held collectively
responsible for all the executive orders issued in the name
of the-Governor in accordance with rules, whether such
orders are authorised, by an individual Minister on a matter
pertaining to his portfolio or as a result of the discussion
at the meeting of the Council of Ministers. Rule 9 provides
that without prejudice to the provisions of rule 7, the-
Minister in-charge of a department shall be primarily
responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to
his department. Section III of the "Rules" containing rules
21 to 30 deal with the departmental disposal of business.
Rule 21 says that except as otherwise provided by any other
rule cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the
authority of the Minister in-charge who may by means of
standing orders give such directions as he may think fit for
the disposal of cases in the department; copies of such
standing orders shall be sent to the Governor -and the Chief
Minister. Rule 22 provides that each - Minister shall by
means of standing orders arrange with the secretary of the
department what matters or class of matters are to be
brought to his personal notice; copies of such standing
orders has to be sent to the Governor and the Chief
Minister. Rule 23 prescribes that except as otherwise
provided in the rules, all cases shall be submitted to the
Minister in-charge by the secretary of the department to
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which they belong. Then comes rule 23(A) to which reference
has already been made.
The first question that has to be decided is whether the
functions under the Motor Vehicles Act had been assigned to
Mr. Karunanidhi, the Minister for Transport. It is true
that when the various departments were reorganized in 1961,
Motor Vehicles Act as well as Transport were included in the
Home Department. But when the D.M.K. ministry came to power
after the 1967 general elections, the Home Department as
such was not allocated to any Minister. The various
subjects included in that department were distributed
amongst several Ministers. Transport was allocated to the
Transport Minister. Motor Vehicles Act as such was not
allocated to any Minister. The allocation of business among
the various Ministers appears to have been made under broad
heads. In 1961 while allocating subjects to the various
departments there was a detailed and exhaustive enumeration
of the subjects. But that method was not adopted in 1967
while distributing the business of the government among the
various Ministers. The functions under the Act undoubtedly
relate to Transport department. It cannot be assumed that
functions under the Act had not been assigned to any
Minister. It is proved that those functions were being
discharged by the Minister for Transport. ’Hence we agree
with the High Court that those functions had been
511
allocated to the Transport Minister and that the State
transport undertaking was being run by the Transport
ministry.
Mr. Karunanidhi has in his affidavit filed before the High
Court sworn to the fact that rule 23(A) was framed at his
instance. Admittedly he could have assigned the functions
under s. 68(C) of the Act to the Transport Secretary by
making a standing order under rule 22. If he could have
done that, we fail to see why he could not advise the
Governor through the Chief Minister to make rule 23 (A).
It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the parliament
has conferred powers under s. 68(C) of the Act to a
designated authority. That power can be exercised only by
that authority and by no one, else. The authority concerned
in the present case is the State government. The government
could not have delegated its statutory functions to any one
else. The government means the Governor aided and advised
by his Ministers. Therefore the required opinion should
have been formed by the Minister to whom the business had
been allocated by ’the Rules’. It was further urged that if
the functions of the Government can be discharged by any one
else, then the doctrine of ministerial responsibility which
is the very essence of the cabinet form of government
disappears; such a situation is impermissible under our
Constitution.
We think that the above submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellants are without force and are based on a
misconception of the principles underlying our Constitution.
Under our Constitution, the Governor is essentially a
constitutional head; the administration of State is run by
the Council of Ministers. But in the very nature of things,
it is impossible for the Council of Ministers to deal with
each and every matter that comes before the Government. In
order to obviate that difficulty the Constitution has
authorised the Governor under sub-Art. (3) of Art. 166 to
make rules. for the more convenient transaction of business
of the government of the State and for the allocation
amongst its Ministers, the business of the government. All
matters excepting those in which Governor is required to act
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in his discretion have to be allocated to one or the other
of the Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. Apart
from allocating business among the Ministers, the Governor
can also make rules on the advice of his Council of
Ministers for more convenient transaction of business. He
can, not only allocate the various subjects amongst the
Ministers but may go further and designate a particular
official to discharge any particular function. But this
again he can do only on the advice of the Council of
Ministers.
512
The cabinet is responsible, to the legislature for every act
ion taken in any of the ministries. That is the essence of
joint responsibility. That does not mean that each and
every decision must be taken by the cabinet. The political
responsibility of the Council of Ministers does not and
cannot predicate the personal responsibility of the
Ministers to discharge all or any of the governmental
functions. Similarly an individual Minister is responsible
to the legislature for every action taken or omitted to be
taken in his ministry. This again is a political
responsibility and not personal responsibility. Even the
most hard working minister cannot attend to every business
in his department. If he attempts to do it, he is bound to
make a mess of his department. In every well planned
administration, most of the decisions are taken by the civil
servants who are likely to be experts and not subject to
political pressure. The Minister is not expected to burden
himself with the day to day administration. His primary
function is to. lay down the policies and programmes of his
ministry while the Council of Ministers settle the major
policies and programmes of the ’government. When a civil
servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of
his Minister. He does it -on behalf of the government. It
is always open to a Minister to call for any file in his
ministry and pass orders. He may also issue directions to
the officers in his ministry regarding the disposal of
government business generally or as regards any specific
case. Subject to that over all power, the officers
designated by the ’Rules’ or the standing orders, can take
decisions on behalf of the government. These officers are
the limbs of the government and not its delegates.
In Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji and ors. (1) construing s. 5 9
(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, a provision
similar to Art. 166(3), the Judicial Committee held that it
was within the competence of the Governor to empower a civil
servant to transact any particular business of the
government by making appropriate rules. In that case their
Lordships further observed_ that the Ministers like civil
servants are subordinates to the Governor. In Kalyan Singh
v. State of U.P.(2) : this Court repelling the contention
that the opinion formed by an official of the government
does not -fulfil the requirements of s. 68 (C) observed :
"The opinion must necessarily be formed by somebody to whom,
under the rules of business, the conduct of the business is
entrusted and that opinion, in law, will be the opinion of
the State Government. It is stated in the counter-affidavit
that all the concerned officials in the Department of
Transport considered the draft scheme and the said scheme
was finally approved by the Secretary of the Transport
Department before the
(1) L. R. 72 T. A. p. 241.
(2) [1962] Sup. (2) S. C. R. p .76.
513
notification was issued. It is not denied that the Secre-
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tary of the said Department has power under the rules of
business to act for the State Government in that behalf.
We, therefore, hold that in the present case the opinion was
formed by the State transport undertaking within the meaning
of s. 68 (C) of the Act, and that, there was nothing illegal
in the manner of initiation of the said Scheme".
In Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. v. State of Gujarat and
anr. ( 3 ) this Court rejected_the contention that the
opinion formed by the Deputy Secretary under s. 17(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act cannot be considered as the opinion of
the State government. After referring to the rules of
business regulating the government business, this Court
observed at p. 282
"In our case the Secretaries concerned were given the
jurisdiction to take action on behalf of Government and
satisfy themselves about the need for acquisition under s.
6, the urgency of the matter and the existence of waste and
arable lands for the application of sub-ss. (1) and (4) of
s. 17. In view of the Rules of business and the
Instructions their determination became the determination of
Government and no exception could be taken."
In Capital Multi-purpose Co-operative Society v. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (1), this Court dealing with the
scope of s. 68 (D) of the Act observed that the State
Government obviously is not a natural person and therefore
some natural person has to give hearing on behalf of the
State Government and hence the hearing given by the special
secretary pursuant to the power conferred on him by the
business rules framed under Art. 166(3) is a valid hearing.
As mentioned earlier in the very nature of things, neither
the Council of Ministers nor an individual Minister can
attend to the numerous matters that come up before the
Government. Those matters have to be attended to and
decisions taken by various officials at various levels.
When those officials discharge the functions allotted to
them, they are doing so as limbs of the government and not
as persons to whom the power of the government had been
delegated. In Halsbury Laws of England Vol. I 3rd Edn. at
p. 170, it is observed :
"Where functions entrusted to a Minister are performed by an
official employed-in the Minister’s department
(1) [1968] 2, S. C R. p. 266.
(2) C. A. 2201 of 1966 decided on 30.3.1967.
L8Sup CI/70-3
514
there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the
act or decision of the official is that of the Minister."
Similar view has been expressed in "Principles of
Administrative Law" by Griffith and Street. That is also
the view taken by Sir Ivor Jennings in his "Cabinet
Government".
For the reasons mentioned above, we are of opinion that the
functions under the Motor Vehicles Act had been allocated by
the Governor to the Transport Minister under "the Rules" and
the Secretary of that ministry had been validly authorised
under rule 23-A to take action under S. 68 (C) of the Act.
The validity of some of the provisions of Madras Act 18 of
1968 which amended the Act was canvassed before us,. It is
not necessary to go into those questions for deciding the
validity of the impugned scheme. Those questions can be
more appropriately gone into and decided if ’and when action
is taken on the strength of those provisions. Hence we
leave open those questions.
In the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed with
costs-hearing fee one set.
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R.K.P.S. Appeals
dismissed.
515