Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 13010-13019 of 1996
PETITIONER:
Collector and Ors. etc.
RESPONDENT:
P. Mangamma and Ors. etc.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/02/2003
BENCH:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2692-2693 OF 1997
ARIJIT PASAYAT,J
These appeals involve common points and are directed
against a Division Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court. Factual matrix giving rise to these appeals is as
follows:
Proceedings were initiated by the District Collector,
Hyderabad under the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands
(Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (in short ’the
Prohibition Act’) read with Section 166(B) of the Andhra
Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1950 (in short
’the Tenancy Act’). The suo motu action was taken on the
ground that there were irregular assignments in favour of
the original assignees and there were clear violations of
several stipulations and conditions provided under the
Special Loani Rules (in short ’the Rules). Transfers made by
the original assignees were illegal. The land situated in
Banjara hills area of Shaiktpet village, a prime locality
and in view of the contraventions of the conditions
stipulated under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act, the
assignments were to be cancelled. As there was no response
in spite of valid notice, order of cancellation was passed
on 18.12.1984. It was indicated that even though newspaper
advertisement was issued requiring the noticees to show
cause, it did not bring any result. There was no response on
the date fixed. The said order was challenged before a
learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, who
taking note of the respective stands of the parties disposed
of the writ applications, inter alia, with the following
directions:
"Simply because 30 years had elapsed by the
date of filing of the writ petition, it does
not mean that the proceedings have to be
automatically closed in spite of the
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divergent claims by the private individuals
and the State which required the
consideration by the authority concerned. The
impugned order is quashed to the extent of
the petitioners concerned and the petitioners
are directed to submit their objections
before the authority within two months from
today. The same shall be entertained by the
competent authority who issued notice in the
paper calling for objections under Section
166-B of the Act and be disposed of on merits
according to law."
Said order was challenged before a Division Bench which by
the impugned judgment held that though there was no time
limit fixed for initiation of action, it has to be within a
reasonable period and, therefore, action after about 30
years cannot be maintained. It was noted that no purpose
would be served by permitting the District Collector to
decide the case afresh after hearing the parties at this
distance of time. Accordingly, the impugned order of
cancellation was set aside by upsetting the directions of
learned Single Judge.
Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh and its
functionaries submitted that approach of the Division Bench
was clearly on untenable premises. Reference was made to
Section 3 of the Prohibition Act, 1977 to contend that it
contains a deemed provision, and assignments before and
after the commencement of the Prohibition Act were covered.
The said Act was enacted in the year 1977. When specific
instances of illegal assignments came to the notice of the
authorities, a special task force was constituted in the
year 1981 and on the basis of decision taken by the
concerned authorities action for cancellation was initiated.
Proper opportunity was given to the parties which they
failed to avail. On equitable consideration, learned Single
Judge had permitted a fresh adjudication. There was no
reason for the Division Bench to set aside the directions
given by learned Single Judge as there cannot be any rigid
formula to determine as to what would be a reasonable period
of time. On the facts of the present case, the action cannot
be said to have been taken after a long period.
Per contra, Mr. P.S. Mishra, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents submitted that the Prohibition
Act has no application to the facts of the case. Assignments
were made under the Rules by the Nizam. The Prohibition Act
is applicable only to assignments made by the Government.
"Assignments" and "Government" are defined in Section
2(1) and 2(2) of the Prohibition Act respectively. Though,
there cannot be any rigid formula for determining the
reasonable period, by no stretch of imagination a period of
30 years can be termed to be a reasonable period.
It was pointed out that under the Prohibition Act there
is a ban on transfer of the land assigned but there was no
such stipulation under the Rules. This stand is controverted
by Mr. Altaf Ahmad with reference to a Certificate dated
4.1.1953 (to which reference has been made in the judgment
by the Division Bench) to contend that there was prohibition
on such transfer.
A reasonable period would depend upon the factual
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circumstances of the concerned case. There cannot be any
empirical formula to determine that question. The
Court/authority considering the question whether the period
is reasonable or not has to take into account the
surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide
that question.
In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and Ors.
(AIR 1969 SC 1297) it was observed that when even no period
of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised
within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable
time must be determined by the facts of the case and the
nature of the order which was sought to be varied. This
aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in
view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points
relating to applicability of the Prohibition Act, and even
if it is held that the Act was applicable, the
reasonableness of the time during which action should have
been initiated were also not considered. It would be hard
to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable".
Reason varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built
up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of
a child’s toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the
reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by
authority, the decision of the judge usually determines what
is "reasonable" in each particular case; but frequently
reasonableness "belong to the knowledge of the law, and
therefore to be decided by the Courts". It was
illuminatingly stated by a learned author that an attempt to
give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying
to count what is not number and measure what is not space.
It means prima facie in law reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. [See Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Anr.
(AIR 1987 SC 2316) and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board
v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)(P) Ltd. and Anr. (AIR 1989 SC
973)]. As observed by Lord Romilly M.R. in Labouchere v.
Dawson (1872) L.R. 13 Eq.Ca. 325) it is impossible a priori
to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must
have the particular facts of each case established before
you can ascertain what is reasonable under the
circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is
essentially what is rational according to the dictates of
reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.
It is to be noted that the respondents questioned
correctness of the orders passed by the Collector by filing
writ petitions. As noted above, learned Single Judge had
directed the issues to be considered by the original
authority. It is a settled proposition in law that even
jurisdictional questions can be considered by an authority
deciding the question whether proceeding was validly
initiated or not.
We find that all the relevant aspects have not been
considered by the Division Bench which confined its
consideration only to the question of delay. The explanation
now offered by the appellants and the stand regarding non-
applicability of the Prohibition Act as raised by the
respondents have not been considered by the learned Single
Judge or the Division Bench. It would, therefore, be
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appropriate to remit the matter back to the High Court for a
fresh consideration by the Division Bench. Normally, the
question relating to valid initiation of action or otherwise
is to be decided by the original authority which was the
direction given by the learned Single Judge. But at this
length of time we do not think it proper to send the matter
back to the original authority. With a view to shorten
litigation, we remit the matter back to the Division Bench
as noted above. The parties shall be permitted to place all
relevant facts in respect of their respective stands before
the High Court which shall consider them in their proper
prospective and render its decision. We make it clear that
we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.
The appeals are disposed of accordingly. Parties shall bear
their respective costs.