Full Judgment Text
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 1
CR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A.
TH
MONDAY, THE 18 DAY OF MAY 2026 / 28TH VAISAKHA, 1948
WP(C) NO. 31672 OF 2024
PETITIONER/S:
M. B. FAISAL
AGED 44 YEARS
S/O. BEERANKUTTY, MELETHIL, VATTAMKULAM P.O.,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 679578
BY ADVS.
SRI.AMAL KASHA
SRI.T.B.HOOD
SMT.M.ISHA
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HIGHER
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
FINANCE (INSPECTION N.T. - J) DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
3 CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, KERALA RAJ BHAVAN,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695099
4 UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, CALICUT UNIVERSITY P.O.,
THENHIPALAM, MALAPPURAM, PIN - 673635
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 2
5 VICE CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, CALICUT UNIVERSITY P.O.,
THENHIPALAM, MALAPPURAM, PIN - 673635
6 MOHAMED SAJID T.
(ID NO. 3030) UNIVERSITY SCIENCE INSTRUMENTATION
CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, CALICUT UNIVERSITY
P.O., THENHIPALAM, MALAPPURAM, PIN - 673635
BY ADVS.
SHRI.S.PRASANTH, SC, CHANCELLOR OF UNIVERSITIES OF
KERALA
SHRI.P.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
FOR R6 BY SMT.NISHA GEORGE
SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.)
SRI.A.L.NAVANEETH KRISHNAN
R4 BY ADV. SRI. P.C.SASIDHARAN, SC
R5 BY SMT. M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
SMT.K.G.SAROJINI, GOVT.PLEADER FOR THE STATE
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
18.12.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C)NO.40998/2024, THE COURT ON
18.5.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 3
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A.
TH
MONDAY, THE 18 DAY OF MAY 2026 / 28TH VAISAKHA, 1948
WP(C) NO. 40998 OF 2024
PETITIONER/S:
P.K.KHALEEMUDHEEN
AGED 50 YEARS
S/O.ZAINUDHEEN, FATHIMA BHAVAN, KHAZI MAIDAN, PONNANI
NAGARAM P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT –, PIN - 679583
BY ADVS.
SMT.M.ISHA
SRI.T.B.HOOD
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT. HIGHER
EDUCATION (B) DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM –, PIN - 695001
2 CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, KERALA RAJ BHAVAN,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM –, PIN - 695099
3 UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT,
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, CALICUT UNIVERSITY P.O.,
THENHIPPALAM, MALAPPURAM –, PIN - 673635
4 VICE CHANCELLOR,
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, CALICUT UNIVERSITY P.O.,
THENHIPPALAM, MALAPPURAM –, PIN - 673635
5 REGISTRAR,
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, CALICUT UNIVERSITY P.O.,
THENHIPPALAM, MALAPPURAM –, PIN - 673635
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 4
6 MOHAMED SAJID T
(ID NO.3030), UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND INSTRUMENTATION
CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, CALICUT UNIVERSITY
P.O., THENHIPPALAM, MALAPPURAM –, PIN - 673635
BY ADVS.
SHRI.S.PRASANTH, SC, CHANCELLOR OF UNIVERSITIES OF
KERALA
R4 BY SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
FOR R6 BY SMT.NISHA GEORGE
SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.)
SRI.A.L.NAVANEETH KRISHNAN
SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH
SRI.P.K.ABDUL RAHIMAN
SMT.ARYA RAGHUNATH
SHRI.KARUKAPADATH WAZIM BABU
SMT.P.LAKSHMI
SMT.AYSHA E.M.
SHRI.ABUASIL A.K.
SHRI.MANU KRISHNA S.K.
SMT.HANIYA NAFIZA V.S.
SHRI.HASHIM K.M.
R3 AND R5 BY ADV. SRI. P.C.SASIDHARAN, SC
SMT. K.G.SAROJINI, GOVT.PLEADER, FOR STATE
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
18.12.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C)NO.31672/2024, THE COURT ON
18.5.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 5
JUDGMENT
[WP(C) Nos.31672/2024 & 40998/2024
...
Both these writ petitions are filed by the members of the Syndicate of
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the University of Calicut, the 4 respondent in WP(C)No.31672/2024, which
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is the 3 respondent in WP(C) No.40998/2024. The grievances highlighted
by the petitioners in these writ petitions are in respect of the outcome of the
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disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Syndicate against the 6 respondent
in both the writ petitions, who was working as the Instrumentation Engineer
in the University.
2. On culmination of the disciplinary enquiry, the Syndicate passed
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an order, finding the 6 respondent guilty of all the charges laid against him
and also imposed with a punishment of reversion to the post of Junior
Engineer for a period of five years. Since it was found that, the actions of the
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6 respondent caused loss to the University to the tune of Rs.27,42,116/-, it
was ordered to recover the said amount from the said person. However, on
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the appeals submitted by the 6 respondent, the said order was set aside by
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the Chancellor of the University, and directed reinstatement of the 6
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respondent with all consequential benefits, as if, the said respondent was
continuing as Instrumentation Engineer. The petitioners are aggrieved by the
said decision and also aggrieved by the non-implementation of the decision
taken by the Syndicate, to challenge the order passed by the Chancellor by
filing a writ petition before this Court. ( WP(C)No.31672/2024 is treated as
the leading case and the parties as well as the Exhibits are referred to in this
judgment, as described in the said writ petition, unless otherwise specifically
mentioned .)
3. The facts that led to the filing of these writ petitions are as follows:
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The 6 respondent was working as the Instrumentation Engineer at the
University Science and Instrumentation Centre (USIC) of the Calicut
University. Earlier, the University issued a tender notice on 4.6.2013 for
installation of Local Area Network (LAN) for connecting various offices of
the University as per Ext.P1. In the said tender notice, the rate of cable
required for completing the work, was to be specified in ‘meters’, whereas,
for the consumables required for such installation as specified in Part D.5 of
Ext.P1, the rate was to be indicated in 'lot'. In response to the said tender
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notice, six bids were received and the 6 respondent in his capacity as the
Instrumentation Engineer, evaluated the quotations and submitted
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comparative statements for the purchase of LAN goods and labour charges.
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Accordingly, sanction was accorded by the 4 respondent-University to enter
into a rate contract with M/s. Net Links Business Consultants India (P) Ltd.
for the supply of LAN. Ext.P2 is the said order. As per Ext.P2 order, the
awardee laid cable for a length of 32,009 meters of LAN installation and the
total amount given to the contractor was Rs.31,32,616/-, in which, the value
of the consumables was just Rs.36,000/- which was calculated at the rate of
Rs.1,000/- per lot.
4. After the expiry of the period of contract referred to above, on
16.07.2014, the University decided to invite a fresh tender for LAN goods
and labour charges for internal LAN. For the purpose of publishing a
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notification, a draft tender notification was forwarded to the 6 respondent
for verification and remarks, he being the technical expert. After examining
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the same, when the 6 respondent returned the draft tender, no unit of
measurement was mentioned for quoting the rate of the consumable items;
either ‘lot’ or other measures.
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5. The tender specifications suggested by the 6 respondent was
approved by the Purchase Committee and a tender notification was published
on 08.08.2014. However, the University re-tendered the same again on
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19.09.2014, on the reason that, the earlier tender notification evoked very
poor response, as only one bid alone was received. In response to the re-
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tender notification, the University received four bids and the 6 respondent
was assigned with the task for verification of the tenders. On his
recommendation, the University issued order dated 29.12.2014, according
sanction for approval of the lowest rates quoted by M/s. Avika Technologies
Private Ltd for the supply of LAN goods.
6. In the tender submitted by M/s. Avika Technology, the rate
approved by the University for consumables included in Part D.5 of Ext.P3
re-tender notification was in ‘meters’ which was not a unit of measurement
for consumables. According to the petitioners, M/s. Keltron, one of the
participants in the tender process did not quote any amount for consumables
and another bidder quoted the rate based on numbers of the consumable
items. The remaining bidder quoted only Rs.8,000/- for the entire items of
consumables. As a consequence of approving the rate quoted by M/s. Avika
Technologies, which was Rs.98/- per meter, the total amount claimed by the
said bidder towards consumables for drawing the cable for a total length of
29,148 meters amounted to Rs.27,42,116/-. The total amount claimed by the
bidder was Rs.81,03627.43.
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7. According to the petitioners, this huge amount was claimed by
the bidder illegally, whereas, in the work awarded based on the notification
in the year, 2013, the total amount spent for consumables was only
Rs.36,000/-, when the cable for a length of 32,009 meters was laid. The said
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amounts were released to the bidder, after the bills forwarded to the 6
respondent for verification, were certified by him. According to the
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petitioners, the 6 respondent being the technical person, who was entrusted
with the task of prescribing the terms and conditions of the tender, approving
the rates and certifying the bills, have committed grave errors and lapses in
the above matter, thereby causing serious loss to the University to the tune of
Rs.27,42,116/-.
8. In respect of the LAN installation referred to above, a preliminary
enquiry was conducted by the Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau, based
on certain complaints received, and they informed the Higher Education
Department of the Government, about the prima facie irregularities found in
the said transactions, and sought permission for further action in the matter.
Thereupon, the Higher Education Department vide communication dated
26.10.2019 requested the University to take necessary action for the same.
Accordingly, in the meeting of the Syndicate of the University held on
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3.12.2019, permission was accorded to conduct a Vigilance investigation into
the alleged irregularities. Accordingly, U.O No.17588/2019/Admn.dated
17.12.2019 was issued by the University in this regard and the enquiry
initiated by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kozhikode Unit, is
now in progress.
9. In the meanwhile, acting on a complaint received by the
Government, the Finance (Inspection) Department conducted an inspection
in the University in the year 2019 and based on the same, a detailed report
was submitted on 08.06.2020. In the said report, taking note of the various
irregularities detected, it was suggested to initiate disciplinary action against
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the 6 respondent. The Higher Education Department forwarded the said
report to the University for necessary action. After considering the said
report, a decision was taken by the Syndicate of the University on 9.9.2020
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to conduct an enquiry against the 6 respondent and as part of the same, the
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6 respondent was suspended pending disciplinary proceedings against him.
10. Challenging the report of the Finance (Inspection) Department and
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the suspension order issued by the University, the 6 respondent filed
WP(C)No.10366/2021 before this Court. A learned Single Judge of this
Court, as per Ext.P5 judgment dated 2.12.2021 interfered in the matter by
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setting aside the order of suspension, with a direction to the University to re-
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instate the 6 respondent. The said judgment was challenged by the
University by filing W.A.No.130/2022 which resulted in Ext.P6 judgment
dated 7.7.2022. The Division Bench of this Court, in Ext.P6 judgment, set
aside Ext.P5 judgment and directed the University to complete the
disciplinary proceedings within a period of two months.
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11. The 6 respondent sought a review of the judgment by filing
R.P.No.692/2022, but the same was dismissed as per Ext.P7 order dated
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3.8.2022. In the meantime, the 6 respondent was issued with a charge
memo and statement of allegations, in response to which, a written statement
was submitted by him in defence. In the meeting held on 17.5.2021, the
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Syndicate, after considering the statement of defence of the 6 respondent,
constituted a three member Syndicate Sub Committee. Accordingly, a
detailed enquiry as per statute 19 under Part III in Chapter 4 of the Calicut
University First statute 1977 was conducted.
12. In the enquiry process, four witnesses were examined on the side
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of the University and three witnesses were examined on the side of the 6
respondent. Forty-five documents were marked from the side of the
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University and Twenty-five documents were marked on the side of the 6
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respondent. After evaluating the evidence, Ext.P8 report was submitted by
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the Enquiry Committee holding that, all the charges levelled against the 6
respondent are proved.
13. Exhibit P8 report was considered by the Syndicate of the
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University on 11.8.2022 and resolved to intimate the said report to the 6
respondent, along with the proposal to impose the punishment to revert him
to the post of Junior Engineer for five years and to recover the loss of
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Rs.27,42,116/- from him. The 6 respondent submitted a representation
before the Syndicate against the said proposal, and after considering the said
representation, the Syndicate in its meeting held on 5.09.2022, resolved to
accept the report and to impose the punishment as proposed, including the
initiation of recovery proceedings. Accordingly, it was resolved to reinstate
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the 6 respondent, who was under suspension, to the post of Junior Engineer
and to treat the period of suspension as leave without allowance. Exhibit P9
is the order issued by the University on 13.9.2022 in implementation of the
decision taken by the Syndicate.
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14. The 6 respondent, challenging Ext.P9, submitted a statutory
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appeal before the 3 respondent Chancellor, as contemplated under Statutes
52 and 53 of Part III of Chapter 4 of the Calicut University First Statutes,
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1977. Based on the directions issued by this Court in the judgment dated
18.1.2013 in WP(C) No.42605/2022, the appeal was heard by the Chancellor
on 20.1.2024. Thereafter, as per the interim order dated 22.1.2024, the
Chancellor directed the University to keep in abeyance all further
proceedings of recovery based on the impugned order and also stayed the
procedure initiated to fill up the post of Instrumentation Engineer, which fell
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vacant consequent to the reversion of the 6 respondent. Subsequently, as
per Ext.P10 order dated 27.6.2024, the Chancellor set aside Ext.P9 order
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passed by the University with a direction that, the 6 respondent shall be
reinstated in service with all service benefits due to him, as if, he continued
in the post of Instrumentation Engineer without any reversion.
15. Upon receiving Ext.P10 order of the Chancellor, a meeting was
convened by the Syndicate on 11.07.2024 and resolved to challenge the said
order before this Court. The said decision was taken by the Syndicate, after
considering the legal opinion given by the Standing Counsel for the
University. Based on the decision taken by the Syndicate, Ext.P11 University
Order was passed on 12.7.2024 to that effect.
16. In the meantime, the then Vice-Chancellor, Sri. M.K.Jayaraj,
demitted the office on 11.7.2024 on completion of his four years as Vice-
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Chancellor and as per order dated 12.7.2024 passed by the Chancellor,
Sri. P. Raveendran took charge as the Vice-Chancellor with effect from 5
p.m. on 12.7.2024. The new Vice-Chancellor decided to keep in abeyance,
the implementation of Ext.P11 order and decided to seek a second legal
opinion from a former Chief Justice of a High Court, as to the legality and
propriety in challenging an order passed by the Chancellor in exercise of his
statutory appellate jurisdiction, at the instance of the University.
17. The opinion received from the former Chief Justice was that, a
challenge of the order passed by the Chancellor at the instance of the
Syndicate or the other authorities of the University is not proper. The legal
opinion of the former Chief Justice was considered by the Syndicate in the
meeting held on 31.8.2024 and it was decided to reject the said opinion and
to implement the earlier decision taken by the Syndicate in its meeting held
on 11.7.2024. Accordingly, U.O No.14433/2024/Admn. dated 24.9.2024
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was issued by the 3 respondent University.
18. In the meantime, one of the members of the Syndicate, Sri. M.B.
Faisal, filed WP(C)No.31672/2024, challenging Ext.P10 order and this Court
passed an interim order on 13.9.2024, staying the implementation of Ext.P10
order. Thereafter, the Vice-Chancellor passed an order on 1.10.2024
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nullifying the decision taken by the Syndicate on 31.8.2024 and based on the
same, U.O. No.15051/2024/Admn. dated 3.10.2024 was issued. Challenging
the said order, another member of the Syndicate, Sri. P.K. Khaleemudheen,
filed WP(C)No.40998/2024. The University order passed on 24.9.2024
issued based on the decision issued by the Syndicate on 31.8.2024 is
produced as Ext.P5 in WP(C) No.40998/2024 and the University Order dated
3.10.2024 nullifying Ext.P5, is produced as Ext.P8 in the said writ petition.
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19. The 6 respondent filed a detailed counter affidavit in
WP(C)No.31672/2024 in which, the maintainability of the writ petition itself
was challenged. The said contention is raised on the ground that, the
petitioner being only one of the members of the Syndicate, is not a person
aggrieved by the order and hence he does not have the locus standi to
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challenge the impugned order. In the counter affidavit the 6 respondent also
highlighted the impropriety in challenging an order passed by the Chancellor,
at the instance of the Syndicate/University, as the Chancellor is the head of
the University. Section 3 of the Calicut University Act was also relied on,
which provides that, the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice-
Chancellor, the Pro-Vice Chancellor if any and the members of the Senate,
the Syndicate and the Academic Council shall constitute a body corporate by
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the name of the University of Calicut. Thus, it is contended that, since the
Syndicate, being a part of body corporate in the name of University of
Calicut, could not have raised a challenge against the order passed by the
Chancellor, who, apart from being the Head of the University, is also
forming part of the body corporate. Apart from the above, averments
justifying the reasons based on which the Chancellor interfered in the Ext.P9
order were also incorporated.
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20. A separate counter affidavit was filed by the 4 respondent
University, practically supporting the contentions raised by the petitioner in
the writ petition and also against the contents and findings of the order
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passed by the Chancellor. It was also contended that, the active role of the 6
respondent in the finalization of the tender and sanctioning of the amounts to
the bidder were specifically found in Exts.P6 and P7 by the Division Bench
of this Court.
21. In WP(C) No.40998/2024, the State Government submitted a
counter affidavit explaining the circumstances under which, the proceedings
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were initiated against the 6 respondent and also about the orders passed as
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part of the said proceedings. The Vice Chancellor, the 4 respondent in the
said writ petition, filed a separate counter affidavit justifying the actions
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taken by him in keeping in abeyance, the implementation of the decision
taken by the Syndicate to challenge the order passed by the Chancellor,
acting upon the legal opinion obtained by him from a former Chief Justice of
a High Court on the issue of proprietary in raising a challenge at the instance
of the Syndicate/University, against an order passed by the Chancellor of the
University. The obligation of the Syndicate to implement the order passed
by the Chancellor being the appellate authority, as provided under Statute 64
of Part III of Chapter 4 of Calicut University First Statute 1977 was also
highlighted. The contentions regarding the impropriety in raising the
challenge against the order passed by the Chancellor in the light of the
stipulation in Section 3 of the Calicut University Act was also specifically
raised. Thus, the Vice Chancellor sought the dismissal of the writ petition.
22. Heard Sri. T.B. Hood, the learned counsel for the petitioners in
both the writ petitions, Sri.P. Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Chancellor of the University assisted by Sri. S. Prasanth,
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Sri. George Poonthottam, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 6
respondent in both the writ petitions, assisted by Sri. L. Navneeth Krishnan,
Sri. P.C. Sasidharan, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Calicut
University, Smt. M.A. Vaheeda Babu, the learned counsel for the
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Vice-Chancellor, the 4 respondent in WP(C)No.40998 of 2024 and
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Smt. K.G. Sarojini, the learned Government Pleader for the 1 respondent in
both the writ petitions.
23. Since the respondents have specifically raised the question of
maintainability of the writ petitions at the instance of the petitioners herein in
their capacity as the members of the Syndicate of the University, the said
question will have to be decided before considering the other issues. This
contention is raised by the respondents mainly on the ground that, according
to the respondents 3,4 and 6, the petitioners do not have the locus standi to
challenge the said orders, as they are not the aggrieved parties. As mentioned
above, the impropriety in challenging the order passed by the Chancellor of
the University in exercise of the statutory powers vested upon it under
Chapter 51 and 52 of Part III of Chapter 4 Calicut University First Statute
1977, was also raised by the said respondents. It was also contended that,
since Section 3 of the Calicut University Act provides that the various
authorities and functionaries of the University, including the Chancellor and
the Syndicate, are forming part of a body corporate having perpetual
succession and common seal, it is not proper for one part of the said body
corporate, to challenge the order passed by the another part of the
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 19
said body corporate, which also happened to be the Head of the University.
The impropriety in such challenge by the Syndicate, being a quasi-judicial
authority, which took a decision on disciplinary action on the employee,
against the order passed by the appellate authority in exercise of the statutory
powers vested upon such appellate authority, was also highlighted by the said
respondents.
24. As against the contentions of the said respondents with regard to
the maintainability of the said writ petitions, the specific case of the
petitioners is that, they being the members of the Syndicate, are interested in
the welfare of the University as a whole and in this case, the disciplinary
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proceedings were initiated against the 6 respondent by the Syndicate, based
on the recommendations of the Financial (Inspection) Department of the
State, on being satisfied about lapses and dereliction of duty on the part of
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the 6 respondent. It was also contended that, such disciplinary proceedings
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were initiated, after being satisfied about the fact that, the actions of the 6
respondent resulted in huge loss to the University to the tune of
Rs.27,42,116/- and it is in the best interest of the University, to recover the
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same from the 6 respondent. It was further pointed out by the petitioners
that, on realizing this obligation, although a decision was taken by the
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Syndicate to challenge the illegal order passed by the Chancellor before this
Court, such decision could not be implemented by the Syndicate, on account
of the undue interference by the Vice-Chancellor, nullifying the decision
taken by the Syndicate in this regard. Therefore, the petitioners, who have
the responsibility to pursue the interests of the University being the members
of the Syndicate, were compelled to submit the writ petitions to ensure that
the culprit behind the loss sustained by the University, is adequately
punished and the amount of loss is recovered from such person. Thus, it is
contended by the petitioners that, they have every right to seek the reliefs
sought for in these writ petitions, which are being pursued for the best
interest of the University as a whole.
25. I have carefully gone through the records, considered the
submissions made by the respective counsel and examined the statutory
provisions relevant for the issues involved in these writ petitions. When
examining the statutory provisions, it is to be noted that, Section 3 of the
Calicut University Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to an 'Act') explains “the
University” and the said provision reads as follows:
“The University. - (1) The Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, The Vice-
Chancellor, the Pro-Vice Chancellor, if any, and the members of the Senate,
the Syndicate and the Academic Council, for the time being, shall constitute
a body corporate by the name of the University of Calicut.
(2) The University shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and
shall sue and be sued by the said name .”
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26. Section 7 of the Act deals with the Chancellor and his powers,
which reads as follows:
“The Chancellor.-
(1) The Governor of Kerala shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor
of the University.
(2) The Chancellor shall be the head of the University and shall, when
present, preside at meetings of the Senate, and at any convocation of the
University
(3) The Chancellor may, by order in writing, annual any proceeding of any
of the authorities or officers of the University which is not in conformity
with this Act, the Statutes, the Ordinances, the Regulations, the rules or the
bye-laws:Provided that, before making any such order, the chancellor shall
call upon such authority or officer to show cause why such an order should
not be made and consider the cause, if any, shown by such authority of
officer within a reasonable time.
(4) The Chancellor may, if he deems it necessary in the public interest or in
the interest of the proper functioning of the University, suspend, dismiss or
dissolve any authority of the University and-
(a) in the case of suspension, take measures for the interim administration
of the University; and
(b) in the case of dismissal or dissolution, constitute such authority by
nomination, or the interim administration of the University till such
authority is reconstituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that the nominated authority shall not in any case continue in
office for a period exceeding one year.".
(5) Every proposal for the conferment of an honorary degree shall be
subject to confirmation by the Chancellor.
(6) An appeal shall lie to the Chancellor against any order of dismissal
passed by the Syndicate or the Vice-Chancellor against any person in the
service of the University.
(7) An appeal under sub-section (6) shall be filed within sixty days from the
date of service of the order of dismissal on the person concerned.
(8) The chancellor shall, before passing any order on an appeal under sub-
section (6), refer the matter for advice to a Tribunal appointed by him for
the purpose.
(9) The Chancellor shall have power to remove the Vice Chancellor or the
Pro-vice-chancellor from office by an order in writing on charges of
misappropriation or mismanagement of funds or misbehaviour:
Provided that such charges are proved by an enquiry conducted by a
person who is or has been a judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court
appointed by the Chancellor for the purpose:
Provided further that the Vice-chancellor or the Pro-Vice-chancellor shall
not be removed under this section unless he has been given a reasonable
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opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken
against him.
(10) The Chancellor shall have such other powers as may be conferred on
him by this Act or the Statutes.”
27. Section 16 deals with the authorities of the University, which reads as
follows:
“Authorities of the University. - The following shall be the authorities of the
University, namely:-
(i) The Senate;
(ii) The Syndicate;
(iii) The Academic Council;
(iv) The Faculties;
(v) The Boards of Studies;
(vi) The Student’s Council;
(vii) The Finance Committee, and
(viii) such other boards or bodies of the University as may be declared by the Statutes to be
authorities of the University.”
28. Section 21 deals with the constitution of the Syndicate and Section 23
deals with the powers of the Syndicate. Section 23 reads as follows:
“Powers of Syndicate : Subject to the provisions of the this Act and the
Statutes, the executive powers of the University including the general
superintendence and control over the institutions of the University shall
be vested in the Syndicate and subject likewise the Syndicate shall have
the following powers; namely:-
(i) to affiliate institutions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such
affiliation prescribed in this Act and the Statutes:
(ii) to make Ordinance and to amend or repeal the same;
(iii) to propose Statutes for the consideration of the Senate;
(iv) to hold, control and administer the properties and funds of the
University;
(v) to direct the form, custody and use of the common seal of the University;
(vi) to arrange for and direct the inspection of colleges, hostels and other
institutions and to constitute a Board of Inspection for that purpose.
(vii) to establish, maintain and manage colleges and institutes of research
and other institutions of higher learning as it may from time to time deem
necessary;
(viii) to appoint teachers and other employees of the University and prescribe
their duties;
(ix) to create administrative, ministerial and other necessary posts;
(x) to suspend discharge, dismiss or otherwise take any disciplinary action
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against teachers and other employees of the University after giving them
reasonable opportunity to defend their position;
(xi) with the previous sanction of the Government, to fix and regulate the fee
payable by students in colleges affiliated to the University;
(xii) to award fellowships, scholarships, studentships, bursaries, medals and
prizes;
(xiii) to exercise supervision and control over the residence and discipline of
students;
(xiv) to consider the financial estimates of the University and submit them to
the Senate in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes made in this
behalf;
(xv) to conduct University examinations and approve and publish the results
thereof;
(xvi) to appoint members to the Boards of Studies;
(xvii) to approve panel of examiners and to fix their remuneration;
(xviii) to approve the appointment of teachers in private colleges;
(xix) to delegate any of its powers to the Vice-Chancellor to a committee
appointed from among its members;
(xx) to arrange for and direct the investigation into the affairs of private
colleges, to issue instructions for maintaining their efficiency, for
ensuring proper conditions of employment of members of their staff and
payment of adequate salaries to them, and in case of disregard of such
instructions to modify the conditions of affiliation or recognition or take
such other steps as it deems proper in that behalf;
(xxi) to withhold or cancel the result of any candidate at any University
examination;
(xxii) to accept endowments, bequests, donations and transfers of any
movable and immovable properties to the University on its behalf,
provided that all such endowments, bequests, donations and transfers
shall be reported to the Senate at its next meeting;
(xxiii) to exercise the powers of the University under clause (xxvii) of section
5.
(xxiv) to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be
prescribed by this Act, the Statutes, the Ordinances, the rules, the bye-
laws and the orders.”
29. Part III of Chapter 4 of the Calicut University First Statutes, 1977,
deals with the disciplinary procedure of the non-teaching staff. Statutes 31 to
49 deals with the disciplinary enquiry and its procedure. Statutes 52(b)
provides that, as against an order imposing a penalty by the Vice Chancellor
or the Syndicate, an appeal shall lie to the Chancellor. Statutes 63 deals with
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the powers of the Appellate Authority which reads as follows:
“Powers of an Appellate Authority. -
(1) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties
specified in Statute 25 the appellate authority shall consider.-
(a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been
established;
(b) whether the facts established afford sufficient grounds for
taking action;
(c) whether the procedure prescribed in these Statutes have been
complied with, and if not, whether such non-compliance has
resulted in violation of any laws of the University or in failure
of justice;
(d) whether the findings are justified; and
(e) whether the penalty imposed in excessive; adequate or
inadequate; and pass orders-
(i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing
the penalty;
(ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed
the penalty or to any other authority with such
direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of
the case:
Provided that-
(i) The appellate authority shall not impose any
enhanced penalty which neither such authority
nor the authority which made the order appealed
against is competent in the case to impose;
(ii) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be
passed unless the appellant is given an
opportunity of making any representation which
he may wish to make against such an enhanced
penalty; and
(iii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate
authority proposes to impose is one of the
penalties specified in items (v) to (viii) of Statute
25 and an inquiry under Statutes 32 to 44 has
not already been held in the case the appellate
authority shall, subject to the provisions of
Statute, 49, itself hold such inquiry or direct that
such inquiry be held and thereafter on
consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry
and after giving the appellant an opportunity of
making any representation which he may wish
to make against such penalty, pass such orders
as it may deem fit.
(2) In the case of an appeal against an order specified in Statute 53
the appellate authority shall consider all the circumstances of the
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case and pass such orders as it may deem just and equitable.”
30. Statute 64 provides that the authority which made the order
appeal against shall give effect to the orders passed by the appellate
authority.
31. Thus, the questions raised in these writ petitions, are to be considered
in the light of the above factual and legal background. On analysing the
statutory provisions as referred to above, it can be seen that, Section 3
specifically creates a body corporate, including the Chancellor and the
members of the Syndicate along with the other functionaries and authorities
of the University. The hierarchy contemplated under the Act and Statutes, in
terms of exercise of powers, would clearly indicate that, as far as the
Chancellor is concerned, he is the head of the Institution and is clothed with
various superior powers including, (1) the power to nullify any decision
passed by any authority of the University if it is found that, it is against the
provisions of the Act and the Statutes, (2) to suspend, dismiss or dissolved
any authority of the University and (3) to act as an appellate authority against
the order of dismissal passed by the Syndicate or the Vice Chancellor against
any person in service of the University. The above mentioned powers are
specifically conferred upon the Chancellor as per Section 7 of the Act,
whereas, when it comes to the question of appellate jurisdiction in the matter
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of orders passed in disciplinary proceedings other that of dismissal, such
power is conferred upon him as per Statutes 52 and 53 of Part III of Chapter
4 of the Calicut University First Statutes.
32. In this case, evidently, Ext.P10 order was passed by the
Chancellor, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him as per the statutory
provisions referred to above. The examination of the above provisions
would also indicate that the Chancellor, apart being the head of the
University, is also the appellate authority of the decisions taken by the
Syndicate in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and thus he is an
authority superior to Syndicate, in all respects. Apart from the above, both
the Chancellor and the members of the Syndicate are forming part of body
corporate named the University of Calicut and they are the integral parts of
such body corporate. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is
whether, is it proper for one component of the body corporate to raise a
challenge against the order passed by the another component of the body
corporate which is superior, unless such challenge is specifically authorized
under the Act or the Statutes.
33. When considering the precedents on the point, one of the decisions
th
relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 6 respondent is
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that of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Administrator,
Cosmopolitan Hospitals (P) Ltd, TVM v. Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner, TVM and Another [2015(5) KHC 16] . In the said
decision, a Division Bench of this Court, considered the question as to the
power of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to challenge the order
passed by the Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, by which, the order of
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was set aside. The writ petition filed
by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and its maintainability was
the subject matter in the above decision, and after elaborately considering the
issue by placing reliance upon a large number of decisions, this Court clearly
held that, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, being an adjudicating
authority vested with quasi-judicial functions, is not empowered to raise a
challenge against the order passed by the appellate Tribunal. While arriving
at the said conclusion, this Court relied upon the decisions rendered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhopal Sugar Industries Limited v. Income
Tax Officer, Bhopal [AIR 1961 SC 182], Union of India v. K.M.
Sankarappa [(2001)1 SCC 582] etc.
34. In Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail v. Enforcement Directorate
[(2007) 8 SCC 254] the question considered by the Supreme Court was
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whether a Special Director appointed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act, 1973 himself can prefer appeal under Section 54 of the said Act before
the High Court, against an order passed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Appellate Board. The Apex Court held as under:
“16. An adjudicating authority exercises a quasi-judicial power
and discharges judicial functions. When its order had been set
aside by the Board, ordinarily in absence of any power to prefer
an appeal, it could not do so. The reasonings of the High Court
that he had general power, in our opinion, is fallacious. For the
purpose of exercising the functions of the Central Government,
the officer concerned must be specifically authorised. Only
when an officer is so specifically authorised, he can act on
behalf of the Central Government and not otherwise. Only
because an officer has been appointed for the purpose of acting
in terms of the provisions of the Act, the same would not by
itself entitle an officer to discharge all or any of the functions of
the Central Government. Even ordinarily a quasi-judicial
authority cannot prefer an appeal being aggrieved by and
dissatisfied with the judgment of the appellate authority
whereby and whereunder its judgment has been set aside. An
adjudicating authority, although an officer of the Central
Government, should act as an impartial tribunal. An
adjudicating authority, therefore, in absence of any power
conferred upon it in this behalf by the Central Government,
could not prefer any appeal against the order passed by the
Appellate Board.”
35. In GRIDCO Ltd. v. Western Electricity Supply Co. of
Orissa Ltd [(2024) 2 SCC 500], it was a batch of appeals,
wherein, particularly in Civil Appeal No. 2674 of 2013, the Apex
Court considered the issue whether the order issued by the
Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of the
Electricity Act, 2003 can be challenged by the Electricity
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Regulatory Commission, under Section 82 of the Electricity Act,
and thus observed;
“31. There is one more aspect of the matter. As held by the
Constitution Bench [PTC (India) Ltd. v. CERC, (2010) 4
SCC 603] , under Section 62, the Commission exercises
quasi-judicial powers. There are appeals preferred by the
Commission against the orders of the Appellate Tribunal in
appeals under Section 111 of the Electricity Act. The
Appellate Tribunal in appeals has dealt with the legality
and validity of the decisions of the Commission rendered in
the exercise of quasi-judicial power. In short, the Appellate
Tribunal has tested the correctness of the orders of the
Commission. The Commission is bound by the orders of the
Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, we have serious doubt about
the propriety and legality of the act of the Commission of
preferring appeals against the orders of the Appellate
Tribunal in appeal by which its own orders have been
corrected. The Commission cannot be the aggrieved party
except possibly in one appeal where the issue was about
the non-compliance by the Commission of the orders of the
Appellate Tribunal. If the Commission was exercising
legislative functions, the position would have been
different.”
36. In Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education in
Kerala v. Karthik Dev [2026 (1) KLT 217] , another Division Bench of
this Court, held that the Admission Supervisory Committee, a statutory
body constituted under the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and
Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act,
2017, cannot be treated as an aggrieved person entitled to maintain a writ
appeal following the decision rendered in Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner (Supra), held thus;
“18. Moreover, the beneficiary or the person adversely affected by the
decision that would be taken by the Committee on a complaint would
always be third parties and not the Committee, which has taken that
decision. It is true that in the present writ petition, the appellant was
arrayed as 2nd respondent. But that does not mean that the appellant has
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a duty to see that the decision taken by it is sustained in a court of law.
The appellant Committee is only a proper party to the writ petition. From
the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Regional Provident
Fund Commissioner (2016 (1) KLT SN 50 (C.No. 53) = 2015 (5) KHC
16), it is clear that an adjudicating authority cannot challenge the order
passed by the higher authority under any circumstance, which otherwise
would undermine the principle of judicial discipline. When the decision
of the appellant is set aside in the writ petition, the appellant cannot be
the aggrieved. It is the person or official respondents benefited by the
aforesaid cancelled decision of the appellant can only be the aggrieved.
The decision of the Committee can be supported or challenged by the
person benefited or adversely affected by the said decision or by the
official respondents who have a duty to see that the admissions are made
in a fair and proper manner. If a quasi-judicial body statutorily
empowered to take a decision in a dispute between third parties starts to
challenge the adverse orders against the decision taken by it before the
court of law, then it will create an anomalous situation that in all the
cases wherein the decision of the quasi-judicial body were interfered by
the Court, such quasi-judicial body or authorities will come up with
appeals.”
37. In a decision rendered by the Himachal Pradesh High Court
in State of H.P v. Vinod Gupta & Ors. [CWP No. 5554 of 2020] ,
wherein proceedings were initiated by the District Collector/Deputy
Commissioner against the Respondents under Section 118 of the
The Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 based
on a complaint. In response, the Respondents filed an Appeal before
the Divisional Commissioner, who allowed it, overturning the initial
order. Dissatisfied with this decision, the State filed a Revision
before the Financial Commissioner, who upheld the Divisional
Commissioner's order. The State, represented by the District
Collector, approached the High Court , wherein it was held ;
“10. This is for the reason that unlike a complainant, a
quasi-judicial authority has to act impartially and take
a call on the lis which is before it and after the case
stands decided by, it become functus officio. It neither
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has the power to file an appeal nor review or revision
etc., against its order. It is for the aggrieved party to
assail the order and the authority which passes the
order cannot be said to be an aggrieved party.
11. In fact, in the scheme of judicial discipline, once
the order passed by the District Collector was assailed
by way of an appeal and the Appellate Authority
passed an order, the order passed by the District
Collector merged in the order passed by the Appellate
Authority and it became binding upon the District
Collector. Similarly, when in Revision petition, learned
Financial Commissioner finally decided the Revision
petition, the order passed by the District Collector, as
it stood merged in the order passed by the Divisional
Commissioner and the subsequent order passed by the
Divisional Commissioner now stood merged in the
order that was passed by the Financial Commissioner.
These extremely important aspects of the matter have
not been appreciated by the District Collector while
filing this writ petition before this Court on behalf of
the State.”
38. In Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner v. West Coast Petroleum
Agency and Others [2012(1) KLT 704] , another Single Bench of this Court
considered the very same question and found that the adjudicating authority
cannot challenge the order passed by the Appellate Authority interfering with
its order. Later, the decision rendered by the learned Single Bench was
upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner v. West Coast Petroleum Agency and Others [WA.No.
813 of 2012]. In the said Single Bench decision, the observations made by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhopal Sugar Industries Private Limited
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(supra) were relied on, which was to the effect that, when a subordinate
authority in the hierarchy does not adhere to or abide by the decision of a
superior authority, its action cannot be justified. Besides, the observations in
Cassel v. Broome [1972 AC 1027] was also relied on, which reads as
follows:
“It Is inevitable in a hierarchal system of courts that there are
decisions of the Supreme Appellate Tribunal which does not attract
unanimous approval.....The judicial system works only if some one is
allowed to have the last word.”
10. If the petitioners are permitted to assume a dual role, that would
be permitting them to abandon the core principle of fair adjudication
and judicial discipline. Such a course cannot be assented to.”
After referring those decisions, it was clearly observed by this Court that, if a
subordinate authority is to challenge the decision of a superior authority that
would be an unwholesome state in areas of quasi-judicial function.
39. Moreover, certain observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Bhopal Sugar Industries Private Limited (supra) are also relevant while
considering the competence of the Syndicate or the petitioners herein who
are challenging the orders purportedly on behalf of Syndicate. The said
observations are as follows:
“Where the Income Tax Officer had virtually refused to carry out the
clear and unambiguous directions which a superior tribunal like the
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had given to him by its final order in
exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment
made by him, such refusal is in effect a denial of justice, and is further
more destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of
justice based as it is on the hierarchy of Courts. In such a case a writ of
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mandamus should issue ex debito justitiae to compel the Income Tax
Officer to carry out the directions given to him by the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal. The High Court would be clearly in error if it
refused to issue a writ on the ground that no manifest injustice had
resulted from the order of the Income Tax Officer in view of the error
committed by the Tribunal itself in its order. Such a view is destructive of
one of the basic principles of the administration of justice.”
40. In this case, there cannot be any doubt that, while issuing Ext.P9
th
order as part of the disciplinary proceedings against the 6 respondent, the
Syndicate of the University was exercising the statutory powers conferred
upon it under Section 23 of the Act by acting as a quasi-judicial authority.
Statutes 52 and 53 specifically provides an appeal against such an order to
the Chancellor who shall exercise his powers while considering the appeal,
as contemplated under Statutes 63 of Part III of Chapter 4 of Calicut
University First Statutes 1977. Statutes 64 creates an obligation upon the
Syndicate, being the authority which passed the order appealed against, to
give effect to the orders passed by the appellate authority. Thus, as observed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhopal Sugar Industries’ case (supra),
the Syndicate is under an obligation to give effect to the orders passed by the
appellate authority. Therefore, raising a challenge against such an appellate
order is not something envisaged under the provisions of the Act and
Statutes framed thereunder. Moreover, as observed in the decisions referred
to above, being an adjudicating authority, the Syndicate is not expected to
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challenge the order passed by the superior authority in exercise of the
statutory powers conferred upon such superior authority being the appellate
authority of the Syndicate. Such a challenge or an attempt to challenge
would be against the institutional hierarchy and the discipline, which are
bound to be maintained in full adherence to the various provisions of the Act
and the Statutes framed thereunder.
41. The said issue can be considered against the petitioners on a
different reason as well. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior
th
Counsel for the 6 respondent, Section 3 of the Calicut University Act
creates a body corporate inclusive of the Chancellor and the members of the
Syndicate. Thus, both are integral parts of a body corporate as envisaged in
the said provision and the scheme of the Act contemplates and confers
various powers and functions to various parts of the said body corporate in
different hierarchies. Therefore, each part of the said body corporate are
bound to act in tandem for the common interest of the University and all the
authorities are bound to respect the orders passed by each other, in exercise
of the statutory powers vested upon such authorities. An interference in the
orders passed by such authorities could be made by the other authority in
different hierarchies, only if such interference or an attempt to interference is
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authorized under the provisions of the Act, specifically. Any other
conclusion on the issue would defeat the purpose of the concept of body
corporate as envisaged under section 3 of the Calicut University Act and
would be against the scheme of the Act. Even otherwise, permitting one
authority under the Act, to challenge an order passed by the superior
authority in the line of hierarchy, would be against the institutional discipline
and if permitted, the concept of the body corporate and common seal
contemplated under Section 3 of the Act would be defeated.
42. In the light of the aforesaid observations, the only irresistible
conclusion possible is that, the Syndicate is not competent to take a decision
to challenge the order of the Chancellor, being the Head of the Institution
and the superior/appellate authority of the Syndicate, particularly in a case
where, the order appealed against is relating to the disciplinary proceedings
against an employee of the University.
43. Evidently, the petitioners have approached this Court, in their
capacity as the members of the Syndicate and also that the Syndicate/
University was prevented from implementing its decision to challenge the
order passed by the Chancellor .In other words, the challenge in these writ
petitions are being made by the petitioners on behalf of the Syndicate
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/University, as the said authority was deprived from raising such challenge,
despite taking a decision to that effect. Since I have already found that, the
Syndicate does not have the power to take a decision to challenge the order
of the Chancellor, particularly when it is passed in a disciplinary proceedings
of an employee, the question regarding the competence of the petitioners to
challenge the same, which is coextensive with that of the Syndicate, can only
be answered against the petitioners.
44. The above issue can be considered from yet another perspective as
well. One of the basic requirements to maintain a writ petition under Art.
226 of the Constitution of India is that, the person approaching this Court
must be a person aggrieved by the order under challenge. Therefore, the
question that has to be considered in this regard is whether the petitioners in
this writ petition are “aggrieved persons” so as to maintain a writ petition.
As mentioned above, even according to the petitioners, they have
approached this Court in their status of being the members of the Syndicate
of the University and the Syndicate is prevented from challenging the order
due to the acts of the Vice Chancellor. Black's Law Dictionary, (Sixth Ed. at
page 65), “aggrieved” has been defined to mean "having suffered loss or
injury; damnified; injured", “aggrieved” person has been defined to mean:
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"One whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose
pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or
judgment. One whose right of property may be established or divested. The
word "aggrieved" refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some
personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a
burden or obligation." The qualifications requisite for attaining the status of
an “aggrieved person” was examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and
Others [1976 (1) SCC 671] . After elaborately considering the above
principles, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 37,
38 and 39 as follows:
“37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to
apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily
fall in any of these categories: (i) “person aggrieved”; (ii)
“stranger”; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper.
Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from
those coming under the first two categories. Such persons
interfere in things which do not concern them. They
masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in
the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest
of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge
in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either
by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are
actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity;
while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category,
may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration.
The High Court should do well to reject the applications of
such busybodies at the threshold.
38. The distinction between the first and second categories
of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated.
The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a
solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of
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lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an
outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants
falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights
have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in
the category of “persons aggrieved”. In the grey outer
circle the bounds which separate the first category from
the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in
a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may
not be “persons aggrieved”.
39. To distinguish such applicants from “strangers”,
among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the
conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and
ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the
circumstances of the case, including the statutory context
in which the matter falls to be considered. These are:
Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has
been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury,
in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been
prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission
of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has
suffered a legal grievance, a person
“against whom a decision has been pronounced which
has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully
refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to
something?”
Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own
beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him
in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to
object and be heard by the authority before it took the
impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in
the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of
jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in
the context of which the scope of the words “person
aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare
measure designed to lay down ethical or professional
standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a
statute dealing with private rights of particular
individuals?”
45. In Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., [(1977) 1 SCC
155] , it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court as ;
“21. In this wider perspective, who is a
“person aggrieved”? Dabholkar [M.V. Dabholkar v.
State of Maharashtra, (1975) 2 SCC 702 : (1976)
1 SCR 306] gives the updated answer:
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 39
“The test is whether the words ‘person aggrieved’
include ‘a person who has a genuine grievance because
an order has been made which prejudicially affects his
interests’, (p. 315)American jurisprudence has
recognised, for instance, the expanding importance of
consumer protection in the economic system and
permitted consumer organisations to initiate or
intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule of
‘locus standi’, such a course could not have been
justified (see p. 807 — New York University Law
Review, Vol. 46, 1971). In fact, citizen organisations
have recently been campaigning for using legal actions
for protection of community interest, broadening the
scope of “standing” in legal proceedings (see p. 403 —
Boston University Law Review, Vol. 51, 1971).”
In the well-known case of Attorney-General of the
Gambia v. Peirre Sarr N.'Jie [1961 AC 617] Lord
Denning observed about the Attorney-General's
standing thus:
“.... The words ‘person aggrieved’ are of wide import
and should not be subjected to a restrictive
interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere
busybody who is interfering in things which do not
concern him; but they do include a person who has a
genuine grievance because an order has been made
which prejudicially affects his interest.” (pp. 324-
325).”
46. After applying the test referred above in the facts and
circumstances of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai (supra) , it was observed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that “While a Procrustean approach should be
avoided, as a rule, the Court should not interfere at the instance of a
'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave
miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests”
47. Thus, from the observations above, it is evident that, the writ
petition can be maintained only by the persons aggrieved and the status of the
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 40
petitioner as a person aggrieved has to be determined by applying the tests
referred to above. When the issue at hand is considered in that perspective, I
am of the view that the petitioners cannot be treated as persons aggrieved, as
they are neither affected individually by the said decision nor their individual
legal rights have been violated. This proposition has been laid down by the
Apex Court in a catena of decisions including Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan
Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, [(2013) 4 SCC 465], wherein it was
observed as follows;
“9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be
permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the
authority/court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved
persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury
can challenge the act/action/order, etc. in a court of law. A writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either
for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there
is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of
statutory duty on the part of the authorities. Therefore, there must be
a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis
of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course,
enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using
its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such
person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such
performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for
invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the
exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for
must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such
right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the
Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the
right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such
right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. [Vide
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [1951 SCC 1024 : AIR 1952
SC 12] , Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [AIR 1954 SC 728] ,
Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [AIR 1962 SC
1044] , Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460 : AIR
1996 SC 2736] and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders
Welfare Assn. (2) v. S.C. Sekar [(2009) 2 SCC 784] .]
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 41
23. Thus, from the above it is evident that under ordinary
circumstances, a third person, having no concern with the case at
hand, cannot claim to have any locus standi to raise any grievance
whatsoever. However, in exceptional circumstances as referred to
above, if the actual persons aggrieved, because of ignorance,
illiteracy, inarticulation or poverty, are unable to approach the
court, and a person, who has no personal agenda, or object, in
relation to which, he can grind his own axe, approaches the court,
then the court may examine the issue and in exceptional
circumstances, even if his bona fides are doubted, but the issue
raised by him, in the opinion of the court, requires consideration,
the court may proceed suo motu, in such respect.”
48. In Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P., [(2001) 4 SCC 734] , held thus;
“2. Generally speaking, a person shall have no locus standi to file a
writ petition if he is not personally affected by the impugned order
or his fundamental rights have neither been directly or substantially
invaded nor is there any imminent danger of such rights being
invaded or his acquired interests have been violated ignoring the
applicable rules. The relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is
based on the existence of a right in favour of the person invoking the
jurisdiction. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where
the writ applied for is a writ of habeas corpus or quo warranto or
filed in public interest. It is a matter of prudence, that the court
confines the exercise of writ jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong
or legal injuries are caused to a particular person or his
fundamental rights are violated, and not to entertain cases of
individual wrong or injury at the instance of third party where there
is an effective legal aid organisation which can take care of such
cases. Even in cases filed in public interest, the court can exercise
the writ jurisdiction at the instance of a third party only when it is
shown that the legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is
threatened and such person or determined class of persons is, by
reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or
economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court
for relief.”
49. In this regard, what the petitioners want by filing these writ petitions
is that, a challenge is made against the order passed by the Chancellor and
thereby the original decision taken by the Syndicate as evidenced by Ext.P9
is implemented. However, as far as Ext.P9 decision is concerned, the same is
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 42
passed by the Syndicate in exercise of statutory functions and powers, being
an adjudicating authority. The very same statute that confers such powers
upon the Syndicate, provided appellate powers upon the Chancellor, to
interfere with the order passed by the Syndicate. Thus, when an appellate
authority passes an order interfering with the order passed by the Syndicate,
the Syndicate is bound by such decision and under no circumstances the
Syndicate can have any grievance with respect to the order passed by the
superior authority. Once the order is passed by the Syndicate, it becomes a
functus officio and further developments in the matter including the appellate
order passed by the superior authority cannot be treated as something which
can create a grievance for the Syndicate in the matter. In Orissa
Administrative Tribunal Bar Assn. v. Union of India, [(2023) 18 SCC 1
104], an interpretation of the term ‘functus officio’ was laid down as ;
“ 104. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon (1997 Edn.) defines the term
functus officio as:
“A term applied to something which once has had a life and power, but
which has become of no virtue whatsoever … One who has fulfilled his office
or is out of office; an authority who has performed the act authorised so that
the authority is exhausted.”
105. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) defines the term as follows:
“Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the
purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority. … an instrument,
power, agency, etc. which has fulfilled the purpose of its creation, and is
therefore of no further virtue or effect.”
106. The doctrine of functus officio gives effect to the principle of finality.
Once a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority has rendered a decision, it is not
open to her to revisit the decision and amend, correct, clarify, or reverse it
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 43
(except in the exercise of the power of review, conferred by law). Once a
judicial or quasi-judicial decision attains finality, it is subject to change only
in proceedings before the appellate court.
50. It is to be noted that, neither the Syndicate nor its members have a
vested right to ensure that, the orders passed by the Syndicate are not
interfered with by a competent authority in exercise of statutory powers.
Therefore, under no circumstances, an interference by such a competent
authority can cause any grievance upon the Syndicate touching upon the
matters dealt with in the order. On the contrary, the Syndicate is under an
obligation as per statute 64 of Part III of Chapter 4 of Calicut University First
Statutes 1977, to implement the decision of the appellate authority.
Therefore, it is the duty of the Syndicate and its members to ensure that the
appellate order passed is implemented without any delay.
51. However, even while I am holding that, the Syndicate is not supposed
to challenge the order passed by the Chancellor, I am not intending to laid
down the said proposition as an absolute rule. This is because, when the
order sought to be challenged is patently illegal or was passed with evident
bias, by ignoring the basic principles of law or completely contrary to the
statutory provisions, in such cases, an exception has to be drawn to enable
the competent authority of the University which are bound to protect the
interests of the University as a whole, to raise a challenge against such
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 44
orders, by invoking the legal remedies available. Such exceptions are to be
provided, in view of the fact that, recent developments in the matter relating
to the administration of Universities in the Country, would clearly make out
the cases that are arising from conflict between the individual or political
ideologies of the person/persons holding such authorities in the Universities,
rather than disputes arising in the pursuit of attempting to ensure the welfare
of the University as whole. Therefore, in exceptional cases where the order
is patently illegal or passed in utter disregard to the legal principles and the
statutory provisions governing the field, thereby affecting the interests of the
University and the beneficiaries thereof, certainly it would be competent to
the authorities concerned to step in, to address such situations.
52. The above view taken by this Court is fortified by the observations
made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P.,
[(2001) 4 SCC 734] Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das [(2000)
2 SCC 465] and in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai's case (supra), where it was
observed that, the court should not interfere at the instance of a stranger
unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of
justice having an adverse impact on public interest.
53. In the light of the above, I have carefully scrutinized Ext.P10 order
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 45
passed by the Chancellor, to find out whether, the said order falls within the
category of exceptional circumstances referred to above. While considering
Ext.P10 order in that perspective, it can be seen that, the order was passed
by the Chancellor apparently after examining the records and it is a detailed
order supported by reasons. It is also evident from the records that, all the
affected parties were heard before passing the said order and there is no case
for any of the parties that there are violation of principles of natural justice.
There is also no dispute with regard to the fact that, Ext.P10 order was
passed by the Chancellor in exercise of the statutory powers vested upon him
as per the relevant provisions and there is no case that while passing the said
order, the Chancellor had gone beyond its jurisdiction. Being the appellate
authority, the Chancellor was competent to appreciate/reappreciate the
evidence and the factual circumstances relating thereto, for the purpose of
taking a decision on the issues. Thus, the order was passed in exercise of
powers admittedly, but the challenge is sought to be raised, on the reason that
the findings and observations are erroneous. Thus, the powers of the judicial
review of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India are called for
in these writ petitions.
54. When considering the scope of judicial review, particularly in the
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 46
matter of a departmental enquiry, it is to be held that, it is confined to the
evaluation of the decision making process and such process of judicial
review cannot be converted into an appellate proceedings ,as enunciated in
Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division, [AIR 1958 SC 398],
held thus;
“28. The High Court, in its several judgments and orders, has
scrutinized, in great detail, the orders passed by the Excise Authorities
under the Act. We have not thought it fit to examine the record or the
orders below in any detail, because, in our opinion, it is not the function
of the High Court or of this Court to do so. The jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that the judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies exercising quasi-
judicial powers, do not exercise their powers in excess of their statutory
jurisdiction, but correctly administer the law within the ambit of the
statute creating them or entrusting those functions to them. The Act has
created its own hierarchy of officers and Appellate authorities, as
indicated above, to administer the law. So long as those Authorities
function within the letter and spirit of the law, the High Court has no
concern with the manner in which those powers have been exercised. In
the instant cases, the High Court appears to have gone beyond the limits
of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.”
In other words, the scope of judicial review in such matters is only to correct
the manifest errors of law or procedure of the decision making process and it
is not intended to examine the correctness of the decision taken by the
authority concerned, by appreciating the factual aspects of the matter as laid
down in Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India[(2023) 11 SCC
159],Om Kumar v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 386] , State of A.P. v.
Sree Rama Rao, [1963 SCC OnLine SC 6], State of A.P. v. Chitra
Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557] , R.K. Jain v. Union of India [(1993) 4
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 47
SCC 119] , SBI v. Ram Lal Bhaskar [(2011) 10 SCC 249],Union of India
v. K.G. Soni [(2006) 6 SCC 794], High Court of Judicature at Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil, [(2000) 1 SCC 416] . In BC Chaturvedi v. Union of
India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 Para 12. ], it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court as follows:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment
and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was
held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are
complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or
evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When
the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its
power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where
the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation
of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based
on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere
with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make
it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal
is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to
reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR
718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 48
that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached
by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error
on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.”
55. After referring to the aforesaid observations, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India and Others [2020(9) SCC 471] ,
it was observed in paragraph 28 as follows:
“28. It is thus well settled that the constitutional courts while
exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume
the role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is
circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural
errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice. Put differently, judicial review is not analogous
to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate
authority. ”
56. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, held thus;
12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing
to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate
authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even
the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge
I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also
endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In
disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act
as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise
of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence.
The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a
fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 49
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit
the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
57. Similarly in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava [(2021) 2 SCC 612] , it
was observed as ;
“24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making
process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure
fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion.
The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held
against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent
with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory
rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is
based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as
no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the
conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by
the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent
error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a
writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of
judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a
matter of fact.
25. xxx xxxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxx
26. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx xxx xxxxx
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction
of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the
Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact
arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in
a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no
evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that
no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 50
arrived at those findings and so long as there is some
evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the
departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.”
58. While applying the aforesaid principles, in considering the challenge
against Ext.P10 order, I do not find any scope for interference on the same as
well. All the contentions raised by the petitioners while challenging the
impugned orders are touching upon the factual matters of the enquiry, borne
out from the documentary as well as oral evidence adduced by the parties
during the course of enquiry; such factual aspects cannot be looked into by
this Court for issuing a writ of Certiorari to quash an error of fact. This view
is fortified in Nagendra Nath Bora (Supra) ;
“24. It is clear from an examination of the authorities of this Court as
also of the courts in England, that one of the grounds on which the
jurisdiction of the High Court on certiorari may be invoked, is an
error of law apparent on the face of the record and not every error
either of law or fact, which can be corrected by a superior court, in
exercise of its statutory powers as a court of appeal or revision.
25. So far as we know, it has never been contended before this Court
that an error of fact, oven though apparent on the face of the record,
could be a ground for interference by the court exercising its writ
jurisdiction. No ruling was brought to our notice in support of the
proposition that the court exercising its powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution, could quash an order of an inferior tribunal, on the
ground of a mistake of fact apparent on the face of the record.
26. But the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the
expression ‘error of law apparent on the face of the record’. Is it every
error of law that can attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the High
Court, to quash the order impugned? This court, as observed above,
has settled the law in this respect by laying down that in
orderto attract such jurisdiction, it is essential that the error should be
something more than a mere error of law; that it must be one which is
manifest on the face of the record. In this respect, the law in India and
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 51
the law in England, are, therefore, the same. It is also clear, on an
examination of all the authorities of this Court and of those in
England, referred to above, as also those considered in the several
judgments of this Court, that the common-law writ, now called order
of certiorari, which was also adopted by our Constitution, is not meant
to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right
of appeal. Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the
record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or
has not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of
the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical
errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this
extraordinary jurisdiction.”
59. Of course, the learned counsel for the petitioners and the
Standing Counsel for the University relied on the observations made by the
Division bench of this court in Ext P6 and P7 judgment/order with regard to
th
the involvement of the 6 respondent. However, the said observations cannot
be relied on to substantiate the challenge against the impugned order, in view
of the fact that, those were only prima facie opinion expressed by this court,
at the stage of pre-enquiry. As far as the order passed by the Chancellor is
concerned, the same was passed, after completing the enquiry, in which, all
the materials relevant, are brought out and the decision was taken, after
examining those aspects, whereas, the observations in Ext P6 and P7 are
th
based on the allegations raised against the 6 respondent, in the notices
issued as part of the enquiry.
60. Thus, in the light of the legal principles discussed above, it is not
possible for this Court to consider such a challenge under Article 226 of the
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 52
Constitution of India. Thus, the only conclusion possible is that, since there
is no illegality in the procedure adopted by the Chancellor in the decision
making process while passing Ext.P10 order, it is not for this Court to sit in
appeal against the factual decisions taken by the said authority. Therefore, I
find that, the order passed by the Chancellor in this case is not something that
falls in the exceptional circumstances referred to above, so as to hold that, a
challenge can be entertained against the same at the instance of one of the
components of body corporate of the Calicut University as envisaged in
Section 3 of the Calicut University Act, 1975.
61. In WP(C) No.40998/2024, several questions have been raised by
the petitioner with regard to the competence of the Vice Chancellor to
interfere with the decision taken by the Syndicate by nullifying the
University orders passed based on such decision on Syndicate. Although,
prima facie I find that such interference at the instance of the Vice
Chancellor was beyond his powers, as he is only one of the members of the
Syndicate, without any specific power to overrule the Syndicate, I do not
intend to go deeper in the said question. This is in view of the fact that, I
have already held that the Syndicate /University is not competent to
challenge the order passed by the Chancellor, particularly in a disciplinary
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 53
proceedings, except under the exceptional circumstances referred to above.
Even in WP(C) No.40998/2024, although the challenge is only against the
order passed by the Vice Chancellor, the ultimate object is to ensure that, the
order passed by the Chancellor is challenged by invoking the legal remedies
available. Therefore, in the light of the finding that, no challenge against the
order of Chancellor is sustainable, I do not find any practical purpose in
answering the questions regarding the powers of the Vice Chancellor on the
above issues, as the same has become mere academical.
62. However, even while arriving at the above conclusion, this court
is of the view that, the case records reveal a strong case of abuse of power
that resulted in huge loss to the University. The huge difference in the
amounts spent by the University for consumables in the work awarded in
2013 and the present bid, is a factor which clearly pointing out to this. On
carefully examining the contentions of the parties, it can be seen that, they
are blaming each other for the loss, although it appears that, as regard as the
loss sustained, there is no dispute. It is discernible from the records that a
Vigilance investigation has been initiated and it is pending. Since there are
apparent irregularities in the amount disbursed, it is in the interest of the
University that a proper investigation is carried out, culprits behind the same
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 54
are identified and punished adequately. It should also to be ensured that the
st
loss sustained by the University is to be recovered. Therefore, the 1
respondent and the University shall ensure that a proper investigation in the
matter is carried out by the Vigilance Department, and appropriate measures
to recover the amount and to punish the culprits, are taken.
In such circumstances, I do not find any scope for interference in the
orders impugned and accordingly these writ petitions are dismissed, with the
above observations and directions.
Sd/-
ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A.
JUDGE
pkk
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 55
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 31672 OF 2024
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE TENDER NOTICE DATED
04.06.2013 ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 17.07.2013
ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY
ACCORDING SANCTION FOR ENTERING INTO RATE
CONTRACT WITH M/S.NET LINKS BUSINESS
CONSULTANTS INDIA (P) LIMITED, COCHIN
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE RE-TENDER NOTICE DATED
19.09.2014 ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 29.12.2014
ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY
ACCORDING SANCTION FOR ENTERING INTO RATE
CONTRACT WITH M/S. AVIKA TECHNOLOGIES
PRIVATE LIMITED, CHENNAI
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2021
IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO.10366/2021 OF THIS
HON’BLE COURT
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 07.07.2022
IN WRIT APPEAL NO.130/2022 OF THIS HON’BLE
COURT
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 03.08.2022 IN
R.P. NO.692/2022 IN WRIT APPEAL NO.130/2022
OF THIS HON’BLE COURT
EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 10.08.2022 OF
ENQUIRY COMMITTEE OF THE UNIVERSITY
(WITHOUT EXHIBITS)
EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF U.O.NO.17381/2022/ADMN DATED
13.09.2022 ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.06.2024
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT CHANCELLOR
EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF U.O.NO.11134/2024/ADMN DATED
12.07.2024 ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT-R6(B) TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE NO.12831/PURCHASE-
ASST-A1/2013/CU DATED 08.08.2014 ISSUED BY
THE UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT-R6(A) TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN KOSHY V.
2025:KER:99000
WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 56
CHANCELLOR REPORTED IN 1979 KLT 555
EXHIBIT-R6(C) TRUE COPY OF THE NOTE FILE BEARING FILE NO.
12831/PURCHASE-ASST-A1/2013/CU DATED NIL
PERTAINING TO THE AWARDING OF THE TENDER
EXHIBIT-R6(D) TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTION OF THE
REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL DATED
29.10.2019
EXHIBIT-R6(F) TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 15.5.2020
ISSUED BY THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL
EXHIBIT-R6(H) TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED
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EXHIBIT-R6(I) TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 3.12.2019
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EXHIBIT-R6(J) TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY NO. 2386/20/USIC-
ASST-2/2019/ADMN DATED 28.12.2019 ISSUED BY
THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT-R6(O) TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED
11.9.2024 ISSUED BY THE VICE CHANCELLOR
EXHIBIT-R6(Q) TRUE COPY OF THE UNIVERSITY ORDER BEARING
UO NO. 15051/2024/ADMN DATED 3.10.2024
EXHIBIT-R6(G) TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY NO.41737/FIN-
AUDIT2/2018/ FIN DATED 29.07.2020 ISSUED BY
THE UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT-R6(K) TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 8.6.2020
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EXHIBIT-R6(L) TRUE COPY OF THE ARGUMENT NOTE DATED
26.7.2022
EXHIBIT-R6(E) TRUE COPYOF THE REPLY DATED 15.2.2020
ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY.
EXHIBIT-R6(M) TRUE COPY OF THE REQUEST DATED 31.8.2022
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EXHIBIT-R6(N) TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL DATED 23.9.2022
FILED BEFORE THE HONOURABLE CHANCELLOR.
EXHIBIT-R6(P) TRUE COPY OF THE UNIVERSITY ORDER UO NO.
14433/2024/ADMN DATED 24.9.2024.
EXHIBIT R4(B) A TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT DATED 18-03-
2015
EXHIBIT R4(C) A TRUE COPY OF THE REVIEW PETITION NO. 692
OF 2022 FILED BY THE 6TH RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT R4(D) A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN REVIEW
PETITION NO 692 OF 2022 DATED 03-08-2022
EXHIBIT R4(E) A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF AUDIT
REPORT
EXHIBIT R4(F) A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER U.O.NO.
17588/2019/ADMN DATED 17/12/2019 OF THE
2025:KER:99000
WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 57
REGISTRAR INTIMATING THE SANCTION TO
REGISTER THE CASE
EXHIBIT R4(A) THE TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT HAVING UO
NO.12408/2014 ADMN DATED 29/12/2014
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 58
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 40998 OF 2024
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 10.08.2022 OF
ENQUIRY COMMITTEE OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY (WITHOUT EXHIBITS)
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF U.O.NO.17381/2022/ADMN DATED
13.09.2022 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.06.2024
ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT CHANCELLOR
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF U.O.NO.11134/2024/ADMN DATED
12.07.2024 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF U.O.NO.14433/2024/ADMN DATED
24.09.2024 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 13.09.2024 OF
THIS HON’BLE COURT IN WRIT PETITION (C)
NO.31672/2024
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED
11.09.2024 OF THE 4TH RESPONDENT VICE
CHANCELLOR
EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF U.O.NO.15051/2024/ADMN DATED
03.10.2024 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT R4(A) A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 12/07/2024
RECEIVED FROM ONE OF THE SYNDICATE MEMBER,
DR RASHEED AHAMMED,
EXHIBIT R4(B) A TRUE COPY OF THE FILE NOTE DATED
12/07/2024 OF THE 4TH RESPONDENT DIRECTING
TO KEEP IN ABEYANCE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN
THE MATTER
EXHIBIT R4(C) A TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING
OF THE SYNDICATE DATED 31/08/2024
EXHIBIT R4(D) A TRUE COPY OF THE MAIL DATED 11/09/2024
SENDING EXHIBIT P7 TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE
UNIVERSITY
EXHIBIT R4(E) A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 11/09/2024
SENDING EXHIBIT P7 TO THE OFFICE OF THE 2ND
RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT R4(F) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTE DATED 13/09/2024
ISSUED BY THIS RESPONDENT TO THE REGISTRAR
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WP(C) No.31672 & 40998 of 2024 59
OF THE UNIVERSITY, DIRECTING TO REPORT THE
MATTER URGENTLY REGARDING WP(C) NO.
31672/2024
EXHIBIT R4(G) A TRUE COPY OF THE MAIL DATED 24/09/2024
FROM THE REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY WITH
RELEVANT ATTACHMENT, TO THE STANDING
COUNSEL,