MOHAMMAD LATIEF MAGREY vs. THE UNION TERRITORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 12-09-2022

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6544 OF 2022    (@ SLP (C) NO.12743 OF 2022)  MOHAMMAD LATIEF MAGREY  …..APPELLANT VERSUS   THE UNION TERRITORY OF  …..RESPONDENTS JAMMU AND KASHMIR & ORS.  J U D G M E N T J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. “The dead are to rest where they have been lain unless reason of substance is brought forward for disturbing their repose.” Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2022.09.12 16:46:14 IST Reason: ­ Justice Cardozo  Yome v. Gorman,  152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 1926). 1 3.     The   leading   case   on   disinterment   in   the   United   States   is Pettigrew   v.   Pettigrew ,   56   A.   878   (Pa.   1904)   which   was decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1904: “The   presumption   is   against   a   change.   The imprecation on the tomb at Stratford, “Curst be he that moves my bones,” whether it be Shakespeare’s own   or   some   reverent   friend’s,   expresses   the universal sentiment of humanity, not only against profanation,   but   even   disturbance.   When   a   case comes   into   court,   the   chancellor   will   regard   this sentiment,   and   consider   all   the   circumstances   in that connection.” 4. This appeal is at the instance of the original writ applicant (father of the deceased, whose son, namely, Mohd. Amir Magrey was killed in an encounter between the police and militants) and is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in Union Territory of J & K and Others v. Mohammad Latief , 2022 SCC OnLine J&K 516 (the Letters Magrey and Another Patent Appeal No. 99 of 2022 dated 01.07.2022) by which the Appeal Court modified the judgment and order passed by the learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   in , Mohammad Latief Magrey v.   Union   of   India   and   Others 2 2022 SCC OnLine J&K 433 (the Writ Petition (C) No. 11 of 2022 decided   on   27.05.2022)   &   thereby   permitted   the   appellant herein and his family members (maximum up to 10 persons) to perform   the   Fatiha   Khawani   (religious   rituals/prayers   after burial) of the deceased at the graveyard while declining to grant permission to disinter the body of the deceased for the purpose of religious rituals.  Factual Matrix 5. It appears from the materials on record that on 15.11.2021, there was an encounter between the militants and police at the   Hyderpora  area of   Budgam   in  Kashmir.   Four   militants were shot dead including the son of the appellant herein. In connection with the said incident, a First Information Report No. 193/2021 was registered at the Saddar Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 307/120­B IPC, 7/27 of the Arms Act and 16, 18, 20 resply of the ULA (P) Act. During the course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer recovered four bullet ridden unidentified dead bodies at the site of the encounter. The dead bodies were shifted to the 3 Police   Hospital  at  Srinagar   for   the   medico­legal  formalities. After conducting the post­mortem etc., the dead bodies were identified as that of a foreign terrorist viz. Bilal Bhai @ Hyder @ Saqlain R/O Pakistan, Aamir Latief Magrey S/O Mohammad Latief   Magrey   R/O   Seeripora   Tehsil   Gool   Ramban,   Altaf Ahmad   Bhat   S/O   Abdul   Rehman   Bhat   R/O   Old   Barzulla Srinagar   and   Dr.   Mudasir   Gull   S/O   Ghulam   Mohammad Rather R/O Parraypora Srinagar. All the four dead bodies were shifted to the Handwara Zachaldara for burial.  6. The material on record further reveals that the bodies of the two out of the four persons killed in the encounter were later exhumed and handed over to their relatives for performing their last rites at the place of their choice. The bodies of the other two persons killed in the encounter i.e. Bilal Bhai @ Hyder and the son of the appellant herein buried through the Auqaf Committee, Wadder Payeen were not disinterred and handed over to their respective family members.  7. It appears that so far as the deceased, namely, Bilal Bhai, a resident of Pakistan is concerned, nobody claimed his body 4 nor was there any demand for handing over of the dead body from   any   quarter.   However,   it  is   the   case   of   the   appellant herein   that   so   far   as   the   dead   body   of   his   son   Amir   is concerned,   he   had   approached   various   authorities   with   a request to hand over the body but none listened to him and ultimately the body of his son (deceased) was buried at the Wadder Payeen Graveyard. It is his case that he was informed by the Police Station at Gool on 16.11.2021 that his son Amir had   been   killed   in   an   encounter   in   Kashmir   and   that   he should   proceed   to   Kashmir   to   identify   the   body.   On 16.11.2021,   the   appellant   along   with   his   family   members reached the Police Station at Saddar, where he was told that his son Amir Magrey was a militant and was killed along with three other associates at the Hyderpora and the dead body of Amir had been buried.  8. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant herein preferred the Writ Petition (C) No. 11 of 2022 in the High Court and prayed for the following relief:  “ In view  of  the  submissions  made  herein  above  and those to be urged at the time of hearing, this Hon’ble 5 Court is humbly requested to direct the respondents to handover the body of Late Mohammad Amir Magray, who   was   killed   in   a   joint   encounter   by   them   on 15.11.2021 at Hyderpora area of Budgam in Kashmir to the petitioner who happens to be his biological father on the facts and grounds mentioned above. ” 9. A learned Single Judge of the High Court adjudicated the writ application and allowed the same directing the respondents herein to make necessary arrangements for the disinterment of the body/remains of the deceased Amir Magrey from the Wadder Payeen Graveyard in the presence of the appellant herein.  10. The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ application filed by the appellant herein, held as under:   “15.  The right of the next of kin of the deceased to have their dear one cremated or buried as per the religious obligations   and   religious   belief   that   the   dead   person professed during his life time, is part and parcel of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The parents and close relations of the deceased are well within their right to demand the dead body of their dear one to be cremated or buried as per their traditions, religious obligations and religious belief. This right would also include the choice of the relatives to have the dead body cremated or buried at his native place. It is not uncommon that the graves of the dead are maintained by their relatives and are visited by their relations and close friends to pay respect and homage on certain occasions. 6  Without dilating much on the issue, it can be said to 16. be well settled that right to life and liberty guaranteed to a   citizen   by   Article   21   of the   Constitution   of India includes   right   of the   citizen   to   live   with   human dignity and this right to live with human dignity even extends after death though in a limited extent. Viewed thus, the right of the petitioner to claim the dead body of his son for performing last rites in his own way and in accordance with local traditions, religious obligations and   religious   faith,   which   the   deceased   professed during his life time, cannot be disputed. But the question that needs to be addressed in the context of present controversy is whether the State can deny this right in the name of preventing law and order situation going out of hand. 17.  It is vehemently contended by the respondents that the decision not to hand over the body of the deceased to the petitioner for performing his last rites, was taken in the larger public interest and to prevent the situation of law and order going out of hand. It is submitted that respondents have witnessed such situations in the past and, therefore, have decided not to handover the dead bodies of the terrorists killed in encounters to their next of kin for cremation or burial to prevent the law and order   situation   getting   worsened.   The   respondents, however, have not come clear as to why the dead bodies of two of the four killed in the encounter, namely, Altaf Ahmad Bhat and Dr. Mudasir Gul were exhumed and handed over to their relatives for their last rites in the graveyards   of their   choice   and   why   the   similar   right claimed by the petitioner was denied. The respondents have tried to draw distinction by submitting that as per the investigation conducted by the SIT, the deceased son of the petitioner was a confirmed terrorist whereas the other two killed, namely, Altaf Ahmad Bhat and Dr. Mudasir Gul were only associates of the terrorists. I do not find any logic or sense in distinction so made by the 7 respondents. It transpires that due to public pressure and   demand   by   the   relatives   of the   two   deceased namely, Altaf Ahmad Bhat and Dr. Mudasir Gul, the respondents relented and permitted their dead bodies to be exhumed and handed over to their relatives. Since the petitioner was a resident of Gool, a remote village in Jammu Province and did not much say in the Valley and, therefore, his request was arbitrarily turned down. The action of the respondents is not traceable to any procedure established by law which is just, fair and equitable. At least none was brought to the notice of this Court. The decision of the respondents not to allow the petitioner   to   take   away   dead   body   of his   son   to   his native village for last rites was per­se arbitrary and falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 18.  Much has been said by the respondents with regard to the status of the body lying buried since 15.11.2021. While it cannot be disputed that the body of Amir Latief Magrey buried   on   15.11.2021   in   Wadder   Payeen Graveyard may have putrefied by now but that alone cannot be a reason not to handover the remains of the dead body to the petitioner who is clamoring at the top of his voice to get even the remains of the dead body of his   son   so   that   he   could   bury   him   in   his   native graveyard   in   the   presence   of relatives   and   after following   all   religious   obligations.   The   apprehension of law and order getting vitiated at this point of time also appears to be illusory. When the respondents could maintain the law and order situation when the dead bodies   of two,   namely,   Altaf   Ahmad   Bhat   and   Dr. Mudasir Gul were exhumed and handed over to their relatives for last rites on 18.11.2021, it is not difficult for the respondents to make necessary arrangements for exhumation of the dead body of Amir Latief Magrey, the son of the petitioner and transport the same in proper escort to Village Thatharka Seripora Tehsil Gool District Ramban.   The   respondents   can   make   appropriate arrangements to ensure that law and order situation 8
does not get vitiated in any manner. The petitioner, as is<br>fervently contended by his counsel, is even ready to<br>undertake that he will abide by all the terms and<br>conditions that may be imposed by the respondents<br>with regard to exhumation, transportation and<br>according of burial to the dead body.”
11. The learned Single Judge issued the final directions in para 19, which reads thus:  “19.  For the foregoing reasons, I am inclined to allow this petition of the father of the deceased Amir Latief Magrey   and   direct   the   respondents   to   make arrangements for exhumation of the body/remains of the   deceased   Amir   Latief   Magrey from   the   Wadder Payeen   graveyard   in   presence   of the   petitioner.   The respondents shall also make appropriate arrangement for transportation of the dead body to the village of the petitioner for according burial in his native graveyard in accordance with the traditions, religious obligations and religious faith which the deceased professed during his life   time   provided   it   is   in   deliverable   state.   The respondents are free to impose any reasonable terms and conditions in respect of exhumation, transportation and burial of the dead body of Amir Latief Magrey, the son   of the   petitioner.   Since   the   dead   body   of the deceased must be in advance stage of putrefaction, as such, it would be desirable that the respondents act with promptitude and do not waste any further time. However, if the body is highly putrefied and is not in deliverable state or is likely to pose risk to public health and hygiene, the petitioner and his close relatives shall be allowed to perform last rites as per their tradition and religious belief in the Wadder Payeen graveyard itself.   In   that   situation,   the   State   shall   pay   to   the petitioner a compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs for deprivation of his right to have the dead body of his son and give him   decent   burial   as   per   family   traditions,   religious 9
obligations and faith which the deceased professed<br>when he was alive.”
12. Thus, the learned Single Judge addressed himself essentially on the following issues:  a. The State could not have denied the right of the appellant to claim the dead body of his son for performing the last rites in accordance with his religious faith on the ground of likelihood of disturbance of public order. According to the learned Single Judge, such right as asserted by the father is enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution.   b. Why   the   dead   bodies   out   of   the   four   killed   in   the encounter were permitted to be exhumed  and handed over to their relatives for their last rites? c.  The action on the part of the respondents in not allowing the appellant to take away the dead body of his son to his native village was violative of Article 14 & 21 resply of the Constitution.  10 13. The Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and others being dissatisfied and aggrieved with the aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court challenged the same by filing the Letters Patent Appeal No. 99 of 2022. The Appeal Court disposed of the appeal holding as under:  “15.  Learned   Advocate   General   while   making   his submission   in   line   with   the   contentions   raised   and grounds   urged   would   contend   that   the   impugned judgment is not legally sound and that writ petitioner was   not   entitled   to   any   of   the   reliefs   prayed   in   the petition including the reliefs sought now. According to the learned Advocate General, the writ court misdirected itself   while   considering   the   controversy   and   did   not consider the matter in its right and correct perspective, warranting   as   such,   setting   aside   of   the   impugned judgment   and   dismissal   of   the   petition.   The   learned Advocate General, however, would fairly contend that having regard to facts and circumstances of the case, respondent   no.   1   and   his   family   members   can   be allowed   to   perform Fatiha   Khawani (prayers   after burial) at the grave of the deceased subject to security measures as may be required to be put in place by appellants,   as   according   to   him,   the   last   rites   of deceased had been performed as per Islamic Religious practices by giving a washing/cleaning of dead body, shrouding/systematic wrapping of the body with two white pieces of cloth, covering the whole body followed by Janaza prayers   and   consequent   burial   of   the deceased  in the  grave,  reciting verses  from  the Holy Book Quran. 16.  Learned counsel for writ petitioner/respondent no. 1, however, would controvert the contentions raised and grounds urged by learned Advocate General inasmuch 11 as   the   aforesaid   offer   made   by   learned   Advocate General, and would insist for exhumation of the body of the deceased for performance of last rites by the writ petitioner/respondent no. 1 herein. 17.  In view of giving up of the relief of exhumation of the body of the deceased for performance of last rituals by writ petitioner/respondent no. 1 before the Apex Court inasmuch   as   in   view   of   uncontroverted/unopposed stand taken by appellants before the Writ Court, that last rites of deceased stand already performed while burying   deceased   at   Wadder   Payeen   Graveyard,   the contention of the counsel for respondent no. 1 in fact pales into insignificance and is not acceptable. 18.  The prayer of counsel for respondent no. 1 made during the course of arguments that respondent no. 1 and his family members be permitted to see the face of deceased by opening the grave of the deceased, cannot be accepted and permitted, firstly, in view of pleading of writ   petitioner   that   the   dead   body   would   start decomposing immediately after burial, and secondly in view of the statement made by the writ petitioner before the Apex Court while giving up the prayer of exhumation of the dead body of the deceased.  The   aforesaid   offer   made   by   learned   Advocate 19. General seemingly is fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 20.  Insofar as alternative relief, pressed by respondent no.   1   before   the   Apex   Court   qua   payment   of compensation   as   granted   by   the   Writ   Court   is concerned, it needs to be appreciated that appellants admittedly did not provide opportunity to respondent no. 1   and   his   family   to   associate   in   the   burial   and performance   of   last   religious   rites   of   the   deceased. Appellants prima facie have acted unfairly inasmuch as unreasonably   in   this   regard   notwithstanding   the allegation of appellants that person of deceased was a 12 terrorist even if it may be assumed, as such, that the deceased   relinquished   his   right   to   be   buried   after performance   of   last   rites   performed   by   his   family members in accordance with the faith professed by him, yet   the   said   right   of   burial   and   performance   of   last religious rituals of deceased available to respondent no. 1 and his family members could not have been denied. Admittedly, respondent no. 1 and his family manifestly has   been   subjected   to   emotional   and   sentimental melancholy. Respondent no. 1 and his family have been deprived by appellants of the right to perform last rites and rituals of deceased by the appellants admittedly without   there   being   any   policy/guideline,   as   such cannot be endorsed in law, in that, ours is a Welfare State acknowledged by the whole globe. The appellants herein also could not have overlooked the background of the family of respondent no. 1 and his family's role in fighting terrorism. The Writ Court having regard to the aforesaid   position   has   rightly   awarded   the compensation   to   the   respondent   no.   1   for   such deprivation   and   the   award   of   said   compensation seemingly is appropriate.” 14. The Appeal Court issued the following directions in para 21, as under: 
“21. For all what has been observed, considered and<br>analysed above, and having regard to the peculiar facts<br>and circumstances of the present case, the instant<br>appeal is disposed of as follows:
(i) Appellants to allow respondent no. 1 and his family<br>members (maximum 10 persons) to perform Fatiha<br>Khawani (religious rituals/prayers after burial) of<br>deceased at Wadder Payeen Graveyard, on the<br>date and time to be decided in consultation with<br>respondent no. 1, subject to taking into account
13 security measures which may be required to be put in place inasmuch as the COVID­19 guidelines. (ii) Appellants to pay compensation of Rs. 5.00 Lakhs, awarded by the Writ Court, to respondent no. 1 is maintained. It is made clear that the payment of said compensation by appellants to respondent no. 1 shall not form a precedence for future in view of the   fact   that   the   said   compensation   stands awarded to the writ petitioner/respondent no. 1 in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case. 15. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the Appeal Court did not approve the decision of the learned Single Judge to direct   the   respondents   herein   to   exhume   the   body   of   the deceased and thereby permit the family members to shift and bury at their native graveyard in accordance with the religious practice.  16. The appellant (father of the deceased) being dissatisfied with the order passed by the High Court is here before us with the present appeal invoking Article 136 of the Constitution.  Submissions on behalf of the Appellant 17.  Mr. Anand Grover, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, at the outset, submitted that he would 14 like   to   confine   his   prayer   to   the   extent   of   directing   the respondents to disinter the body so as to enable the appellant as   a   father   and   other   family   members   to   perform   the prayers/rituals to their satisfaction. Mr. Grover submitted that the body is now buried past almost more than eight months. In such circumstances, the family members of the deceased would not like to disturb the remains of the dead body and once  the   prayers   are   offered,  the   body   may  be  once  again buried. However, Mr. Grover clarified that the appellant would like to wash the body with water and wrap it up with a new white cloth.  18. Mr. Grover further submitted that the Appeal Court ought not to   have   disturbed   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single Judge   directing   the   respondents   to   exhume   the   body.   He would submit that the appellant as a father still believes that his son was not a terrorist or a militant and was killed in a fake encounter. Mr. Grover would submit that assuming for a moment without admitting that the deceased was a militant, the   police   should   have   handed   over   the   dead   body   to   the 15 family members and could not have buried the body discreetly at the Wadder Payeen Graveyard.  19. The entire line of argument of Mr. Grover is that the appellant has a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution to perform the last rites of his dead son in accordance with the rituals prevailing in Islam. The appellant as a father could not have   been   deprived   of   such   fundamental   right.   He   would submit that as the appellant was not permitted or rather given an opportunity to perform the last rites of his dead son, there is no other option but to pray for exhumation of the dead body.  20. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Grover seeks to rely upon the following decisions:  (1) Pt. Parmanand Katara, Advocate v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 248,  (2) ,   S.   Sethu   Raja   v.   The   Chief   Secretary The   Chief Secretary,   Government   of   Tamil   Nadu   and   Ors., WP(MD) No.3888 of 2007 decided on 28.08.2007,  (3) Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re , (2012) 5 SCC 1,  16 (4) Jakir Sk. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.,  2017 SCC OnLine Cal 3354,  (5) Vineet   Ruia   v.   Principal   Secretary,   Ministry   of Health   and   Family   Welfare,   Government   of   West  AIR 2020 Cal 308,  Bengal, (6) Ram   Sharan   Autyanuprasi   v.   Union   of   India,   AIR 1989 SC 549,  (7) Ashray Adhikar Abhiyan v. Union of India , (2002) 2 SCC 27,  (8) , 2020 SCC Pradeep Gandhy v. State of Maharashtra OnLine Bom 662. 21. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Grover prays that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and appropriate relief may be granted. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents 22.  On the other hand, this appeal has been, vehemently, opposed by  Mr.   Ardhendumauli  Kumar   Prasad,  the   learned  counsel appearing for the respondents submitting that no error, not to 17 speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. The learned counsel would submit that the impugned order passed by the High Court is a balanced order keeping all the relevant aspects of the matter in mind, more particularly, the issues relating to public order etc. and no interference is warranted at the end of this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.  23. The learned counsel would  submit that the appellant as a father   of   the   deceased   cannot   assert   that   he   has   a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution to seek exhumation   of   the   body   for   the   purpose   of   performing  the necessary rituals.  24. The learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to the averments made in the affidavit in reply filed for the purpose of   opposing   the   present   appeal.   We   quote   the   relevant averments, as under:  “4. It is respectfully submitted that in the previous round of before this Hon'ble Court in SLP(C) No. 10760 of 2022, the Petitioner submitted that he does not press for the relief   regarding   exhumation   and   handing   over   of   the 18 body remains of his deceased son. Relevant extract of the   order   dated   27.06.2022   passed   by   this   Hon'ble Court in SLP(C) No. 10760/2022 are reproduced herein below:   "Learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset states that he does not press for the first relief granted   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the High Court regarding exhumation and handing over of the body remains of his deceased son."  5. Pursuant to the above, the Hon’ble High Court after considering the said submission of the petitioner herein passed the present Impugned Order. Relevant extract of the Impugned Order dated 01.07.2022 passed by the Hon’ble High Court is reproduced herein below: "7. Indisputably, Respondent No. 1 herein has given up first relief, granted by the Writ Court, before the Apex Court as regards exhumation and  handing  over  of   the   body­remain  of  his deceased son. As such, the appearing counsel for parties were heard on the rest of the reliefs identified in the order of the Apex Court." 6. Further, the Hon’ble High Court whilst passing the present   impugned   order   was   pleased   to   allow   the petitioners herein and his family members (maximum 10 persons)   to   perform   Fatiha   Khawani   (religious rituals/prayers after burial) of the deceased at Wadder Payeen Graveyard, on the date and time to be decided in consultations with respondent no. 1, subject to taking into account security measures which may be required to   be   put   in   place   in   as   much   as   the   COVID­19 guidelines.  7. It is submitted that the respondent is agreeable to the abovementioned   relief   granted   by   the   Hon'ble   High Court   with   regards   to   performing   Fatiha   Khawani (religious   rituals/prayers   after   burial)   subject   to 19 reasonable conditions being imposed by the concerned District   Magistrate   in   the   interest   of   public   health, security and maintenance of law and order. 8. It is humbly submitted that further relief sought by the   Petitioner   before   this   Hon'ble   Court   regarding exhumation of the body of the deceased and offering prayer thereat is opposed by the answering respondent authorities   on   the   ground   of   state   security,   law   and order, public health & hygiene apart from the fact that the same will open a floodgate of similar requests and will raise serious security concerns and threat to public order   and   health.   In   this   regard   detailed   averments have   already   been   submitted   by   the   answering respondent before single bench and Divisional Bench of JK High Court.  9. It is respectfully submitted that the deceased was a hard core terrorist associated with a terrorist group and was killed in an encounter with the security forces on 15.11.2021   along   with   Pakistan   based   terrorist   with whom he was hatching different terror conspiracies.  10.  That   pursuant   to   the   fierce   gun   battle/encounter that led to killing of the deceased terrorist, authorities have performed the last rites of the deceased as per his religious beliefs and practices and buried the dead body as per the religious customs. It is respectfully submitted that the Hon'ble High Court has nowhere observed that there   has   been   any   violation   of   practice   of   religious customs during the last rites of the deceased. 11.  It is respectfully submitted that it has been more than 8 months from the date of burial of the dead body and as of now the same would have decomposed hence, no purpose would suffice by exhuming the same as the same may lead to adverse public health issues. This factual   position   is   also   elaborately   admitted   by   the petitioner  in  its  pleadings  as  well  before  the Hon'ble High Court of J&K, Srinagar.  20 12. That,   it   is   further   respectfully   submitted   that pursuant to the encounter of terrorist namely Burhan Wani, a disturbing trend of glorification of the deceased terrorists   was   witnessed   in   the   valley   wherein   anti­ national emotions were stoked in the youth and they are instigated against the Indian Republic to join various terror   groups.   It   is   respectfully   submitted   that   in exhuming the remains of the deceased, such emotions may be flared and such activities shall be revived which may lead to a further threat to national security and glorification of terrorism.   13. It is respectfully submitted that the valley is affected by   terror   activities   and   there   are   regular   gun­ battle/encounters   between   the   security   forces   and terrorists. Any direction of exhumation of the body will lead to similar requests from the family of other killed terrorists, which may adversely affect security of nation and public order in the entire Union Territory of JK, as mentioned   above   and   averments   already   submitted before the Honourable High Court.  14. Therefore, in light of the submissions made herein­ above,  it  is  respectfully  submitted  that  the prayer  of exhumation of the mortals of the deceased may not be granted   and   the   direction   of   allowing   the   petitioners herein   and   family   (maximum   10   persons)   to   perform Fatiha Khawani (religious rituals/prayers after burial) of the deceased at Graveyard, on the date and time to be decided in consultations with respondent no. 1, subject to taking into account security measures which may be required to be put in place in as much as the COVID­19 guidelines   may   be   allowed   and   the   present   Special Leave Petition may be dismissed.”   [Emphasis supplied] 21 25. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel appearing   for   the   respondents   prayed   that   there   being   no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed. Analysis  26. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions of law fall for the consideration of this Court:  a. Whether the appellant (father of the deceased) can pray for exhumation of  the dead body of his son from the graveyard asserting that it is his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution to perform the last rites of his slained son? b. Will it be in the fitness of the things, more particularly, having regard to the fact that the body is now buried past more than eight months to order, exhumation so as to enable the appellant and his family members to perform the rituals as followed in Islam? c. Assuming for a moment that it is the fundamental right of   the   father   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   to 22 perform the last rites and rituals of his son with dignity before being buried in a graveyard, should this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 (1) of the Constitution disturb the impugned order passed by the High Court at the risk & peril of public order, health etc. and   grant   the   relief   of   exhumation   after   almost   nine months? d. Whether   the   High   Court   in   appeal   committed   any substantial error in passing the impugned order? Exhumation of Body
Exhumation involves opening up a grave (or occasionally a
vault) and removing the human remains already buried there. Also known as ‘disinterment’, exhumation is controversial – even if the intent is usually to rebury the displaced remains elsewhere. Most societies and cultures that embrace burial as a means of bodily disposal exhibit an entrenched reluctance to disturb the dead’s earthly repose mainly for two reasons. The first   is   public   health   concerns   around   the   potential transmission of disease from the decaying corpses. Secondly, 23 and more fundamentally, exhumation offends the basic moral premise of allowing the dead to ‘rest in peace’ and is generally regarded as a forbidden or sacrilegious act.  28. Ordinarily,   the   request   for   exhumation   would   fall   into   two broad categories: “public interest and personal reasons.” 29. The lawful authority for exhumation is contained in Section 176(3), CrPC, 1973. This activity is permitted for the purpose of   crime   detection   and   other   such   pressing   situations. Whenever   there   is   a   suspicion   of   foul   play   like   homicide, criminal   abortion,   disputed   cause   of   death,   poisoning   etc. exhumation   may   be   carried   out   for   the   purpose   of   post­ mortem examination.  30. In   the   instant   case,   after   the   deceased   was   killed   in   the Hyderpora encounter, the authorities performed the last rites of   the   deceased   with   all   dignity   with   the   aid   of   the   Auqaf Committee   as   per   the   religious   beliefs   and   practices   and buried him in J&K on 15.11.2021. 31. The stance of the State on oath is, that the dead body of deceased was shifted and buried by the Auqaf Committee in 24 accordance with all the religious obligations at the Wadder Payeen Graveyard, in presence of the Executive Magistrate, Zachaldara. The last rites of the deceased had been performed as   per   the   Islamic   Religious   practices   by   giving   a wash/cleaning of dead body, shrouding/systematic wrapping of the body with two white pieces of cloth, covering the whole body followed by the Janaza prayers and consequent burial of the deceased in the grave, reciting the verses from the Holy Book Quaran. However, the appellant asserts that it was his privilege to perform the last rites of his son as a father. Scope of Articles 25 & 26 resply of the Constitution 32. In   Mohd. Hamid and Another v. Badi Masjid Trust and , (2011) 13 SCC 61, this Court held that:  Others 10.   ….. Page 406 of Hanafi Law Relating to Wakf or Trusts was also placed before the High Court and has also been placed before us by the counsel appearing for the respondents. Page 406 of the said law reveals a fatwa   contained   in   Fatawa­e­Alamgiri   at   p.   556,   in which it is stated under the heading “A burial ground” in the following manner: 25
“When a body has been buried in the ground,<br>whether for a long or short time, it cannot be
exhumed without some excuse. But it may lawfully
be exhumed when it appears that the land was
usurped, or another is entitled to it under a right of
pre­emption.”
xxx xxx xxx
12. In this connection, we may also refer to the decision<br>of this Court in Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P. [(1984) 1<br>SCC 81 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 35] In the said decision, this<br>Court has considered the scope and ambit of Articles 25<br>and 26 of the Constitution of India and also the<br>jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the<br>Constitution of India. In the said decision, the question<br>which arose for consideration was that whether two<br>graves could be shifted to some other place for the<br>purpose of finding out some permanent solution to the<br>perennial problem of clashes between the two religious<br>communities. While dealing with the aforesaid issue,<br>this Court considered various fatwas issued by religious<br>heads, namely, Head Muftis and Shahi Imams from<br>Delhi, Banaras and Patna stating the position of law for<br>shifting the graves under the Shariat law.
13. After going through all those fatwas, this Court<br>in Gulam Abbas [(1984) 1 SCC 81 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 35]<br>found that: (SCC p. 86, para 6)
“6. … The common theme in all these fatwas is that<br>under the Shariat law respecting of graves is the
religious obligation of every Muslim, that shifting of
dead bodies after digging old graves in which they
are lying buried is not permissible and to do so
would amount to interference with their religious
rights.”
26 It was further found that such religious rights of every person   and   every   religion   are,   however,   subject   to “public order”, the maintenance whereof is paramount in the larger interest of the society. It was also held that if it becomes necessary to shift graves in certain situations and exigencies of public order, the same would surely provide   a   requisite   situation,   especially   as   the fundamental   rights   under   Articles   25   and   26   are expressly made subject to public order.”     [Emphasis supplied] 33.   In   , Gulam Abbas and Others v. State of U.P. and Others (1984) 1 SCC 81, this Court held that:    …..Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, on which 5. strong reliance was placed by counsel for the contesting respondents representing the Sunni community in that behalf,   undoubtedly   guarantee   (a)   to   all   persons freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation   of   religion   and   (b)   to   every   religious denomination or any section thereof freedom to manage its   own   affairs   in   matters   of   religion   but   both   these fundamental rights have been expressly made “subject to public order, morality and health”. In other words, the exercise of these fundamental rights is not absolute but must yield or give way to maintenance of public order and the impugned suggestion was mooted by the Court and has now been found to be feasible by the Chairman of the Committee in the larger interest of the society for the   purpose   of   maintaining   public   order   on   every occasion of the performance of their religious ceremonies and functions by members of both the sects…..   Counsel   for   the   Sunnis   relied   upon   five   Fatwas 6. issued by their religious heads (Head Muftis and Shahi Imams)   from   Delhi,   Banaras   and   Patna   stating   the position under Sheriat Law. The common theme in all these Fatwas is that under Sheriat Law respecting of 27 graves is the religious obligation of every Muslim, that shifting of dead bodies after digging old graves in which they are lying buried is not permissible and to do so would amount to interference with their religious rights. True, this position under Sheriat Law cannot be doubted but   as   explained   earlier   the   religious   rights   of   every person and every religious denomination are subject to “public order”, the maintenance whereof is paramount in the   larger   interest   of   the   society.   For   instance,   the ecclesiastical edict or right not to disturb an interred corpse   is   not   absolute   as   will   be   clear   from   Section 176(3)   of   Criminal   Procedure   Code   which   permits   its exhumation for the purpose of crime detection and this provision is applicable to all irrespective of the personal law governing the dead. In fact, quoting a Hadit, one of the Fatwas relied upon by the contesting respondents states   “unnecessary   shifting   of   graves   is   also   not permissible”…..” [Emphasis supplied]        34. In  Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and Others v.
Government of Tamil Nadu and Another,(2016) 2 SCC 725,
this Court held that:
43.…..The rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26,
therefore, are circumscribed and are to be enjoyed
within constitutionally permissible parameters.Often
occasions will arise when it may become necessary to
determine whether a belief or a practice claimed and
asserted is a fundamental part of the religious practice
of a group or denomination making such a claim before
embarking upon the required adjudication. A decision on
such claims becomes the duty of the constitutional court.
It is neither an easy nor an enviable task that the courts
are called to perform. Performance of such tasks is not
28
enjoined in the court by virtue of any ecclesiastical
jurisdiction conferred on it but in view of its role as the
constitutional arbiter. Any apprehension that the
determination by the court of an essential religious
practice itself negatives the freedoms guaranteed by
Articles 25 and 26 will have to be dispelled on the
touchstone of constitutional necessity. Without such a
determination there can be no effective adjudication
whether the claimed right is in conformity with public
order, morality and health and in accord with the
indisputable and unquestionable notions of social
welfare and reforms. A just balance can always be
made by holding that the exercise of judicial power to
determine essential religious practices, though always
available being an inherent power to protect the
guarantees under Articles 25 and 26, the exercise
thereof must always be restricted and restrained.
        [Emphasis supplied] 35. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the religious rights of every person and every religion are, however, subject to the “public order”, the maintenance whereof is paramount in the larger interest of the society. Both these fundamental rights have been expressly made “subject to public order, morality and health”. The exercise of these fundamental rights is not absolute but must yield or give way to maintenance of public order, morality and health. 29 Right to have a decent burial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution 36. In  (supra), this Court observed that:  Pt.   Parmanand Katara 
“3. …..right to dignity and fair treatment under Article<br>21 of the Constitution of India is not only available to a<br>living man but also to his body after his death…..”
Ashray Adhikar(supra),this Court held that:
1.  ..…On the basis of that letter, an important question as to the right of homeless deceased, to have a decent burial, as per their religious belief and the corresponding obligation   of   the   State   towards   such   people   having arisen, the letter was treated as a writ petition and was listed for hearing. The letter prayed for an intervention by this Court and to issue necessary directions to all those concerned, so that a person dying on the road, can at least claim for a decent burial or cremation as a person belonging to the society. On the basis of that letter,   notices   have   been   issued.   The   Deputy Commissioner   of   Police   (Headquarters)   has   filed   a counter­affidavit, indicating the role of the police in such matters. On behalf of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Dr Satpal,   Deputy  Municipal   Health  Officer   has   filed   an affidavit, indicating therein that when a person dies on the streets and the dead body remains unclaimed, it is handed over to MCD by the Delhi Police and thereafter the dead body is cremated at electric crematorium, Bela Road by the Health Department of MCD, free of cost. In case the dead body is that of a Muslim, then the same is buried in a burial ground near Delhi Gate by the Waqf Board   and   Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi   bears   the expenses. On behalf of the Ashray Adhikar Abhiyan, a rejoinder­affidavit was filed. In course of hearing, the 30
Court wanted from the petitioner, as to what guidelines<br>the petitioner wants from the Court and pursuant to the<br>same, the proposed guidelines were submitted by the<br>petitioner. On going through those guidelines, we find<br>that apart from claiming a decent burial, the proposed<br>guidelines cover a vast field, which we apprehend,<br>would not come within the purview of the original<br>prayer.….”
Ram Sharan Autyanuprasi(supra),this Court opined
that:
13. …..It is true that life in its expanded horizons today<br>includes all that give meaning to a man's life including<br>his tradition, culture and heritage and protection of that<br>heritage in its full measure would certainly come within<br>the compass of an expanded concept of Article 21 of the<br>Constitution. Yet, when one seeks relief for breach of<br>Article 21, one must confine oneself to some direct, overt<br>and tangible act which threatens the fullness of his life<br>or the lives of others in the community.”
39. In Vineet Ruia (supra), the Calcutta High Court held that:
“20. By and large, whether it is for a theist or atheist,<br>freedom of conscience and free profession and practice<br>of religion is protected under Clause (1) of Article 25 of<br>the Constitution. The term “religion” in that Clause need<br>not necessarily be linked to any particular religion as is<br>understood as a religious denomination. It is a matter of<br>faith and of one's own conscience which could trigger<br>the profession and practice of what may be religion in<br>the larger sense to a particular individual. With this<br>concept in mind, it needs to be delineated that it is not<br>the religious practices of the different religious<br>denominations which matter in such instances. It is a
31 matter of connectivity with the person who has died and the   near   relatives   may   be   in   whatever   degree   of relationship.   Fundamentally,   human   relationship between   the   parent   and   child,   husband   and   wife, grandparent and grandchild, etc. is not based on any religious tenet. It is a matter of faith and conscience of every individual. If such a person is to take recourse to any practice and free profession on the foundation of freedom of conscience in terms of Clause (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution of India, it could get abridged only by the   reciprocal   covenant   that   such   activity   should   be subject to public order, morality and health and to other provisions   of   Part   III   of   the   Constitution.   This   is   the inbuilt mode of controlling such activities even in terms of Clause (1) of Article 25. The eligibility of a person to perform the funeral rites, be it connected to cremation or burial, may be sometimes guided by factors which may be   akin   to   accepted   practice   even   in   religious denominations. If we were to look at the varied practices among   the   Hindus   as   a   whole   or   different denominations of Hindus, one thing is clearly certain; the   facility   to   provide   ritualistic   offerings   by   way   of water,   flowers  or  even  certain  grains  are  quite  often seen as fundamentally for the satisfaction of the person making such offer to the dead before burial/cremation, as   the   case   may   be.   Post   cremation   rites   including, receiving the mortal remains in the form of ashes and bones which are treated as sacred to the near relatives of the departed and further handling of those materials in accordance with faith and belief also stands accepted in such communities (profitable reading in this regard can be had from Garuda Purana, Vishnu Purana and other ancient Hindu texts and scriptures). In so far as Christians are concerned, if one were to look at different denominations, it can be seen that there are practices, which may with slight variations, generally provide for prayers   before   the   dead   bodies   are   disposed   of   by burial and by offering prayers even after disposal on different   dates   and   times   depending   upon   the   faith, belief and practice in different Churches. A perusal of 32
canons would show that different ritualistic processes<br>are delineated for such matters. We have mentioned it<br>only to indicate that there are different practices<br>available. In so far as the Muslims are concerned,<br>whatever be the difference in beliefs and practices<br>among the Hanafis, who are treated as a majority group<br>of Sunnis in India, on one hand, and the Shias on the<br>other hand, one clear thread of connectivity is the faith<br>and belief that the disposal of human remains is a must<br>as well as post Kabar (Burial) rituals (Certain passages<br>from Al­Bahr­ur­Raiq will buttress this aspect). The<br>family also intends to have its own practices carried<br>forward to the extent it relates to their faith and belief.<br>We refer to all these only to demonstrate that by and<br>large the Indian community always has the desire for<br>intricate practices in the form of rituals with the<br>participation of near relatives of a deceased, following<br>what could be permissible under given<br>circumstances…..
xxx xxx xxx
23. …..the right of the family of a Covid­19 victim to<br>perform the last rites before the cremation/burial of the
deceased person is a right akin to Fundamental Right
within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. While exercising their power to impose restrictions
on citizens in their way of life in the wake of outbreak of
an endemic like Covid­19, a fine balance must be struck
by the State and the local self­government institutions
so that the aforesaid right of a citizen to perform the
obsequies of his near and dear ones does not stand
abridged or abrogated excepting for very compelling
reasons…..”
[Emphasis supplied]
33
40. In Anandhi Simon v. State of Tamil Nadu, Represented by<br>Chief Secretary to Government and Others, (2021) 3 Mad<br>LJ 479, the Madras High Court held that:
“16.The protection of life and personal liberty which is
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
many cases. There are lot of rights which are included
in Article 21 such as right to privacy, right against
solitary confinement, right to legal aid, right to speedy
trial etc. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in many cases has
also observed and interpreted that right to have a
decent burial is also included in Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. The right to human dignity is not
restricted to living human being but is available even
after the death also…..
xxx xxx xxx
xxxxxxxxx
34. Insofar as the exhumation for the purpose of<br>enabling the family members of the deceased to perform
their religious ceremonies and to bury the dead body at
an appropriate place of their choice is concerned, there
is a legislative vacuum. Even though under Section 176
Cr.P.C. and Section 174(1) Cr.P.C, the Magistrate and
the Officer­in­charge of the Police Station are having the
powers to order for exhumation, those cases do not deal
with the case on hand, where the buried person or his
family members are not involved in any criminal offence.
35.(d) In Common Cause v. Union of India reported<br>in (2008) 5 SCC 511, the Hon'ble Supreme Court<br>observed that if there is a buffer zone unoccupied by the<br>legislature or executive which is detrimental to the<br>public interest, judiciary must occupy the field to sub­<br>serve public interest.
LJ 479, the Madras High Court held that:
34
36.The case on hand also falls under the
aforementioned category where there is a legislative
vacuum.There is no legislation in India dealing with
cases where family members seek for exhumation of the
dead body for the purpose of burying the same and for
performing the ceremonies in the place meant for their
religious faith.”
[Emphasis supplied]
41. In Pradeep Gandhy (supra), the Bombay High Court held<br>that:
38.…..In the system of governance prevailing in our
country, it is highly unlikely that a Governmental
decision would please each and every citizen. While
dissent on valid grounds could contribute to newer
developments in the matter of framing of policies,
resentment of the nature put forth by the Petitioners in
WP­I leaves a bad taste in the mouth. We have found
the petitioners to be rather insensitive to others' feelings.
The founding fathers of the Constitution felt that the
people of India would strive to secure to all its citizens
FRATERNITY, assuring the dignity of an individual. That
is the preambular promise….. we find little reason to
deprive the dead of the last right, i.e., a decent burial
according to his/her religious rites…..”
42.
18.  The fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   has been   given   an   expanded   meaning   by   Judicial pronouncements.   The   right   to   life   has   been   held   to include   the   right   to   live   with   human   dignity.   By   our tradition and culture, the same human dignity (if not more), with which a living human being is expected to be 35 treated, should also be extended to a person who is dead. The right to accord a decent burial or cremation to the dead body of a person, should be taken to be part of the right to such human dignity...”
43.InVikash Chandra @ Guddu Baba v. The Union of India &
Ors., 2008 SCC OnLine Pat 905 : (2008) 2 PLJR 127, the
Patna High Court held that: 
“5. …..It is expected that Patna Medical College &<br>Hospital Officials or the State Officials will see to it that<br>the disposal of unclaimed and unidentified dead bodies<br>are done in accordance with law with utmost respect to<br>the dead and in case it is verifiable the last rites may be<br>in accordance with known faith of the deceased.”
44. In Ramji Singh @ Mujeeb Bhai v. State of U.P. & Ors.,<br>(2009) 5 All LJ 376, the Allahabad High Court held that:Ramji Singh @ Mujeeb Bhai v. State of U.P. & Ors.,
“17. We thus find that the word and expression ‘person’
17.We thus find that the word and expression ‘person’
in Art 21, would include a dead person in a limited
sense and that his rights to his life which includes his
right to live with human dignity, to have an extended
meaning to treat his dead body with respect, which he
would have deserved, had he been alive subject to his
tradition culture and the religion, which he professed.
The State must respect a dead person by allowing the
body of person to be treated with dignity and unless it is
required for the purposes of establishing a crime to
ascertain the cause of death and be subjected to
postmortem or for any scientific investigation, medical
education or to save the life of another person in
accordance with law, the preservation of the dead body
and disposal in accordance with human dignity.”
36 Scope and Powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
45. Article 136 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court<br>to grant special leave in its discretion against any judgment,<br>decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or<br>matter passed or made by any court or tribunal except by any<br>court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to<br>the armed forces. It reads as under:
“136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.—(1)<br>Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme<br>Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to<br>appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,<br>sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or<br>made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.<br>(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,<br>determination, sentence or order passed or made by any<br>court or tribunal constituted by or under any law<br>relating to the Armed Forces.”“136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.—(1)<br>Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme<br>Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to<br>appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,<br>sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or<br>made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,<br>determination, sentence or order passed or made by any<br>court or tribunal constituted by or under any law<br>relating to the Armed Forces.”
46. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 is divisible into two<br>stages: the first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for the<br>special leave to file an appeal and the second stage<br>commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the
37
special leave petition is converted into an appeal. The legal<br>position as summarised by this Court<br>in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359;<br>affirmed in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara<br>Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376,<br>regarding the scope of two stages reads as under:
“(a) While hearing the petition for special leave to<br>appeal, the Court is called upon to see whether the<br>petitioner should be granted such leave or not.<br>While hearing such petition, the Court is not<br>exercising its appellate jurisdiction; it is merely<br>exercising its discretionary jurisdiction to grant or<br>not to grant leave to appeal. The petitioner is still<br>outside the gate of entry though aspiring to enter<br>the appellate arena of the Supreme Court. Whether<br>he enters or not would depend on the fate of his<br>petition for special leave.
(b) If the petition seeking grant of leave to appeal is<br>dismissed, it is an expression of opinion by the<br>Court that a case for invoking appellate jurisdiction<br>of the court was not made out.
(c) If leave to appeal is granted, the appellate<br>jurisdiction of the court stands invoked; the gate for<br>entry in appellate arena is opened. The petitioner is<br>in and the respondent may also be called upon to<br>face him, though in an appropriate case, in spite of<br>having granted leave to appeal, the Court may<br>dismiss the appeal without noticing the respondent.
(d) In spite of a petition of special leave to appeal<br>having been filed, the judgment, decree or order<br>against which leave to appeal has been sought for,<br>continues to be final, effective and binding as
38
between the parties. Once leave to appeal has been<br>granted, the finality of the judgment, decree or<br>order appealed against is put in jeopardy though it<br>continues to be binding and effective between the<br>parties unless it is a nullity or unless the Court may<br>pass a specific order staying or suspending the<br>operation or execution of the judgment, decree or<br>order under challenge. [ Id, 372, para 14.]”
47. In Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169, the Constitution<br>Bench of this Court has explained the scope and powers of<br>this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in detail:
“9. On a careful examination of Article 136 along with
9.On a careful examination of Article 136 along with
the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide
discretionary power with which this Court is invested
under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional
cases only, and as far as possible a more or less
uniform standard should be adopted in granting special
leave in the wide range of matters which can come up
before it under this article.By virtue of this article, we
can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal cases,
in income tax cases, in cases which come up before
different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other
cases.The only uniform standard which in our opinion
can be laid down in the circumstances is that Court
should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases
where special circumstances are shown to exist. The
Privy Council have tried to lay down from time to time
certain principles for granting special leave in criminal
cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court
inKapildeov.King. It is sufficient for our purpose to say
that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly
since the reasons, constitutional and administrative,
which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need
not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are
39
useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for
invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special
leave.Generally speaking, this Court will not grant
special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and
special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave
injustice has been done and that the case in question
presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a
review of the decision appealed against.Since the
present case does not in our opinion fulfil any of these
conditions, we cannot interfere with the decision of the
High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed.
[Emphasis supplied]
48. A three­Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Hem Raj,<br>Son of Devilal Mahajan of Bijainagar, Condemned<br>Prisoner, at Present Confined in the Central Jail, Ajmer v.<br>State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462, held as under:Hem Raj,
“2.Unless it is shown that exceptional and special
circumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice
has been done and the case in question presents
features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the
decision appealed against,this Court does not exercise
its overriding powers under Article 136(1) of the
Constitution and the circumstance that because the
appeal has been admitted by special leave does not
entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and
contest all the findings of fact and raise every point
which could be raised in the High Court. Even at the
final hearing only those points can be urged which are
fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when the leave
to appeal is asked for. The question for consideration is
whether this test is satisfied in either of these two
appeals. After hearing the learned counsel in both the
State of Ajmer,AIR 1954 SC 462, held as under:
40
appeals we are satisfied that none of them raise any
questions which fall within the rule enunciated above.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Another,(1980) 3
SCC 141, has explained the Article 136 of the Constitution as
under:
“7.   …..In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable   cases.   The   discretionary   dimension   is considerable but that relates to the power of the court. The   question   is   whether   it   spells   by   implication,   fair a procedure as contemplated by Article 21. In our view, it   does.   Article   136   is   a   special   jurisdiction.   It   is residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This Court   functionally   fulfils   itself   by   reaching   out   to injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Article 136. Is it merely a power in the court to be exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no procedural limitation in the manner of exercise and the occasion for exercise? Is there no duty to act fairly while hearing a case under Article 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or, after such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly any doubt that here is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power   vested   in   the   summit   court.   It   must   be remembered that Article 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding fathers unarguably intended in the very terms of Article 136 that it shall be exercised by   the   highest   judges   of   the   land   with   scrupulous adherence   to   judicial   principles   well   established   by 41
precedents in our jurisprudence. Judicial discretion is<br>canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity. Cardozo,<br>with elegant accuracy, has observed: [Benjamin<br>Cardozo : The Nature Of The Judicial Process, Yale<br>University Press (1921)]
“The Judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly<br>free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a<br>knight­errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own<br>ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his<br>inspiration from consecrated principles. It is not to<br>yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and<br>unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a<br>discretion informed by tradition, methodized by<br>analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to<br>‘the primordial necessity of order in the social life’.<br>Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion<br>that remains.”
8.It is manifest that Article 136 is of composite
structure, is power­cum­procedure — power in that it
vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and procedure
in that it spells a mode of hearing. It obligates the
exercise of judicial discretion and the mode of hearing so
characteristic of the court process. In short, there is an
in­built prescription of power and procedure in terms of
Article 136 which meets the demand of Article 21.
9.We may eye the issue slightly differently. If Article 21
is telescoped into Article 136, the conclusion follows that
fair procedure is imprinted on the special leave that the
court may grant or refuse. When a motion is made for
leave to appeal against an acquittal, this Court
appreciates the gravity of the peril to personal liberty
involved in that proceeding.It is fair to assume that
while considering the petition under Article 136 the court
will pay attention to the question of liberty, the person
who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and his
locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade
42
the court to grant special leave. When this conspectus of
processual circumstances and criteria play upon the
jurisdiction of the court under Article 136, it is
reasonable to conclude that the desideratum of fair
procedure implied in Article 21 is adequately answered.
xxx xxx xxx
11.The wider the discretionary power the more sparing
its exercise. Times out of number this Court has stressed
that though parties promiscuously “provoke” this
jurisdiction, the court parsimoniously invokes the power.
Moreover, the court may not, save in special situations,
grant leave to one who is not eo nomine a party on the
record. Thus, procedural limitations exist and are
governed by well worn rules of guidance.”
[Emphasis supplied] 50. Thus, the principles of law discernible from the aforesaid are that   unless,   it   is   shown   that   exceptional   and   special circumstances exist; that substantial and grave injustice has been done  and   the  case and   question presents   features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against, this Court would not exercise its overriding powers under   Article   136   (1)   of   the   Constitution.   The   wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under Article   136   is   to  be   exercised  sparingly   and   in  exceptional cases   only.   Keeping   these   principles   in   mind,   we   need   to 43 decide whether the relief prayed for by the appellant should be granted or not? Condition of the Body after Burial 51. Even the writ court had allowed disinterment subject to the condition that the body should be found to be in a deliverable state. It further stated that if the body is found to be highly putrefied then it may pose a risk to public health and hygiene. In such a situation the family of the deceased would only be allowed to perform the last rites in the graveyard itself.  52. It   has   been   argued   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   the respondents themselves had disinterred the dead bodies of two persons, who were killed along with the appellant’s son. One of them was shot dead by a foreign militant, while the other was killed during the crossfire and they were disinterred within two days of burial on the directions of District Magistrate Kupwara and handed over to their next of kin for performing their last rites   in  their   own   way.   It  can   be   easily   assumed   that  the bodies must not have decomposed much in two days thereby leaving them in a deliverable state. 44 53. The appellant himself has relied on an expert, namely, Dr. Arpad   A.   Vass,   a   Senior   Staff   Scientist   at   the   Oak   Ridge National Laboratory and Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee in Forensic Anthropology, who has stated that decomposition of the human body begins around 4 minutes after a person dies. The expert has said that the body starts to liquify after one 1 month of decomposition. As each day passes by, more putrefaction is undergone by the body. Even the learned Single judge by order dated 27.05.2022, had mentioned that the dead body of the deceased must be in advanced stage of putrefaction. Almost 9 months have passed post burial which is suggestive that the body may not be in a deliverable state. It will be too much at this stage to disinter the body. The dead should not be disturbed and some sanctity should be attached to the grave. 54. It goes without saying that the right to live a dignified life as enshrined   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   is   not  only available to a living person but also to the “dead”. Even a dead person has the right of treatment to his body with respect and 45 dignity   which   he   would   have   deserved   had   he   been   alive, subject   to   his   tradition,   culture   and   religion   which   he professed. These rights are not only for the deceased but, his family members also have a right to perform the last rites in accordance with the religious traditions. We are of the view that it would have been appropriate and in fitness of things to hand   over   the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   to   the   family members, more particularly, when a fervent request was made for   the   same.   It   is   of   course   true   that   for   any   compelling reasons or circumstances or issues relating to public order etc. more particularly in cases of encounter with the militants the agency concerned may decline to part with the body. These are all very sensitive matters involving security of nation and as   far   as   possible   the   court   should   not   interfere   unless substantial &  grave injustice  has been  done. Although, for some reason or the other, the body of the deceased was not handed over to the family members yet the same was buried with respect & dignity, with the help of the Auqaf Committee at the Wadder Payeen Graveyard. We are convinced of one 46 thing that the body was buried with dignity. There is nothing on record to indicate that the dead body was dealt with in any manner insulting or hurting the religious feelings of the family members.  55. However,   what   is   not   appealing   to   us   is   the   vociferous submission  on  behalf   of   the   appellant   that  with  a  view to remedy the wrong, as alleged, this Court should direct the respondents to exhume the body and permit the appellant and his family members to thereafter perform the rituals. It is for this very wrong as alleged that the High Court has awarded a monetary compensation of the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/­.  56. After a body has been buried, it is considered to be in the custody of the law; therefore, disinterment is not a matter of right.   The   disturbance   or   removal   of   an   interred   body   is subject to the control and direction of the court. The law does not favour disinterment, based on the public policy that the sanctity of the grave should be maintained. Once buried, a body should not be disturbed. A court will not ordinarily order or permit a body to be disinterred unless there is a strong 47 showing of necessity that disinterment is within the interests of justice. Each case is individually decided, based on its own particular facts and circumstances.  57. The respondents have stated on oath that the body of the deceased   was   buried   with   all   honour.   The   body   was   first washed and thereafter wrapped in a fresh white cloth. The prayers were also performed at the time of the burial. There is nothing to indicate that the deceased was not given a decent burial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. The right  to  dignity   and   fair  treatment  under   Article   21   of  the Constitution is not only available to a living man but also to his body after his death. We, as a court of law, respect the emotions and sentiments expressed by the appellant as the father of the deceased. However, the court of law should not decide the rights of the parties considering their sentiments. The court of law has to decide the matter in accordance with law, more particularly, keeping in mind the doctrine of Rule of Law. 48 58. We take notice of the fact that India has no legislation relating to exhumation except Section 176(3) of the CrPC. As noticed by the Madras High Court in the case of   Anandhi Simon (supra), very few countries are having a legislation in regard to exhumation. One such legislation available is in Ireland under Section 46 of the Local Government (Sanitary Services) Act, 1948 as amended by Section 4 (2) and the Second Schedule of the Local Government Act, 1994. 59. The   Union   of   India   may   consider   enacting   an   appropriate legislation on exhumation so as to tackle the situations like the one on hand.  60. We are of the view that the relief granted by the High Court as contained in para 21 of the impugned judgment can be termed as just, proper and equitable. We direct the respondents to comply   with   the   directions   issued   by   the   High   Court,   as contained in para 21 of the impugned judgment and order.  61. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.   49 62. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. …………………………J. (SURYA KANT) …………………………J. (J.B. PARDIWALA) New Delhi; September 12, 2022 50