Najmunisha Etc. vs. The State Of Gujarat

2024 INSC 290 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2319­2320 OF 2009     1. SMT. NAJMUNISHA ….SOLE APPELLANT IN  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2319/2009 2. ABDUL HAMID CHANDMIYA  ALIAS LADOO BAPU     ...SOLE APPELLANT IN  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2320/2009 VERSUS 1. THE STATE OF GUJARAT      2.NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU  ... RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T  AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J. 1. The   instant   criminal   appeals   arise   out   of   SLP Signature Not Verified (Criminal) No(s). 7419­7420 of 2009 assailing the Digitally signed by Nirmala Negi Date: 2024.04.09 17:48:02 IST Reason: Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 1 of 54    2319­20 2009 Common Impugned Judgment dated 16.03.2009 of the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1702 of 2004 and 2097 of 2004 moved by the Original Accused No. 01 ( Smt. Najmunisha   – Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1702 of 2004 before the High Court) and Original Accused No. 04 ( Abdul Hamid Chandmiya alias   – Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. Ladoo Bapu 2097 of 2004 before the High Court). 2. Smt.   Najmunisha   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “Accused   No.   01”)   was   originally   convicted under Sections 29 read with 20(b)(ii)(c) and 25 of   the   Narcotics   Drugs   and   Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “NDPS   Act   1985”).   The   Trial   Court   had sentenced   her   to   ten   years   of   rigorous imprisonment and fine of INR 30,000/­ (Rupees Thirty   Thousand   only)   for   the   charge   under Section 29 read with Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS   Act   1985   and   in   default,   she   had   to undergo one year of simple imprisonment. No separate sentence was imposed under Section Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 2 of 54    2319­20 2009 25 of the NDPS Act 1985. This sentence was subsequently   modified   by   the   High   Court   of Gujarat while partly allowing her appeal to the effect   that   her   fine   was   enhanced   to   the minimum   prescribed   fine   of   INR   1,00,000/­ (Rupees   One   Lakh   only)   and   reduced   the sentence   in   default   of   paying   the   fine   from simple   imprisonment   of   one­year   to   simple imprisonment of three months. 2A . Abdul   Hamid   Chandmiya   alias   Ladoo   Bapu (hereinafter referred to as “Accused No. 04”) is the   husband   of   Accused   No.   01   who   was originally convicted under Section 29 read with 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act 1985 and sentenced to thirteen years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of INR 1,00,000/­ (Rupees One Lakh only). The same was affirmed by the High Court of Gujarat while also dismissing his appeal. 3. Accused   No.   05   ( Nazir   Ahmed   alias   Nazir Bazara ) was convicted under Section 20(b)(ii)(a) of the NDPS Act 1985 and was sentenced to six Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 3 of 54    2319­20 2009 months   of   rigorous   imprisonment   along   with fine of INR 5,000/­ (Rupees Five Thousand only) which   he   completed   during   the   trial   and therefore did not prefer any appeal before the High Court of Gujarat. 4. The facts leading to the present set of appeals are that on 10.12.1999  at about 06:30 PM, the PW­02   Mrs   Krishna   Chaube   (Intelligence Officer/Inspector)   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “Mrs Chaube”) had received a secret information that   the   Accused   No.   04   would   be   carrying narcotic   substances   in   an   auto   rickshaw bearing   registration   number   GJ­9T­2355   at about   07:00   AM   on   11.12.1999   and   shall   be passing through one  Shahpur Darwaja . The said secret   information   was   recorded   by   her   and reported to her superior officer (PW­03), namely Mr Pawan Singh Tomar   – who was the Zonal Officer (hereinafter referred to as “Mr Tomar”). 5. Thereby, on 11.12.1999, it is submitted by the prosecution   that   on   directions   of   Mr   Tomar, Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 4 of 54    2319­20 2009 they   assembled   at   about   06:30   AM   near   the raiding point and arranged for the   and panchas waited for the Accused No. 04 at different points of the raiding route. When the Accused No. 04 showed   up   in   the   said   vehicle   as   per   the information,   they   attempted   to   stop   the   auto rickshaw, instead it sped away at a high speed. Therefore,   the   members   of   the   raiding   party arranged for and chased the said auto rickshaw which was eventually, after covering a certain distance, found abandoned near a road and the Accused No. 04 was said to have escaped. On conducting   the   search   of   the   said   auto rickshaw,   the   raiding   party   found   a   driving license of one  Shri Abdulgafar Gulamali Shaikh alias Rajubhai  in addition to  charas  to the tune of 1.450 Kilograms.   6. As Accused No. 04 had run away, the raiding party   eventually   was   led   to   the   house   of Accused No. 04 wherein the Accused No. 01 was already   present.   Thereinafter,   the   son   of Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 – namely Abdul Rajak  (hereinafter referred to as “Accused Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 5 of 54    2319­20 2009 No.   02”)   –   came   inquiring.   Eventually   the raiding   party   conducted   a  search   of   the   said house wherein in the open kitchen there was a cement   bag   which   had   yellow   coloured   wires beneath which they are said to have found one bundle   wrapped   in   newspaper   which   was fastened   with   a   linen   thread   inside   which   a transparent   plastic   bag   contained   2.098 Kilograms of substance of which turned out to be  Thereafter, the necessary formalities charas.  were   completed   and   Accused   No.   01   and Accused No. 02 were arrested. Eventually, the panchnama   was   also   recorded   with   two independent witnesses.  7. The statements of Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 02 were recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS   Act   1985   wherein   it   was   stated   that Accused   No.   01   aids   the   business   of   drug trafficking as conducted by Accused No. 04 – who was absconding. Eventually, Accused No. 04   is   also   said   to   have   been   arrested   on 26.06.2000   and   per   his   statement   under Section   67   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   he   had Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 6 of 54    2319­20 2009 confessed   to   be   transporting   and   selling   the contraband which he sold regularly to Accused No. 05. 8. Eventually, the charges were framed and a total of   five   prosecution   witnesses   were   examined with PW­01 being one of the   panch   witnesses, PW­02 to PW­04 being members of the raiding party,   and   PW­05   being   the   FSL   expert.   Per contra,   the   defence   had   examined   a   total   of seven witnesses in their favour.  9. The trial of Accused No. 01 to Accused No. 05 was concluded by the Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 143 of 2000 and Sessions Case   No.   295   of   2000   vide   judgment   dated 28.01.2004, whereby while the Accused No. 02 and   Accused   No.   03   were   acquitted,   Accused No. 01,  Accused  No.  04  and  Accused No.  05 were convicted as aforementioned.  9A. Since both the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 had moved in respective appeals before the High   Court   of   Gujarat   their   conviction   stood affirmed, while the fine imposed on Accused No. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 7 of 54    2319­20 2009 01   was   enhanced   as   aforementioned   and   the default sentence was reduced. As stated above, Accused No. 05 did not prefer any appeal. 10. The High Court of Gujarat had observed that the statements of the appellants herein under Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 were   prima facie  voluntary and without inducement, threat or coercion and the statement of Accused No. 01 refers   to   dealing   of   narcotic   substances   by Accused   No.   04   for   a   long   period   of   time   in which she aided as well. Therefore, there exists a   presumption   in   favour   of   the   prosecution under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “IEA   1872”). None of the accused had either retracted the said   statements   or   they   had   moved   any complaints   alleging   perversity.   The   defence, despite   leading   evidence,   could   not   establish their   version   that   the   officers   had   come inquiring about house of Accused No. 04 and eventually   arrested   Accused   No.   01   and Accused   No.   02   as   against   all   legalities. Furthermore,   there   was   consistency   in   the Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 8 of 54    2319­20 2009 statements of prosecution witnesses and that no specific   unreliability   was   established   in   the panchnama  by the defence. As to the necessary compliance laid down in the provisions of the NDPS   Act   1985,   the   procedure   established under Section 52A of the NDPS Act 1985 was not   to   be   considered   and   that   there   was   no requirement of any authorization under Section 41   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985.   Since   Mr   Tomar, being a Gazetted Officer, had accompanied the raiding   party   pursuant   to   the   information communicated by Mrs Chaube on 10.12.1999, defence has also not raised any contention as to breach of Section 36 or Section 53 of the NDPS Act 1985. 11. The High Court of Gujarat had also observed in paragraph number 36 of its judgment that there is compliance of Section 57 of the NDPS Act 1985 as established from the reports (Ex. 87 and   Ex.   112)   submitted   to   the   Zonal   Officer. Furthermore,   it   rejected   the   defence   that   the prosecution   failed   to   prove   documentary evidence   as   the   defence   did   not   raise   any Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 9 of 54    2319­20 2009 objection to the exhibiting of said documents, including arrest reports recorded in compliance of Section 57 of the NDPS Act, arrest memo of Accused   No.   04   and   Accused   No.   01   and intimation given to the next kin of the accused persons.    12. The High Court of Gujarat was of the opinion that except two minor inconsistencies, namely, apropos   who   called   the   panchas   and   the recording of statement of Accused No. 02, there was no reason to question the veracity of the depositions of the members of the raiding party. Those minor fallacies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses do not go to the root of the matter. Thereafter, while acquitting Accused No. 02, the High Court believed that there was no evidence implicating him to the criminality involved.   In   the   same   breath,   the   Court observed that such finding of acquittal does not throw   prosecution’s   case   as   against   other accused persons,  inter alia , Accused No. 01 and Accused   No.   04,   which   is  established   beyond any reasonable doubts.  Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 10 of 54  2319­20 2009 13. With   respect   to   the   objection   that   no independent witnesses were examined to prove joint   possession  of   house   by   Accused   No.   01 and Accused No. 04, the High Court of Gujarat placed  reliance  on the   depositions  of  Defence Witness   (brother   of   Accused   No.   04),   who testified   that   the   said   accommodation   was occupied by the accused persons to entertain their guests. The fact of possession of the house by   Accused   No.   01   and   Accused   No.   04   is bolstered by their own confessional statements and   corroborated   by   the   testimony   of   an independent   witness   PW­01.   Thereupon, perusing   the   statements   of   Mrs   Chaube   and PW­05, the High Court held that there was no infirmity   regarding   the   receipt   of   muddamal with seals intact on the goods being sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination.  14. Delving   into   the   question   of   compliance   of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, the High Court was inclined to accept the argument of the   prosecution   that   the   statement   of   Mrs Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 11 of 54  2319­20 2009 Chaube   with   respect   to     recording   of   secret information   and   conveying   it   to   her   superior officer   stood   established   by   consistent testimonies of Mrs Chaube and Mr Tomar and clarified that the testimony of the former cannot be   thrown   on   the   premise   that   there   was variation on the point that who called the  panch witness.   Considering   the   aforementioned, theHigh Court of Gujarat affirmed the case of conviction of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04.  15. The learned Counsel for the appellants herein contends   that   the   statement   of   the appellants/accused in the instant case recorded under the provision of Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 was not admissible and ought not to have been the basis of conviction of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04. It has been brought to   our   attention   that   the   High   Court   has critically   scrutinized   the   said   statements   of Accused   No.   01   to   Accused   No.   04   and   has observed   that   the   same   being   voluntary   in nature and having been corroborated by other Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 12 of 54  2319­20 2009 evidence can form the basis of their conviction. For this purpose, reliance has been placed on the decision in  Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil   whereby   it   has   been Nadu   (2021)   4   SCC   1 categorically   held   that   a   statement   recorded under   Section   67   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   is inadmissible in evidence. The majority opinion herein   had   held   that   power   of   recording   of statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is limited in nature and conferred upon subject to the safeguards as set out in Sections 41 to 44 of the NDPS Act 1985 for the purpose of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrants and for conducting of only an enquiry and not in the course of investigation. It is for the initiation of an investigation or enquiry under the NDPS Act 1985 and it does not meet the threshold of a confessional statement.  16. It   is   submitted   that   the   secret   information received by Mrs Chaube was only related to the auto rickshaw wherein the Accused No. 04 was to   be   carrying   the   contraband   –   which   was eventually   seized.   However,   there   existed   no Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 13 of 54  2319­20 2009 secret information apropos the house wherein the subsequent search/raid was conducted by the raiding party. The latter was totally out of the   scope   of   the   information   received   and recorded   and   thereby   the   search   therein   was absolutely   illegal   and   in   violation   of   the provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985. The   learned   Counsel   has   further   drawn   our attention to the fallacies and inconsistencies in the   recorded by the raiding party in panchnama addition to the depositions of the prosecution witnesses.  17. The learned Counsel further relies on  Darshan Singh   v.   State   of   Haryana   (2016)   14   SCC 358   which deals with scope of Sections 41(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985 and the need of their   independent   compliance   against   each other. This Court herein went on to hold that mere registration of FIR at the instance of the SHO and its subsequent communication to the Superintendent of Police would not amount to sufficient compliance with Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act 1985. For this purpose, reference is Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 14 of 54  2319­20 2009 made   to   paragraph   number   13   of   the   said judgment at Page 364 as follows: 

Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 15 of 54  2319­20 2009

18. The aforesaid reference places its reliance on a judgment   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this Court,   i.e.,   Karnail   Singh   v.   State   of  which is also relied Haryana (2009) 8 SCC 539 upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It is a well celebrated judgment on the statutory requirement   of   writing   down   and   conveying information to the superior officer prior to entry, Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 16 of 54  2319­20 2009 search and seizure as per Section 42(1) and (2) of   the   NDPS   Act   1985,   requiring   a   literal   or substantial   compliance.   The   learned   Counsel has brought our attention to paragraph number 35 of the judgment at page 554 which dealt with effect   of   the   decisions   in   Abdul   Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2000) 2   and that in  SCC 513 Sajan Abraham v. State . By virtue of this, of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 692 it   was   observed   that   while   a   total   non­ compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 would be impermissible, a delayed compliance with   satisfactory   explanation   about   the   said delay   could   be   an   acceptable   compliance   of statutory   requirements   under   Sections   42(1) and (2). For a better clarity of the judgment, paragraph number 35 is reproduced as follows:  “  In conclusion, what is to be noticed 35. is that Abdul Rashid [(2000) 2 SCC 513 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 496] did not require literal compliance   with   the   requirements   of Sections   42(1)   and   42(2)   nor  did Sajan Abraham [(2001) 6 SCC 692 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1217] hold that the requirements of Sections   42(1)   and   42(2)   need   not   be Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 17 of 54  2319­20 2009 fulfilled   at   all.   The   effect   of   the   two decisions was as follows: (a) The   officer   on   receiving   the information [of the nature referred to in sub­section (1) of Section 42] from any   person   had   to   record   it   in writing in the register concerned and forthwith   send   a   copy   to   his immediate   official   superior,   before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1). (b) But if the information was received when   the   officer   was   not   in   the police station, but while he was on the   move   either   on   patrol   duty   or otherwise, either by mobile  phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay   would   have   resulted   in   the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and   thereafter,   as   soon   as   it   is practical, record the information in writing   and   forthwith   inform   the same to the official superior. (c) In other words, the compliance with the   requirements   of   Sections   42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the   information   received   and sending   a   copy   thereof   to   the superior   officer,   should normally precede the   entry,   search and   seizure   by   the   officer.   But   in special   circumstances   involving emergent situations, the recording of Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 18 of 54  2319­20 2009 the   information   in   writing   and sending a copy thereof to the official superior   may   get   postponed   by   a reasonable period, that is, after the search,   entry   and   seizure.   The question   is   one   of   urgency   and expediency. (d) While   total   non­compliance   with requirements of sub­sections (1) and (2)   of   Section   42   is   impermissible, delayed   compliance   with satisfactory   explanation   about   the delay will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. To illustrate, if any delay   may   result   in   the   accused escaping or the  goods or evidence being   destroyed   or   removed,   not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non­sending   of   a   copy   of   such information   to   the   official   superior forthwith,   may   not   be   treated   as violation   of   Section   42.   But   if   the information was received when the police   officer   was   in   the   police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received,   or   fails   to   send   a   copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of Section 42 of   the   Act.   Similarly,   where   the police   officer   does   not   record   the information   at   all,   and   does   not inform   the   official   superior   at   all, then also it will be a clear violation of   Section   42   of   the   Act.   Whether there   is   adequate   or   substantial Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 19 of 54  2319­20 2009 compliance with Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each   case.   The   above   position   got strengthened   with   the   amendment to Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.” 19. Per   contra,   the   learned   Counsel   for   the Respondent No. 02 herein contents that there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. There has been well   recorded   compliance   of   the   statutory requirements   and   the   evidences   have   been sufficiently   appraised   by   the   Courts   below. Moreover,   there   has   been   no   material contradiction   in   the   testimonies   of   the prosecution   witnesses   and   the   same   aspires confidence.   It   is   a   settled   law   that   the concurrent   findings   of   the   facts   must   not ordinarily be interfered with unless there exists a  prima facie  perversity or absurdity in light of the observation in paragraph number 26 in the decision delivered in   Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 219. 20. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02 that there has been Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 20 of 54  2319­20 2009 substantial   compliance   of   the   statutory requirements under Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985   as   Mrs   Chaube   recorded   the   secret information in writing and conveyed the same to her superior officer namely, Mr Tomar prior to the raid conducted as against Accused No. 04 and Accused No. 01. It is contended that the search undertaken at the residence of Accused No.   04   whereby   Accused   No.   01   was   also present, was in continuation of the action taken on the basis of the said secret information. For this, the learned Counsel has brought to our attention the testimonies of Mrs Chaube (PW­ 02) and Mr Tomar (PW­03). Alternatively, even assuming   that   the   said   latter   part   of   the raid/search at the house of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 was not in continuation of the action taken towards Accused No. 04 as per the   secret   information,   there   has   still   been appropriate   compliance   of   Section   42   of   the NDPS Act 1985 for the reason that the same was   based   on   the   personal   knowledge   of   Mr Tomar, who is a Gazetted Officer. It is further Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 21 of 54  2319­20 2009 contended that the provision of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act is to be read disjunctively and henceforth there is no requirement to take down the   information   in   writing   where   it   emanates from   the   personal   knowledge   of   the   superior officer.   To  further   this   argument,   the   learned Counsel   has   distinguished   the   facts   of   the present   case   from   the   ratio   in   decisions   in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC   and     as they refer 299 Karnail Singh (supra) only to the process to be followed upon receipt of   information   from   any   person   and   not   to “personal knowledge” of the officer. 21. Furthermore,   it   is   submitted   that   there   has been a substantial compliance of Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act 1985 as during the action being taken   against   the   Accused   No.   04   and   his absconding   therefrom,   an   emergent   situation arose   which   necessitated   the   search   in   his house – which was nearby to the place where auto   rickshaw   was   abandoned.   There   was   a grave possibility that if the Accused No. 04 was at his house then he might run away and/or if Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 22 of 54  2319­20 2009 there was any further amount of contraband at his residence, he would have appropriated that as   well.   Thence,   the   raiding   party   had   their hands tied down to necessarily carry out the said search at the house of Accused No. 04 in light of the ratio in   not Karnail Singh (supra) necessitating   literal   compliance   rather substantial compliance contingent on the facts of each case. 22. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02 further contends that the scope of Section 50 of the NDPS Act 1985 is limited to the search on the person of an individual and does not include adherence   to   the   search   made   on   any premise(s).   Reliance   is   placed   on   State   of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4  wherein it was held that presence of a SCC 350 Gazetted Officer is required only at the time of the search which is on the person and is not applicable   during   search   of     premises.   To bolster this argument, it is submitted that the said   interpretation   fits   into   the   reading   of Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 23 of 54  2319­20 2009 Section  42  of  the   NDPS Act 1985 as  Section 42(1)(a)   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   comprehends search   of   a   building   or   conveyance   or   place while   Section   42(1)(d)   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985 contemplates for search of a person. 23. Apropos,   the   presumption   pertaining   to   the recovery of contraband, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02, submits that once the recovery of the contraband has been made from the possession of an individual, there arises a rebuttable presumption as per Section 54 of the NDPS   Act   1985   that   the   said   individual   has committed an offence under the NDPS Act 1985. To   further   build   this   contention,   the   learned Counsel   has   brought   our   attention   to   the decision in   Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh   (2003)   7   SCC   465   whereby   at paragraph numbers 22 to 26 of the judgment, it was   has   been   laid   down   that   the   aforesaid possession of contraband includes constructive possession and it need not be only an actual possession of the contraband. On the basis of Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 24 of 54  2319­20 2009 these above recorded submissions, he prays for dismissal of the instant appeals. 24. Before we delve into the factual analysis based on   the   legal   principles   and   jurisprudence existing  in each contention,  it is  pertinent  to refer to the heart and soul of the Constitution of India,   1950   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “Constitution   of   India”)   –   Article   21   – necessitates   a   just   and     fair   trial   to   be   a humane and fundamental right and actions of the   prosecution   as   well   as   the   authorities concerned within the meaning of the NDPS Act 1985 must be towards ensuring of upholding of the rights of the accused in order to allow to have   a   fair   trial.   The   harmonious   balance between the Latin maxims  salus populi suprema (the safety of the people is the supreme law) lex  and   (safety of the salus republicae suprema lex State is the supreme law) is not only crucial and pertinent but lies at the core of the doctrine that welfare of an individual must yield to that of the community   subject   to   the   State   being   right, Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 25 of 54  2319­20 2009 just, and fair as was iterated in the decision of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436 . 25. The NDPS Act 1985 being a special law with the purpose   to   curtail   the   drug   menace   in   the republic necessitated the comprehensive control in favour of the authorities. The same is well reflected in the decisions of this Court across the last couple of decades. Accordingly, the key provisions to be contemplated for the purpose of appraising   the   present   factual   matrix   are Sections 41, 42, and 67 of the NDPS Act 1985. The same are thereby analysed herein after. 26. Having heard the learned Counsels for both the parties, we deem it appropriate to refer to the jurisprudence of Section 6 of the IEA 1872. It is to be observed that it deals with relevancy of facts   forming   part   of   same   transaction   and therefore, it is crucial to refer the bare provision which reads as follows:   “6. Relevancy of facts forming part of   same   transaction.–– Facts   which, though   not   in   issue,   are   so   connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 26 of 54  2319­20 2009 they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places .” 27. This   court   has   laid   down   the   test   for   “acts forming part of same transaction” in   Gentela Vijyvardhan   Rao   and   Anr.   v.   State   of , wherein it Andhra Pradesh (1996) 6 SCC 241 has been held that it is based on spontaneity and   immediacy   of   such   statement   or   fact   in relation   to   the   fact   in   issue.   Provided   that   if there was an interval which ought to have been sufficient   for   purpose   of   fabrication   then   the said   statement   having   been   recorded,   with however slight delay there may be, is not part of res   gestae .   The   same   was   adopted   by   a   3­ Judges’ Bench in the decision of   Dhal Singh Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2016) .  SCC OnLine SC 983 28. In the present factual matrix, having perused the material it appears that the attempt towards raiding/searching the residence of Accused No. 04 was not explicitly in pursuance of detaining the   said   accused   but   the   testimonies   of   the Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 27 of 54  2319­20 2009 members of the raiding party showcase the idea of search of  the house to be an afterthought with   an   admitted   time   gap   of   40­45   minutes between having raided the auto rickshaw which was alleged to be abandoned by the driver and Accused No. 04 and subsequent search of the house of Accused No. 04, wherein Accused No. 01 was present. Moreover, it appears from the record that even the idea to search the house was   for   the   purpose   of   recovery   of   more contraband   and   not   to   apprehend   the   said absconded   accused   at   the   first   instance. Thence,   it   can   be   safely   concluded   that   the search   conducted   at   the   residence   of   the Accused No. 04 is not a continuance of action of the raiding party towards the search of the auto rickshaw   based   on   the   secret   information received   by   Mrs   Chaube.   Accordingly,   it  does not appropriately fulfill the requirements of the test   laid   down   in   Gentela   Vijyvardhan   Rao (supra). 29. Having   reached   the   conclusion   that   the searches of the abandoned auto rickshaw, and Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 28 of 54  2319­20 2009 at   the   house   wherein   Accused   No.   01   was present,   to   be   different   transactions,   the subsequent consideration is apropos necessary statutory safeguards enlisted in the NDPS Act 1985.   Henceforth,   we   shall   further   delve   into the legal analysis of relevant provisions of the NDPS Act 1985. 30. The next issue that falls for our consideration is with respect to the compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985. For the said purposes, an analysis of the bare text of Section 42 of the NDPS   Act   1985   is   undertaken   hereinafter. Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 is worded as follows:  “42. Power of entry, search, seizure and   arrest   without   warrant   or authorisation.— (l)   Any   such   officer   (being   an   officer superior   in   rank   to   a   peon,   sepoy   or constable) of the departments of central excise,   narcotics,   customs,   revenue intelligence  or any other department  of the Central Government including para­ military   forces   or   armed   forces   as   is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or   any   such   officer   (being   an   officer superior   in   rank   to   a   peon,   sepoy   or Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 29 of 54  2319­20 2009 constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe   from   personal   knowledge   or information   given   by   any   person   and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug,   or   psychotropic   substance,   or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission   of   such   offence   or   any illegally   acquired   property   or   any document   or   other   article   which   may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired   property   which   is   liable   for seizure   or   freezing   or   forfeiture   under Chapter   VA   of   this   Act   is   kept   or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed   place,   may   between   sunrise and sunset,— (a) enter into and search any such  building, conveyance or place; (b) in   case   of   resistance,   break   open any door and remove any obstacle to such entry;  (c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the manufacture thereof   and   any   other   article   and any animal or conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish   evidence   of   holding   any Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 30 of 54  2319­20 2009 illegally acquired property which is liable   for   seizure   or   freezing   or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; and  (d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has   reason   to   believe   to   have committed   any   offence   punishable under this Act:  [Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture of manufactured drugs   or   psychotropic   substances   or controlled substances granted under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder, such   power   shall   be   exercised   by   an officer   not   below   the   rank   of   sub­ inspector:  Provided further that] if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or   authorisation   cannot   be   obtained without   affording   opportunity   for   the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search   such   building,   conveyance   or enclosed   place   at   any   time   between sunset   and   sunrise   after   recording   the grounds of his belief.  (2)   Where   an   officer   takes   down   any information in writing under sub­section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the   proviso   thereto,   he   shall   within seventy­two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior .” Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 31 of 54  2319­20 2009 31. From the perusal of provision of Section 42(1) of the   NDPS   Act   1985,   it   is   evident   that   the provision   obligates   an   officer   empowered   by virtue of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985 to record the information received from any person regarding an alleged offence under Chapter IV of the NDPS Act 1985 or record the grounds of his belief as per the Proviso to Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act 1985 in case an empowered officer proceeds on his personal knowledge. While the same is to be conveyed to the immediate official superior prior to the said search or raid, in case of any inability to do so, the Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act provides that a copy of the same shall be   sent   to   the   concerned   immediate   official superior along with grounds of his belief as per the proviso hereto. This relaxation contemplated by virtue of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act 1985 was brought about through the Amendment Act of 2001 to the NDPS Act of 1985 wherein prior to this position, the Section 42(2) mandated the copy   of   the   said   writing   to   be   sent   to   the immediate official superior “forthwith”. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 32 of 54  2319­20 2009 32. The   decision   in   Karnail   Singh   (supra)   has been extensively referred by the learned Counsel for the Appellants and at the cost of repetition, it is observed that absolute non­compliance of the   statutory   requirements   under   the   Section 42(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985 is verboten. However, any delay in the said compliance may be allowed considering the same is supported by well­reasoned explanations for such delay. This position adopted by the instant 5­Judges’ Bench of this Court is derived from the ratio in the decision   in   Balbir   Singh   (supra)   which   is   a decision by a 3­Judges’ Bench of this Court. 33. Another   3­Judges’   Bench   while   dealing   with compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 in  Chhunna alias Mehtab v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 9 SCC 363  dealt with criminal trial   wherein   there   was   an   explicit   non­ compliance of the statutory requirements under the NDPS Act 1985. It was held that the trial of the Petitioner­Appellant therein stood vitiated. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 33 of 54  2319­20 2009 For a better reference, the judgment is quoted below as: “ 1.  The case of the prosecution was that at 3.00 a.m. a police party saw opium being prepared inside a room and they entered the premises and apprehended the   accused   who   was   stated   to   be making   opium   and   mixing   it   with chocolate. 2.  It is not in dispute that the entry in search of the premises in question took place   between   sunset   and   sunrise   at 3.00   a.m.   This   being   the   position,   the proviso   to   Section   42   of   the   Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act was applicable and  it is admitted that before the entry for effecting search of the building neither any search warrant or authorisation was obtained nor were the grounds   for   possible   plea   that   if opportunity for obtaining search warrant or authorisation is accorded the evidence will   escape   indicated.   In   other   words, there   has   been   a   non­compliance   with the provisions of the proviso to Section 42 and therefore, the trial stood vitiated.

34. In   Dharamveer   Parsad   v.   State   of   Bihar (2020)   12   SCC   492,   there   was   non­ examination of the independent witness without any   explanation   provided   by   the   prosecution Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 34 of 54  2319­20 2009 and even the   panchnama   or the seizure memo were not prepared on the spot but after having had   reached   police   station   only.   Since   the vehicle was apprehended and contraband was seized in non­compliance of the Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 – conviction and sentence of the appellant therein was set aside. Apart from the said reasons there were various suspicious circumstances that inspired the  confidence of the Court to set aside the conviction affirmed by the High Court therein. Paragraph numbers 05 and 06 are reiterated below for reference: “  In the present case PW 1, who is the 5. investigating officer, in his deposition has stated   that   the   information   i.e.   the contraband was being carried from the Indo­Nepal border identified in a vehicle, details of which had also been provided, had been received in the evening of 2­7­ 2007. PW 1 has further stated that on receipt of this information, he had formed a team and had moved to Raxaul from Patna, which place they had reached by 2.00 a.m. in the morning of 3­7­2007. The vehicle   in   question   had   been apprehended and the contraband seized at   about   6.00   a.m.   of   3­7­2007.   No explanation   has   been   offered   why   the statement had not been recorded at any anterior point of time and the same was so done after the seizure was made. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 35 of 54  2319­20 2009 6.  Even if we were to assume that the anxiety of the investigating officer was to reach   Raxaul   which   is   on   the international border and therefore, he did not   have   the   time   to   record   said information as per requirement of Section 42 of the Act, the matter does not rest there.   There   are   other   suspicious circumstances affecting the credibility of the   prosecution   case.   Though,   the investigating   officer  has   stated   that  he had moved to Raxaul along with a team and two independent witnesses, the said independent   witnesses   were   not examined. No explanation is forthcoming on this count also. That apart from the materials   on   record   it   appears   that   no memos including the seizure memo were prepared at the spot and all the papers were   prepared   on   reaching   the   police station at Patna on 4­7­2007.” 35. The case presented by the prosecution appears to   be   primarily   standing   on   the   fact   that initially, Accused No. 04 – who was identified by Mr Tomar to be sitting inside the auto rickshaw which was part of the secret information – had absconded,   leaving   behind   the   contraband which was eventually seized by members of the raiding party. It is furthermore admitted that a Driving   License   was   also   recovered   from   the Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 36 of 54  2319­20 2009 said auto rickshaw. However, it has never been their case that neither the owner of the auto rickshaw was attempted to be identified nor the person whose driving license was found therein was   searched   for   by   the   authorities   for   the purpose   of   the   instant   case.   It   is   never explained   by   Mr   Tomar   how   he   was   able   to identify the face of the Accused No. 04 sitting on the   passenger   seat   inside   the   auto   rickshaw while it was being driven at high speed. It is also not their case that any previous photographic identification   for   the   Accused   No.   04   was provided as part of the said information or as to how did he know the face of the Accused No. 04. 36. Even further, it is an admitted fact by the PW­ 01   –   the   alleged   independent   witness   of   the recovery   –   that   the   panchnama   was   not prepared at the time of actual recovery from the auto   rickshaw.   Same   is   affirmed   by   the testimonies of the members of the raiding party, namely,   PW­02   to   PW­04.   It   is   furthermore intriguing to note that the  panchnama  which is timed   “0930”   was   prepared   and   the   PW­01 Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 37 of 54  2319­20 2009 states as part of his cross­examination that he left for his office taking an auto rickshaw after the   incident.   However,   the   testimony   of   Mrs Chaube reveals that the PW­01 and the other panch  were present in the NCB Office after the incident   and   even   deposes   to   the   effect   that they, being present in the said office, ended up inscribing   their   signatures   on   the   statements taken by them. 37. It does not transpire from the material on record as to exactly how the Accused No. 04 came into the fiasco here except for the claim by Mr Tomar of having identified him as the auto rickshaw per   the   secret   information   fled   the   scene.   It creates   a   doubt   in   the   mind   of   the   Court apropos the case presented by the prosecution. 38. Adopting the words of V. Ramasubramanian, J., while   speaking   for   the   Bench   in   Ramabora alias   Ramaboraiah   &   Anr.   v.   State   of Karnataka   (2022)   SCC   OnLine   SC   996 referred to the mythological Swan, Hamsa and drew an analogy with the following observations Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 38 of 54  2319­20 2009 made in the decision in   Arvind Kumar alias Nemichand   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Rajasthan (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099: . The principle that when a witness 49 deposes   falsehood,   the   evidence   in   its entirety   has   to   be   eschewed   may   not have   strict   application   to   the   criminal jurisprudence   in   our   country.   The principle governing sifting the chaff from the   grain   has   to   be   applied.   However, when   the   evidence   is   inseparable   and such   an   attempt   would   either   be impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable,   the   natural   consequence would   be   one   of   avoidance.   The   said principle has not assumed the status of law   but   continues   only   as   a   rule   of caution.   One   has   to   see   the   nature   of discrepancy in a given case. When the discrepancies are very material shaking the very credibility of the witness leading to a conclusion in the mind of the court that is neither possible to separate it nor to rely upon, it is for the said court to either accept or reject. 39. It becomes difficult to accept the case presented against the Accused No. 04 by the prosecution and it is not acceptable to state that the same has   been   proved   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt. The inconsistencies in the testimonies and lack of   observation   of   due   process   of   law   by   the Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 39 of 54  2319­20 2009 investigating agency has severely impacted the case of the prosecution. 40. The   subsequent   and   alternate   contention   put forth by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02 pertains to the non­requirement of the compliance of Section 41 of the NDPS Act 1985. To   appreciate   the   said   contention, jurisprudential aspect ought to be dealt with. Section 41 of the NDPS Act 1985 deals with the power   to   issue   warrant   and   authorization   to both  a Magistrate  and   an  Officer  of   Gazetted rank as applicable and the same is reproduced below as follows:  “ 41.   Power   to   issue   warrant   and .— authorisation (1)   A   Metropolitan   Magistrate   or   a Magistrate   of   the   first   class   or   any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may issue a warrant for the arrest   of   any   person   whom   he   has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act, or for the search, whether by day or by night, of any building, conveyance or place in which   he   has   reason   to   believe   any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or   controlled   substance   in   respect   of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any document Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 40 of 54  2319­20 2009 or   other   article   which   may   furnish evidence   of   the   commission   of   such offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which may   furnish   evidence   of   holding   any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter   VA   of   this   Act   is   kept   or concealed:  (2) Any such officer of gazetted rank of the   departments   of   central   excise, narcotics,   customs,   revenue   intelligence or any other department of the Central Government   including   the   para­military forces   or   the   armed   forces   as   is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer of the revenue, drugs control,   excise,   police   or   any   other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person   and   taken   in   writing   that   any person   has   committed   an   offence punishable   under   this   Act   or   that   any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or   controlled   substance   in   respect   of which   any   offence   under   this   Act   has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission   of   such   offence   or   any illegally   acquired   property   or   any document   or   other   article   which   may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired   property   which   is   liable   for seizure   or   freezing   or   forfeiture   under Chapter   VA   of   this   Act   is   kept   or Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 41 of 54  2319­20 2009 concealed in any building, conveyance or place,   may   authorise   any   officer subordinate to him but superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or a constable to arrest such   a   person   or   search   a   building, conveyance or place whether by day or by night or himself arrest such a person or   search   a   building,   conveyance   or place.  (3) The officer to whom a warrant under sub­section   (1)   is   addressed   and   the officer   who   authorised   the   arrest   or search or the officer who is so authorised under sub­section (2) shall have all the powers of an officer acting under section 42.”  41. In the instant case, we are primarily affected by virtue of the jurisprudence of Section 41(2) of the   NDPS   Act   1985,   which   begins   from   the power of search and seizure conferred by the State upon its executive or administrative arms for   the   protection   of   social   security   in   any civilized   nation.   Such   power   is   inherently limited by the recognition of fundamental rights by   the   Constitution   as   well   as   statutory limitations. At the same time, it is not legitimate to assume that Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India would be affected by the provisions of search and seizure. It is a settled law that the Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 42 of 54  2319­20 2009 statutory provisions conferring authorities with the   power   to   search   and   seize   are   a   mere temporary   interference   with   the   right   of   the accused   as   they   stand   well   regulated   by reasonable   restrictions   emanating   from   the statutory provisions itself. Thence, such a power cannot   be   considered   as   a   violation   of   any fundamental   rights   of   the   person   concerned. The same is iterated in  MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra Sharma, District Magistrate, Delhi .  1954 SCR 1077 42. In   light   of   the   aforementioned   constitutional backdrop, provisions of general search warrants and seizure were incorporated for the first time in   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1882, thereupon,  in Sections  96, 97, 98, 102,  103, 105,   165   and   550   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure, 1898 and presently, in the Code of Criminal   Procedure,   1973   under   Sections   93, 94, 100, 102, 103 and 165. Upon perusal of Section 41(1) of the NDPS Act 1985, it is evident that the said provision empowers a Magistrate to issue search warrant for the arrest of any Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 43 of 54  2319­20 2009 person or for search, whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence under the provisions of the NDPS Act 1985. Section 41(2) of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   further   enables   a Gazetted Officer, so empowered in this regard by   the   Central   Government   or   the   State Government, to arrest or conduct a search or authorize an officer subordinate to him to do so, provided   that   such   subordinate   officer   is superior   to   the   rank   of   a   peon,   sepoy   or constable.   It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   the empowered Gazetted Officer must have reason to believe that an offence has been committed under Chapter IV of the NDPS Act 1985, which necessitated the arrest or search. As per Section 41(2)   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985,   such   reason   to believe   must   arise   from   either   personal knowledge   of   the   said   Gazetted   Officer   or information   given   by   any   person   to   him. Additionally, such knowledge or information is required to be reduced into writing by virtue of expression “and taken in writing” used therein. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 44 of 54  2319­20 2009 43. The learned Counsel of the Respondent No. 02 presents   an   alternate   argument   that   the expressions   “personal   knowledge”   and   “and taken in writing” contemplated by Section 41(2) of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   ought   to   be   read disjunctively,   thereby   eliminating   the requirement   of   taking   down   information   in writing   when   it   arises   out   of   the   personal knowledge of the Gazetted Officer. We are not inclined   to   accept   this   interpretation.   The position   for   recording   the   reasons   for conducting   search   and   seizure   are   well established   through   the   ratio   in   paragraph number 25 (2C) in   Balbir Singh case (supra) as mentioned below:  “(2­C)   Under   Section   42(1)   the empowered   officer   if   has   a   prior information   given   by   any   person,   that should   necessarily   be   taken   down   in writing. But if he has reason to believe from   personal   knowledge   that   offences under Chapter IV have been committed or materials which may furnish evidence of commission   of   such   offences   are concealed   in   any   building   etc.   he   may carry out the arrest or search without a warrant between sunrise and sunset and this provision does not mandate that he should record his reasons of belief. But Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 45 of 54  2319­20 2009 under the proviso to Section 42(1) if such officer   has   to   carry   out   such   search between   sunset   and   sunrise,   he   must record the grounds of his belief. To   this   extent   these   provisions   are mandatory   and   contravention   of   the same would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial.” 44. Applying   the   aforesaid   legal   position   to   the present factual matrix, we do not find force in the submission that the raiding party proceeded to   conduct   search   at   the   house   on   personal knowledge of the Gazetted Officer, Mr Tomar. Foremost, the fact that the secret information received   by   Mrs   Chaube   was   limited   to anticipation   of   Accused   No.   04   carrying contraband from a particular route in an auto rickshaw,   remains   unchallenged.   Accordingly, there was no prior information to the raiding party,   including   Mr   Tomar   (Gazetted   Officer) that   there   is   contraband   in   the   house   of Accused   No.   04,   thereby   necessitating   search for the same. Additionally, it is deposed by the PW­01   that   he   was   asked   to   accompany   the raiding party to the house of Accused No. 04, which   was   located   nearby   for   the   purpose   of Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 46 of 54  2319­20 2009 carrying   out   a   search   thereof   and   admits   of having   no   knowledge   about   any   written information   with   the   raiding   party   for conducting raid at the said house. Further, Mrs Chaube in her examination in chief stated that upon the directions of Mr Tomar that the house of Accused No. 04 was nearby, they proceeded to   conduct   raid   thereof.   Per   contra,   in   her cross­examination, she admits that the raiding team proceeded to the house of Accused No. 04 for   the   purpose   of   search   of   the   contraband pursuant   to   the   discussions   carried   by   them and not particularly on the personal knowledge of Mr Tomar. 45. She   further   goes   on   to   admit   that   it   was obligatory   for   her   to   obtain   a   written authorization from her superior officer – which was Mr Tomar in this case. She omitted seeking the said authorization on the premise that there was an emergent need to conduct search at the house.   Such   major   inconsistency   as   to   the ‘source’   of   information   of   existence   of contraband   at   the   house   of   Accused   No.   04 Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 47 of 54  2319­20 2009 weakens   the   case   of   the   prosecution. Furthermore,   the  testimony   of  Mr   Tomar   has some glaring irregularities apropos his personal knowledge of having contraband at the house of Accused No. 04. Mr Tomar, on one hand in his testimony   admits   that   the   officers   of   raiding party together decided to conduct raid at the house of Accused No. 04 post recovery from the auto   rickshaw,   however,   on   the   other   hand admits of having knowledge of the residential address   of   Accused   No.   04   from   the   secret information. However, Mr Tomar nowhere in his depositions stated that he proceeded to conduct raid at the house on his personal knowledge.  46. From  the   aforementioned,   we  are   of  the   view that the raid/search conducted at the house of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 was not based on the personal knowledge of Mr Tomar, rather it was an action on the part of raiding party bereft of mandatory statutory compliance of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985.  47. Furthermore, even if the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02 would justify the raid at the Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 48 of 54  2319­20 2009 house on account of “ reason to believe from …. information given by any person and taken down in writing ” as per Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985,   still   the   prosecution   is   not   able   to establish   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubts. Because the secret information, as received by Mrs Chaube in the present facts was limited to the apprehension that Accused No. 04 was to carry contraband via an auto rickshaw from a particular  route. There  is no reference to the apprehension of existence of contraband in the house   of   the   Accused   No.   04   in   the   said recorded information.  Thence, the  raid at  the house of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 is in violation of the statutory mandate of Section   41(2)  of   the  NDPS  Act  1985   and  the ratio in the precedent of   Balbir Singh (supra) and  .  Consequently, the Karnail Singh (supra) conviction of Accused No. 01 premised on the recovery of 2.098 kilograms of   charas   from the house is not in consonance with the mandatory statutory   compliance   of   Section   41(2)   of   the NDPS Act 1985. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 49 of 54  2319­20 2009 48. While the facts and evidences are appreciated in the instant case, the testimonies of the PW­01 and the members of the raiding party do not present such a compliance of the information of rights to the Accused No. 01 herein. While a claim is made to this effect, nothing has come up from the perusal of the   panchnama   or the deposition   of   the   PW­01   to   this   effect. Accordingly, the authorities have further failed to   protect   the   inherent   rights   granted   to   the Accused   No.   01   by   virtue   of   the   statutory safeguards. 49. Thereinafter, a significant reliance was placed by   the   High   Court   on   the   statements   of   the accused   wherein   a   categorical   admission   was substantiated by them, especially Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04. To begin with, Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 reads: “ 67.   Power   to   call   for   information, etc .— Any officer referred to in section 42 who is authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, during   the   course   of   any   enquiry   in Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 50 of 54  2319­20 2009 connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act,—  (a) call   for   information   from   any person   for   the   purpose   of satisfying   himself   whether  there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder;  (b)  require any person to produce or deliver   any   document   or   thing useful or relevant to the enquiry;  (c)  examine   any   person   acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.” 50. The evidentiary value of confessional statements recorded   under   Section   67   of   the   NDPS   Act 1985 was dealt with by this Court in the case of .   As   per   the   majority Tofan   Singh   (supra) verdict   delivered   by   3­Judges’   Bench   in   this case has held that the powers conferred on the empowered officers under Section 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 read with Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 are limited in nature conferred for the  purpose  of  entry, search,  seizure  and arrest   without   warrant   along   with   safeguards enlisted   thereof.   The   “enquiry”   undertaken under   the   aforesaid   provisions   may   lead   to initiation of an investigation or enquiry by the Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 51 of 54  2319­20 2009 officers   empowered   to   do   so   either   under Section 53 of the NDPS Act 1985 or otherwise. Thus,   the   officers   empowered   only   under   the aforesaid   provisions   neither   having   power   to investigate nor to file a police report meet the test of police officer for the purpose of Section 25   of   the   IEA   1872.   Consequently,   the   bar under   Section   25   of   the   IEA   1872   is   not applicable   against   the   admissibility   of confessional   statement   made   to   the   officers empowered   under   Section   41   and   42   of   the NDPS Act 1985. 51. Furthermore, it was also held by this Court that Section   67   is   at   an   antecedent   stage   to   the investigation, which occurs after the empowered officer under Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 has   the   reason   to   believe   upon   information gathered in an enquiry made in that behalf that an   offence   under   NDPS   Act   1985   has   been committed and is thus not even in the nature of a confessional statement.  Hence, question of its being   admissible   in   trial   as   a   confessional statement against the accused does not arise. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 52 of 54  2319­20 2009 52. The  same,  therefore,  cannot be  considered  to convict an accused person under the NDPS Act 1985. A reference at this stage may be made to the   majority   view   in   the   3­Judges’   Bench decision   wherein   it   was   held   as   follows   in paragraph number 158: 

53. By   virtue   of   the   decision   in   Tofan   Singh (supra) ,   the   benefit   is   to   be   granted   to   the appellants   herein   in   regard   to   the inadmissibility   of   their   statements   under Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985. Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 53 of 54  2319­20 2009 54. In   the   light   of   the   above,   these   appeals   are allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as that of the Trial Court.   The   appellants   are   acquitted   of   the charges framed against them by giving benefit of doubt.  55. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. ………….…………………………J.        (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) …………..…………………………J. (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH) APRIL 09, 2024; NEW DELHI Criminal Appeal No(s).   of            Page 54 of 54  2319­20 2009