B.S.N.L. vs. PRAMOD V. SAWANT

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 19-08-2019

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NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 503 OF 2010 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED AND OTHERS ..........APPELLANT(S) VERSUS PRAMOD V. SAWANT  AND ANOTHER ......RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J.   The   appellants   are   aggrieved   by   the   dismissal   of their   writ   application,   rejecting   the   challenge   to   their prosecution for lack of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as “Cr.P.C.”). 2. A  criminal   complaint  case  no.14/S/2003  was  filed by Signature Not Verified respondent   no.1   before   the   Additional   Chief   Metropolitan Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Date: 2019.08.19 14:27:04 IST Reason: Magistrate under clauses 26(2)(3) and 39 read with clause 27 1 of the Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1981 read with Section 3(3) of Maharashtra Private   Security   Guards   (Regulation   of   Employment   and Welfare)   Act,   1981   (hereinafter   called   as   “the   Act”).     The complaint   stated   that   the   appellant   –   Corporation   was registered with the respondent ­ Security Guards Board. The Corporation was under obligation to engage security guards registered with respondent no.1 only.   An inspection revealed engagement   of   unregistered   guards.     The   Magistrate   issued process against the appellants in 2003.  The appellants prayed for recall of the process, which was rejected on 06.04.2004. A criminal revision preferred against the rejection was allowed on 07.09.2004.   The matter was remanded for reconsideration, which was again rejected by the Magistrate on 07.06.2005. The writ petition preferred by the appellants against the issuance of process was also rejected on 22.12.2006.   The fresh revision against order dated 07.06.2005 assailed the prosecution on grounds of being barred by limitation, that the Act was not applicable   to   the   appellants’   establishment,   and   that   the 2 issuance   of   process   was   bad   in   absence   of   sanction   under Section   197,   Cr.P.C.,   appellants   nos.2   to   4   being   ‘public servants’.   The revision application was again dismissed on 05.09.2007   leading   to   the   impugned   order   assailed   in   the present appeal.   In the writ petition, the appellants gave up their challenge on grounds of limitation and inapplicability of the Act which has therefore attained finality. The challenge in the writ petition is confined to the question of sanction only. 3. The High Court relying on  Mohd. Hadi Raja vs. State of , (1998) 5 SCC 91, held that the protection Bihar and another of sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. was not available to officers of Government companies or public undertakings even if it fell within the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution. 4. Shri R.D. Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, submitted that appellants nos.2 to 4 fell   within   the   definition   of   ‘public   servant’   as   they   were discharging   public   duty   in   pursuance   of   the   policy   of   the Central Government.   Appellants nos.2 to 4, belonged to the 3 Central   Civil   Service   –   Class­I,   having   been   appointed   by Hon’ble the President of India to the Indian Telecommunication Service, were removable by orders of the President only. The fact   that   they   may   have   been   sent   on   deputation   to   the appellant Corporation is inconsequential mandating sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. before their prosecution.  The High Court   erred   in   distinguishing   Dr.   Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela vs. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jah and another , (1990) 4 SCC 169, considering that the appellants nos.2 to 4 were removable by orders of the President of India only. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents acknowledged the original appointment of appellants nos.2 to 4 in Central Civil Services Class­1. It was however submitted that the appellant Corporation was established on 01.10.2000.   The appellants nos.2 to 4 were sent on deputation initially.  Option was given for absorption in the appellant Corporation. Appellants nos.3 and 4 opted for absorption and thus became employees of the appellant Corporation with effect from 01.10.2000 and ceased 4 to be government employees in the Central Civil Services Class­ 1.  Appellant no.2 appears to have retired from the appellant Corporation while on deputation, but his status is not clear.  6. The appeal raises a short and pure question of law for consideration with regard to the protection under Section 197, Cr.P.C.   available   to   employees   of   public   sector   corporation claiming the status of a ‘public servant’.  The relevant extract of Section 197, Cr.P.C., reads as follows:
“197. Prosecution of Judges and public
servants.
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or<br>Magistrate or a public servant not removable<br>from his office save by or with the sanction of<br>the Government is accused of any offence<br>alleged to have been committed by him while<br>acting or purporting to act in the discharge of<br>his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance<br>of such offence except with the previous<br>sanction­
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or,<br>as the case may be, was at the time of<br>commission of the alleged offence employed, in<br>connection with the affairs of the Union, of the<br>Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or,<br>as the case may be, was at the time of<br>commission of the alleged offence employed, in<br>connection with the affairs of a State, of the<br>State Government.”
5 The term ‘public servant’ has been defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, the relevant portion for the present case reads as follows: “21.   “Public   servant”.—The   words   “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following; namely:   — xxxxxxx Twelfth —Every person— (a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated   by   fees   or   commission   for   the performance   of   any   public   duty   by   the Government; (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial   or   State   Act   or   a   Government company   as   defined   in   section   617   of   the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).” 7. At the very outset, we are of the opinion that the question for grant of sanction for prosecution under Section 197, Cr.P.C. on the ground of being a ‘public servant’ is not available to appellants nos.3 and 4 on account of their ceasing to be employees of the Indian   Telecommunication   Service   after   their   absorption   in   the appellant Corporation on 01.10.2000, prior to the complaint.  The fact that their past service may count for purposes of pension in 6 case   of   removal   or   dismissal   by   the   Corporation   or   that administrative approval of the concerned ministry may be formally required before any punitive action will not confer on them the status of ‘public servant’ under the Cr.P.C.  8. The necessary facts with regard to status of appellant no.2 are not very clear from the pleadings.   It appears that at the relevant point of time before superannuation he was on deputation to the Corporation. The allegations related to discharge of his duties in the appellant   Corporation.   We   are   therefore   required   to   consider   if sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. was a prerequisite with regard to him in a status as a ‘public servant’.  The question is no more res   integra   and   stands   authoritatively   settled   that   employees   of public sector corporations are not entitled to the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. as ‘public servant’.  9. In   (supra), the court was considering the Mohd. Hadi Raja   need   for   sanction   for   prosecuting   officers   of   public   sector undertakings or government companies falling within the definition of   ‘State’   under   Article   12   of   the   Constitution   and   who   were removable from office save by sanction of the Government.  Holding 7 that protection  under   Section  197,   Cr.P.C.  was   not  available to such persons, it was held as follows: “27.  Therefore,   in   our   considered   opinion,   the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   is   not applicable   to   the   officers   of   government companies or the public undertakings even when such public undertakings are “State” within the meaning   of   Article   12   of   the   Constitution   on account   of   deep   and   pervasive   control   of   the Government….” 10. In   ,   (2005)   13   SCC   213, N.K.   Sharma   vs.   Abhimanyu rejecting the challenge for requirement of sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C., it was observed as follows: “13. Admittedly the salary of the appellant is not paid by the Government. He at the relevant time was not in the service of the State. Prosecution against an officer of a government company or a public   undertaking   would   not   require   any sanction under Section 197 CrPC.” 11.  The question again fell for consideration in  Chandan Kumar Basu vs. State of Bihar , (2014) 13 SCC 70, involving an officer of an   Indian   Administrative   Service   serving   on   deputation   as Administrator­cum­Managing   Director   of   Bihar   State   Housing 8 Cooperative Federation Ltd.   Elucidating the requirements to be fulfilled for the applicability of the protection under Section 197, Cr.P.C., it was observed as follows: “8. A reading of the provisions of Section 197(1) of the Code reveals that there are three mandatory requirements   under   Section   197(1)   of   the   Code, namely: ( a ) that the accused is a public servant; ( b ) that the public servant can be removed from the post by or with the sanction either of the Central or the State Government, as the case may be; ( c ) the act(s) giving rise to the alleged offence had been committed by the public servant in the actual or purported discharge of his official duties.” 12. We are of the opinion that sufficient evidence is not available on record at this stage with regard to the status of appellant no.2 in all aspects for us to unhesitatingly hold that the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C shall be available to him. These are matters to be considered by the Magistrate on basis of the evidence that may be placed before him during the course of trial. 9 13. Mohd. Hadi Raja  (supra) has been noticed more recently in Punjab State Warehousing Corporation vs. Bhushan Chander and another , (2016) 13 SCC 44, holding that the High Court erred in   providing   the   protection   under   Section   197,   Cr.P.C.   to   an employee of the appellant Corporation which was fully government owned   and   financed   by   the   State   Government,   and   therefore, respondent fell within the definition of a ‘public servant’.   Setting aside the orders of the High Court, this Court observed as follows: “23.  In   Mohd.   Hadi   Raja   v.   State   of   Bihar   the question   arose   whether   Section   197   CrPC   was applicable   for   prosecuting   officers   of   the   public sector undertakings or the government companies which can be treated as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Court referred   to   Section   197   CrPC,   noted   the submissions   and   eventually   held   that   the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 CrPC is not applicable to the officers of government companies or the public undertakings even when such   public   undertakings   are   “State”   within   the meaning   of   Article   12   of   the   Constitution   on account   of   deep   and   pervasive   control   of   the Government. 24.  The   High   Court   has   not   accepted   the submission of the Corporation in this regard. We are constrained to note that the decision in  Mohd. Hadi Raja   has been referred to in the grounds in this appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest 10 that the said decision was cited before the High Court…”  14. Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela  (supra),   on which the appellants have placed reliance, is completely distinguishable on its own facts. The  appellant was  employed in  the  Municipal Corporation as a Laboratory Officer.   He was only entrusted with discharge of duties as a public analyst. His remuneration was not paid by the Government, but by the Corporation.  The observations in Paragraph 5 have to be understood in that context: “5.  Section 197, CrPC clearly intends to draw a line between public servants and to provide that only in the case of the higher ranks should the sanction of the government to their prosecution be necessary. While a public servant holding an office of the kind mentioned in the section is as such public servant appointed to another office, his   official   acts   in   connection   with   the   latter office  will also relate  to the  former  office.  The words   “removable   from   office”   occurring   in Section 197 signify removal from the office he is holding. The authority mentioned in the section is the authority under which the officer is serving and competent to terminate his services. If the accused is under the service and pay of the local authority,   the   appointment   to   an   office   for exercising functions under a particular statute will not alter his status as an employee of the local authority.” 11 15. It   is   therefore,   held   that   the   question   of   sanction   under Section 197, Cr.P.C. with regard to appellants nos.3 and 4 treating them to be ‘public servant’ simply does not arise because of their absorption   in   the   Corporation.   With   regard   to   appellant   no.2, considering   his   status   as   on   deputation   to   the   appellant Corporation   at   the   relevant   point   of   time   and   in   absence   of necessary   evidence   with   regard   to   his   status   in   the   appellant Corporation throughout the litigation being ambiguous, we leave that question open for consideration in the trial after necessary evidence is available. 16. The trial has turned out to be stillborn since 2003, with the appellants   filing   one   application   after   another.     We   are   of   the considered   opinion   that   the   trial   needs   to   be   expedited   and concluded at an early date. It is ordered accordingly. The Magistrate shall endeavour to conclude the trial within a period of one year. The parties are directed to cooperate for its early disposal. 12 17.  The appeal is dismissed.  ………………………………….J.   (NAVIN SINHA) ……….………………………..J.      (A.S. BOPANNA)   New Delhi, August 19, 2019. 13