Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 215 OF 2005
Common Cause (A Regd. Society) .... Petitioner (s)
Versus
Union of India .... Respondent(s)
O R D E R
P.Sathasivam, CJI.
1) This writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, has been filed by Common Cause-a Society registered
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under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 engaged in taking
up various common problems of the people for securing
redressal, praying for declaring ‘right to die with dignity’ as a
fundamental right within the fold of ‘right to live with dignity’
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and to issue
direction to the respondent, to adopt suitable procedures, in
consultation with the State Governments wherever
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necessary, to ensure that the persons with deteriorated
health or terminally ill should be able to execute a document,
viz., ‘my living will & Attorney authorization’ which can be
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the executant being admitted to the hospital with serious
illness which may threaten termination of life of the
executant or in the alternative, issue appropriate guidelines
to this effect and to appoint an Expert Committee consisting
of doctors, social scientists and lawyers to study into the
aspect of issuing guidelines regarding execution of ‘Living
Wills’.
2) On 19.06.2002 and 25.06.2002, the petitioner-Society
had written letters to the Ministry of Law, Justice and
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Company Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare with a similar prayer as in this writ petition.
Concurrently, the petitioner also wrote letters to the State
Governments in this regard, as hospitals come within the
jurisdiction of both the State Governments and the Union of
India.
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3) In the above said communication, the petitioner had
emphasized the need for a law to be passed which would
authorize the execution of the ‘Living Will & Attorney
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Society particularly relied on the decision of this Court in
Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 648 to support
its request. Since no reply has been received, the petitioner-
Society has preferred this writ petition.
4) Heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for the
petitioner-Society, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the Union of India and Mr. V.A. Mohta,
learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Praveen Khattar, learned
counsel for the intervenors.
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Contentions:
5) According to the petitioner-Society, the citizens who are
suffering from chronic diseases and/or are at the end of their
natural life span and are likely to go into a state of terminal
illness or permanent vegetative state are deprived of their
rights to refuse cruel and unwanted medical treatment like
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feeding through hydration tubes, being kept on ventilator
and other life supporting machines, in order to artificially
prolong their natural life span. Thus, the denial of this right
| pain and | agony b |
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mental which the petitioner-Society seeks to end by making
an informed choice by way of clearly expressing their wishes
in advance called “a Living Will” in the event of their going
into a state when it will not be possible for them to express
their wishes.
6) On the other hand, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned
Additional Solicitor General submitted on behalf of the Union
of India that as per the Hippocratic Oath, the primary duty of
every doctor is to save lives of patients. A reference was
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made to Regulation 6.7 of the Indian Medical Council
(Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations
2002, which explicitly prohibits doctors from practicing
Euthanasia. Regulation 6.7 reads as follows:-
“Practicing euthanasia shall constitute unethical
conduct. However, on specific occasion, the question
of withdrawing supporting devices to sustain
cardiopulmonary function even after brain death,
shall be decided only by a team of doctors and not
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| dance wi<br>n of Hum | th the<br>an Organ |
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Court in Parmanand Katara vs. Union of India (1989) 4
SCC 286 to emphasise that primary duty of a doctor is to
provide treatment and to save the life whenever an injured
person is brought to the hospital or clinic and not otherwise.
7) The petitioner-Society responded to the
abovementioned contention by asserting that all these
principles work on a belief that the basic desire of a person is
to get treated and to live. It was further submitted that when
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there is express desire of not having any treatment, then the
said person cannot be subjected to unwanted treatment
against his/her wishes. It was also submitted that subjecting
a person, who is terminally ill and in a permanently
vegetative state with no hope of recovery, to a life support
treatment against his/her express desire and keeping him
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under tremendous pain is in violation of his right to die with
dignity.
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injections, put any person to death, as it would amount to
“active euthanasia” which is illegal in India as observed in
Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug vs . Union of India (2011)
4 SCC 454. Therefore, the petitioner-Society pleads for
reading the aforesaid regulation only to prohibit the active
euthanasia and the said regulation should not be interpreted
in a manner which casts obligation on doctors to keep
providing treatment to a person who has already expressed a
desire not to have any life prolonging measure. Thus, it is the
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stand of the petitioner-Society that any such practice will not
be in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in
Gian Kaur (supra) as well as in Aruna Shanbaug (supra) .
Discussion:
9) In the light of the contentions raised, it is requisite to
comprehend what was said in Gian Kaur (supra) and
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Aruna Shanbaug (supra) to arrive at a decision in the
given case, as the prayer sought for in this writ petition
directly places reliance on the reasoning of the aforesaid
verdicts.
10) In Gian Kaur (supra) , the subject matter of reference
before the Constitution Bench was as to the interpretation of
Article 21 relating to the constitutional validity of Sections
306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, wherein, it was
held that ‘right to life’ under Article 21 does not include ‘right
to die’. While affirming the above view, the Constitution
Bench also observed that ‘right to live with dignity’ includes
‘right to die with dignity’. It is on the basis of this
observation, the Petitioner-Society seeks for a remedy under
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Article 32 of the Constitution in the given petition.
11) Therefore, although the discussion on euthanasia was
not relevant for deciding the question of Constitutional
validity of the said provisions, the Constitution Bench went
on to concisely deliberate on this issue as well in the ensuing
manner:-
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| right to d<br>ith human<br>ht up to | ie'. The 'r<br>dignity w<br>the end |
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25. A question may arise, in the context of a dying man,
who is, terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state that
he may be permitted to terminate it by a premature
extinction of his life in those circumstances. This category
of cases may fall within the ambit of the 'right to die' with
dignity as a part of right to live with dignity, when death
due to termination of natural life is certain and imminent
and the process of natural death has commenced. These
are not cases of extinguishing life but only of accelerating
conclusion of the process of natural death which has
already commenced. The debate even in such cases to
permit physician assisted termination of life is
inconclusive. It is sufficient to reiterate that the
argument to support the view of permitting
termination of life in such cases to reduce the period
of suffering during the process of certain natural
death is not available to interpret Article to 21
include therein the right to curtail the natural span
of life .”
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In succinct, the Constitution Bench did not express any
binding view on the subject of euthanasia rather reiterated
that legislature would be the appropriate authority to bring
the change.
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12) In Aruna Shanbaug (supra), this Court, after having
referred to the aforesaid Para Nos. 24 and 25 of Gian Kaur
(supra), stated as follows:-
| arefully c | onsidered |
It was further held that:-
101. The Constitution Bench of the Indian Supreme
Court in Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab 1996 (2) SCC
648 held that both euthanasia and assisted suicide
are not lawful in India. That decision overruled the
earlier two Judge Bench decision of the Supreme
Court in P. Rathinam vs. Union of India 1994(3) SCC
394. The Court held that the right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the
right to die (vide para 33). In Gian Kaur's case
(supra) the Supreme Court approved of the
decision of the House of Lords in Airedale's
case (supra), and observed that euthanasia
could be made lawful only by legislation .
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13) Insofar as the above paragraphs are concerned, Aruna
Shanbaug (supra) aptly interpreted the decision of the
Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur (supra) and came to the
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conclusion that euthanasia can be allowed in India only
through a valid legislation. However, it is factually wrong to
observe that in Gian Kaur (supra) , the Constitution Bench
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Bland (1993) 2 W.L.R. 316 (H.L.). Para 40 of Gian Kaur
(supra) , clearly states that “even though it is not necessary
to deal with physician assisted suicide or euthanasia cases, a
brief reference to this decision cited at the Bar may be
made…” Thus, it was a mere reference in the verdict and it
cannot be construed to mean that the Constitution Bench in
Gian Kaur (supra) approved the opinion of the House of
Lords rendered in Airedale (supra). To this extent, the
observation in Para 101 is incorrect.
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14) Nevertheless, a vivid reading of Para 104 of Aruna
Shanbaug (supra) demonstrates that the reasoning in Para
104 is directly inconsistent with its own observation in Para
101. Para 104 reads as under:-
“ 104. It may be noted that in Gian Kaur's case
(supra) although the Supreme Court has
quoted with approval the view of the House of
Lords in Airedale's case (supra), it has not
clarified who can decide whether life support
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| consent,<br>uld give c<br>is an extr | and then<br>onsent fo<br>emely im |
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15) In Paras 21 & 101, the Bench was of the view that in
Gian Kaur (supra), the Constitution Bench held that
euthanasia could be made lawful only by a legislation.
Whereas in Para 104, the Bench contradicts its own
interpretation of Gian Kaur (supra) in Para 101 and states
that although this court approved the view taken in Airedale
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(supra), it has not clarified who can decide whether life
support should be discontinued in the case of an
incompetent person e.g., a person in coma or PVS. When, at
the outset, it is interpreted to hold that euthanasia could be
made lawful only by legislation where is the question of
deciding whether the life support should be discontinued in
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the case of an incompetent person e.g., a person in coma or
PVS.
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upheld that the ‘right to live with dignity’ under Article 21 will
be inclusive of ‘right to die with dignity’, the decision does
not arrive at a conclusion for validity of euthanasia be it
active or passive. So, the only judgment that holds the field
in regard to euthanasia in India is Aruna Shanbaug
(supra), which upholds the validity of passive euthanasia
and lays down an elaborate procedure for executing the
same on the wrong premise that the Constitution Bench in
Gian Kaur (supra) had upheld the same.
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17) In view of the inconsistent opinions rendered in Aruna
Shanbaug (supra) and also considering the important
question of law involved which needs to be reflected in the
light of social, legal, medical and constitutional perspective,
it becomes extremely important to have a clear enunciation
of law. Thus, in our cogent opinion, the question of law
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involved requires careful consideration by a Constitution
Bench of this Court for the benefit of humanity as a whole.
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Constitution Bench to go into all the aspects of the matter
and lay down exhaustive guidelines in this regard.
19) Accordingly, we refer this matter to a Constitution
Bench of this Court for an authoritative opinion.
……….…………………………CJI.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
………….…………………………J.
(RANJAN GOGOI)
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………….…………………………J.
(SHIVA KIRTI SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 25, 2014.
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