Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2748 of 2007
PETITIONER:
Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur
RESPONDENT:
Smt. Vibha Shukla & Ors
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/05/2007
BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2748 OF 2007
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 9072 of 2006]
S.B. SINHA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
01.09.2005 passed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court
whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the appellant herein
questioning the judgment and order dated 18.01.1991 passed by the U.P.
State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow, (for short, ’the Tribunal), was
dismissed.
3. Respondent No. 1 was a Sports Teacher appointed on or about
21.7.1973 for a period of one year purported to be in terms of the U.P.
Muncipal Corporations Adhiniyam, 1959, (for short ’the 1959 Act’). Her
services were extended from time to time. By reason of an order dated
18.08.1980, her services were terminated on payment of one month’s salary
in lieu of notice. She filed an application before the UP Public Services
Tribunal, inter alia, questioning the said order of termination dated
18.08.1980 and claiming regularization of her services purported to be in
terms of Section 16(GG) of the UP Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (for
short ’the 1921 Act’). The Tribunal allowed the said application. As
indicated hereinbefore, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by
the appellant herein.
4. The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is the
applicability of the 1921 Act vis-a-vis the 1959 Act.
5. The 1921 Act was enacted to establish a Board to take the place of the
Allahabad University in regulating and supervising the system of High
School and Intermediate Education in the United Provinces, and to prescribe
the courses therefor. Appointment in terms of the said Act is permissible
only upon furnishing information in that behalf to the District Inspector of
Schools as laid down under Section 16-E(2) thereof. A teacher of an
institution is required to be selected by a Selection Committee constituted
thereunder. The Committee of Management of the institution is empowered
to appoint candidates out of the list of teachers recommended in order of
preference. The names of the selected candidates, as far as practicable,
should consist of three candidates for each post found by the Selection
Committee to be suitable for appointment. It is required to communicate its
recommendations together with such list to the Committee of Management
in terms of Sub-section 6 of Section 16-E of the 1921 Act. However, sub-
section (11) thereof provides for a non obstante clause, in terms whereof,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6
appointments in the case of a temporary vacancy caused by the grant of
leave to an incumbent for a period not exceeding six months may be made
by direct recruitment or promotion without reference to the Selection
Committee. The proviso appended thereto in no uncertain terms states that
such an appointment shall not continue for a period of more than six months
or beyond the end of the educational session during which such appointment
was made.
6. Section 16-F of the Act prescribes the manner in which the Selection
Committee is to be constituted. Section 16(FF) of the Act provides for the
terms and conditions of service of the Head of Institutions, teachers and
other employees.
7. The Legislature of the State of Uttar Pradesh inserted Section 16(GG)
in the 1921 Act by the UP Act No. 5 of 1977, which came into force with
effect from 21.4.1977. It reads as under :
"16(GG): Regularization of appointment of ad hoc
teachers: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in Section 16_E, 16-1 and 16-FF, every teacher of
an institution appointed between August 18, 1975
and September 30, 1976 (Both dates inclusive) on
ad hoc basis against a clear vacancy and
possession prescribed qualifications or having
been exempted from such qualifications in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, shall,
with effect from the date of commencement of this
section, be deemed to have been appointed in a
substantive capacity, provided such teacher has
been continuously serving the institution from the
date of his appointment up to the commencement
of this section."
8. The 1959 Act, on the other hand, provides for the mode and manner in
which appointment for the employees of the Municipal Corporations are to
be made. Section 106 of the 1959 Act provides for creation of one or more
posts specified therein; Clause (vi) whereof reads as under :
"106. Creation of posts \026 (1) Subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed a Corporation
may from time to time create one or more of the
following posts, as it may consider necessary, in
connection with its affairs, namely \026
(iv) other posts of officers; staff and other
servants necessary for the efficient discharge of its
functions"
9. Section 107 prescribes the manner in which such appointments are
required to be made. Sub-sections (2) and (3) thereof read as under :
"(2) Appointments to the posts not included in the
posts referred to in Sub-section (1) per mensem
shall be made after consultation with the State
Public Service Commission in the manner
prescribed and not otherwise. The authority to
appoint such officers and servants of the
Corporation shall vest \026
(a) in respect of those officers and servants who
are immediately subordinate to the Mukhya Nagar
Lekha Parikshak, in the Mukhya Nagar Lekha
Parikshak, and
(b) in respect of all other officers and servants, in
the Municipal Commissioner.
(3) All other appointments except those specified
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6
in Sub-sections (1), (2) and (5) shall be made in
accordance with the recommendations of a
Selection Committee constituted under Sub-section
(4) and authority to make such appointments shall
vest \026
(a) in respect of those officers and servants who
are immediately subordinate to the Mukhya Nagar
Lekha Parikshak, in the Mukhya Nagar Lekha
Parikshak, and
(b) in respect of all other officers and servants,
in the Municipal Commissioner."
10. Sub-section (4) of Section 107 provides for constitution of the
Selection Committee referred to in sub-section (3) therein. Section 108,
however, empowers the authorities to make officiating and temporary
appointments to certain posts without consulting the State Public Service
Commission or obtaining the recommendations of the Selection Committee,
but no such appointment shall continue beyond the period of one year, nor
shall be made where it is expected to last for more than a year without
consulting the State Public Service Commission or otherwise than in
accordance with the recommendation of the Selection Committee, as the
case may be.
11. With effect from 01.12.1977 by UP Act 10 of 1978, Section 108-A
was introduced in the 1959 Act. A further amendment was made by
inserting Clause (b) therein with effect from 25.04.1978. Section 108-A of
the 1959 Act reads as under :
"108-A \026 Appointment of teachers of institution maintained by
Corporations \026 Notwithstanding anything in Sections 107 and
108 \026
(a) the appointment of a teacher in any college, affiliated
to any University as defined in the Uttar Pradesh State
Universities Act, 1973 and maintained by a Municipal
Corporation, shall be made in accordance with the provisions of
that Act, and
(b) the appointment of a teacher or Head of an
institution recognized in accordance with the Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 and maintained by the Municipal
Corporation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of
that Act."
12. Section 540 occurring in Chapter XXIII of the 1959 Act provides for
the Rule making power of the State.
13. It is not in dispute that pursuant to or in furtherance of the said
provision, UP Nagar Mahapalika Education Services Rules have been
framed. Rule 13 of the Rules provides for appointments to be made through
a departmental Selection Committee. Rules 16 and 17 lay down the
procedure for appointment. Rule 19 empowers the appointing authority to
make temporary appointment for a period of less than one year. Sub-rule (3)
of Rule 19 reads thus :
"(3) Temporary and officiating appointments \026
The appointing authority shall make appointments
in temporary and officiating vacancies also from
the list, which will be valid for one year or the next
selection whichever is earlier, of candidate
recommended by the Commission or prepared by
the Selection Committee, as the case may be.
Provided that in any year if the list is
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6
exhausted or if no candidate is available in that list,
the appointing authority may, without consultation
with the Commission, where such consultation is
necessary, or without the recommendation of the
Selection Committee, make appointments in such
vacancies for a period not exceeding one year from
amongst servants or persons possessing the
qualifications prescribed for recruitment to those
posts."
14. First respondent, as noticed hereinbefore, was appointed in 1973. Her
appointment indisputably was extended from time to time. Having regard to
the statutory embargo contained in Section 108 of the 1959 Act, each of
such extension must be treated to be a fresh appointment. She was
appointed on a temporary post. Her appointment indisputably was not made
in terms of Section 16-E of the 1921 Act. It is of some significance to notice
that whereas an appointment in terms of Section 108 of the 1959 Act cannot
be made for a period exceeding one year, in terms of Section 16-E(11) of
the 1921 Act, an appointment can be made for a period not exceeding six
months and, that too subject to the condition that no appointment made
under the said section would not, in any case, continue beyond the end of the
educational session during which such appointment was made.
15. The 1959 Act, being a later Act, ordinarily would prevail over the
1921 Act. Rules have also been framed under the 1959 Act. The provisions
of the said Rules being in consonance with the provisions of the 1959 Act
would be treated to be a part thereof as it is well-settled that Rules validly
framed would become part of the main legislation. Any appointment made
in terms of Section 108 of the 1959 Act must, thus, conform to the
provisions contained therein as also the rules framed thereunder. Section
108 of the 1959 Act is an exception to the provisions of Section 107 thereof,
which in turn is in tune with the constitutional scheme laid down under
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Prior to 1.12.1977 when
Section 108-A was introduced, an appointment of a teacher to be made by a
Municipal Council was to be governed by the provisions contained therein
or the rules framed thereunder. Section 108-A does not incorporate the
provisions of the 1959 Act by reference. It merely carves out an exception
to Section 107 and 108 of the Act provided that all such appointments were
made in terms of the 1921 Act. Section 16 (GG) of the 1921 Act per se,
therefore, would not apply when no appointment has been made in terms
thereof. Section 16(GG) of the 1921 Act raises a legal fiction wherefor the
conditions precedent laid down thereunder must be strictly complied with.
[See Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd., 2007 (5) SCALE 452]
16. Respondent No. 1 was appointed during the period August 18,1975
and 30th September, 1976 on temporary basis. Such an appointment was not
made in terms of sub-section (11) of Section 16-E of the 1921 Act. There is
nothing to show that there existed a clear vacancy or she was appointed in
terms of the Act. Procedures for appointments under the 1921 Act and the
1959 Act are different. The Selections Committees constituted under both
the Acts also are different. The terms and conditions of the teachers
appointed under the two acts are also different. It is, thus, difficult to accept
the findings of the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court that the said
provisions would apply to the case of the first respondent herein.
17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, has
drawn our attention to paragraph 4.5 of the counter affidavit to contend that
the respondent was appointed along with others during the period 1.7.1976
to 30.6.1977. It may be so but having not been appointed in conformity with
the provisions of the 1921 Act, in our considered opinion, Section 16-GG
thereof has no application in the instant case.
18. Our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court in
Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow & Anr. [(2001) 2
SCC 423] wherein this Court in a case arising under the UP Cooperative
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6
Societies Employees Services Regulations, 1975 opined that having regard
to Regulation 103, termination of service of an employee in violation thereof
would be illegal, stating :
"In this case we do not find any such pleading of special
circumstances either before the Tribunal or before the
High Court. Since Regulation 103 of the Regulations is
referred to in the order of the Tribunal as well as in the
High Court and it has bearing in deciding the
controversy, the focus is needed on it. It reads:
"103. The provisions of these Regulations to the extent of
their inconsistency with any of the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya
Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962, Workmen’s Compensation
Act, 1923 and any other labour laws for the time being in
force, if applicable to any cooperative society or class of
cooperative societies, shall be deemed to be inoperative."
By a plain reading of the said Regulation it is clear that in
case of inconsistency between the Regulations and the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State
Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and any
other labour laws for the time being in force, if applicable
to any cooperative society or class of cooperative
societies, to that extent the Regulations shall be deemed
to be inoperative. In other words, the inconsistent
provisions contained in the Regulations shall be
inoperative, not the provisions of the other statutes
mentioned in Regulation 103. The Tribunal in this regard
correctly understood the regulation but wrongly refused
the relief on the ground that no reinstatement can be
ordered on a regular employment in view of the
provisions contained in the said Regulation. But the High
Court read the regulation otherwise and plainly
misunderstood it in saying that if there is any
inconsistency between the Regulations and the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and other labour laws for the time
being in force the Regulations will prevail and the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other labour laws shall
be deemed to be inoperative. This misreading and wrong
approach of the High Court resulted in the wrong
conclusion. In the view it took as regards Regulation 103
the High Court proceeded to state that even if there was
retrenchment in view of Regulation 5 of the Regulations
the Labour Court was not competent to direct
reinstatement of the appellant who was not recruited in
terms of Regulation 5 because the Labour Court had to
act within the ambit of law having regard to the
Regulations by which the workman was governed."
19. Such a question does not arise for consideration before us.
Indisputably, the appointment as also the terms and conditions of services of
the first respondent are governed by the 1959 Act. Herein no case involving
inconsistencies in the provisions of the two statutes arises.
20. Furthermore, it is trite that regularization is not a mode of
appointment. It has been so held by a Constitution Bench of this court in
Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) & Ors. 2006 (4) SCC
1]. The principle enunciated by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Umadevi (supra) has inter alia been applied by this Court in Post Master
General, Kolkata & Ors. v. Tutu Das (Dutta) [2007 (6) SCALE 453] stating
as under :
"12. What was considered to be permissible at a given
point of time keeping in view the decisions of this Court
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6
which had then been operating in the field, does no
longer hold good. Indisputably the situation has
completely changed in view of a large number of
decisions rendered by this Court in last 15 years or so. It
was felt that no appointment should be made contrary to
the statutory provisions governing recruitment or the
rules framed in that behalf under a statute or the proviso
appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
13. Equality clause contained in Article 14 and 16 of
the Constitution of India must be given primacy. No
policy decision can be taken in terms of Article 77 or
Article 162 of the Constitution of India which would run
contrary to the constitutional or statutory schemes."
21. Submission of the learned counsel that persons similarly situated are
still continuing in service is not of any moment. This aspect of the matter
has also been dealt with by this Court in Post Master General, Kolkata
(supra) stating:
"17. Submission of Mr. Roy is that the respondent has
been discriminated against inasmuch as although the
services of Niva Ghosh were regularised, she had not
been, may now be noticed.
18. There are two distinctive features in the present
case, which are:-
(i) Equality is a positive concept. Therefore, it cannot be
invoked where any illegality has been committed or
where no legal right is established.
(ii) According to the appellant the respondent having
completed 240 days, does not fulfil the requisite criteria.
A disputed question of fact has been raised. The High
Court did not come to a positive finding that she had
worked for more than 240 days in a year.
19. Even otherwise this Court is bound by the
Constitution Bench decision. Attention of the High Court
unfortunately was not drawn to a large number of recent
decisions which had been rendered by this Court."
22. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that Section
16(GG) of the 1921 Act has no application to the fact of the present case
and, thus, the Tribunal as also the High Court committed a manifest error in
passing the impugned judgments. They are set aside accordingly. The
appeal is allowed. However in the facts and circumstances of this case, there
shall be no order as to costs.