(CA No.2794 of 2022 @ SLP(C) No.12061/2021
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2794 OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.12061/2021)
EASTERN COALFIELDS LIMITED & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RABINDRA KUMAR BHARTI RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. On the basis of the complaint lodged against the
respondent who was employed as a clerk with the
appellant(s) relating to demands for bribe by the
respondent to clear retirement formalities, the
respondent came to be arrested by the Central Bureau of
st
Investigation on 31 August, 2015. A case was lodged
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Anita Malhotra
Date: 2022.04.13
15:23:01 IST
Reason:
against the respondent under Section 7 (12) & (13),
sub-section 2 read with Section 13(i)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellant also
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passed an order of suspension against the respondent on
rd
3 August, 2015. This suspension was no doubt revoked
th
on 15 September, 2015. Appellant served respondent a
th
notice of the departmental enquiry on 20 March, 2017.
This prompted the respondent to move a writ petition.
In the writ petition, the following order was passed on
29.06.2017: -
“Let the affidavit-of-service filed in
Court today be kept with the record.
Let an affidavit-in-opposition be
filed within a period of three weeks. Let an
affidavit-in-reply thereto, if any, be filed
within a period of one week thereafter.
Let this matter appear for hearing
in the Combined Monthly List of August, 2017
within the first 50 matters under that
heading.
In the affidavit-in-opposition the
respondents shall disclose the nature of the
criminal proceeding pending against the
petitioner including the names of the
witnesses in the criminal proceeding as well
as the departmental enquiry.
The respondents shall be at liberty
to proceed with the departmental enquiry but
shall not pass any final order without the
leave of the Court.”
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3. The departmental proceedings accordingly,
continued. According to the appellant(s), the enquiry
was held and the respondent participated in the enquiry
also. At the end of the enquiry, the appellant(s) filed
an application seeking leave to pass the final orders.
This resulted in, the learned Single Judge passing
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judgment dated 10 , February 2021. This decision was
impugned by the respondent before the Division Bench.
In the meantime, the respondent’s service came to be
nd
dismissed from service by order dated 2 March, 2021.
By the impugned judgment the Division Bench has
proceeded to direct that the final order of dismissal
of the respondent be stayed till the disposal of the
criminal case. It was further ordered that the order of
the dismissal against the respondent will become
operative on the criminal proceeding culminating in an
order of conviction. The Court also notes that the
Court was exercising power of the Court of Appeal
provided in Order 41 Rule 33.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
The complaint of the appellant(s) is that the Division
Bench of the High Court has erred in not noticing that
principally it is not desirable to delay the
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departmental proceeding on account of pendency of a
criminal case. The principle that it is desirable to
delay the departmental proceeding when a criminal trial
is also pending, is owing to the fact that the employee
would be compelled to disclose his defence before the
departmental proceedings. The principle is
inapplicable. This is for the reason that by virtue of
the order, we have referred to dated 29.06.2007, the
learned Single Judge had permitted the enquiry to go
on. According to the appellant(s), the respondent
participated in the enquiry and thereafter on the
culmination of the enquiry in keeping with the order
passed on 29.06.2017 after the judgment of the Single
Judge dated 10.02.2021 the order of dismissal came to
be passed. The further case of the appellant(s) is that
the order of dismissal was not the subject matter of
appeal. In other words, dismissal of the respondent was
not challenged before the Division Bench.
It is also contended that a verdict of acquittal in
the trial which may occur in the future would not
affect the disciplinary proceedings as these
proceedings have purport different from the
disciplinary proceedings. The principles applicable to
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disciplinary proceedings are different is apparently
the contention.
5. Per Contra, Mr. Mahesh Prasad, learned counsel for
the respondent would point out that the impugned order
does not call for any interference. He would further
submit that the disciplinary proceedings were not
conducted in a proper manner.
It is pointed out that the charges, the witnesses
and evidence in the Criminal case and also in the
departmental proceedings are the same. He relied on
‘Capt. M. Paul Anthony Versus Bharat Gold Mines Limited
1
& Another . In M. Paul Antony (supra) it was held as
follows:
20. This decision has gone two steps
further than the earlier decisions by
providing:
1 . The “advisability”, “desirability” or
“propriety” of staying the departmental
proceedings “go into the scales while
judging the advisability or desirability
of staying the disciplinary proceedings”
merely as one of the factors which cannot
be considered in isolation of other
circumstances of the case. But the
charges in the criminal case must, in any
case, be of a grave and serious nature
involving complicated questions of fact
and law.
1 (1999) 3 SCC 679
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2 . One of the contending considerations
would be that the disciplinary enquiry
cannot — and should not be — delayed
unduly. If the criminal case is unduly
delayed, that may itself be a good ground
for going ahead with the disciplinary
enquiry even though the disciplinary
proceedings were held over at an earlier
stage. It would not be in the interests
of administration that persons accused of
serious misdemeanour should be continued
in office indefinitely awaiting the
result of criminal proceedings.
21. In another case, namely, Depot
Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf
Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
548 : AIR 1997 SC 2232] again it was held
that there is no bar to proceed
simultaneously with the departmental
enquiry and trial of a criminal case
unless the charge in the criminal case is
of a grave nature involving complicated
questions of fact and law.
6. We may further notice that in the said judgment
this Court took note of the judgment in State of
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Rajasthan v. B.K.Meena and Ors wherein it was inter
alia held as follows:
“The only ground suggested in the above
decisions as constituting a valid ground for
setting the disciplinary proceedings is that
the findings of the trial court in the
2 (1996) 6 SCC 417
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criminal case may not be prejudiced.” This
ground has however been hedged by providing
further that this may be done in the cases
of grave nature involving question of facts
and law”.
7. In Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. v. N.
| Balakrishna n | 3 | | this Court noticed two different streams |
|---|
| | | |
| of judicial views: | | |
|---|
| | |
| “21. There are evidently two lines of<br>decisions of this Court operating in the<br>field. One being the cases which would<br>come within the purview of Capt. M. Paul<br>Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [(1999)<br>3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] and G.M.<br>Tank v. State of Gujarat [(2006) 5 SCC<br>446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] . However, the<br>second line of decisions show that an<br>honourable acquittal in the criminal case<br>itself may not be held to be<br>determinative in respect of order of<br>punishment meted out to the delinquent<br>officer, inter alia, when: (i) the order<br>of acquittal has not been passed on the<br>same set of facts or same set of<br>evidence; (ii) the effect of difference<br>in the standard of proof in a criminal<br>trial and disciplinary proceeding has not<br>been considered (see Commr. of<br>Police v. Narender Singh [(2006) 4 SCC<br>265 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 686] ), or; where<br>the delinquent officer was charged with<br>something more than the subject-matter of<br>the criminal case and/or covered by a<br>decision of the civil court (see G.M.<br>Tank [(2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S)<br>1121] , Jasbir Singh v. Punjab & Sind<br>Bank [(2007) 1 SCC 566 : (2007) 1 SCC<br>(L&S) 401 : (2006) 11 Scale 204] | |
3 (2007) 9 SCC 755
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and Noida Entrepreneurs'
Assn. v. Noida [(2007) 10 SCC 385 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 792 : (2008) 1 SCC
(L&S) 672 : (2007) 2 Scale 131] , para
18).”
8. We may notice a recent judgment in Karnataka Power
| Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju | and Another |
|---|
| wherein it was interalia held: - | | |
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| | |
| “ | |
9. We would notice that this is a case where there is
a criminal case against the respondent. The
appellant(s) as employer also launched disciplinary
4 (2019) 10 SCC 367
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proceedings. It is undoubtedly true that this Court has
taken the view that when the charges are identical and
gives rise to complicated issues of the fact and law
and evidence is the same, it may not be appropriate to
proceed simultaneously in disciplinary proceedings,
along with the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle largely is that the employee who is facing
the disciplinary proceeding would necessarily have to
take a stand. This in turn would amount to revealing
his defense and therefore prejudice the employee in the
criminal proceedings. No doubt, this Court has laid
down that it is not an absolute embargo and the
principle is one to be applied based on the facts of
each case.
10. Even applying the principles as such to the
facts, that is, examining its impact on the destiny of
this case, we find as follows:
When the respondent was faced with the
disciplinary proceeding, he approached the High
Court. Apparently, he sought stay of the
proceedings. The High Court did not deem it
appropriate to grant stay of the disciplinary
proceeding. Instead, as noticed by us by order
dated 29.06.2017, the proceedings were allowed to
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be continued. According to the appellant(s) proper
enquiry was held and the respondent participated.
As to whether the enquiry was held properly or not
is not a matter on which we do express our opinion.
However, at the end of the enquiry as held by the
appellant in view of the order passed by the High
Court the appellant sought permission to pass the
final order, or the appropriate order of penalty.
This led to the disposal of the writ petition
itself by the learned Single Judge. The learned
Single Judge in the judgment noticed that this is a
case where the respondent had already revealed his
defence by participating in the proceedings. It is
further found that order dated 29.06.2017, which
permitted the enquiry to be continued was not
challenged. The learned Single Judge accordingly
permitted the disciplinary proceedings to attain
finality at the hands of the disciplinary
authority. The disciplinary authority accordingly
passed an order dismissing the respondent from
service. No doubt this is during the pendency of
the appeal.
11. In the appeal, the order of the disciplinary
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authority dismissing the respondent was not the subject
matter of challenge by way of an amendment in the writ
petition. The Division Bench has posed the question as
to what would happen if the criminal trial culminates
in acquittal and it is thereafter that the High Court
deemed it appropriate also apparently with reference to
its power under Order 41 Rule 33 to pass the order
keeping in abeyance the order of dismissal and it was
to become operative upon the criminal trial going
against the respondent.
12. We would notice that what is most pertinent is the
aspect that in the challenge in the writ petition
against the holding of the disciplinary proceedings,
obtaining of an interim order in the nature of the case
was of relevance and importance to the question at
hand. The principle involved being that when parallel
proceedings are held on the basis of identical charges
and the same evidence, the employee should not be
allowed to disclose his defence. This aspect of the
matter is to be looked into with reference to the
effect of the order dated 29.06.2017. As a result of
the said order passed during the pendency of the writ
petition, the respondent had allegedly participated in
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the enquiry and there would be no scope for applying
that principle as such. In such circumstances, we think
that High Court may not have been justified in
passing the impugned order the result of which is that
though the appellant(s) conducted the disciplinary
proceeding as permitted by the learned Single Judge and
the respondent allegedly participated in it and all
that remained was passing of an order by the
disciplinary authority and what is more during the
pendency of the appeal no doubt the order of the
dismissal has been passed, the appellant is forced to
retain the respondent and the order is to remain in
suspended animation to attain finality only if the
criminal case is decided in the future and it ends in
the conviction of the respondent. We do not think that
the High Court was justified in passing such an order
in the facts of this case.
13. We may also observe that reference made to Order 41
Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code may not have been
justified. Order 41 Rule 33 no doubt clothes the
appellate court with an extra ordinary power, which
however is a rare jurisdiction. It is to reach justice
in the special facts of a case. It is not an ordinary
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rule to be applied across the board in all the appeals.
In fact, the principle is interalia no doubt that even
if there is no appeal by any of the parties in the
proceedings, an order can be passed in his favour in
the appeal carried by the other side. Any order which
ought to have been passed can be passed. In this case,
there is no order against the appellant(s) by the
learned Single Judge. The order of dismissal was not
specifically the subject matter of challenge as
noticed. We do not think in the facts of this case,
that it is a fit case where the High Court could have
supported the directions with reference to Order 41
Rule 33.
14. The upshot of the above discussion is that the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we
allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.
We, however, make it crystal clear that it will be
without prejudice to the rights of the respondent to
challenge the disciplinary proceeding in any competent
forum. We leave open all remedies and contentions of
the respondent in this regard.
The appeal is allowed as above. There will
be no order as to costs.
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All pending applications stand disposed
of.
……………………………………………. .J.
[K.M. JOSEPH]
……………………………………………. .J.
[ HRISHIKESH ROY]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 7, 2022.
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