Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5729 of 1994
PETITIONER:
SECRETARY, QUILON DISTT., MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS’ COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD.
RESPONDENT:
REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/08/1994
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY & N.P. SINGH
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
1994 SUPPL (2) SCR 762
The following Order of the Court was delivered:
Leave granted.
This appeal arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala
High Court made in Writ Appeal No. 1169 of 1993 dated 16.9.93. The
appellant is a registered cooperative society consisting of workers and it
had obtained certain stage carriage permits. One among which was oh the
route Kundara-Chinnakkada via Anchalmpod and Civil Station of 22 Kilometers
distance. The appellant had obtained the permit under s. 58 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, Act IV of 1939 on December 23, 1987 for a period of three
years which stood expired by December 22, 1990. In the meanwhile, the Motor
Vehicles Act No. 59 of 1988, (for short ’the Act’) has come into force on
July 1, 1989 in relation to the State of Kerala. The appellant made an
application to the Regional Transport Authority, Kollam, on January 4, 1991
seeking renewal .of the permit. The Regional Transport Authority rejected
the application on the ground that there is no power under the Act to grant
renewal to a permit granted under Act IV of 1939. When the appellant
carried the matter in appeal, State Transport Appellate Authority confirmed
the same and the High Court by the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench upheld the order of the State Transport Authority. Thus this appeal
by special leave.
It is contended for the appellant that renewal is in continuation of the
permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority on December 23, 1987, By
operation of s.217(2)(b), it is a permit granted under the old Act and
continued in its operation and that, therefore, by deeming fiction the
appellant is entitled to the renewal as a substantive right and it cannot
be rejected on the ground that after the Act has come into force the
appellant cannot seek the renewal under the Act by operation of the
statutory deeming fiction granted by Clause (b) of sub-S.(2) of s.217. We
find no force in the contention. Clause (31) of s3 defines permit means
permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority or an Authority
prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorising the use of Motor
Vehicle as a transport vehicle. Section 72 gives substantive right to grant
the permit and s. 81 deals with duration and renewal of the permit. Sub-
s.(l) provides that a permit other than a temporary permit issued under s.
87 or a special permit issued under sub-s. (8) of s.88 shall be effective
without renewal for a period of five years. The proviso is not necessary.
Therefore, it is omitted. 5ub-s.(2) provides that a permit may be renewed
on an application made not less than fifteen days before the date of
expiry; Permit granted under sub- s.(l) of s.72 of the Act shall have,
therefore, the duration of five years by operation of sub-s. (1) of s.81
and renewal shall be under sub-s.(2) in the prescribed mariner. In other
words, the permit granted under s.72 may be renewed for a further period of
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five years and in an appropriate case it may be refused- The condition
prece-dent is that the initial grant of permit must be under the Act.
Section 217(2)(b) speaks of only the existing certificate of fitness or
registration or licence or permit issued or granted under the repealed
enactments and notwithstanding the appeal of the Motor Vehicles Act IV of
1939, by operation of sub-s.(l) of s.217. the permit shall continue to have
effect after such commencement from 1.7.89 under the repealed Act as if
that Act was in operation. Under the same conditions and for the same
period, as if the Act had not been passed. In other words, notwithstanding
the repeal of the Act IV of 1939, the permit issued under the repealed Act
will continue to be operative for the period for which it was issued as if
this Act had not been passed and the repealed Act continues to be in
operation. With the expiry of the period of grant given in the permit under
the repealed Act, by necessary implication the operator has to make fresh
application in the prescribed mariner to the Concerned Regional Transport
Authority or State Transport Authority and seek a grant under s.72. The
grant of renewal is no more than a fresh permit to operate the transport
service for a fresh period mentioned in (he renewed permit. Therefore, the
operation of the permit issued under s.58 of the repealed Act IV of 1939 is
a terminus with the expiry of the period of the grant and the operation of
the Act IV of 1939 ceases to have effect from that date. Any right to run
the permit, therefore, must be under the permit granted under the Act as
per its provisions. Harmonious construction of the relevant provisions
would lead to the above conclusion lest any other construction would fly in
the face of the express provisions of the Act. By necessary implication of
s.217(2)(b) the right to renewal under the Act IV of 1939 stands repealed
with the expiry of the period of grant of the permit made under the
repealed Act. Since the application was not made for fresh grant under the
Act, the rejection of the renewal application under Act IV of 1939 or under
the Act is perfectly legal. The High Court is right in its conclusion. The
application for the renewal would not lie under the Act.
Pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court on April 4, 1994, if the
permit of the intervenor is cancelled and the renewal is made in favour of
the appellant, obviously with the dismissal of the appeal, the renewal
would stand cancelled and the permit granted to the intervenor would stand
revived. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs.